Nick_76Add to that 300 SD-10 (as of now). Anyway, I don’t think IAF or Indian armed service modernisation is Pakistan centric anymore.:)
A missile is only as good as its seeker / software are. And here, it is the AMRAAM, even if downgraded, which is a greater threat imo, than the SD-10’s. The MKI with TVC and Elta 8222 has a variety of tricks to avoid / escape ranged BVR shots. But lighter single seat fighters like the LCA would appreciate the advantages of a towed decoy more.
Nick_76Yeah, let’s add some more weight. Good idea.
Great, aint it?
Though, for all we know, its part of that ~600 Kg difference b/w the internal fuel + empty Tejas & the 9.5 T CTOW.
Well either its for the LCA or the MKI, what it being the tip of the spear and all, and Pakistan buying 500 AMRAAMs. The program exists.
Nick_76Always too quick to compare, always too quick to conclude.
Has it struck you that the IAFs requirements may be entirely different than the original Gripen, in terms of T2W and other parameters?
Nick_76LCA may get a towed decoy as well.
Nick_76Nick, is this the official ASR?
Im slightly confused. Is the CTOW literally CTOW (in which case it should be around 9 T (Empty weight + Internal fuel) or is it basic AA configuration? Also MTOW…is it really meant to that high?
Official ASR.., they have been mangled via so many additions, that even IAF pilots will have problems knowing what was added where..:rolleyes:
The CTOW issue has been explained by Sens. And the MTOW, is M, after all. It will rarely be required, if ever. An average A2A BVR missile barely approaches 180 kgs, a WVR 110. With 7 pylons, and say 4 with 2 missiles of each sort (580 kg), and 2800 Kg of fuel, thats when you approach the 3.4 T external figure, not even 4T. Take bombs and you get more leeway in adding weight. With MKIs and MiG-27s and Jags, and Mirage 2000s’ theres no need to add some 4T bombloads on the LCA.
A 3.5 T weapons load will give this aircraft substantial legs with a good weapons package. Or even 2 tanks, and 4 Missiles ie a 2.5T Package.
Nick_76..looking at the people in the pics, Nagpur appears to be close to 40 deg C and around noon, its the worst..I can attest to it because I’m from Baroda and in summer, the dry heat really felt severe, almost always above 40 deg C.
By the way, loved the Tejas test pilot’s patch on Gp Cpt Nayini Harish.
Harish looks like as if he is taking a walk in the park at a hill station. No sweat, absolutely unruffled. Talk about being calm and collected..
Nick_76CTOW – Clean Take off weight, 9.5T
Empty – 6.5T
External stores >/= 4T
MTOW 14.5 T
Internal fuel 2.485 T
External fuel 2.812 T
1T = 1000 Kg
Speed
1.15M at low level
1.6 M at alt
Nick_76I dont think it was the GE engine alone that caused the LCA weight to jump 2000kgs to 10,000kgs.
The IAF has asked for more avionics eqpt internally, but other fitments (OBOGs etc) and ability to carry heavier loads on diff pylons increasing the weight in part.
Also, it seems the Kaveri project is now being shut down on the quiet. If this JV gets underway, Kaveri will not power the LCA even in the future as no JV will be for just 20 or 40 aircraft engines. And hence Kaveri is dead for all intents and purposes or at the most reduced to a R&D effort.
No such thing. Kaveri variants are also required for:
1. Navy- Marine versions
2. AF- for future trainers & light aircraft, plus the UCAV plans
3. Derated variants have been proposed for future “aerospace vehicles”.
The Kaveri remains essential to Indias plan to master the entire aircraft manufacturing cycle.
Almost everything in the LCA has a technology spinoff or variant planned for use in other projects. With the success of the MiG-27 and Jaguar upgrade projects, the IAF is also increasingly aware of the contribution of the LCA to projects which would have been done at extortionate cost by worldwide OEMs.
