Thanks Nick , Yes I would do the changes and reference it where ever I can , Most of the data you see there are either based on the dicussion we had at BRF and from inputs from Arun.
Good job!
Although if you find some flaws there let me know and I could make the necessary changes.
I would brush up the opening scenario also.
Indeed if we could manufacture Greenpine class with the customisation we require then its really a notable achievements and less talked about one
Exactly! The indian media is beyond stupid to not realise the significance of what DRDO has revealed, which of course DRDO will not repeat to public.
From BR, wiki and BEL, this is the list of Indian made radars- (I copied the list from BR)
–Indra 1, Indra 2 2D radars, 100 km, 90 KM- 37 ordered/ in Indian service
–BFSR-SR– over 1000 2D BFSR for army
–3D CAR– 9 ordered, 7 IAF, 2 Navy, more if Akash SAM is ordered, with 180 KM range, 150 targets TWS, Planar Array Antenna
–Low Level Lightweight 50KM 3D radar, for IAF, based on Indra-2 technology, 20 ordered
–Battery Level Radar Rajendra, 80 Km range, meant for Akash, 64 target TWS, Passive Phased Array antenna
–WLR, 40 Km range, for artillery detection and ranging, 28 planned, developed from Rajendra
License produced, Flycatcher, Reporter, Thales/ Signaal RAWL Naval radar for long range 2D Surveillance, Elta medium power radars (19), Elta BFSR-MR
Now add GreenPine to above list, 600- 1000 Km range, AESA, and this is really a strategic sytem
I think, local AESA might now replace THD-1955 when they finally get retired (12).
One of the strategic radar we need to develop either as joint development with Russia or indigenously are the Long Range OTH types , Russians have range of modern meter and decameter OTH mobile/semi-mobile radars capable of 1500 ~ 3,500 Km range and above which not only aids in LR BM detection but also makes any Stealth capability useless against them
This is what I think this is:
http://www.hindu.com/2006/12/23/stories/2006122305661600.htm
NEW DELHI: India and Russia have decided to cooperate more closely in defence research and development with the identification of three cutting-edge areas in which the scientists will work together.
A joint group of specialists has identified and finalised 12 projects in stealth, hypersonic and microwave technologies, according to highly placed sources. The decisions were taken at a meeting of the India-Russia Working Group on Military Technical Cooperation which ended here on Friday.
In microwave technology, Russian specifications are not meeting Indian requirements and the problem is under study, the sources added. Both sides will cooperate on technologies to track ballistic missiles.
The Agni-3 Potential even to target the remotest part of the globe with its variable payload vs range configuration is simply amazing , The Indian Thermonuclear Warhead with a variable yeald of ( 45 ~ 300 Kt ) has a weight of about 200 ~ 250 Kg.
http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/MISSILES/Images/Graph_payload_vs_range_r2A_700pixle.jpg
Wow. The entire PRC is now under Indian deterrence, once the Agni-3 is productionized.
And AGNI-4/AGNI-3++ will probably introduce MIRVs.
Hi Sens,
But the last ones are that, which ate-up the lions-share in a defence budget.
The Indian LCA and MBT in mind, I am not so optimistic about capabilities.
The MKI was developed and built in Russia. Some contend was added to Indian specifications and mayor parts of the MKI will still come from Russia.If it is China or India, indigenous seems to have a special meaning in Asia.
You would be correct in stating that the strategic programs were better funded viz the other programs, thats the whole thing. When funded reasonably, Indias defence apparatus has delivered.
http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/MISSILES/Agni.html
http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/MISSILES/Prithvi.html
Coming to costs, a more detailed look here:
http://forum.keypublishing.co.uk/showpost.php?p=1076742&postcount=535
As a result, the ratio of non-defence industrial R&D to defence R&D expenditure (as per 2002-03 figures) is only about 1.13 as compared to over 4 in the developed countries. Moreover, much of this meagre industrial R&D expenditure is concentrated in pharmaceuticals, transportation, and chemicals, which are of little assistance to the defence sector. The above factors naturally have implications for the country’s ability to exploit the defence R&D efforts fully. For instance, the absence of an appropriate industrial base forces the DRDO to import raw material, components, and subsystems that go into a given product, whose exports, given the nature of the systems being developed, are either embargoed or are subject to a time-consuming licensing process. This often forces the DRDO to develop all the necessary major high-tech components and subsystems from scratch leading to delays and cost escalations.
