While im of the view that LCA would most definitely be inducted into IAF service, i have couple of questions which don’t have much to do with current discussion.

Being one of the lightest fighter on the planet with (probably) all sorts of measures taken to save weight, what sort of growth potential does this little fighter have in terms of future upgrades. For example, we have seen ealier flnakers being turned in SU-35, F-16 turned into Block F machine, and even Gripen going through its upgrade. Being an extremely compact fighter that LCA is and still waiting for the engine around which it was designed, where do you LCA’s growth potential.

Given the exponential growth in avionics – the LCAs growth potential is one of the smallest issues as it stands today. The ADA has already charted out an avionics growth plan for the aircraft f.e. and its already being implemented. The OAC on the LCA for instance replaces three separate LRUs. Similarly, the MMR as it stands today, is much lighter than the original since its components have been rationalized.
Coming to propulsion, and the like, the entire issue is of getting a Block 1 out of the door. The rest is iterative. Once production stabilizes, and teething troubles solved, the design team can work on derivatives or even upgrades.

While many would argue that IAF is fully backing LCA, i personally am not fully convinced. First IAF has only placed an order for 8+20 (another 20 only optional yet) Tejas..and even that order of 20 took considerable time. Although IAF has reiterated on numerous times that the requirement is for 200+ machines, it would have been a lot better to actually demonstrate its commitment by allocating funds for more machines. Having said this, could anyone here elaborate on the relationship between DRDO/subsidiaries and IAF. The way i look at it (and i may be wrong) is that DRDO has promised IAF a lot in the past and not delivered in time forcing the latter to reconsider its plans on more than one occasion. Is it possible that IAF don’t have the sort trust in DRDO that is required in such a project, and hence the lack of further committment???

Simple fact is that the IAF has done all its supposed to by the letter of the agreeement. They have committed to the program and put in the exact orders necessary to keep it chugging along. Note my use of the words, letter and exact. What this means is that the IAF wont go the extra mile to help the LCA all the time. They are treating it the same way they treated the MKI, the Mirage and Jaguar programs, albeit putting in much more resources to finetune the bird. But they dont have the institutional design and development background to fully run and support a program of this magnitude.

Coming to DRDO and the IAF, which came first, the chicken, or the egg? Thats the issue, either side will point fingers, but what is thankfully, finally present is a coordination committee which was sorely missed earlier. With all three, IAF, HAL and DRDO on it, decisions are now being made faster and with more commitment from the users side, even if the latter is still used to being finicky and a penny pincher. To some extent, GOI has laid down the law. But the IAF will not budge until the LCA meets the same requirements as any import would.

The MMR is a typical case. The A2A modes work, the A2G dont- yet. In other countries, the MMR would be hoisted on, accepted in the interim and then work would continue on the A2G. But the IAF finds this unacceptable, they want a perfect product from day1, so ELTA has been roped in to solve the A2G issues.

The same attitude exists throughout when it comes to the LCA. The Navy is more willing to cut corners on its first batch products as long as the second batch has the desired specs, and are retrofitted to the first , but the IAF wont accept the same. The difference in attitude is because the Navy itself designs its stuff with DRDO so they know how hard it is, and are willing to keep the big picture in mind.

Simply poor project management.

Although some here might not agree with me, but to start with India did not have the expertise to initiate a mega project such as LCA on her own. Indian aviation industry was still in its infancy, and young indian aviaition experts under constant push by GOI for more indigenisation probably felt that they could deliver LCA within those timeframes on their own. Although some foreign expertise were brought in from the beggining, but probably not enough which has haunted the project to the day. Although more foreign consultation is being sought now, i think its probably too little too late. As i have always said i dont think anything would force LCA project to be cancelled (that’s almost inconceivable), the delays in LCA project have forced IAF on a number of times to reconsider its modernisation plans. While the project has slowly improved and they have realised the importance of expert consultancy, i still feel the process is a bit too slow. With time, IAF’s ASR would increase and LCA would have to play chase unless it can catch up in near future.

Its easy to come up with such predictions and dismissals, but are you even aware of the reality?

The LCA, the Arjun have been the stepchildren of Indian defence research. Its only in the past decade where money has been flowing, sanctions have come down, so foreign cooperation can be reeopened.