Nick_76Sens, although i agree that India will have to pay for any such integration, I wonder who would carry out this work? Would Russia or Israel be willing to provide each other the required details of the relevant systems? For example, the israeli radar on Harrier uses Derby and not R-77 while Mig-29K will be using the latter.
India has integrated Russian AAMs in the past wherein the OEM was less than cooperative. This was also done with the R-73E. Push come to shove, even the RVV-AE can be integrated with the MMR/ Elta 2032. Political issues apart, the tech part can be licked..
Nick_76Don’t prize the day, before the integration work for that is done already. So far no fighter kept the time frame. To be on the safe side the related software is just basic. To fine tune that and rise the limits will take several years. Even Microsoft with no shortage in money or to hire the best personal you can get for money is unable to do such miracle you claim for India. The others are just more experienced about some surprises through the related complexity. So Eurofighter, Rafale and many others do “jump” from level to level. May I remember, that some fools in India had the wishfull thinking to have new engine and a new fighter at the same time?!
Despite my critical words, I do wish the best about the Tejas.
What you are forgetting is that India does have relevant experience in weapons integration and clearance, as compared to engine development where the “fools in India” had no experience at all. Also, the fact that OEM support is available (Elta) wherein engine development had external OEM involvement in fits and spurts till date.
Lets see:
Jaguar IS/IB Upgrade – 4 new PGMs + 1 new Missile + new LDP integrated and cleared, new cockpit avionics + hand controller
MiG-27 Upgrade – ditto
Jaguar IM Upgrade – new radar, new avionics
In the case of the MKIs, local weapon integration rigs have been developed and deployed as well.
So, the LCA’s weaponisation within the IOC/FOC timeframe is possible.
What matters is how complex the integration is, ie if the fighter is asked to field all 4-5 types of EO/LGPGMs in IAF inventory, or just one. 2-3 types of BVR weaponry or one, etc. And funding.
Nick_76Hmmm, interesting… So, what kind of aircraft is LCA? Not a transport aircraft, I guess??
Light fighter, not many of those around. Gripen – far ahead & more mature at this point of time, the LCA and the T-50 Trainer cum fighter. F-16, Mirage 2000 et al go more into the medium fighter category..so does the IDC Ching Kuo, in a matter of speaking. Gripen NG also moves there..
So lets not argue about a stupid article by a journalist who decided to use unnecessary hyperbole and lets concentrate on the facts alone, ie the information in the article.
Nick_76Bringiton,
Very sensible post!
The radar (We dont know which yet) hasnt even flown aboard the LCA combat jet and then their is testing which still remains .
Its the Elta 2032. Some 4-5 have been acquired for the first few Tejas, for weaponisation. The next batch of IOC jets, 20 odd aircraft + a few LSP, will have the LSP radars which are being manufactured by Elta to ADA design with Indian antennas, TWTs, exciters etc. The follow on will be the Indian MMRs, either the current ones, or a more advanced AESA design.
And why is this stuff about the LCA getting a radar this year, news?
Nick_76Oops!
Heres another source, which matches what Rajkumar says – two senior people, both IAF and both corroborate separate accounts.
Bad news for Burradiarrhea and his verbal diarrhea.
http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/MONITOR/ISSUE3-5/wollen.html
The Program
Project definition (PD) commenced in October 1987 and was completed in September I988. The consultant, chosen from four contenders, was Dassault Aviation, France. Engineers, connected with design and development of aircraft know how vital it is to get the ‘definition’ correct. From this flows detail de-sign, construction and eventually maintenance costs.After examining the PD documents, the IAF felt that the risks were too high (likely shortfalls in performance, inordinate delay, Cost over-run, price escalations) to proceed further. A Review Committee was formed in May 1989. Experts from outside the aviation industry were included. The general view was that infrastructure, facilities and technology had advanced in most areas to undertake the project. As a precaution, Full Scale Engineering Development would proceed in two phases. Phase 1: design, construction and flight test of two Technology Demonstrator aircraft (TDI & 2); construction of a Structural Test Specimen; construction of two Prototype Vehicles (PVI &2); creation of infrastructure and test facilities.
