Abhimanyu,
You are right about the money being spent on the entire project, not just given to Dassault. In 1986, Rs 575 Crores, was sanctioned for the LCA and five prototypes.
(Pgs 30 onwards):
In 1986, Dassault was chosen to help in the Project definition. In 1987, Dassault sent 12 engineers to India to work with the ADA team on the project requirements, but they projected the Rafales (at the time) 3 Dig, 1Analog FBW which ADA rejected in favour of Martin Marietta’s 4 Channel All Dig FBW!
Indian Air Force AHQ was not too happy with the choice, and Dassault dropped off from the program as the FBW is the heart of the fighter, and without control over it, their contribution would have been very limited. So that was it!
In 1987, 11 Ge 404 engines were ordered at $ 11 Million, and by end of 1988, the PDP (Project Definition Document) was submitted.
In 1990, Rajiv Gandhi, the Prime Minister who supported the LCA, lost the election, and it was not until 1992, the program truly kicked off, according to Rajkumar, two whole years were lost thanks to economic troubles ( the Gulf War and oil prices soared).
The Rs 575 Crores allocated, were not spent till the late 90’s!! Dassault made some money out of the LCA, probably a few million for the engineering staff and their assistance in the early wind tunnel testing etc.
Sweden has no input in Tejas.
There was some limited cooperation on the radar between HAL & Ericcson, after that, both countries went their own way.
Britain has no input in Tejas.
No, RajKumar brings BAe’s contribution up repeatedly. Their assistance was not in technologies but guidance. Eg which process to follow in development, ie if you have three tests to do, which to do first, and then get the BAe guy to come over and evaluate whether the preparations are correct. Another BAe test chap came and flew the LCA Simulator to point out corrections- he said, ok, no probs. BAe help stopped once the EF program picked up speed, somewhere late 90’s.
ADA has over-stepped Italian expertise in the design and production of composites, in that mankind’s largest flying machine, the Airbus A380 flies with composites modelled using Tejas’ Autolay software. The contract was won by defeating IBM, gloabalCAD and UniGraphics.
Composites are a vast field, so we really cant say we’re better than the Italians or vice versa. But yes, you are correct in that India is at a good footing in composites and doesnt need any external assistance.
The above is gross misrepresentation. As mentioned by Dr. Subramanyam, ADA was working on pencil-stencils to design Tejas in 1980s. The purchase of these CFD-testing equipment, CAD-CAM facilities ec. was done from Dassault.
Not just Dassault but others as well.
As mentioned earlier, the figure of $100 million is inaccurate, because sanctioned in 1983 it was also used for the construction of buildings, hiring personnel, and setting-up of test-centers between ’85 and ’87. This amount was also used in development of the 1/7 scale-model, and it’s subsequent testing in 1990.
Hence, all of the $100 million sanctioned in 1983 were not awarded to Dassault aviation between ’85 and ’90.
‘Tis true.
Though true that as per the technical document posted earlier, the max. AoA of Tejas was to be 26 degrees. However, now the performance requirements have been met at 22 degrees itself, which is good news.
It must be noted that the earliest estimate for AoA was as high as 35 degrees.
AoA is a software set limitation. There are some good books on FBW modelling for combat aircraft, If I had time, I’ll post from them. Designers try to set hard limits and soft limits, the latter are what you can push through, the former, not. Given different payloads and different fuel/ ordnance combinations, AoA limits also change.
Obviously the true performance envelope of any in development fighter would be classified, but I wouldnt be surprised if the AoA mentioned now, is actually for the weaponised LCA and not the clean ones earlier.
References :-
1) Autolay software makes ADA a global leader
2) ** Mr. Hali has often been inaccurate, as in his article on the Indian ABM test.
Hali is Burururs second uncle in terms of accuracy.
I hope India will come to it senses about that. Start the Tejas and Kaveri into service as soon as possible. After that take a usefull amount of money into your hand to better it in steppings to come. Divert money into foreign fighters are short term solutions only. Next time you have the engine first to design the fighter around that. India can learn from the real thing only and the shortcomings, when doing that. But to be carefull, experiences do not prevent future problems, when it comes to the edge of technology.
You are cent per cent correct!
Good question, when every store station is designed for a given capacity from the start.
The minimum for that is ~100 kg to start with.
Incorrect – read what I have written. It was originally planned to get the Aphid, and then came the R-73E. For other aircraft, it may be ~100 Kg or whatever, for the LCA it most certainly was not. The inner pylons were rated for much higher weights, while those near the wingtips were rated for very low weights, and well they might if all they were to carry were R-60’s.