The fact of the matter, however, is that, far from being a waste, investing in defence R&D has contributed significantly to national defence despite the many constraints. The value of indigenous defence items based on the DRDO’s R&D and delivered to the Services during 1985-2005, according to estimates, is about Rs.14,800 crore. This includes armaments (43 per cent), missiles (30 per cent), electronics including avionics (22.5 per cent), naval sensors and weapons, armoured vehicles, engineering equipment, food, textiles and other combat wear, and life sciences products. Further, firm orders exist for Services-approved items, valued at Rs.11,900 crore, to be supplied by 2010. These include the first 20 Tejas Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) for the Air Force and 124 Arjun Main Battle Tanks (MBTs) for the Army. The value of DRDO-developed items in use by the Services by 2010 would thus be nearly Rs.26,000 crore, not insignificant by any measure. All these systems have been accepted by the Services for induction after extensive user trials and stringent threshold levels of acceptance in the post-user trials production phase. According to the DRDO, often problems of technology transfer due to limited engineering and production capability in the domestic industrial sector make the latter phase particularly difficult.
It is also instructive to know broadly how DRDO’s budget of over Rs.5000 crore actually gets spent. About 35 per cent of the budget goes towards the priority activities of the DRDO, which are the development and implementation of strategic systems that include nuclear weapons and long-range missiles such as Agni. About 18 per cent goes towards salaries of the 7,000 scientists and 12,000 technical staff, and about 12 per cent towards works and maintenance of infrastructure. About 5 per cent goes towards funding research projects in universities and institutions. That leaves only about 30 per cent exclusively for the development of technologies, systems and products spanning the whole S&T spectrum, from agriculture to aerospace.
This effectively means that only 2 per cent of the defence budget is available for developing systems such as the MBT, electronic warfare systems, missiles under the Integrated Guided Missile Development Programme (IGMDP), a range of radars, avionics, armaments, and combat engineering equipment. All these have been developed at much lower costs compared to international prices. These have also resulted in DRDO capability in a broad range of militarily critical advanced technologies. Notwithstanding the delays, cost-overruns, and apparent failures in some of the major projects — which are not entirely due to the DRDO’s shortcomings — the above achievements are creditworthy, given the levels of funding and available scientific manpower.
Moreover, the true significance of the above achievements can be better appreciated if one realises that one cannot really put a value to the DRDO’s efforts in the development of strategic weapons and systems. These are systems that cannot just be imported from anywhere or developed in collaboration with any country. The production value of these systems is not a true measure of the real impact of their development. Equally significant is the DRDO’s contribution in ensuring continuity of supplies of components in the face of changed politico-strategic situations, embargoes, and sanctions.
26,000 crore Rs- is anywhere between 5-10 Billion$ , given fluctuating exchange rates.
There is a writeup on local projects here, got the link from another forum, but even it barely scratches the surface. Basically, India spends much lesser on military R&D than its peers and spreads the money out on a vast range of programs. It couples this with strict bureaucratic control and oversight, which is not optimum. But the new DPP is stressing upon a brand new model of private manufacture, and stresses upon exports, which is to revamp the existing model and bring more investments in. Lastly, the concept of offsets is finally being implemented in India, this means that Indian industry- private and public, is not tied to the Indian services limited funding cycle.
Coming to MKI- I dont think anyone can call it indigenous in terms of being entirely or majorly designed in India, the term is used viz. its local manufacture, which is coming with substantial TOT (over which again there has been smoke and fire, because of a misreading of phase IV production). The major parts of the MKI- in particular its engine, will be made in India, which is now investing substantially in russian derived production- RD-33, AL-55I, AL-31FP.