{This entire thing was estimated at Rs 575 crores, unlike Burururs claims of Dassault alone!}
[I]Phase 2: construction of three more PV ‘5, the last PV5, being a trainer; construction of a Fatigue Test Specimen; creation of facilities at various work centres. Cost of Phase I – Rs.2188 crores, of Phase II – Rs. 2,340 crores. [/I]
Phase I commenced in 1990. However, due to a financial crunch, sanction was accorded in April 1993 and was marked by an upsurge in work.
{Same as what Rajkumar notes!}
The critical path in this program has been the design, fabrication and testing of its fly-by-wire flight control system FCS). An electronic FCS is a must for an aircraft with relaxed static stability.
The FCS also provides the pilot ‘care free handling’; flight limits cannot be exceeded, which at lower speeds on aircraft like the MiG-23/27 or Jaguar, results in the loss of the aircraft. The Aeronautical Development Establishment (ADE) is the nodal agency for development of the FCS. One reason for delay of the first flight could have been the Unexpectedly large effort required for coding control laws into the FCS software, which were then checked out on Minibird and Ironbird test rigs at ADE and HAL, respectively. The control laws were developed with the aid of real time simulators at ADE and BAe, UK. As a point of interest, a second series of inflight simulation tests of flight control software took place in July 1996 at Calspan USA on an F-16D VISTA (variable inflight stability aircraft); 33 test flight were carried out. Another reason for delay was the sanction imposed after Pokhran II in May 1999. Scientists working at Lockheed Martin, USA were sent hack; equipment, software and documents were impounded. Herculean efforts brought the FCS software to a standard where the FCS performed flawlessly over 50 hours of testing on TD 1 by pilots, resulting in the aircraft being cleared for flight in early 2001.
Space constraints prevent any meaningful description of materials, technology, facilities, processes developed for execution of the project. Military aviation enthusiasts may read a monograph on Aeronautical Technology that has attained maturity through DRDO efforts; much of this technology finds application in the LCA project. The monograph was brought out at Aero India 1998. The LCA is tailless with a double-sweep delta wing. Its wing span is 8.2 m, length 13.2 m, height 4.4 m. TOW clean 8.500 kg, MTOW 12500kg. It will be super-sonic at all altitudes, max speed of M 1.5 at the tropopause. Specific excess power and g-over load data has not been published. Maximum sustained rate of turn will be 17 deg per sec and maximum attainable 30 deg per sec. Funds have been sanctioned for a Naval LCA. PD and studies in critical technology areas have commenced. The aircraft will bee powered by a Kaveri engine (more information follows) and is to operate from the Indian Navy’s Air Defence Ship, under construction. Launch speed over a 12 deg ramp is 100 kts; recovery speed during a no flare deck landing, using arrester gear, is 120 kts. Take off mass 13 tonne, recovery mass 10 tonne. Most stringent requirements! The airframe will be modified: nose droop to provide improved view during landing approach; wing leading edge vortexes (LEVCON) to increase lift during approach and strengthened undercarriage. Nose wheel steering will be powered for deck manoeuvrability.
During early flight development, the TD aircraft will be powered by a single GE F404 F2J3 engine (7,250 kg reheat thrust). The indigenous Kaveri engine, under development by the Gas Turbine Research Establishment (GTRE) is slated for installation in a PV aircraft. Over 7,000 hours of ground testing of the core engine (Kabini) and four prototype Kaveri engines, together with flights in a Tu-16 test-bed aircraft would have been completed. Engine components have been produced by several manufacturing units, including HAL, where the exclusive Cellular Manufacturing Facility (CNC machining) was established in November 1988. A concurrent engineering approach has been followed to provide engines early in the LCA’s flight development. Salient engine features; 3 stage fan; 6 stage HP compressor with variable geometry IGV, I and II stators; annular combustion chamber; cooled single stage HP and LP turbines; modulated after-burner; fully variable, convergent-divergent nozzle; length 3490 mm; max diameter 910 mm; dry thrust 52 kN; reheat thrust 81 kN; thrust weight ratio 7.8. The ‘Achilles heel; in the successful development of the LCA, in the opinion of this author, is the Kaveri engine.