Lets evaluate your claim of poor PM. Ok, the Kaveri is a mistake- but what other options were there in terms of engines? The IAF already declared the RD-33 as a no show thanks to its MiG-29 experience.

So the five years delay due to the N tests. Was the LCA team informed before hand about what was going to happen? No- they were not. It was a decision made at the crux of the moment, and the political masters said, the price is worth paying since nukes were more important. They were correct to some degree, but did someone inform the user and convince the IAF? No, didnt happen.

Ok, what about the umpteen deals DRDO had planned with Bae (for flight control), Moog for actuation, LockMart for FBW and tests on the VISTA, work with Raytheon (proposed) for MMR, with other US firms for the RLG INS…all cancelled….all cancelled. Sanctions.

Before that, a decade of forex issues …and then bingo…a few years later, we have sanctions.

DESPITE these issues, the LCA team

Completed the FBW on their own by setting up a team to code it inhouse
Compensated for lack of VISTA by own flight sim
Did their own first cut radar design and got it into flight trials
Developed and integrated a full glass cockpit
Launched and completed a program for an all Indian RLG INS..
Developed and manufactured a complete local undercarriage
Ditto for the canopy and canopy severance system
Developed both the HW and software for multiple avonics LRUs..

Seriously…what are they supposed to be? Magicians?

The list is huge, there are other forums where folks would know more than I do as well, such as BRF

Project management is a cop out when talking of a poorly funded program where funding is available in trickles and bursts and which has languished for a decade under both funding and sanctions.

And before anyone asks, yes, several European firms were consulted, to bypass sanctions, the prices quoted were out of the range of Indias pocket at the time.

Its now that India is putting moolah into a spate of joint ventures and all sorts of stuff.

The point is that 70% indigenisation for the Tejas has always been planned with tieups and assistance to bypass two decades of zero development in India. Now take away $$ and that assistance, and see what happens to best laid plans!

The Tejas being a compact fighter, simply needs among best in the class systems to perform. It cant afford any compromises in subsystems, and that means only tieups with industry leaders can be contemplated. Which is expensive and a pain in the butt.

Its very hard to predict which aircraft has lower drag or more drag at different corners of the flight envelope. The actual Cd values will not even come out in the windtunnels per se, but actual flight tests. And I think this is where the Gripen has the current edge – its a mature tested platform but more importantly with an engine its designed for, from day1. The LCA is juggling several powerplant options, and there is little time for painstaking optimization for each option. Though it can be done once an initial squadron is in service, while work proceeds on the iterative improvements.

Hindsight suggests that coupling a new airframe with an abinitio engine development program was very risky and India is now paying the price. But at the time, other options were also unavailable, bar the Ge404 which was always regarded as but an interim engine unsuitable for series production aircraft.

Ironically enough, its the US which effectively crippled the LCA timeline by imposing sanctions. Almost 3-5 years were lost in the program thanks to complete cessation of assistance in actuators, flight control testing as well as engine integration. The US also illegally impounded an Indian designed FBW DFCC computer under the grounds that India had consulted Lock Mart over FBW testing and this was related. It was a clear attempt to scuttle the program.

That time lost is now hurting the program since the spare time, budgeted for in any program has been used up.

India chose the US for political reasons and technological. Several of the early choices in the LCA had politics coupled with them. Dassault too didnt have full experience with Quad FBW and several of their answers were not satisfactory when they came to India to respond to a tender for collaboration.

In contrast, MBB and BAe were fair with info, accurate and had the tech to collaborate as well. Politics meant that Dassault got the initial deal, which still went ok, but critically, the US got the overall project for engine, INS, FBW assistance etc. What a collosal mistake.

India should have gone with BAe instead. The tendency to couple politics with arms deals is a common one in many countries, but Indian politicians got swayed by hubris and naivete, and did not show mature strategic thinking.

Personally, it sounds like India would rather spend billions on a Military Project that has failed by every reasonable standard. Just, admit to a mistake and move on…….:( There is no shame as Military Project fail all the time! The US has had many………learn from your mistakes! 😮 Can India really throw good money on top of bad. For what???

India could do with many more such failures then, which develop an aero industry from scratch.

On failure, if the US can put such a woeful, third rate, dawg such as the Super Horror into production and salvage something out of it via decent avionics, I think the LCA- in comparison, has a much better potential.

