It would be interesting to compare the servicability rates of HAL built aircraft and foreign built aircraft.

Surely IAF Personnel are responsible for all front and second line maintenence?

Put up the figures for the PAF & PAC Kamra, then lets see..:p

Latest AFM (Nov 2006) has an item on the low level of Mig 21 Bison servicability rate of around 33% in the IAF. Additionally, it says that there are “similar problems” with the Jaguar and MIG-27 fleet. As a result the number of available aircraft in IAF fighter squadrons is gradually decreasing. How accurate is this information or is it part of ASM Tyagi strategy to push the government for interim purchases before the MRCA and LCA comes through?

Who is the author of the AFM piece..
Just curious.

The Bison fleet serviceability is around 55% (check this thread) with individual squadrons at 70%.

The maintenance facilities etc are getting established, so it will go upto the usual 80% level (common for an aircraft of the Bis’s generation) in a year or so.

Jaguar & MiG-27s average around the same. The newer aircraft of which a handful have been inducted (with around 80 all in all, planned over the next couple of years) have all new avionics fits and will see MTBF etc gradually ramp up, as is always the case.

It is worthwhile looking at past practise- serviceability for the Mirages for example, was pretty low when initially acquired, and is now near the 100% mark, with almost all aircraft available at any given time, bar the few off the flightline for routine maintenance.

Yes, you would be correct in saying that the IAF is making a big “money push” for new aircraft. What they are not tomtomming however, is that even those aircraft will gradually be ramped up & since they will come with a substantial tech transfer package, the IAF may decide to involve themselves in what they want.

Basically a couple more squadrons of Mirages appear likely.

This thread is better off without him & his made up stories..best it remains that way.

http://www.carnegieendowment.org/events/index.cfm?fa=eventDetail&id=908&&prog=zgp&proj=zsa

This has not been posted here before, to the best of my knowledge.

India’s Strategic Environment and the Role of Military Power

Indian Air Chief Marshal Shashindra Pal Tyagi began his remarks on “India’s Strategic Environment and the Role of the Military” by highlighting that there are two Indias that we see today: a resurgent, politically stable and economically booming India on one hand; and a poor India that is struggling to break the poverty barriers on the other. He emphasized that India is trying to break out of centuries of poverty and the primary goal of India is economic progress. He argued that no economic growth is possible without peace and stability, and no peace and stability is possible, in turn, without military power. Therefore, according to him, India’s military power will have to play a crucial role within India’s strategic environment in the next 20-25 years to ensure peace and stability and thus, ensure India’s sustained economic growth.

ACM Tyagi divided India’s strategic environment into the external and the internal parts. On the external front, he identified two key strands: 1) political instability in India’s immediate neighborhood; and 2) the presence of various nuclear powers in the region. He pointed out that the political systems in almost all of India’s neighbors are not stable and it is hard to predict what kind of political systems would ultimately take root in these countries. While India’s democratic parliamentary system with all its imperfections continues to function in a stable manner, the same cannot be said about most countries in India’s immediate neighborhood. In his opinion, the political systems of India’s neighbors are either in flux or under severe strain, whether it is Nepal, Pakistan, Afghanistan, China, Bangladesh or Sri Lanka. Clearly, the jury was out on what shape and form the political systems in these countries would take. From India’s point of view of maintaining peace and stability and economic growth, he suggested that an established democratic political system in the region was clearly in India’s interests, since it is widely believed that when there is an established democratic tradition, generally speaking, peace prevails. He clarified that India did not want to enforce or sell democracy but simply wanted to see more democracy in its region.

The second key aspect of India’s external environment to be noted was that India was in a region where three nuclear powers- India, China and Pakistan- operated, along with other nuclear powers. Thus, besides the political instability, nuclear arms were a key element of India’s strategic environment.

On the internal front, he highlighted the significant threat posed to India by a great amount of non-state actors. Noting that terrorism not only threatened the peace and stability of India and its region but also countries across the world, he pointed out that there are political systems that are either unwilling or unable to deal with these elements. Since peace and stability are the key ingredients for sustained economic growth, and terrorism seems to threaten this very peace and stability in the region, it was critical to address this issue. He was also quick to point out that the US shared practically the same concerns on terrorism as India and there was a congruence of views between the US and India.