Points of view
In the late eighties India’s aircraft Industry was not as advanced as Sweden’s; and yet India follows a more arduous design/development route for its LCA, compared to Sweden for its JAS-39 Gripen. The Gripen embodied a far higher percentage of foreign, off-the-shelf technology, including its RM-12 engine (improved GE F404). France (Dassault Aviation) built and exhaustively flew a demonstrator aircraft (Rafale-A) before embarking on construction of Rafale prototypes. Over 2,000 flights were completed by September 1994 when first Flight of a production Rafale was still 20 months away. At that point of time, Dassault Aviation had built or flown 93 prototypes, of which at least fifteen went into production Sixteen years elapsed from ‘first-metal-cut’ of the Rafale demonstrator to entry into service. Current plans for the LCA is ten years. And what of India’s past record? Just a hand-ful of trainer aircraft designed and productionised. The story is similar for the Typhoon (earlier Eurofighter 2000). It was seventeen years from ‘first-metal-cut’ (EAP) to squadron entry in 2000. One more timeframe needs to be noted. It took Gripen six and a half years from first flight (prototype) to entry into squadron. For the LCA, four and a half years is the target! The quantum of test flying hours required to attain Initial Operational Clearance (IOC) is about 2000 hours; an impossible task in four and a half years. Concurrent production will shorten service entry time, but this will not enable the present target to be reached.The LCA remains a high-risk project. All too often glitches occur in development of a fly-by-wire FCS. The Typhoon is an example; this, despite vast experimental work for over a decade by leading aircraft manufacturers in the UK and Germany (Jaguar, F-104, EAP). Engine development is the most complex of all activities. There are sure to be problems during flight development of the Kaveri, GTRE’s first engine. Teething problems after service entry will occur; and major reliability improvements will be required in the first decade of its exploitation. Engines of the Russian fleet of fighters operated by the IAF (MiG-21 BIS, MiG-23BN/27M MiG-29) have this in-service history. Proceeding from this, four points emerge:
(a) India has its best designers, engineers, scientists, academicians working on/contributing to the project. In the main, they are devoted and tireless in their efforts to success-fully complete the project. They need support (not blind sup-port) of the polity, defence services and bureaucrats. Public support will follow, provided there is honest transparency;
(b) Costs of the project will escalate. (checks and balance are necessary, but let there be no inordinate delays, as have occurred in the past;
(c) The future of the aircraft industry, military and civil, depends on success of the LCA (and ALH, Saras, HJT-36) project; and,
(d) It is unlikely that the LCA will attain initial operational clearance (IOC) before 2010 When it is achieved, it will be an industrial success of magnificent proportion, and is sure to receive the acclaim it deserves.A few words on final operational clearance (FOC). The entire avionics and weapon systems are con-figured around three 1553 B data bus. Mission oriented computation/flight management is through a 32 hit computer. Information: from sensors (e.g. multi-mode radar, IRST, radar/laser/missile launch-warning receivers); from the inertial navigation System with embedded GPS; from targetting pod (FLIR, laser designator) are presented to the pilot on a head-up-display and head-down-displays. A helmet mounted target designator steers radar and missile seekers for early target acquisition (during a ‘close-in’ air-to-air engagement with a Vympel R-73 missile, currently the best dog-fight’ missile in the world). Laser guided bombs and TV guided missiles, require a pilot to initially ‘zero-in’ the laser designator or missile-mounted TV camera, on the ground target. Considerable engineering effort and expertise is necessary to achieve avionics-weapon integration and to prove the integration by live trials. Success here means FOC. Depending on what is stated in the (updated) ASR, it could take two years and around 1,500 hours of flight testing to move from IOC to FOC.
