Tehere’s never been any impasse except in yellow indian press.
Its been over three years now since Dassault entered exclusive negotiations with the Indian MoD. For all the complexity of the deal, it shouldn’t have taken half as long after the effort invested at earlier stages, so there’s good reason to believe the ‘yellow Indian press’. Except that the main point of contention is likely to be the deal’s total cost rather the word of the contract.
For this reason and others I am extremely skeptical of the Su-30 having an operating cost advantage over a Rafale. The Rafale may be an extremely expensive aircraft to operate, but the Su-30MKI should be in a completely different class.
(per wiki)
The Rafale has ~34k pounds of thrust in AB.
The Su-30MKI has ~55kThe Su-30MKI’s engine has only 1000 hours operating time between overhaul, its thrust vectoring nozzle requires overhaul every 500 hours, and the total engine life is only 3000 hours.
You also have to factor in the difference in costs of the engine. The Su-30MKI might go through three sets of engines over its lifetime but if they cost a third as much, it remains a cost neutral prospect.
The Su-30MKI airframe itself requires an overhaul every ~1500 hours of flight and is only designed to reach 6,000 hours total.
6,000hrs is pretty standard for a 4th gen airframe. Three overhauls over its lifetime isn’t too bad.
The Sukhoi is going to burn far more fuel. An operator would need to buy more airframes to get the same hours flown per year due to reduced availability. An operator would need to buy more engines due to reduced availability and lifespan, etc.
They burn more fuel yes and so ordinarily you’d expect a heavies like the Su-30 & F-15 to cost more to operate. But what’s more relevant here is the lifecycle cost wherein you have to add the acquisition costs associated with the Rafale as well as the industrial aspect i.e. domestication of the type.
Bottom line, if the Rafale can’t handily beat the Su-30MKI’s operating costs then something has gone terribly wrong at Dassault.
Actually the critical fact here is that the Su-30MKI’s support infrastructure is a sunk cost. It isn’t the same as comparing with a Rafale serving in the AdlA. The entire capital costs associated with the Rafale support will have to be measured the against a (relatively) cheap expansion of existing infrastructure for the MKI. Also add in savings achieved through logistical commonality in spares if they stick with the Su-30.
An 18,000,000 overhaul gets you another 1500 hours of flight time. ($12k per hour, and that just the overhaul, not fuel, not engines, or other normal operating costs)
600 modifications. The cost likely includes upgrades and engine replacement.
The Mirage 2000 costs about twice as much in terms of revenue expenditure (spares and maintenance) as the Su-30MKI. Link 1 Link 2 A less than encouraging statistic suggesting that spares and consumables sourced from France tend to be pricey.
When was the last fixed wing combat aircraft that India purchased from the US?
World War 2 era?
Apart from a few recent purchases of US transports/patrol/helicopters, India has typically steered well clear of US types.
I don’t think the sanctions placed before on India will be so easily forgotten.
It’s official: US overtakes all to become India’s largest defence supplier (ahead of Russia, Israel, France, UK)
India becomes biggest foreign buyer of US weapons (ahead of Saudi Arabia, South Korea, UK, Turkey)
Naturally, I might be wrong, but from Indias point of view, placing a large important order with such a history would not be the smartest move, considering the potential tensions in the region.
China.
Any clue about that? (Apart from Ajai Shukla deliriums). REmind me how long last an AL-31 engine btw?
– There was a breakdown of the numbers of unserviceable aircraft and over a third of those were queued up for routine overhaul IIRC with no facility available. The article’s probably there on the IAF thread.
– The Al-31’s lifecycle is probably a third of equivalent western engines. That doesn’t mean the aircraft’s operational availability will be a third as well. You stock up engines beforehand and the AL-31s already manufactured in-house, so that’s another plus.
Delete perhaps there are several magnitude of order between Rafale ans MKI regarding RCS.