Turning his attention to the new, resurgent India, ACM Tyagi was optimistic that India’s high growth rates would be maintained in the coming years. He argued that as India experiences rapid economic growth, economic security and trade security will be increasingly more important. In other words, geo-economics, rather than geopolitics, will become the priority. The new threats to India will involve threats to its economic interests, and this in turn will imply that India would have to forget geographical boundaries and actually prepare itself to protect its interests even beyond its geographical borders.

The other security implication of India’s economic resurgence would be in the arena of energy security. As India’s energy needs grow dramatically, India’s basic security interest would clearly lie in ensuring a free, uninterrupted flow of energy to fuel its economic growth. Highlighting again the convergence of interests with the US in its quest for energy security, ACM Tyagi emphasized that the Indian military’s role in providing energy trade security would be critical.

Tyagi clarified that his remarks about the need for ensuring economic security beyond India’s geographical borders should not be taken out of context to imply any grandiose hegemonic plans. Rather, he highlighted India’s track record in the international arena and argued that the Indian armed forces had always played a very responsible role in international conflicts, often as part of UN peacekeeping forces. He conceded, however, that the role of India’s military was increasing and that it has recently played crucial roles in disaster relief and disaster management in various countries including Sri Lanka, Indonesia, Pakistan, Philippines and even the US in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina. Thus, he envisioned that military diplomacy would be one of the key roles of the military in the coming years.

In conclusion, ACM Tyagi made the case that India, with its impeccable track record, should be an active participant in matters of international security. He hoped that all countries, like India, would continue to seek to live peacefully with each other in the future. Only in such an undisturbed, peaceful environment would India be able to grow economically.

Q&A

During the Q& A session that followed, ACM Tyagi pointed out that India’s armed forces were cooperating extensively with other militaries in the region including the US, Singapore and Japan. He emphasized that the security interests of India and the US coincide- both are firm believers of democracy, free flow of energy and ensuring peace and stability around the world. Asked to clarify his comments on his remarks about operating outside India’s geographical boundaries, ACM Tyagi clarified that all militaries already operated beyond their boundaries, citing examples of India’s participation in military exercises with different countries as well as humanitarian efforts in the aftermath of the Tsunami and the earthquake in Pakistan, etc.

On the question of handling terrorism, ACM Tyagi noted that the Indian armed forces have been dealing with the scourge of terrorism for over half a century now and have consequently evolved and adapted to deal with the unique nature of terrorism and asymmetrical warfare. He did not foresee any major structural changes in the organizational structure of the Indian armed forces, though he did admit that they were being restructured to deal with international threats, especially ones that operated beyond India’s geographical boundaries.

Asked if China constituted a threat to India and if so, what capabilities was India seeking to acquire to address such a threat, ACM Tyagi mentioned that as military men, the Indian military forces have been taught to look at capabilities, rather than intentions. In this context, the Indian military continues to prepare itself for all military contingencies, even though relations with China are looking great at the moment. He admitted that the Indian military was thinking about China and keeping a close watch on China’s growing military strength. He added that the lack of transparency in China’s military budgets and planning made military calculations more difficult and demanded preparation for all scenarios. He concluded by saying that while the Indians were not concerned about China per se, they were definitely watching its rise.

On the India-US nuclear deal, he emphasized that the key thing to note was that India had pursued this deal not to enhance its nuclear weapons arsenal but to ensure its energy security needs in the future. He argued that India had chosen the plutonium route under the leadership of Homi Bhabha and that energy needs were the driving force behind the deal, and not any desire to acquire greater amounts of uranium. On the ties between India’s and Iran’s air forces, ACM Tyagi noted that there was very little interaction between the air forces of the two countries especially since Iran no longer had a highly advanced Air Force. He brushed aside criticism that India was allying closely with the US at the expense of its relationship with Iran, stressing that India wanted to maintain good relations with all its neighbors including Iran though the “good or decent relations” would be defined based on the situation.