There will he setbacks in the flight development phase. All major engineering projects suffer them e.g. India’s first two SLVs failed disastrously. The Prime Minister was present at the first launch at Sriharikota; so was this author. Disappointment was everywhere, but no recrimination; only determination to get it right. Loss of a demonstrator aircraft or prototype could take place, lives could he lost, leading to questions/debate. Therefore, let the recent transparency in tile program continue, even intensify; let it he honest, 2010 is not far, for a first’ program of this magnitude and complexity.
Nick_76Oh boy Nitin, you exhibits the classic case of intellectual constipation and verbal diarrhea and continues your fond obsession of re-writing LCA history
Dear Burururur, since you cant write my name correctly – its in my handle, I anoint you with a new name. Oink-Oink. Or Twisty tail.
So Oinky, Oink – lets get this straight..
Flight global
Dear Oinky Oink, thats Flight Global! Its a journalist writing based on some third hand sources. Here, The Tejas Story, Manohar Books, 2008- ISBN: 81-7304-764-2, clearly states – Pg:29-30:
Rs 575 Crores were allocated for the ENTIRE LCA program at the stage. At Rs 57.5 to a $, thats 100 Million, but even that is a stretch.
Dassault was part of the program in 1986, dropped out by 88 when their FBW proposal was rejected.
12 Dassault engineers came to Bangalore in 87 to help with the PDP. In contrast, 500 HAL engineers went to ADA.
What happened between 83 and 2000
Oinky Oink,
Nadkarni was NEVER associated with the LCA program!! Which is why he makes so many errors in his claims:
1. Radar was not sourced from Ericcson. In fact Ericcson proposed a colloboration but it was too expensive, and the idea dropped. GeC Ferranti helped the program more, as they supplied two scanners for the prototype MMRs.
2. Alenia didnt provide CFC panels for the wings but jointly developed the same, and NAL India was the design authority viz the wings.
3.FBW testing was not done with France etc, but with MMCS, US now a part of LM. They assisted with only specific parts of the FCS, namely DFCC and FBW validation via the CALSPAN testbed.
Nadkarni’s rhetoric has been countered here:
http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/MONITOR/ISSUE3-5/narayanan.html
The LCA: With All Due Respect to the Naysayers…
Narayanan Komernath
The newspaper headline lit up my sleep-deprived eyes at 2am on the airliner from Mumbai: “LCA flies for the first time”. The long wait was over and the jet fighter designed by Indians was actually flying! But its critics had not given up. Its time now to take a look at the arguments against indigenous weapon programs, captured succinctly by Admiral (Retd.) J.G. Nadkarni, who wrote1 with such passion about the “Sad State of the LCA” after that first flight. Let us take each of the Admiral’s points in turn.
1. Cost Escalation of the LCA / How the Public has been Misled by DRDO
According to Adm. Nadkarni, the initial estimate, circa 1983, was around Rs. 700 crores. Today, it is Rs. 3000 crores. Given the Admiral’s claim that much of the technology had to be imported, it is fair to express these costs in US dollars, the currency of foreign arms and technology dealers. In 1983, $1 was roughly Rs. 10. In 2001, $1 is about Rs. 45.90. So, the cost “escalated” from $70 crores in 1983, to $66 crores in 2001? Taking inflation of the dollar into account, it appears that the LCA project cost is coming in below the original estimates!
2. All DRDO-developed weapon systems are failures
The Admiral specifically mentions the Akash surface-air missile, citing continuing testing as evidence of failure. Elsewhere2, ramjet-powered missiles have taken over 400 tests before field deployment, over the course of a 7-year test program, with induction of the improved version coming more than 12 years into development. At this writing, the Akash has already gone into serial production, with several difficult technologies mastered.