Coming to the LCA, its definitely indigenous- if the J-10 is Chinese, and the Gripen is swedish, and its basically meant to develop a local aerospace design and manufacture capability. The initial production batches are to have a 70% local content, which will rise gradually over the production run.
Sens, continue here
http://forum.keypublishing.co.uk/showpost.php?p=1076871&postcount=537
Pardon me , but I did a small write up on the recent ABM test with lots of help received from from our own Arun_S to make it technically accurate.
Good work Austin, some editorial critique: if you brush it up grammatically and spelling wise, and reference it, it would be even better.
Interestingly- this is what Dr Saraswat, noted after the ABM test:
Hindustan Times, December 2, 2006
“The test validated many technologies, hardware and software that went into building long-range tracking radars (LRTR), new generation missiles, terminal guidance systems, communication systems and missile control systems,” Saraswat said.
Scientists had been working on the exo-atmospheric intercept system for “almost five years.” Saraswat had no qualms admitting that “experiments do not mean deliverance and at least half a dozen tests would be required before making any commitments could be made on when the system would be ready for users.”
If the DRDO is to be believed, the basic elements for the BMD system have been developed indigenously. Except the LRTR, which is a modified Israeli Green Pine radar. “We have ruggedised the radar and produced most of its components. More than 30 private firms helped us in developing software and hardware for the interception systems.”
In another interview, Dr Saraswat reveals that India can now manufacture these radars on its own. This is a huge step forward for Indian radar development, to be able to manufacture GreenPine class AESA radars.
DRDOs strategic plans are really assisting India’s technology development. I wonder why they are not working on Long range 3D radars for the IAF after 3D CAR?
Will you be going to AeroIndia this time?
In most presentative means, Ships. We have build all Soviet major Ice Breakers (exept the Lenin, and Arktica classes) and lot of specialliced ice strenghten cortainer ships and tugs as well as huge tonnage of normal commercial ships.
Also, normal heavy indstry products (Like I said, before the war preparations, our industry was almoust completely wood-forrest oriented.) Also Finnish construction workers have made lot of building assigments in quite High key soviet buildings, like Hotel Moskva and the Virü Hotel in Tallin. Also, our textile industry was almoust completely tasked by soviet exports. Thats why it almoust completely vanished in the early 90’s:( 🙁
It didn’t show in larger charts, becouse, in the end, we were small producer, but perhaps the Ice-breakers presents the most visiple element of this.
When you say “normal heavy industry” products, could you be more specific? This stuff is fascinating (to me at least). The Soviet Union has been often the target of propoganda (eg read Clancys works) where the average soviet worker is described to be living in a veritable gulag of shoddy civilian goods, since they only made military items. But your description (and ties with other countries) indicates that the standard of living, and modernisation was not so different.
Goll. can you state more on the tie-up between Finland and the Soviet Union during the cold war in terms of industry?
What did Finland provide the Soviet Union?
Thanks,this is a subject very rarely addressed in any publication..
Deterrance is a suicidal strategy for both India and Pakistan. The only reason deterrance worked during the Cold War is because the Capitalist-Communist conflict was primary ideological, and there had never been direct conflict between the primary combatants of the Cold War.
The conflict between India and Pakistan has historical, ethnic and sectarian elements. This is not a rational conflict, but a highly emotional one. In truth, the only solution is a negotiated settlement to the territorial dispute and the complete nuclear disarmament of both India and Pakistan.
You know when you come up with china disarming, we’ll take your bombast seriously.
BELs locally developed products
BEL to showcase exportable products, contract manufacturing capabilities
Premier Defence PSU Bharat Electronics Limited (BEL) is constantly innovating to manufacture state-of-the-art professional electronic equipment and components for the international market. BEL manufactures a wide range of Military Communication Systems, Radars and Sonars, Naval Systems, Telecom & Broadcast Systems, Electronic Warfare Systems, Tank Electronics, Opto Electronics, Professional Electronic Components and Solar Powered Systems.