This event report was prepared by Anirudh Suri, Junior Fellow in the South Asia program at the Carnegie Endowment.

From defenseworld.net, article from MilTech

India’s “Radiance”: ADA/HAL LCA TEJAS

By Paul Dreger

India has for a long time pursued the strategic objective to become at least partially independent from foreign sources for the procurement of weapon systems, that are considered as strategic. Within this long-term goal, the capability to design, develop and manufacture a state-of-the-art combat aircraft has been a recurring and firm reference point.

The first attempt in this direction launched in the second half of the ’50s, was the HAL HF-24 MARUT (“Wind Spirit”). The aircraft, designed by a team headed by the legendary Prof. Kurt Tank who had been responsible among others for the FW-190 and Ta-152 of WWII fame was only partially successful due to its inadequate performance. The MARUT had been intended as a potentially Mach-2 capable multi-role combat aircraft but because of the insufficient power of its licence-built Rolls-Royce ORPHEUS Mk703 engine it could actually only go supersonic in dives. Despite this a total of 147 MARUTs were built, and the type saw combat service in ground-attack roles during the war against Pakistan in 1971. The proposed HF-73 derivative was to use more powerful engines for full supersonic performance but the programme was cancelled after a crash leading to the decision to procure the JAGUAR. The last MARUT was finally withdrawn in 1985.

In addition to the main LCA series production run for the Indian Air Force, the Indian Navy is expected to eventually procure some 40 naval derivative aircraft to equip its carriers.

After this very limited success not to say partial failure more than twenty years elapsed before the launch of another fresh attempt. The idea for what eventually became the Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) programme was formulated back in 1983 – a timeframe which also saw the start of other combat aircraft projects such as the US ATF (Advanced Tactical Fighter) which eventually resulted in the Lockheed Martin F/A-22 RAPTOR, the EUROFIGHTER or the RAFALE all of which have been plagued by interminable delays and cost overruns for the most disparate reasons.

Programme Background

It should be stressed that the LCA programme was since the very beginning aimed not only at the design and manufacture of new state-of-the-art combat aircraft per se! but more broadly at the establishment of an integrated scientific/industrial capability to develop and put in production a complete airborne weapon system in all its elements: airframe engine, avionics fire control system based on multi-mode radar electronic countermeasure suite on-board systems and components and so on. In other words the true final goal is to leverage on the LCA programme for the creation of a new technology base in India covering the whole spectrum of disciplines related to the design and manufacturing of combat aircraft.

It is quite clear that such a very ambitious effort necessarily implies accepting substantial risks, particularly as regards the development schedule. Such risks however must be evaluated and assessed in view of the long-term goal as mentioned above, and not simply in relation to the timeframe for the development and operational deployment of the LCA. This point is apparently lost to many of those who criticise or even ridicule the LCA for being years behind schedule.

The LCA project definition phase was launched in 1987 by ADA (Aeronautical Development Agency), with a first flight very optimistically planned for 1990 and entry into service five years later. Industrial activities are the responsibility of Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd (HAL).

Needless to say, the original programme schedule quickly proved to be grossly unrealistic; indeed, the Full Scale Engineering Development (FSEO) Phase1 was launched in June 1993, this being financed by the government to the tune of Rs. 2,188 crore (1 crore = 10 million rupees). The first technology demons-trator, designated TDI (serial number KH2001), was actually rolled out on 17 November 1995. Here again innumerable delays, due to technical difficulties but also to political reasons contributed to the first flight being postponed until 4 January 2001. Several critical systems and components, including most notably the Fly-by-Wire flight control system (developed in collaboration with Lockheed Marlin) and the General Electric F404 engine (planned for the TD aircraft pending availability of the indigenous GTRE GTX-35VS KAVERI), are American imports and hence suffered from the embargo, enforced by the US Government in 1998 due to the Indian nuclear programme.
The two LCA technology demonstrators in formation flight.