3. Most of the LCA is foreign technology or parts, with very little indigenous content.
The LCA has been tested with an American GE F-404 engine. It is logical to use a proven engine during the test phase of a new airframe. The engine inlets of the LCA were indeed tested in French supersonic wind tunnels. A supersonic wind tunnel is an extremely expensive facility to develop; India’s supersonic tunnel at Bangalore is old, and not large enough to handle large models of the LCA inlets. Thus it was smart of the LCA developers to enlist French help in the testing. Perhaps for the initial prototype, various components were indeed imported. Clearly, these components would have held up the program, had we waited for their development in India. The claim about “very little indigenous content” is blatantly false.
4. All weapons to be carried by the LCA are, and will be, foreign-made.
The first weapons to be tested on the LCA may be foreign-made. Is there any reason to believe that derivatives of the Akash, Trishul, Lakshya etc., developed in India, won’t be adapted to work with the LCA? It is our airplane; we do not need foreign licenses to test missiles with it.
5. It is foolish for India to try to develop an advanced combat aircraft alone: a consortium of nations developed successful modern fighters such as the Eurofighter.
Let us review Item 3, above, where the Admiral pooh-poohs Indians for accepting so much foreign help to develop the first LCA prototype. So, the Admiral contends that it is wrong to get technical assistance where needed, but it would be quite right to spend crores of Indian tax rupees just buying pieces of the production airplane as part of a consortium, never really getting the technology. Wow!
Why did European nations form a consortium to develop the Eurofighter? The answer is simple: otherwise American manufacturers would have put each of their individual defense industries out of business. Given the high cost of European labor, the economics of developing in Europe are not significantly better than those of developing in America. We on the other hand, have a unique but limited window of opportunity to develop defense technology for the next few years, before labor and production costs equalize with the rest of the world.
6. The LCA is obsolete. All state-of-the-art fighters since 1990 are radar-stealthy.
This, with all due respect, is false. The Eurofighter, which the Admiral cites as a stellar example of a state-of-the-art fighter developed by a multinational consortium, is no “stealthier” than the LCA. Neither uses internal weapon carriage, the geometric features of the American stealth aircraft, nor the claimed Russian technology of plasma sheaths for stealth. Stealth comes at a high cost in aerodynamic performance, which the LCA and Eurofighter designers avoided. It is not at all clear that in a short-range battle such as may be expected on the India-Pakistan border, a stealthy aircraft with poor agility will win over a less-stealthy aircraft with better agility. Stealth will not help dislodge Pakistanis perched on Himalayan cliffs: agility will. The per-unit cost of a typical stealth aircraft will run to roughly $100 million (Lockheed-Martin F-22). That is Rs. 459 crores. If we opt to wait for stealth technology before fielding the LCA, (1) the cost will go much higher, (2) the number of airplanes bought will be much smaller, and (3) these aircraft could be overwhelmed by larger numbers of FC-1s and Super-7s from the enemy.
7. The LCA is incapable of any significant upgrading at all during its lifetime. It is a very small, single-engined aircraft tightly packed with equipment. It cannot be fitted with a bigger engine or expanded avionics.
Lets consider this wonderful claim. In the past 20 years, electronic components have been getting smaller and lighter, while their performance has been increasing. Even greatly “condensed” electronics, five years from now, will outperform today’s avionics packages. The same logic applies to the engine. There is no reason to “fit” the LCA with a “bigger” engine. To my knowledge, no aircraft in modern times has been designed with a larger-than-needed fuselage (like the shirts I got sewn as a growing kid) on the theory that one may need to fit a “bigger” engine later on. This would be ridiculous aerodynamic design. As engines get better, they become smaller for the same thrust, or stay the same size and deliver more thrust. Thus, advanced versions of the Kaveri engine need not be bigger: they just need to be better.
8. Now that the first prototype has flown, the project should be cancelled.
This was the most astonishing declaration in the article. Clearly, the first prototype of the LCA is a technology demonstrator and test vehicle. This prototype will not go into mass production. However, subsequent prototypes announced by DRDO/HAL are very interesting, since they advance the technology level substantially. Thus, it is possible that LCA prototype version 3 or 4, or 5, may be much closer to the aircraft that will see the most mass production. To cancel the project now would serve only the enemies of India.