Apart from all the other tests mentioned in my original post, flutter testing and SCT (Structural coupling tests) would also have to be redone. Remember, this is not a developed bomb truck for which a decades worth of flight performance is known, and for which developers will take more risks since they feel confident. Instead, each and every parameter will be checked and validated, and this takes time.
From Janes:
GTX-35VS. Improved turbofan planned as engine for LCA. Core was to run early 1991, engine in mid-1992.
Overall pressure ratio 21
Entry gas temperature 1377°C
flat rated at ISA +20°C, S/L
max dry 50,6 kN
AB 80.07 kNRM12 testing started at GE in June 1984, Gripen first flight 9th Dec 1988.
54-80.5 kN. The extra thrust did come by rising entry gas temperature by 105°C of basic F404 and to rise airflow by 10% over F404. First test of F404 was Dec 1976 and first flight in 1978.
At the same time of the GTX-35VS, India had its first MiG-29 with RD-33 to be “inspired”! So with more than a decade later India did start a similar engine development to offer performances of the late 70s or early 80s.
It seems, that none of the foreign contenders, do show any real intrest to rise the engine technology of India to that modest level even.
India misses the technology to bring the Kaveri even to 100 % of that modest level, not speaking of further growth-variants of that.
So it is intresting to learn, how India will overcome that bottle-neck.
There is a lot of money in need, to convince the other engine-makers to share that technology or India science will make a break-through in that area.
To stick the finger to the point. At the moment it is impossible for India to go behind the limited 95 % and there is no real solution in sight, to solve that problem in the near future.
So before starting new dreams or wishfull thinking, it does make sense to live with a limited Tejas and limited Kaveri engine for some years at least.
Its clear that given time, the Kaveri will fly and be “ok”, but to what end? The problem is that coupling a new airframe with a new engine is always risky, and especially for a country with very little experience of either. In the LCAs case, it all depends on what the IAF chooses. If they want an indigenous engine at all costs, then that is what will appear on the aircraft. If they are ok with an EJ etc, thats what will come. Time will tell, and I do hope ADA has the IAF sign off on the dotted line, so AHQ cant flip flop.
Nick, which WVR missile was LCA meant to be using and what is the weight diffrence between those and R-73E?
Something in the aphid class, or the IAFs aphid stocks…~ 44 Kg. The R-73E weighs around ~105 Kg.
Pardon my ignorance. But why did India not seek help from russians…i dont think the russians put any sanctions on them???
Too little time & too different from what the Russians are used to. Right now, the RD-33 would be totally unsuitable for the LCA in terms of dimensions & performance..plus, the LCA is built around western standards of avionics (Mil et al) and dimensions etc were set to specific standards. Getting the Russians involved would literally require working from scratch, and having them brought upto speed & then adapt their methods and eqpt to the LCA and vice versa. At the end of the day, it wouldnt be the original LCA anymore. If India had some 5 years plus, then it could have gone for this approach, but its doubtful it would pay the required dividends. Note that even now, while talking of engine options, the Russians werent chosen and for FBW finetuning its Boeing which has been chosen and not a Russian firm, and for radars, again its Elta doing the assembling to ADAs design and not Phazatron!
This change in the ASRs was a good move though. Who can imagine a fighter getting IOC in 2009-10 time frame and not being qual’d to carry the IAF’s main WVR weapon?
Did the IAF/ADA did not forsee a heavier weight WVR missile coming in the future when the ASRs for that hardpoint were being made?
I know I am showing my ignorance of Rajkumar’s book.
One feeling I get throughout, is that the ADA team was all about doing exactly what AHQ demands of them for fear of not doing what AHQ expected of them, so whilst they kept the “option” open of adding new gear/redesign (eg they could redesign the wing, make a new OAC replace the original MC and what not), there was a degree of being risk averse, since they were inexperienced and couldnt push the envelope.. Add to that the specter of delays, since the last decade since that silly ’83 launch date has been tomtommed ad infinitum by all concerned and hence renewed pressure to get the fighter out.
True, the IAF should have known that they wanted the R73E and it should have been specced at the start, but their integration into the program was fitful in the early days. With the huge fleet of cheap Russian aircraft, the LCA was just something they could depute someone to, and he’d take care of it. And despite Rajkumar @ NFTC /ADAs best efforts, there were simply too many things to manage. Today, the IAF review team (with the DCAS) meets monthly.