The FSED Phase II started in November 2001 under an additional budget of Rs. 3,302 crore. The overall programme financing included not only the manufa-cture of two technology demonstrator aircraft, but also five prototypes (PV1 to PV5) and eight limited series production (LSP) planes.

The second demonstrator (TD2, #KH2002) was rolled out in August 1998 and flew for the first time on 6 June 2002. The fight test programme has since progressed, although not at the pace sought and expected after such long delays, and by early January 2004 a total of 140 flights had been performed. An important achievement although perhaps more from the psychological rather than technical point of view, was the first supersonic flight by TDI on 1 August 2003, followed on 27 November by TD2 which reached Mach 1.1 on its 66th flight.

After the two demonstrators, the development programme is to continue with five prototypes. PV1 was rolled out on 4 May 2003 and flew for the first time on 24 November and PV2 is expected to have also been completed by the times these lines appear in print. The prototypes are to be progressively more representative of the production aircraft with a lighter composite fuselage (-746kg), more and more capable flight control software (implementing variable gain control laws) aerial refueling probe and possibly the radar, to be installed in the PV2, PV3 and PV4. One PV aircraft is to be manufactured in a single-seat naval configuration and another as a two-seat, the remaining three being representative of the basic, Indian Air Force single-seat configuration.

All the prototypes as well as most probably the whole first series production run of about 30-40 aircraft are now planned to be powered by the F404 engine, this being due to the development programme of the KAVERI being even more beyond schedule than the aircrafts. Indeed. General Electric is offering India a dedicated more powerful version of the F404 for the production TEJAS. Designated F404-GE-IN20, this offers 20,000lb thrust (9070kg, 89.1kN) with afterburning. The new version would use elements of the RM12 derivative of the F404, built by Volvo Flygmotor for the JAS 39 GRIPEN, as well as a FADEC similar to the system as used on the F414 engine which equips the F/A-18E/F Super HORNET. The proposed initial contract is rumoured to be for 35 engines, which would point to a batch of 30 aircraft plus spares.

Three Main Versions

The TEJAS (“Radiance” or “Glorious” in Sanskrit) as the LCA has been officially named, has been conceived to satisfy a number of different operational requirements for both the Indian Air Force and the Indian Navy. The basic single-seat IAF version will be a multi-role combat aircraft capable of performing air superiority missions as well as ground-attack and anti-ship roles. A still unspecified variety of guided and unguided weapons will supplement the 23mm twin-barrel GSh-23 cannon with 220 rounds, semi-recessed in a slightly protruding fairing under the starboard engine intake trunk.

The planned dedicated carrier-borne variant will also be a single-seater but will feature a number of adaptations and changes including e.g. a new Landing gear with stronger legs and long-stroke shock absorbers tail hook and enhanced high-lift aerodynamic devices (retractable canard surfaces wing leading edge vortex controllers replacing the slat of the ground-based variants) to reduce approach speed and improve low speed controllability. The naval TEJAS will also have a lowered nose to enhance forward visibility during approach: and a retractable in-flight refueling probe replacing the fixed type. The maximum weapon load will be slightly reduced (from 4,000kg to 3,500kg) to partially compensate for the higher empty weight, while an additional weight reduction is planned to be obtained by further increasing the already large contents of composite material of the basic version which amount to 45% of the airframe by weight and 95% of its surface.

The other member of the family will be a tandem two-seater for operational trainer roles at OCUs (Operational Conversion Units) the PV5 prototype being manufactured in this configuration. The aircraft will have aerodynamics commonality with the naval version. The attrition problems frequently encountered in the last years in the pilot training by the Indian Air Force makes it essential to introduce such a variant in adequate numbers.

The Way Ahead

Coming to the operational deployment of the TEJAS and while a certain caution is advisable in view of the many development problems that have been encountered so far current plan calls for IOC (Initial Operational Capability) to be hopefully achieved by 2007 in coincidence with enough aircraft having been delivered to equip half a squadron, with FOC (Full Operational Capability) following by 2009. It will probably be necessary to wait until 2010-2012 for the aircraft to attain its full multirole potential. Some independent Indian commentators have put forward much more pessimistic forecasts and they don’t see series delivery starting before 2008 with IOC in around 2010 or even 2012.