After all, we all know what the Sewer Horror is worth in airframe terms, but even its useful. Of course, India shouldnt aim so low, but try to get the aircraft upto ASRs. Doubtless, you agree. :p 😉

Sorry but I prefer to believe the Russian T-72 crewman I heard it from.

That crewman was making a good joke at your expense. There is no arm feeding issue in the T-72 autoloader, unless the crewman is dumb enough to put his hand slap bang in front of the rammer. Plus there is a guard at the side to prevent the crew from any such possibility.
The T-72 eats crewmans hands myths is one of the most inane ones which refuses to die out.

Plus they dont want a desparate (for finances) Russia to turn to China for financing, or sell it weaponry far better than currently released stuff so as to finance the PAKFA. No JSF or F-22 is ever going to China, but we couldnt say the same for the PAK-FA till india joined it.

With the numbers stacked against it, India needs technology to survive against the PLAAF. Especially with those S-300 PMU2s which will make the IAFs life “interesting” if even more are purchased.

The one, who controls the related satellites for navigation, communication and intel can claim an independent network for a net-centric-warfare. The other ones do try something similar, but have to be aware about the limitations are related to that. In the F-35 program are several nations, but none except the USA will have all knowledge to that and the related control.
When a lot of general data about the the F-35 program and the planned performances are known, nothing similar is heard about the PAK-FA. Things like to be overweight or delays are known to the public and had to be addressed, before program costs may get out of control. With the PAK-FA there are no informations and no public control by that with alll the shortcomings. When there is no shortage of unspecific claims and wishfull thinking related to that. We have no idea, what are the wishes of India related to that PAK-FA, when we do know, what the British do exspect of their F-35s. Can it be, that a lot of problems with the Indian military programs are related to that wishfull thinking and a lack of open control?!
All that has nothing to do with military secrets. The true performance of military hardware will be learned in operations only.

I think the rest of your post just develops the first theme further.

So lets go to that. First, the hardware and software that links everything together. Commercial processors and other items are like commodities now. How they are tied together makes the difference, and there both India and Russia have experience. Both nations will implement something of their own desire and differing requirements.

Then it comes to the signals that these things will rely on- GPS for instance. But both india and russia have signed up to resuscitate GLONASS as well.
Coincidence?

Finally- what existing experience does either country have?
I have already mentioned some of what India is doing. Keeping that aside, Russia itself had one of the most advanced network centric models in the world, even before that term became commonplace albeit not used to its optimum potential. Todays Russia is not subject to embargos on modern COTS Semiconductor items, it can integrate third party gear and it has the design heritage of the SU to draw upon for modern systems, to the extent that it provides datalinked Flankers for export which India has purchased and is using.

All in all, this network centric thing being very hard is more hype than substance- many nations can implement variations of it, and its upto their services and local industry to see how they can support it. While a developing country like India may not reach the high bandwidth stage – a laptop to call down airstrikes in every platoons hands- anytime soon, it may well be able to datalink its units to function with far better situational awareness and perform far better than before. That is enough.

A single network-centric warefare platform is not a centric-network.
Back to earth. What are the details about that network and what specifcations do the Indians claim for their future fighter. Words are cheap and hard to verify. I did hear something similar about Arjun and Tejas before.

Hard to verify? Words are cheap? The Russians have extensive experience in datalinks and N/W centric ops, somewhat to the detriment of individual pilot freedom at some times. The Sukhoi MKs all carry datalinks of various flavours, why would the PAK-FA be any different? It would presumably be a newer gen, higher bandwidth more capable unit as well.

Coming to India, its setting up a national datalink n/w to link all its fighters, ADGES, and to be delivered Phalcons together. The local AEW&C unit is to have both fighter/ ground unit datalink interface as well as SATCOM links. This, for instance, is a locally developed DL for interfacing Naval ships, aircraft and AEW (Ka-31) units:
http://www.bel-india.com/BelWebsite/index.aspx?q=&sectionid=217

Dont see why something similar couldnt be part of the PAK-FA. After all, stealth would require n/w centricity to be made optimum use of.

Coming to the Arjun, a BMS system has been developed, a more advanced one is in development. Current one plots tank position, etc using GPS to give friend and foe info. The next unit is to be more comprehensive and provide info on loadouts, fuel status, tank status (serviceable, damaged) etc. The system could be presumably fitted to other tanks as well, but the space issues in T type tanks are well known.