Perhaps you should read the post again. The reference was to a generic medium fighter and a generic heavy fighter and the issue was determining the objective of the MMRCA program (unlike weight there was no ‘reduced RCS’ qualifying condition).
Perhaps, but so far this is only based on hear says. Besides the additional context of full TOT that explode the budget is not an IAF demand.
– No hearsay involved. Its just plain logic. The only practical difference between a medium fighter and a heavy fighter is operating cost (and perhaps RCS). The advantage of lower cost vis a vis the Su-30MKI is already all but lost.
– ToT may not have been an IAF priority but it can’t be omitted from the contract at this point. So for better or worse, the current price is what it is.
I was referring to selection of another plane without any tender nor IAF involvement, which would be even worse than the Swiss saga and possibly not allowed under current law.
– Additional Sukhois can be ordered off-the-shelf from Rosoboronexport without any particular hassle.
– The Su-30MKI production at HAL can be extended beyond 2018 without any problems.
– An early order of off-the-shelf PAK FAs can be placed without a competitive tender.
– Even the F-35 could be ordered in an FMS sale and justified by the MoD as a single vendor purchase justified by operational necessity.
(It is however true that EF & SH don’t have much of a chance.)
Yes, the new government is certainly in a difficult position, now that the true amount of industrial investments required to meet full TOT have been valued. It would not be surprising they were massively underestimated by prior government to pass the motion. I do not think they have any latitude in relaxing any demands to cut price as they would be sued by the competitors, So only option is to let the negotiations go through and ultimately acknowledge it is too expensive or preferably that the L1 contractor failed to comply on either guarantee or Life Cycle.
Agreed. 🙂
er, if you take just a price, maybe, but if you look at the availability and the total hours flown, hardly… when half of your fleet sits on the ground, the word “effective” seems quite misplaced
India could buy two Su-30MKIs for every Rafale. Possibly even more. And they’ll retain a far greater part of that capital within the country since the Su-30MKI production has already been domesticated to a large extent.
Also, availability is no longer 50%, its on its way up with the local repair and overhaul facility now operational (60% now IIRC). They could probably improve that further while also upgrading the aircraft.
depends what the price was about. aircraft only, ToT, offsets… if DA came just with an inflated price, methinks there wouldn’t even be negotiations
All news reports, articles, opinion pieces published in the last five years suggest that the budget sanctioned was all inclusive. The Dassault bid had plenty of items unpriced and it seems the MoD didn’t realize the true cost of the deal until well after the Rafale had been declared L1.
Not totally accurate, MMRCA is about procuring a medium plane to meet certain needs which the Su 30,hardly medium , did not fulfill to the point of not even bothering to enter that competition. The missed opportunity for license build mirage, led to the governmental rigid and strict MMRCA competition with the consequences of further delaying the needed planes to see service. So as stated by the IAF air marshal, substituting MMRCA with Su-30 now won’t do. Not to mention how poorly it would reflect that the mindef choose another plane out of the blue after the painful and time consuming selection process imposed by the government on the IAF.
– The only reason an operator would specifically call for a ‘medium’ aircraft instead of inviting all and sundry to the competition, was that the aircraft class would be cheaper to operate than the ‘heavy’ class of existing fighters (otherwise why exclude the F-15E). Unfortunately as things stand, the Rafale’s life cycle cost is far in excess of the Su-30MKIs, thus eroding the rationale behind the ‘medium’ requirement. Going by recent reports the Su-30MKI is pretty cost effective even vis a vis the Mirage 2000.
– Opting for an alternative wouldn’t be out-of-the-blue. Behind the scenes I’d imagine both the IAF and Dassault are aware of the true state of play (whatever it might be) and would be prepared to act accordingly.
So, yes mindef and government can cut budget. IAF appear to be acutely aware of the risk, given a top officer felt compelled to express concerns that contradict his mindef.Not something you see everyday.