Be this as it may, as already indicated the current financing of the LCA programme includes a first batch of eight limited series production (LSP) aircraft, which were ordered in early June 2002. Given that the first prototype has just flown, the LSP order is mostly intended to allow HAL to prepare the necessary facilities. This first order is expected to be followed by a first series batch of some 30-40 aircraft.

The Indian Air Force looks at the TEJAS programme as the direct replacement of its fleet of MiG-21s, while at the same time progressing from the specialised air-to-air roles of the small Russian fighter to multirole capabilities. This translates into a total requirement for 220 aircraft, including 20 two-seat conversion trainers.

The TEJAS would thus complement the much larger Su-30MK1, with the two types coming to represent the bulk of the IAF combat line until the new fifth generation combat aircraft (currently designated PAKFA) to be developed in cooperation between Russia and India will enter service.

The 220 TEJAS for the IAF should be supplemented by an additional 40 aircraft for the Indian Navy. In the first quarter of 2003 the Indian Government approved the relevant development programme to the tune of the equivalent of $210 million with clearance for carrier operation planned for 2007 and entry into service not later than in 2010. However, considerable uncertainties still seem to surround the programme. On the one hand, the real wisdom of developing a naval variant of the LCA in view of such a limited production run could be questioned. On the other hand and arguably more ominously, the Indian Navy is finally completing negotiations for the purchase and radical reconstruction of the moothballed Russian aircraft carrier ADMIRAL GORSHKOV in a package deal that includes, amongst other items at least 20 MiG-29K fighters. The Russians are reported to have reacted ”furiously” to recent attempts by the Indian naval authorities at including non-Russian items (such as the Israeli BARAK SAM system) in the modernisation programme for the GORSHKOV, and they would most likely cancel the deal if the Indians were to refuse the MiG-29Ks. Suggestions have also been floated to the effect that the ex-GORSHKOV is to operate the MiG-29Ks while the future planned 37,000 tons Air Defence Ship (ADS) would receive the navalised TEJAS, but such a twin solution appears highly perplexing unless the ADS is postponed to a distant future.

The Prime Minister of India, Shri Atal Bihari Vajpayee with ADA and HAL managers, technicians and military personnel at the roll-out ceremony of the first LCA prototype (PV1).

Mention has also been done, from time to time, of the TEJAS supposedly having good export prospects. Surely, if the aircraft will live up to its designers’ expectations, and if its selling price will be reasonable, then some export success is possible – if not for other reason then for the political advantages of not having to buy from either Russia or the West. The series production price ofthe TEJAS is currently projected at the equivalent of $17-20 million for the first batch, and efforts are being implemented to reduce this figure down to $15 million once production ramps up. Timing would seem to be a critical factor, however, in that China is also pushing ahead with the development of a similar combat aircraft and will most probably aim at the same export market.

Technical Description

Looking in some detail to the LCA design features, the effort by the designers to apply a variety of state-of-the-art technologies in order to achieve the required flight performance together with multirole operational capabilities in such a small airframe is evident. The TEJAS is in the same weight and size class as the JAS-39 GRIPEN, which however could capitalise on the superb experience Saab and its associated industries had matured in over 60 years of continuous combat aircraft design – and despite this suffered from not-so-negligible development problems with the loss of two prototype aircraft during flight tests. In fact the two aircraft are currently powered by variants of the same engine. It is however interesting to note that some of the most significant peculiarities of latest-generation Russian combat aircraft have found room on the TEJAS, including e.g. the IRST (Infrared Search and Track) sensor, the HMD/S (Helmet Mounted Display/sight) as well as ‘TVC’ (Thrust Vectoring Control) as a future pre-planned improvement.