At Aero India 2007, BEL will be displaying products and equipment from its wide range which have very good export potential. They include Communication equipment, Command and Control Systems, Radars and Sonars, Opto Electronics and Thermal Imaging products, Electronic Warfare Systems, Tank Electronics, Simulators and Avionic Systems.
BEL will also showcase its capabilities to offer both ‘Build to Print’ and ‘Build to Spec’ solutions for foreign manufacturers seeking Indian partners to meet their offset requirements. Some of BEL’s facilities like electronic and mechanical assembly, vacuum brazing and dip brazing will be highlighted.
The Communication equipment on display will include UHF and VHF Hand Held Transreceivers; Secure Tactical Radio in VHF band – STARS V Mark II; VHF and UHF Base Stations; Digital Radio Trunking System, Secure Telephone and Secure Fax; CDMA and SATCOM Systems; S-Band Mobile Radio; Encryption equipment; Unit Level Switch Board (ULSB) Mk II and Mk III – portable telephone Switch Boards for field use at battalion level; Semi-Ruggedised Automatic Exchange, SRAX Mk II; Ruggedised Data Terminal; ATM Switch; and Tactical Communication System.
The Command and Control Systems on display will include Artillery Combat Command Control System (ACCCS), Battlefield Surveillance System (BSS), Battlefield Management System (BMS), Integrated Air Command Control System (IACCS), Composite Communication System, Intelligent Message Terminal and Ruggedised Simputer.
BEL’s Radars and Sonars on display will include Battle Field Surveillance Radar – Short Range; Target Designator Sight, Transducer – Sonar, IFF Mk XI (CLIFF), Surveillance Radar Element, Schilka Upgrade, Navigational Radar and Electro Optical Director. Models of 3D Medium Range Radar, Battery Level Radar, Reporter Radar, Weapon Locating Radar, Flycatcher Radar and INDRA II Radar will also be exhibited.
Opto Electronics and Thermal Imager Products on display will be Night Vision Binoculars; Night Vision Goggles; Night Weapon Sights; Hand Held Thermal Imager; Hand Held Thermal Imager – Uncooled; Integrated Observation Equipment (IOE) – an imaging system for observation and fire monitoring by Artillery, it consists of a Thermal Imager, Laser Range Finder mounted on a Goniometer with North Finding Facility and a Global Positioning System; Laser Range Finder – Air Defence; Laser Range Finder – Hand Held Eye Safe; Laser Range Finder – Binocular Eye Safe; Gap Measuring Device Mk II; Laser Designator cum Range Finder for Mortar Fire Control; Video Communication System with Image Compresseion and Image Intensifier Tubes Gen 2+.
Tank Electronics systems on display will be Advanced Land Navigation System; Combat Net Radio; Tank Intercom System R-174 Mk II; Digital Universal Control Harness; Indigenous Gunner’s Main Sight and Driver’s Night Periscope. The L-70 and Zu-23 Gun Upgrades will also be shown.
A few of BEL’s Electronic Warfare Systems will also be on display including Cellphone Jammer and Sanket.
Avionic Systems on display will be Head Up Display, Radar Warning Receiver and Airborne Electronic Warfare Systems.
Simulators on display will be Mortar Simulator, Anti Tank Guided Missile Simulator, BMP II Driving Simulator and Forward Observation Simulator.
BEL will also show some of its non-defence products like Batteries, Simputer, Electronic Voting Machines, Direct To Home Set Top Box, ADSL Modem, MEMS, Microwave Tubes, Smart Card-based Access System, Intermediate Data Rate and Super Components.
In addition to an indoor display in Hall D, BEL will also have an outdoor display of some of its larger products. These will include the Upgraded Flycatcher Radar – an all weather anti-aircraft weapon control system; Battle Field Surveillance Radar – Short Range with Thermal Imager; 2-Axis Stabilised Optronic Pedestal to work in association with Guns to make them operate in autonomous mode; Low Probability of Intercept Radar, which is mounted on a wheeled vehicle; Radar SV 2000; Weapon Locating Radar; Battery Level Radar and Aluminium Skin Shelter with NBC Power Source and Antenna Mast.