But there are other instances of how good decisions were made & got equally worthwhile returns.
Eg the MC development went very well and came up with an excellent product, because handpicked pilots from the IAFs most modern (at the time) aircraft -29s, Mirage 2000s and DARIN Jags, drew up the project requirements of what the MC should be capable of.
Today, the LCA test crew has a Mirage 2000 pilot, a Jaguar one & a MiG-27 one!
Just to understand how a shoestring budget ran the LCA- very few sets of actuators were procured for the program. 1 Full set went on the Iron bird rig, a half set went to the mini bird rig at ADE, qualification testing took up another set, and hence there were barely enough sets for 2 flying aircraft at most. Any actuator leaks, serviceability issues were also fixed locally and involved shuttling actuators around the various rigs, since the US reps had suspended support (sanctions). Only in 98, were more orders placed for deliveries in 2004, with a steep price escalation, but this time for the LSPs and with some spare!
Upon reading the book & other primary contributors comments on the subject, I can say its a bloody miracle that the LCA is not only flying but that its critical FBW has been actually kept on track. The entire aircraft in fact – the same issues with the engines, again all support had ceased, and there were but two instrumented engines essential for test flying. By a stroke of luck and some careful thought, the head of LCA Propulsion, had actually obtained the entire engine mathematical thrust model before the sanctions, so the LCA team was able to assess the range and performance via simulation before the test flights began and validated the assumptions.
Why would an ordnance switch cause a redesign, supposedly of the wing?
Weight primarily. The original wing was stressed for lighter WVR missiles per ASRs, but once the IAF put forth new specs, ie the R73E, they had to redesign the wing, redo the flow modelling – aero etc, plus ordnance separation studies. Electronics wise, the SMS and MC can handle new stuff so that wont be a pain if OEM cooperates and chips in with ordnance codes etc, though RajK mentions even that was difficult in this case, because the Russians didnt share source codes for integration as they wanted to do the work themselves ($$).
Nick, this is a really interesting point. Although I cant claim that I know much about aviation industry, but 2 the best of my knowledge this is not the norm in west, i.e. setting up of unreasonable targets in such mega projects to push the project team ahead. However, since India was trying to establish an aviation indutry and has a different culture compared with the west, it is plausible it is plausible (though not logical since failure to meet impossible deadline will be demoralising for those involved) that they may have followed this line of action. But I wonder who was setting up these tight deadlines, and why did they keep giving out such optimistic deadline again and again (over the years we have seen a number of deadlines for service entry)?
Its a cultural thing to an extent.
See, in the case of the LCA, it was a national project, so the GOI was committed to it, so not meeting unreasonable internal targets wouldnt kill the project. The IAF itself was well aware of how overambitious the initial projections were – Rajkumar says the first time he sat down & reviewed the meet, he knew the plans were way too ambitious, too much with too little. He communicated the same to AHQ.
So why this constant push for unrealistic deadlines? For one, it was inexperience and overenthusiasm to begin with. Many things were simply not known. For instance, lets take the FBW, ie FCS. A full years worth of work was done with advanced FCS modeling, later when a BAe test rep joined the program as a visitor, he told ADEs FBW team that they were being too ambitious, since the first flights should be with a fixed FCS. But ADE didnt know this and had gone for the 2nd option, and they didnt want to offend the AHQ, who anyway knew very little about the complexities of FBW modelling but would want the more ambitious targets met. So the decision to revert to fixed gain for the first TDs was finally taken by the experts at ADE because the FBW team lead put his foot down, and was supported by others, including a Navy control laws / FBW expert and the decision finally pushed through..but time was lost, a years worth per RajKumar! Many such things..at other times, time was saved thanks to some really prudent decision making, and some luck as well. And engineering challenges throughout- a gearbox designed by the CVRDE (Arjun guys) team who were used to making 2T drivetrain gearboxes etc, and were asked to make a ~40 kg unit. Their AMAGB as delivered was 39 Kg! Many lessons learnt, which was the point, right.
Then there was the “oops factor”. First they say x, then they think x+1, then at x+!, its x+2…scope creep. Each time you think you are done, theres a little bit left out or because the customer wants something else. So the wing design is done. Metal cutting is about to begin – no, hold off. Why? The IAF now wants R-73Es on the wing, so redesign has to take place, ok redo..etc etc
Then there were incidents out of the PM teams control. The 91 economic collapse, the post Pokhran sanctions, the lack of external support at critical times – eg BAe couldnt step up when the program could be speeded up, as they were busy with the EF…
Finally, plain old organizational inertia to stick to earlier estimates, since anyways the customer knows, and who GAS about the media or reports about delays?