The aerodynamic configuration is based on a pure delta wing layout with shoulder-mounted wings. The forward wing-fuselage junctures cover the side-mounted fixed-geometry air intakes thus straightening the airflow entering the intakes even at high angle of attack (AoA) to obtain a smooth distortion-free airflow to the engine. The wing’s outer leading edge incorporates a three-section slats while the inboard sections have additional slats to generate vortex lift over the inner wing and high-energy air-flow along the fin to enhance high AoA stability and prevent departure from controlled flight. The wing trailing edge is occupied by a two segment elevons to provide pitch and lateral control. Two airbrakes are located in the upper rear part of the fuselage to the side of the fin.

The aircraft is naturally unstable, stability and control being provided by a full-authority quadruplex digital Fly-by-wire (FBWI flight control system).
The structure of the TEJAS is mostly made in advanced materials, and even the metallic parts are aluminum-lithium and titanium alloys. The demonstrators have about 30% of the in structure by weight built by carbon composite and 57% by aluminum alloy these percentages shifting to 40% and 43% respectively in the prototypes and production aircraft. In particular, the wing upper and lower skin are single composite (CFRP Carbon Fiber Reinforced Plastic) elements bolted on the wing box whose spars and ribs are built of carbon composite (the same solution as adopted on the F/A-22). The same material is used for the elevons, fin and rudder, and airbrakes, while most of the fuselage skin is also made of composite as are the landing gear doors.
The fuselage-mounted retractable landing gear uses single wheels on trailing arms for the main units and a twin-wheel for the nose unit. A brake parachute is located in the fairing under the rudder. The fuel is carried in integral fuselage and wing tanks, while a fixed in-flight refueling probe (retractable in the naval variant) is a standard fit. A significant increase in fuel capacity (actually superior to internal tankage) can be provided by three 1,200lt or up to five 800lt external tanks carried on the four inner store stations and the under fuselage one.

There are a total of seven hard points (three under each wing and one under the fuselage), with the four inner pylons and the central one being “wet”. A Stores Management System (SMS) with 32 bit single-chip micro-controller based dual-redundant architecture and MIL-STD-1553B armament bus for intra-system communication and weapon interface will provide integrated control of air-to-air and air-to-ground weapons. The range of these weapons does not appear having been defined yet, or at least no information have been released.

The TEJAS avionics architecture is configured around MIL-STD-1553B data buses with built-in redundancy. The Mission Data Processor’s design follows Open Architecture Computing (OAC) criteria which overcome hardware obsolescence and enable software reusability. Commercial Off-The-shelf (COTS) components duly tested to military standards have been extensively used. The Digital Flight Control Computer (DFCC) takes inputs from the pilot inertial platform and air data sensors and generates appropriate commands to the control surfaces (rudder elevons slats and air brakes) actuators for effecting necessary deflections for aircraft maneuvers as per pilot’s demand. The Flight Control System software has been developed using Ada language and follows DOD standards. An Independent Verification & Validation (IV&V) process ensures correctness, consistency, completeness and adherence to MIL standards of all safety-critical onboard software.

As already indicated, in addition to the basic airframe and the KAVERI engine, the LCA programme also envisages an ambitious development effort for several systems and equipment. One of the most significant such items is a multimode radar offering all the modes that are nowadays expected by such a state-of-the-art system including track-while-scan for the simultaneous engagement of multiple aerial targets Doppler beam sharpening, moving target indicator, ground mapping, and more. The antenna will be a light-weight, low-profile slotted waveguide array with a multilayer feed network for broadband operation. This radar being developed by the ERDE (Electronic Research and Development Establishment) in cooperation with HAL has however run into major delays and cost escalations. It is thus not totally inconceivable that in order to avoid adding further uncertainties to the LCA programme as whole a foreign solution could be adopted for at least the initial TEJAS production batch.

Mention has been made of French types (such as the RDY already installed in the IAF’s MIRAGE 2000s), Russian and Israeli models and perhaps even the Italian FIAR GRIFO which however could be at a disadvantage due to it being in service on Pakistani aircraft.

GRTE KAVERI

As already commented, the real long-term goal of the LCA programme is to establish the required industrial capabilities to design and produce all the main components of a combat aircraft. It is thus logical that the power plant should be regarded as one of the critical elements in the overall LCA effort.