9. It would be a miracle if the LCA can ever be produced at less than Rs 150 crores each
Rs. 150 crores is less than $33 million per aircraft (the current estimate is $26million). A modern F-16 goes for about $60 million per copy; an F-22 for $80 to 100 million. A BAE Hawk jet trainer aircraft, which India is now buying for license production over the next 5 to 10 years, costs $24 million per copy, and is an obsolete design, with no weapons, no ability to fly supersonic or execute high-angle-of-attack combat maneuvers of the type the LCA will perform. In contrast to the Hawk, where much of that money goes abroad (except for the commissions to assorted arms agents) to develop newer weapons to be sold to Pakistan later, the LCA development money stays in India, multiplying wealth through economic turnover. The American rule-of-thumb for defense expenditures is a factor of 3 in economic benefit from turnover. Therefore, even if we take the Admiral at his word, the LCA will clearly deliver on the cost/performance front.
10. The LCA will only be equivalent to a first-generation F-16
Assume for a moment that this is true. It would still be a good reason to induct the LCA in large numbers. This is because the primary threat to be countered by this mass-produced aircraft is the Chinese-supplied FC-1 or “super F-7” which the PLAF and the PAF may field. Both would fall in the same general category as the first-generation F-16s. So the LCA is accurately focused on realistic threat perceptions.
Secondly, the statement is false. Initial development of the LCA’s fly-by-wire control system was done using the F-16XL Advanced Fighter Technology Integrator. This is a research airplane developed from the F-16 in the 1980s-90s to demonstrate technologies which were obviously unavailable on first-generation F-16s, such as high-angle-of-attack maneuver recovery, supersonic cruise, and digital feedback control for artificial stability. In addition, later prototypes of the LCA will demonstrate thrust vectoring, learned from the Russian Su-30 technology.
11. Defence R&D is not a make-believe game to be played by exploiting the fascination for techno-nationalism.
How soon we forget! In 1999, when nuclear-armed Pakistan invaded the Kargil heights, what allowed Indians to laugh off the blatant Pakistani threat of nuclear attack? My guess is that it was our belief in our nuclear-armed fighter-bombers and ballistic missiles. These weapons were not built with foreign assistance. In other words, where there is national urgency, and where no foreign purchases can be made nor commissions sought, our military is willing and able to accept the products that our scientists/engineers turn out. Perhaps there is a lesson here?
Admiral Nadkarni perhaps reflects the frustration felt by many patriotic Indians, especially those in the Armed Forces, that our indigenous technology lags that of the West, and our efforts to give our fighting men and women the latest and best weapon systems invariably suffer from delays, technical problems, etc. This is understandable. However, it would indeed be a catastrophe for India if these frustrations added to the already-severe burdens shouldered by our technical people, and discourage them. The result might be that we give up trying, when in fact there is every reason for us to give our technical people the greatest encouragement!
In protecting our nation and way of life, we have no permanent friends. Air Marshal Wollen3 , tracing the history of the LCA, had concluded years ago: “the development of a suitable engine is the Achilles Heel of the program”. This is still true today, but consider that the LCA prototype is flying with American engines today. Is it entirely luck that enough GE engines were obtained to permit airframe flight testing, but no mass purchase agreement was signed (which would have killed the Kaveri program), and enough flight-controls were tested on the F16 XL to permit program completion within 2 years, all before May 1998? Thomas Jefferson said: “I am a strong believer in luck. And the harder I work, the luckier I get”. Perhaps the Indian aerospace program is “getting luckier” too.
All Indians should be proud of the LCA. This airplane is ours! With each flight, our knowledge will increase; as each imported component is replaced with indigenous innovation, the money spent will stay inside India, generating Indian jobs, technical infrastructure and experience. Senior leaders like Adm. Nadkarni, I hope, will be more supportive of Indian indigenisation programs in future. Indian kids expect and deserve it! Congratulations to the LCA team. Jai Hind!