For the first time, BEL will be selling some of its products like the Solar Lantern, Set Top Box for Free To Air Channels and Memory Stick at its outdoor display area at Aero India 2007. A special discount of 10 per cent is being offered on the products.
http://www.hindu.com/2007/02/02/stories/2007020203681000.htm
DRDO: a better understanding needed
R. RamachandranNotwithstanding the delays, cost-overruns, and apparent failures in some of the major projects, the DRDO’s achievements are creditworthy given the levels of funding and the available scientific manpower.
OF LATE, the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) has come under severe criticism in the media, sections of which appear to be in a campaign mode. The Government has also decided to set up a committee to review its functioning. Before getting into any detailed scrutiny of the DRDO’s projects, it is important to have a proper understanding of the research and development system in the defence sector, its relation to the national science and technology system, its place in the country’s overall industrial base, and the importance for the armed forces.
For the last ten years, the DRDO’s budget has been 5-6 per cent of the total defence budget. The 2006-07 defence budget stood at Rs.89,000 crore of which the R&D component was Rs.5,454 crore. (The country’s total defence R&D expenditure includes investment by industry. This is about 8 per cent of the DRDO’s expenditure nearly all of which is by the public sector units.) It is, therefore, somewhat strange that there is often talk of a lack of defence preparedness and modernisation of the armed forces due to the DRDO’s failure to meet the Services’ needs.
Let us, for the sake of argument, assume that the money spent on the DRDO is a total waste. How is a mere one-twentieth of defence expenditure responsible for the apparent vulnerability of the armed forces to perceived threats? Or more precisely, compared to Rs.500-1000 crore of annual defence procurement based on DRDO technologies, imports have been around Rs.10,000-12,000 crore. (The current annual budget for capital acquisitions for defence is about Rs.35,000 crore.) Surely, the nation’s defence ill-preparedness cannot be attributed to the “wasted” 2-3 per cent of annual procurement. Why is there no political or media focus on the 90-95 per cent of the annual defence expenditure and the manner in which it is being spent?
One of the basic problems in the organisation of the country’s defence is that threat perceptions are not based on any systematic analysis by the Services of the geopolitical and the geostrategic environment in the country’s neighbourhood and a comprehensive technical assessment based on that of medium- to long-term operational requirements of weapons and systems. Any demand placed on the national defence R&D system should reflect such an assessment. Unfortunately, many of the Services’ demands would seem to be derived from foreign vendors’ sales pitches — what have come to be termed BBC (Best of Brochure Claims) in DRDO circles — and their lobbying network of arms dealers, agents (very often ex-service personnel), and middlemen operating in the country. As a result, system specifications (which constantly keep changing) placed on defence R&D would seem to mirror not the actual dynamics of the security environment of the country but the dynamics of technological evolution of the global defence industry, which the DRDO is expected to realise fully.
From this perspective, there would seem to be little appreciation by the nation’s executive and the Services of what a DRDO scientist, writing in India’s National Security: Annual Review 2001, has referred to as the “Triple Trap” the country is increasingly facing: “What is developed abroad will not suit our new [defence] requirements; what is suitable will be denied; what is not denied will be unaffordable.” The article added: “It is not adequately recognised that the dimensions of the scientific, technological and manufacturing effort that is needed to break out of this `triple trap’ are so large that the entire S&T and the advanced manufacturing infrastructure of the country is barely up to the task.”
Strong civil industrial R&D efforts, and increased manufacturing capability, are necessary to sustain a good defence technology base. To understand the national R&D scenario, in particular in the industrial sector, and to locate defence R&D in that perspective, the following figures would help. Although defence accounts for the highest share (18.3 per cent in 2002-03) of the national R&D expenditure, the total national spending as a fraction of GDP/GNP is only around 0.8 per cent, which is low compared to even countries such as Brazil and China, let alone developed countries. More importantly, the industrial R&D effort is a mere quarter of the total R&D expenditure, as against nearly two-thirds in industrialised economies.