Its not so much ‘cut’ the budget as it is refuse to pay (far) more than was originally budgeted for the contract.
Anyway, my personal opinion, is current government ,given the nature of their communication is working on finding most gracious way out of the deal. Hope to be wrong, and that they are only in a hard bargaining stance with Dassault. But that IAF officer making such statement, is no good sign, rather it indicates concern on ever getting the elusive budget for the planes they need.
I have a similar reading. The IAF’s public statements on the matter are practically speaking, a mode of lobbying, which it would have preferred to avoid if it were confident about the deal going through. All the same, the result could still surprise both of us.
As for the statement of no plan B, you should read it as : no matter what the plane name is, the MMRCA was conducted for procuring a certain type of planes with given capabilities. It can not be substituted by some other plane with other characteristics .
The MMRCA originated in a plan to license-build Mirages. The focus was on diversifying sources of procurement and getting a ‘medium’ aircraft (with the reasoning that it would be cheaper to operate than the ‘heavy’ Su-30). The requirements were not written around the Rafale.
With the Rafale turning out to be hugely more expensive than the Su-30MKI, there are no savings expected from through its ‘medium’ designation. The IAF (like the Swiss and Brazilian govts) before it might prefer the Rafale but it’ll make do with the Su-30s if that’s what the MoD decides. That can be supplemented perhaps with an early order of PAK FAs (or even F-35s) if so required.
A politically correct way for an IAF officer to tell his mindef :do not use the current level of noise and confusion as an excuse to negate military requirements and impose some ill deal instead. Justifiably IAF have painfully at the expense of severe delay complied with the procurement selection process. So they will appreciate moderately to say the least ,to get something else in the end after so long, for unclear reasons.
The politically correct response from the MoD will likely be a warning about other more painful cutbacks elsewhere, if the deal at its current price-point is sanctioned.
Sure, they may order more SU-30s, but these are being manufactured very slowly it seems.
16 per year. Can also be supplemented with off-the-shelf deliveries from Russia.
No, IAF will still be flying MIG 21S/27s post 2020, almost definately if Rafale deal not signed and they decide to wait for LCA MK II, that or they will be reduced in size to around the same size as the PAF. Lets also remember the Jaguars are getting very old too.
15 squadrons of Su-30MKIs on order. 12 squadrons of Mirages, MiG-29s and Jaguars (link). 2 squadrons of Tejas Mk1s.
That’s 29 squadrons without counting additional orders for MMRCA or alternatives. Hardly the same size as the PAF (which is 15 squadrons as per your post).
The last Jaguar was delivered around 2006 I think. With the new upgrades and armaments sanctioned for it(link).
, its always been intended to serve past 2025.
I would not rely in Wiki and just adding up numbers to get an idea of strength. Air Forces do not work like that.
Many Mirages were cannabalised for spares, many F-7s are in overhaul so rest are used to make up front line numbers, attrition has also taken its toll, and some are kept in storage.
The number of aircraft operational is a good measure of an air force’s strength. If as you say some aircraft are grounded, non-operational, then the source itself is incorrect and should be amended. You should probably amend the Wiki entry yourself.
Russia and China used the Regiment system, which is very similar to squadrons in everything but name.
25 to 30 aircraft per regiment I believe. On the other hand, NATO naval squadrons are usually 12 aircraft strong. Point being, aircraft numbers are often a better measure of comparison than squadron numbers (though given differing combat potentials of various types, that too is insufficient by itself).
Yes, MIGS will be retired and replaced with nothing (certianly not Rafale or LCA) by 2017.
According to the defence minister, if the Rafale deals falls through, they’ll order more Su-30MKIs (i.e in addition to the 60 odd under production slated for delivery to 2018).
350 is the number of airframes of Mirage and F-7 over the years, and certianly not the number in service. You are deliberatley being dishonest in the argument you are putting across or you know little of how air forces work. It is far more accurate to go by squadrons.