References
1. J.G. Nadkarni, J.G., (Admiral, Retired, Indian Navy) “Sad State of the LCA”. Rediff.com, January 13, 2001. http://www.rediff.com/news/2001/jan/13nad.htm
2. Fletcher, C.F., Lane, D.R., “Service Experience With Three Generations of Ramjets”. In “Ramjets and Ramrockets for Military Applications”. AGARD Conference Preprint No. 307, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Neuilly Sur Seine, France, October 1981.
3. Wollen, MSD, “The Light Combat Aircraft Story”. Indian Aviation, Opening Show report, Aero India 2001.
The art of selling projects as mastered by DRDO..
You could just write oink, oink, oink instead..we will understand you perfectly!!
Nick_76Sens, I too agree with you, though I OTOH believe that designing a good fighter is possible even when the engine is also going through the development. There are fighters out there that have been or are being designed in such a way, but then the nations involved usually have a lot more experience in these field than India has. I honestly believe that where India went wrong (more than anything else including the lack of expertise) was poor project management which resulted in poor planning consequently leading to mistake after mistake. For example, as Nick mentioned that LCA was originally planned to get the Aphid, and then came the R-73E. This comes as a huge shock to me, even though IAF’s involvement/interest was fitful in the early days. Even a novice like myself knows that fighters take years to design and (those that get through) remain in service for decades. Now if im not mistaken, work on R-73 began in 70s and it enetered service in mid 80s. It was meant to replace Aphid and weighed almost twice as much as the latter. If LCA was still designed (in 90s) to use Aphid as its primary weapon, I can only blame the lack of sight and project management.
With regard to the success of LCA/Kaveri, i also believe that their success is linked to quick induction into IAF.
Sorry, Vikas but your claims about poor PM just because the R-73E was around from the 70’s etc and wasnt factored in dont hold water. There are actually far better (or worse!) examples, openly acknowledged. Almost all are ego driven because some decision maker thought he was slighted so didnt cooperate with the project.
First, the R73 being developed in the 70’s and entering service later on, are all fine, but not in India! IAF probably got its first Archers well into the 90’s and then standardized upon them! In fact, I recall seeing pics of MiG-29s in service throughout much after they were inducted with R-60s! The IAF’s standard A2A armament for the MiG-21 was the R-60 MK and it was well liked by pilots and maintenance. (Partly probably because its predecessor Atoll was so pathetic)
Remember, just because the MiG-21s were being phased out did not mean that all their related eqpt would be junked as well, and as the LCAs would first go to the Mig-21 squadrons it made ample sense to reuse the same stocks. In fact, the R-60MKs were well into service and they might still be around. In 1999, there were R-60-MK armed MiG-29s still around (you can carry more for the weight).
So what ADA did was prudent. They allowed sufficient leeway for the avionics to include new weaponry and did what AHQ asked of them. Remember, AHQ itself has often been unaware of what Russia had or would give India, so they couldnt project the R-73E before it was inducted.
And R-73E is now the standard missile only now, after both Sukhois and Upg MiG-21s carry it. Otherwise AHQ could have asked for some other AAM. During 90’s you’d remember, Soviet Union collapse caused huge problem for AF dependent on them for spares. So building up R73E stocks would be an issue.
Where things messed up, is WHEN AHQ got to know, yes, for the MKI (~1996) and MiG-21 Upg (~1997-98) large numbers of R-73Es would be acquired, they should have gone back to ADA and asked for it.
But they didnt bother, because they didnt understand or know how much effort goes into weapons integration when aircraft is being designed from scratch. In IAF, weapons integration has been done on aircraft already designed from somewhere else.
Small things, but they add upto lost time when counted together. Its all that learning curve, these things cant be PM’ed away, each time you do something for the first time, millions of such things will occur. If same mistakes occur twice over, then thats culpability. In MCA or IJT, if AHQ/HAL or whatever make the same “ooops”, then the AHQ/ PM team should be whacked, because they would have learnt what was what.
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