An update on the F-22 hypoxia problems: investigators are now focusing on whether physiological support for the pilot is effected by the arctic survival suit (Elmendorf-Richardson, Alaska) and the anti-exposure suit (Langley), as these are where the majority of the incidents have occurred:

http://www.aviationweek.com/Article.aspx?id=/article-xml/awx_05_02_2012_p0-453509.xml&p=2

Some new pics of Su-30MKM:

http://www.militaryparitet.com/perevodnie/data/ic_perevodnie/2851/

IIRC, they’ve narrowed down their investigations to carbon monoxide in the cockpit due to the engine exhaust somehow getting into the OBOGS, possibly via the bleed air intakes- and very low levels of carbon monoxide can have serious effects (hypoxia). The solution may be as simple as starting-up the aircraft in the open air as opposed to inside the hanger, either way the cause has been difficult to pin down.

Although, the OBOGS was not held ultimately responsible for Capt. J. Haney’s fatal crash in November 2010, it is believed he was incapacitated due to hypoxia and was unable to pull the ring for the emergency oxygen generator located to the lower side of the seat. This was probably due to the bulky and cumbersome nature of his arctic survival suit. As he struggled to find the ring-pull, his F-22 entered a steep, inverted and high speed dive (CFIT?), either way that’s clearly an ergonomic design flaw.

What the hell are you talking about?

The Yasen, in today’s dollars, is ~$1 billion / boat.

See the Lenta.ru article for 2 quotes putting them at about that much a piece. It’s not a damn Zumlolwalt.. 😀

D’oh!! Apologies, I stand corrected- dunno what I was thinking!:o
Having factored in the 13.4Rbn paid to ‘Malahit’ for the 885M technical development cost- this would take the cost of the lead 885M (Kazan) to just over $2bn (at today’s exchange rate), but obviously this development figure would be eventually shared as a programme acquisition unit cost.

164 млрд руб.— контракт с ОСК на строительство и поставку четырех атомных подлодок проекта 885М “Ясень-М”;
164 billion rubles — contract with OSK for the construction and delivery of four submarines of the Project 885M “Ash-m” (164/4= 41Rbn, 41Rbn/$29.4234= approx. $1.4bn per sub);

47 млрд руб.— контракт с ОАО “Севмаш” на строительство головной лодки “Казань” проекта 885М;
47 billion rubles — contract with OAO “Sevmash-” for building the sub “Kazan” of the Project 885M class (47Rbn/$29.4234= approx. $1.6bn);

39 млрд руб.— допсоглашение с ЦКБ МТ “Рубин” на проектирование атомного подводного крейсера стратегического назначения проекта 955А “Борей”;
39 billion rubles- agreement with TsKB MT “Rubin” for the design of SSBN Project 955A Northwind/Borei;

13,4 млрд руб.— контракт со СПМБМ “Малахит” на разработку техпроекта модернизации подлодки проекта 885М;
13.4 billion rubles — contract with SPMBM “Malahit” on the development of the technical project to upgrade the submarine Pr.885M

Подробнее: http://kommersant.ru/doc/1812512

Only 8-9 885Ms is too little to replace all the Akulas, Oscars and Sierras. Is this class going to be supplemented with a smaller attack SSN sans VLS tubes like was speculated until a few years ago?

Not quite, you guys are mistaking the Soviet Navy’s ‘bastion’ SSBN doctrine with the Russian Navy’s roles. This doctrine was centred around maintaining a first or pre-emptive strike with SLBMs. In order to protect their SSBNs from USN SSNs (whose primary assignment was to shadow Soviet SSBN patrols, ensuring that if war broke out, the Soviet missile fleet could be destroyed before it could launch its missile arsenal). Hence the Soviet Navy had to guarantee that USN vessels would not be unable to reach these bastion sites- i.e. the Soviets had to keep Americans ships away from all Soviet territorial waters in a tactic called “sea denial.”

This doctrine became entrenched in 1973, as the Soviets began to commission new Delta-class SSBN’s for the Atlantic Northern Fleet, USN NAVINT observers began to notice a change in their pattern of SSBN deployment. Rather than engaging in open-water patrols as was customary for missile boats, the Deltas, boats with the ability to strike American cities from 4,200 miles away, were being limited to patrols within the Barents Sea, where they were shielded by a layer of Soviet SSN’s and surface ships.

Soviet sea denial plans dictated that the Sea of Japan, Greenland, and parts of the Northwest Pacific Basin would be blockaded to ensure the invulnerability of the Soviet SSBN fleet.

Today’s Russian Navy has no first/pre-emptive strike doctrine. The formidable and stealthy ‘Borei’ class are tasked with credible deterrence and can conduct open/blue water patrols without being restricted to bastions protected by SSNs, as their complement of RSM-56 (the most advanced SLBM in existence) with a range greater than 9,000 miles can strike anywhere in the World against heavily defended targets whilst remaining undetected (at least until it’s too late).

Hence, there is no longer any need for such a large number of Russian SSNs (as compared to Soviet Navy numbers) they are freed from SSBN ‘bodyguard’ duties. The 885M in particular, is a formidable blue water, area denial tool in itself (but I agree 5/6 is not enough, maybe a new SSK design will act as complement, especially as 885M weighs in @ nearly $3bn a pop!).

Itar-Tass reported today that the Russian MoD will order 5 Pr.885M from 2015 (including Kazan) to 2021.

Significantly, the report hints of 885M deploying a new class of missile :

Подлодки проекта 885М будут оснащены гиперзвуковыми ракетами с маневрирующими боевыми частями с дальностью стрельбы до одной тысячи километров, глубоководными самонаводящимися торпедами, ракето-торпедами и другим оружием, новейшим радиоэлектронным оборудованием, гидроакустическим комплексом, средствами связи и навигации. Шумность таких АПЛ будет намного ниже, чем у однотипных российских и иностранных подлодок. Фактически это будут АПЛ поколения ‘4+’.”, – рассказал собеседник агентства.

http://old.lenta.ru/news/2012/04/25/yasen/

Submarines of project 885M class will be equipped with hypersonic missiles with a manoeuvring warhead and launch range of up to one thousand kilometres, deep water autonomous torpedoes, rocket-torpedoes and other weapons, the latest electronic equipment, hydro acoustic (sonar) complex communications and navigation. Noise of 885M will be much lower than those of similar Russian and foreign submarines. In fact it will be a sub of generation ‘ 4 + ‘. ‘,-said the agency spokesperson.

Wasn’t sure if these clearer shots of IAC1 had already been posted (taken 16 & 17 March 2012), so here they are anyways:

And my point about VSTOL etc is that to assume that we will want or have to launch aircraft in the same way as the 1940s in the 2040s seems slightly narrow to me. It must be possible to envisage these ships in the future rather than operating as if they are straight out of Red Storm Rising?

It is precisely because the RN and UK govt. lack vision that they have reverted to the ‘B’. The true visionaries are the USN with their Ford class CVNs and X-47Bs- even the IN are considering CATOBAR/EMALS for their future requirements.
But if the RN envisions PoW in combined operations with the USMC- then hey who am I to argue…..just don’t try to window dress a fundamentally flawed decision as anything else.

As for bandwidth issues, there are currently several research projects underway to address radio-band congestion such as polarization, multiport or dense coding techniques. However, the most promising is radio vorticity (encoding many channels on the same frequency) and if trials go well it should be commercially available by the 2020s- if not sooner.