Responsible for the design and development of the KAVERI engine is the Gas Turbine Research Establishment (GTRE). GTRE was created back in 1959, and its activities have since progressed through a number of medium-thrust experimental engines starting with the GTX-37-14U afterburning turbojet, the GTX37-14UB low bypass turbofan derivative and finally the GTX-35VS turbofan, the forerunner of the KAVERI.

The actual launch of the programme for the KAVERI dates back to 1986, just before that of the LCA. The first bench run of the core engine was performed in early 1995 with the initial test of the complete engine following in September. A total of 17 development engines have been planned to contribute to the development programme, which however has suffered from significant delays. Some help has been obtained from Russia in the form of additional tests being conducted at the well-equipped Russian test centres in particular high-altitude chamber tests, which should account for at least 1,000 hours out of the estimated total of 8,000 test hours deemed necessary to complete the engine development. A subsequent evaluation campaign, announced but not yet started, foresees initial actual flight tests being carried out with an engine mounted in a pod under a Tu-16. It is however clear that the engine’s development schedule is out of synch with the LCA programme, hence the decision to equip at ;least the initial production batch of TEJAS with an improved version of the General Electric F404-GE-F2J3 which already powers the demonstrators and the pre-production aircraft.
One peculiar design target of the KAVERI has been to tailor it to the specific local operating conditions in particular the high ambient temperature’ which have given way to the flat rating of thrust to be maintained up to ISA +20OC external temperature condition. The KAVERI is a two-shaft low by-pass ratio (about 0.4) turbofan with afterburner with a mass flow of 78kg/s. The low pressure rotor is based on a three-stage fan/low pressure compressor, designed to produce a 3.4:1 pressure ratio and driven by a single-stage turbine with cooled blades. The high pressure core uses a six-stage compressor, with variable inlet guide vanes on the first two stator vanes, designed to generate a 6.4:1 compression ratio. It is also driven by a single-stage turbine with cooled blades built using directional solidified technology. The engine’s overall design pressure ratio of 21.5:1 (by comparison the conceptual similar F404 and EJ200 reach a value of 26:1) is still a target, the actual value reached so far being less than 20:1. The annular combustion chamber uses air-blast fuel atomisers while the high-pressure turbine inlet temperature is 1,700K. The afterburner is fully modulable and ends with a convergent-divergent Variable nozzle which should in the future give way to a multi-axis thrust-vectoring unit to enhance aircraft’s maneuverability. Finally the engine Control is via a FADEC (Full Authority Digital Engine Control) developed by GTRE itself in collaboration with HAL.
The engine current Weight is in the range of 1,150kg, the target for the production Version being 950kg, i.e. about 100kg lower than the F404. The maximum sea level static thrust flat rated to ISA+20-C condition is 52/81kN (5,300/8,260kg), respectively in dry/afterburning regime, with a related specific fuel consumption of 22.1/57.5 mg/Ns (0.78/2.03 kg/h/kgst).

Actualy I haven’t disowned anything – you continue to read what you want to.

Right..anything else..hmmm.. Is the sky not blue? Wait 2+2 is not equal to 4…please! Anyways, you are now on record & it will be quite interesting to see you stick to it..if you can.

As for flame baiting — you don’t think repeatedly asking what exactly Pakistan has contributed – despite being answered a number of times — is flame baiting? Does pot, kettle, black mean anything to you. Your intent on this thread is also clear to see even for a blind person.

Sorry- but it was only in your prior few posts wherein you said this..before that, all we had from your compatriots was calling RayRubik a retard for merely asking this question, and the dismissive “search on the forum” handwave.

My intent, as it is or was- has been clear- a) Find out the Pakistani contribution to the JF-17 to determine whether onr not, it is not license production. If you cant handle that, then sorry- you shouldnt be discussing this in the first place.

Your response on the other hand, has been documented. I have no wish to continue to engage in this circular discussion, but your statements are of course, now on record.