As a result, the ratio of non-defence industrial R&D to defence R&D expenditure (as per 2002-03 figures) is only about 1.13 as compared to over 4 in the developed countries. Moreover, much of this meagre industrial R&D expenditure is concentrated in pharmaceuticals, transportation, and chemicals, which are of little assistance to the defence sector. The above factors naturally have implications for the country’s ability to exploit the defence R&D efforts fully. For instance, the absence of an appropriate industrial base forces the DRDO to import raw material, components, and subsystems that go into a given product, whose exports, given the nature of the systems being developed, are either embargoed or are subject to a time-consuming licensing process. This often forces the DRDO to develop all the necessary major high-tech components and subsystems from scratch leading to delays and cost escalations.
The fact of the matter, however, is that, far from being a waste, investing in defence R&D has contributed significantly to national defence despite the many constraints. The value of indigenous defence items based on the DRDO’s R&D and delivered to the Services during 1985-2005, according to estimates, is about Rs.14,800 crore. This includes armaments (43 per cent), missiles (30 per cent), electronics including avionics (22.5 per cent), naval sensors and weapons, armoured vehicles, engineering equipment, food, textiles and other combat wear, and life sciences products. Further, firm orders exist for Services-approved items, valued at Rs.11,900 crore, to be supplied by 2010. These include the first 20 Tejas Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) for the Air Force and 124 Arjun Main Battle Tanks (MBTs) for the Army. The value of DRDO-developed items in use by the Services by 2010 would thus be nearly Rs.26,000 crore, not insignificant by any measure. All these systems have been accepted by the Services for induction after extensive user trials and stringent threshold levels of acceptance in the post-user trials production phase. According to the DRDO, often problems of technology transfer due to limited engineering and production capability in the domestic industrial sector make the latter phase particularly difficult.
It is also instructive to know broadly how DRDO’s budget of over Rs.5000 crore actually gets spent. About 35 per cent of the budget goes towards the priority activities of the DRDO, which are the development and implementation of strategic systems that include nuclear weapons and long-range missiles such as Agni. About 18 per cent goes towards salaries of the 7,000 scientists and 12,000 technical staff, and about 12 per cent towards works and maintenance of infrastructure. About 5 per cent goes towards funding research projects in universities and institutions. That leaves only about 30 per cent exclusively for the development of technologies, systems and products spanning the whole S&T spectrum, from agriculture to aerospace.
This effectively means that only 2 per cent of the defence budget is available for developing systems such as the MBT, electronic warfare systems, missiles under the Integrated Guided Missile Development Programme (IGMDP), a range of radars, avionics, armaments, and combat engineering equipment. All these have been developed at much lower costs compared to international prices. These have also resulted in DRDO capability in a broad range of militarily critical advanced technologies. Notwithstanding the delays, cost-overruns, and apparent failures in some of the major projects — which are not entirely due to the DRDO’s shortcomings — the above achievements are creditworthy, given the levels of funding and available scientific manpower.
Moreover, the true significance of the above achievements can be better appreciated if one realises that one cannot really put a value to the DRDO’s efforts in the development of strategic weapons and systems. These are systems that cannot just be imported from anywhere or developed in collaboration with any country. The production value of these systems is not a true measure of the real impact of their development. Equally significant is the DRDO’s contribution in ensuring continuity of supplies of components in the face of changed politico-strategic situations, embargoes, and sanctions.
The intangible benefits of nurturing a sound defence R&D base, which has self-reliance as an essential element, cannot be over-emphasised. This will, in the course of time, lead not only to spin-offs into the civilian industry but also spin-ins from the civilian industry into defence technology development in the form of cost-effective off-the-shelf components and subsystems. A strong domestic R&D base also provides the requisite expertise for evaluating imports of high technology systems, which today forms a significant fraction of India’s defence acquisitions. But, most importantly, the challenging nature of developing complex defence technologies also provides the necessary attraction and encouragement to youngsters to look upon S&T as a career option, which is essential for advanced technology development across disciplines not just in defence.