The main focus remained the budget – for the LCA team. The LCA TD stage shot under the estimate by a full 200 odd crore (200,00,000 Rs) Rupees and the money was promptly used for the follow on LSP etc.
But overall, this has been a learning experience for all concerned, which is the point. Dont make the same mistakes again, for one.
ONE of which is – SAY what is possible and DONT set unrealistic targets for yourself or make claims about the same. The public or the external commentators dont GAS about your internal thoughts and “motivations”, but become bewildered by changing dates and what not.
Take a look at all recent DRDO pronouncements – they are mostly crisp, and mention timelines ONLY when the key enablers, technologies and subsystems are practically ready.
Nick,
Is there any reason to spoon feed good information to trolls who will only come back with more troll worthy posts?
Treat trolls as the barking dog next door. Do what you got to do but make sure to taunt him once in a while. Sure he’s annoying but that doesn’t mean you can’t throw a rock at him once in a while and get him really riled. Would you throw real food at him and try to get him to like you knowing full well that the dog will never like you?
BTW, check this out:
http://www.forumwarz.com
😀I wonder how long it will take the forum poobahs to delete this post
Thanks Vick! Good point – I better spend my time more productively than talking to a troll, especially with it being the weekend!!
Re: the website: LOL
So for 36 Degrees they went all the way to Nagpur??? That is the hot trail for you!! Do you know where the first batch of LCA is supposed to be based and what is the temp of that place today??
Do you know the temp of Arakkonam, where LCA was last tested:D, But then again you are Budding journalist, who probably know more than I do, do tell us why LCA has to go to Nagpur for 35 degrees hot trail.
Gawsh, each time you open your mouth you just put out your copy paste “knawlijj” on display and leave us poor Injuns spellbound. I bet before you read the Sulur/ Arakkonam news on the net, you didnt even know those places existed, and here you are pretending to know stuff, LOL!
Gee expert, heres somethign interesting for you – Arak. is humid, the conditions there are quite different from those in Nagpur, its pure blistering dry heat, those who’ve lived in Central/North & South India know the difference and Nagpur is very similar to a lot of places where the LCA would be operationally deployed.
Please dont embarass yourself by talking hot air (gas as coldfire puts it) about a country and a region you know precious little about.
When they are looking into costly alternatives, they have a real problem, that they are unable to overcome in the near future to stay polite.
Sens you dont have to be faux polite. If you have a point to make, make it – theres a world of difference between the likes of you and the teenaged internet warriors like Buraidiah (whoever he is).
To get to your point, of COURSE there is a problem – for all we know the Kaveri may never come on the LCA, but the point I was making is that ONE WAY OR THE OTHER, the Kaveri is a step India HAD to take. Given Indian requirements, a Kaveri type project was essential and it will have much utility even if it never becomes the de facto engine for LCA++++ (once the IAF is done with LCA ASRs).
Every engine has a design specification to start with, before it will follow a growth-path. See the F404 about that. (48-72 kN), when the tweaked R12 variant is 54-81 kN or a rise 12,5 %. (overclocking capability)
The Kaveri is restricted to reach even the basic value performance, because a critical technology is not at hand to built it.
See above.
Of cause it is an achievement to built the Kaveri up to the possible level of today! It does make sense to use that Kaveri, even without to the specification values. But for a while the growth of the Tejas is limited too.
When India is able to get the missing technology for that critical material, the Kaveri will be back on track.
The point being made in the articles is that more options exist, beyond the Kaveri. The Ge414, Eurojet are on offer. Safran (Snecma) has offered to work on the Kaveri itself to get it to spec. The point is that today, India has the money to evaluate options that werent available to it earlier. And hopefully, its politicians will have the sense to fund the programs as required, and not in fits and bursts.
Times change. Today, Elta is roped in practically overnight, from the Indian procurement point of view, to speed up the MMR. Earlier, that would have required some 5 years of wrangling before the foreign exchange was cleared. So times do change.
It is really pathetic reading …….don’t know where to start when someone whines now ….having embarked on the lofty goals of flying the LCA in 1991 and inducting in IAF in 1994:eek:
It is pathetic to read your trolling, given that its now proven that you were speaking nonsense about the LCA having been started with a bang in ’83 and what not! This is the third source, each of which was a person involved directly with the program which gives the lie to your silly assertions.