The Chinese and Russians seem to manage without a squadron-sized building block.
PAF has 15 fighter squadrons. Of these, 4 are F-16, 3 JF-17 and the rest F-7/Mirage. Leaving 7 relatively modern squadrons and 7 older equipped squadrons. PAF will probably want to keep 2 Mirage ROSE squadrons in service and its 2 F-7PG squadrons (which as you pointed out are relativley new airframes and their Grifo/AIM-9L/M capability makes them handy point defence/lead in trainers).
That’s precisely my point, the Mirage & F-7 will likely serve in the PAF longer than the MiG-21/27s in the IAF.
I really dont know how you came to the conclusion of 2035. Having 350 F-7s/Mirages and 80 F-16s and 60 JF-17s would give PAF a squadron strength of nearly 27 squadrons!!!!!!!
Added up the numbers on Wikipedia. Assumed they were grouped in larger squadrons.
Apologies, meant MIG-27, not MIG-23.
According to news reports all MiG-27s are to be retired by 2017.
Well they recently retired a CCS F-7 squadron replaced by JF-17s just a month back, considering more JF-17s will be rolling of the production line you can easily see all F-7s being replaced very soon. Interesting point about the PGs. Talk of keeping them for lead in fighter training and aggressor training.
Irrespective, IAF will still be flying ANCIENT helicopters and planes in terms of airframe age. The accident rate this year alone is probably a good indication of things to come.
The PAF has almost 350 F-7s and Mirages. At the JF-17s current production (16 units/yr), it will take about 20 years to replace the fleet, taking the last F-7 retirement to 2035.
Additionally this means the retirement of F-7s and Mirages. Due to the LCA and Rafale fiascos there is more then healthy chance Indian pilots will still be flying MIG-21s, MIG-23s and Jaguars 10 years from now. If that is not a reality check I dont know what is.
That would be interesting, considering that the MiG-23 was retired several years ago. You think the PAF will retire the F-7 before the IAF retires its last MiG given that the last F-7PG was delivered in 2002?
LOL
Comparing apples and oranges will not make you very clever, you know… Tejas are likely to cost $10 million more per copy (that’s still cheap), whereas the Mirage 2000 upgrade also include training, tools, ground support stuff, ammunitions, etc.
The Mirage upgrade includes tooling & training. It does NOT include ammunition. That was a separate and very pricey contract (450 MICAs for $1.23bn).
‘Apples to oranges’ would have been a appropriate remark if a cheap Tejas upgrade was being compared with an expensive off-the-shelf Mirage purchase. Not the other way round. The fact that even adding $10 million to the Tejas’ flyaway cost leaves it cheaper than a Mirage upgrade, suggests a huge disparity in the costs of the two aircraft. And following from that, one of them offers far better value than the other (though to be fair cost effectiveness has never been the Mirage’s USP).
It doesn’t equate – hence my almost.
Tejas is cheaper, but also not as good in most (all?) performance parameters.
‘Cheaper’ is a huge understatement. Tejas’ flyaway cost is $26 million (2014). Contrast that with the cost to merely upgrade the Mirage 2000C – $45 million (2012).
(I’d estimate the flyaway cost of a new build Mirage 2000-5 at current day prices at upwards of $60 million.)
Egypt’s ‘full stocks’ of combat aircraft include a large number which are overdue for retirement, none which have an active radar missile integrated, & of those which aren’t over-age, only a handful which they can put anything other than short-range PGMs & SARH AAMs on – & I think even that handful would need modernisation to use modern weapons.
The explanation given by the Egyptians for the rush was rising instability in Libya. Well there’s no real air threat from that quarter and air defences are predominantly (entirely?) short range. For the air-to-air role they’d have had the option of MiG-29s as well as JF-17s (in addition to second hand Mirages). It does seem like a prestige buy. Not the most prudent of investments at this time but if they can rustle up the cash, that’s that.