26,000 crore orders = even at an unrealistic 50 Rs to a Dollar (actual exchange rate fluctuated between Rs 20 to 44 a dollar) is around 5.2 Billion $.
F-18 is part of the MRCA. It can go anyways- west or russian.
India normally buys force multipliers from the west and from israel. These include refuelling systems, electronic warfare items, optronics – thermal imagers in the thousands for example, ammunition technology..
Sweden has a chance to provide a complete artillery system for the Indian Army’s towed guns requirement, 155mm, 52 caliber with transfer of technology.
Why India buys Russian is a complex question. First is price for capability offered. With western/ indian systems fitted to them, russian units can offer excellent quality. Second, is of logistics- for example, russian tanks fit into the same logistics footprint of the earlier T-72 tanks. Third, is of technology- would any western nation have agreed to share missile technology as in the brahmos example or the MKI? I doubt it. Today India is working with russia for hypersonic missiles and the 5th Generation fighter, again unlikely to have Dassault or EADS offering an indepth tech access ability for a5G platform to India.
India’s local capabilities are increasing over time, for instance, almost all C3I systems are developed in India, radar development is also picking up pace, in EW and systems, India is also fielding more of its own units. Strategic missiles, same. So over time, the % of foreign input will reduce, but given Indian armed forces hankering for the latest technology, colloboration is a given for at least 30% of items. They want the same level of items as being developed/ inducted in the west, as far as possible, so unless there is a multi-decade long sanction clamped on India, they will not compromise. Strategic systems are a different issue and are likely to benefit from cooperation, but will be developed solely in India.
Sumeet…thanks for the above information. Its apparent that this conversion was rejected due to its feasibility/cost effectiveness and not because it was not possible. My argument was that MKI is a heavily modified flanker in the same way as F-16 block 60 is heavily modified version of earlier viper/falcon. While they can be labelled as ‘almost’ new designs due to extreme modifications, they cannot be branded as new designs.
This is semantic nitpicking. Put enough money and you can seemingly convert any Flanker variant to the other whilst keeping certain portions from the earlier variant. The fact is that the airframe modifications dont make a Su-30K to MKI transition economically feasible, as compared to a newbuild. What the report does not mention- is the fact that the greater concern is of avionics in the MKI vs the K. The Bars for instance cannot be fielded on the K, it requires a lot of modification to the airframe and the same goes for many avionics items in the MKI which have been sited carefully, and cannot be replicated without changing the internal schema. The Block 60 comparison is also false, because it does not see a completely new flight envelope, and hence airframe considerations, as the MKI to Su-30K’s. The latter are not super-manoueverable, the former are.
From BR
Anti-Ballistic Missile Defence Project
Unveiled in 2006, the ABM project was a surprise to many observers. While DRDO had revealed some details about the project over the years, its progress had been marked by strict secrecy, and the project itself was unlisted, and not visible among DRDO’s other programs. The ABM project has benefited from all the incremental improvements achieved by the DRDO and its associated industrial partners via the long running and often contentious Akash and Trishul programs. However, it is a completely new program, with much larger scope and with predominantly new subsystems.
The ABM project has two Missiles- namely the AAD and PAD (Prithvi Air Defence) missiles. The former is an endo-atmospheric interceptor of new design, which can intercept targets to a height of 30 km. Whereas the latter is a modified Prithvi missile, dubbed the Axo-atmospheric interceptor (AXO) with a dedicated second stage Kill vehicle for ballistic missile interception, upto an altitude of 80 km.