Second, do us all a favour, learn to write properly & be cogent. Rambling drivel is not impressive.
Third, get yourself some good sources. The LCA Story by AM Rajkumar is a start, it clearly states that unreasonable targets were set in order to push the project team ahead, and these targets were near impossible in the best of times, but became unattainable thanks to the Indian economic crisis of 91.
So all those talk of inducting LCA in 1994 was gas…
Gee, give yourself a prize! Every other poster here, and Air Marshals MSD Wollen and Rajkumar, both IAF, both associated with the LCA give a decade after 2000 as a reasonable date to expect the LCA. First you poured scorn on the articles and now you sing another tune!
Of course you would!
Oh this will put the fanboys to shame(u know who),coz they were only insisting on 1993 LCA start date… this is even better LCA development started only in 2001, after first flight:p
Learn how to read, or is it banned wherever you were? He points out – and AM Rajkumar agrees – that critical parts of the LCA development were begun in 2001, AFTER the first flight, because FINALLY, the TD phase was deemed to have started and hence FUNDS were SANCTIONED for the next phase, ie developing an operational fighter!
Some more whining for the LOST time, were they not knew what is involved in developing a Plane??? Are they such naive or fools not to account for the simple things!!!
I dont know what is more silly – your silly broken english, or your deliberate misreading of something which is plain and simple in order to flame, even where you fail! Given your language you cut a sorry figure for your educational system.
First, the LCA is a learning effort. Get that straight. Even the BAe folks involved in the program could only give estimates. Estimates are fine tuned, once more experience builds up. A year was lost when the scheduled gain FCS had to be replaced by fixed gain FCS, and AHQ wanted the first! So you learn by doing, something which is obviously beyond you!
What is this then…… some at no charge…….but some were paid for design study….but then beyound those were required and Dassault were paid $100Million for those design services.
Dassault was paid for a design study to help prepare a PDP, which was submitted to the IAF, vetted and cleared in the late 80’s and finally cabinet approval and project clearance obtained.
So the Max angle of attack is 22 degrees!!! well either this bloke don’t know what he is talking or the all the material till today is wrong….:dev2:
For the current PV, with the current software release as agreed to by the IAF.
Below was supposed to be the objective of Technical demonstrator…that was back in 2003
Again, you dazzle us! TDs were TD’s, the current aircraft are PVs and several flight test points will be recertified. Do us all a favour and read up on what flight testing is!
You make up what he is talking
All your posts are made up, Titanium. Which is why you were banned for trolling the first time around, and yet you persist.
Quit the silly provocative one liner approach and learn what a discussion is. In short, grow up.
A very optimistic view into the reality. A modest 100% specification engine is starting its grows path, when cleared for first use. The report does show, that India has not the know how at hand to built even that basic specification engine. At least India does not hide that problem, what is the first step to overcome that.
Dont know what you are trying to say but what the ADA guy said is exactly what is known to him, from the GTRE team, who have shared the performance details. Namely, that the Kaveri practically meets its thrust requirements in dry thrust, falls short in afterburning, and is a bit overweight.
And to bring the engine to production ready standards, to the degree that the LCA requires, will necessitate more time, and research into more advanced materials which no country will share!
In tandem, the LCA team, ie ADA the PM, are going to offer readily available options to the IAF in 3 months time, this will presumably include the Ge414, the redesigned Kaveri, and the EJ derivative. Its upto the IAF to choose which it wants AND sign off on the deal (so that the notoriously fickle AHQ cant dance around and play the blame game later on).
Its also a fact of life that the LCA has its supporters in AHQ and the LCA team working with the aircraft, and the latter are very appreciative of the aircraft. Life is never black or white, but greys.
While the report shows the other side of the LCA program which its critics always deny, the fact that the LCA program is progressing satisfactorily, that its radar is still in local control viz PLM, as its been designed locally, and Elta is doing integration, component level work & assembly to speed things up, and that the IAF team is very supportive of the program – which bodes well for its IOC/ FOC targets being met.
Meantime, the Kaveri is also being developed and has made vital strides. Even if it doesnt go into the LCA, a UCAV or UAV or future project for training or what not, may use it or a derivative. The Kaveris lessons will be used for designing similar engines for cruise missiles to other defence projects.
So where do you see the “very optimistic view into reality” here? Just the facts..