Both these missiles are cued by an active phased array Long Range Tracking Radar, based on the Elta GreenPine. The missile launchers are connected to a launch control center (LCC) and mission control center (MCC) which can be located upto a 1000 km away. There are multiple links between the centers and the launcher, to avoid jamming. Both wireless links (based on CDMA technology for anti-jamming purposes) and fibreoptic links are used. The entire set up was tested in November 2006, under the Prithvi Air Defence Exercise, when a prototype AXO, with a designation of PAD01 successfully intercepted another Prithvi missile at a height of 50 km. The target missile (PAD02) was set to mimic the profile of a Tactical Ballistic missile with a 600 km range. The test was a complete success, with the hit to kill methodology successfully tested (Neither Missile had a warhead). The prototype had an active radar seeker integrated with its kill vehicle.
After the test, the program Director Dr. Saraswat noted that there were still more tests to be done (six in all) before the DRDO could certify the AXO as functional, and that it was too early to rule out cooperation with other countries. Even so, the flawless functioning of the entire setup (hardware and software)- much of which was custom developed for the project, was a big shot in the arm for the DRDO. The project leader also noted that they had evaluated the S-300V in depth, and that its radars and missiles would not meet the specifications of the Indian made system.
The DRDO plans further tests of the endo-atmospheric interceptor as well, which can target aircraft as well as ballistic missiles. At present, the aim of the project appears to be modest, despite its challenges for a developing country such as India. For one, it does not aim to field capabilities such as boost-phase intercept or intercept Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles. Its directed primarily against the plethora of Intermediate range and short range Ballistic missiles fielded by Pakistan and China against India.
Guys.. stop this lengthy tit for tat response…:mad:
Oh I feel like going pidgin poetic on star49 again..:diablo:
the point is why Su-30 missing from the line up? ever thought about this. why they went with single pilot Su-27SM. difference between tactical and strategic.
Because they dont need it dude, by just upgrading even a portion of their massive combat fleet, and spending the rest on training and flight hours,their requirements are met.
the point is u cannot even make of half of Pak-FA.
In your dreams. India can clearly contribute to the PAK-FA, keep being in denial, it wont help Pakistan.
let me put this way, BARS,AL-31FP, FBW, Structure, HMS, Datalink, weopons is it Israeli? u are only making components. now show me some thing more critical than this. Aircraft cannot fly without engine.
HUD, Internal jammer, DMG etc are some of the Israeli components, other stuff is Israeli as well, but once again, why should I give you any info! :diablo:
who say transfer can only be from Gov to Gov. there is nothing in private sector.
Russian rules specify max emphasis on private industry. Russia-India trade aint that hot either, in high end stuff bar Govt deals. India finds it better to design stuff for the US and Europe, more money.
thats what i am saying. they will need money if India put money quickly like by end of this year. by next year. it will be only buyer-seller. obviously u havent read the full statements. and i dont want to show everything.:p
You are delusional, the InAF has declared that it wants key access to workshare and design commitments. Chew on it. :p
No one is disupting that. It is the slow decision and implementaion process. that will lead India to now where. neither here nor there.
Indias decision making meets its needs. Being a developing country, it has to carefully evaluate how and where it uses its funds for maximum effect.
tell this to Airbus and Boeing. they accepted suppliers a decade well before service entry of jet. suppliers decision of MS-21 is very near. let see what composite u can provide. kindly look around Vaso site also. .
Airbus and Boeing are not Russian firms. Once again you pass of some regurgitated claims from Lexis Nexis as reality. What next, claims of Leninets PESA being LPI?
Because u have taken an illogical position that India can contribute anything to 5th generation. Designing 5th generation is different process. there is very minimal for later comers once design and Centralized computing system is built up. u will be playing with cheap export variant.
The problem is that you are illiterate, take a gander around the forum and everyone would agree you are a grade A goof. I doubt whether anything I say will even enter your head about what and where Indian firms can work on what. Regurgitating keywords from Lexis Nexis is not knowledge, and I cant waste my time giving you enlightenment.
hehe why should i sad with some thing unrelated.:p u went into this trap of tennis match when u said ur going to avoid:diablo:
I have been making a joke out of you for the past bunch of posts, and still you come back, lol. I havent had so much fun in a while. 😀