With regard to what worthies from PAF say- While I would like to – I am not privi to the information they have – and therefore cannot defend or reject what they say. I would hazard a guess that they know more than me or you. Comparison to the LCA is to be expected – given that India is the main rival.

I would actually hazard a guess and say that the lacked the kind of honest professionalism expected from them when it came to admitting their limitations by engaging in this sort of silly propoganda (with the current CAS apparently being much better if we consider his recent interview).

As for why its such a big deal – as you say its a giant step for Pakistan. Unfortuneately for you they will compare and will not have much regard for what was made where when they do. They will look at performance, price etc only. I can appreciate your frustration with this.

Hmm…I actually see your frustration, given that you are unable to provide any kind of evidence whatsoever for the original question, now you seek recourse in performance & price. Nice generic catch-all phrases…but then again, care to point out the exact performance or avionics specs or performance specs or even the exact price? Wait, you cant..! But never mind, keep plugging away!

Sorry but you have convinced me of nothing. I still believe that the main purpose of the LCA was to give the IAF a modern, indigenous fighter at the right price and within the specified time. Harping on about industry benefits — while I do not want to belittle them — does not make up for the fact that the main purpose has not been achieved.

Why would you think I wanted to “convince you”? :rolleyes:
I just wanted to point the severe lack of logic & any sort of factual information in your posts, wherein you applied your window dressed benchmarks to an Indian project with its differently stated objectives! Now it may really please you to blazes to continue to insist on Pakdef or elsewhere about how the LCA is indeed a failure on the lines of Pak good, India bad, pwnage etc, but that hardly reflects the reality, as it were.

If your view is that the main purpose was to build up the industry and actualy getting it avialable for the IAF on time and on price was just a secondary priority — you are entitled to it — but I must say I find this highly ilogical. These articles you’ve got saying its all about developing the industry – are they at point of project launch or after all the problems with it?

You find it highly illogical, since they contradict your deeply held belief- in that sense, I really cant help you. But I really doubt whether articles dating from the 80’s from the gentlemen who launched the LCA program or even recent ones, from external observers are really concerned about what you state!

India’s “Radiance”: ADA/HAL LCA TEJAS, Military Technology, Paul Dreger

Excerpt: It should be stressed that the LCA programme was since the very beginning aimed not only at the design and manufacture of new state-of-the-art combat aircraft per se! but more broadly at the establishment of an integrated scientific/industrial capability to develop and put in production a complete airborne weapon system in all its elements: airframe engine, avionics fire control system based on multi-mode radar electronic countermeasure suite on-board systems and components and so on. In other words the true final goal is to leverage on the LCA programme for the creation of a new technology base in India covering the whole spectrum of disciplines related to the design and manufacturing of combat aircraft.

It is quite clear that such a very ambitious effort necessarily implies accepting substantial risks, particularly as regards the development schedule. Such risks however must be evaluated and assessed in view of the long-term goal as mentioned above, and not simply in relation to the timeframe for the development and operational deployment of the LCA. This point is apparently lost to many of those who criticise or even ridicule the LCA for being years behind schedule

Click on it above, the complete article is on the IAF thread.

Hmm…there are several other reports from Indian scientists & the like, who were involved from the program from its genesis, I might have to hand type it out & I well might, but as this is the PAF thread..

As you say – we agree – If India has struggled with all these wonderful crosslinkages etc. Pakistan would have realy struggled. And therefore their approach is correct.
I’m sure the JF-17 is the first – measured – step – I would expect many further measured steps in the future.

Yet, those measured steps will continue to place Pakistan on reliance on the gentlemen who actually built the JF-17 for Pakistan. A subtle point, which you fail to discern.

OPV’s – Offshore Patrol Vessels. Put Castle Class OPV into google and you’ll find em. Indian Navy uses the Sukanya Class for the same purpose.

Well I hope they aint like those subs you sold the Canucks mate. 😀
On second thoughts I do! 😀

During that period the IAF seconded MiG-21s to the squadrons for keeping pilots @ the standard 180 hours/ yr figure minimum. Full ops combat pilots usually get away with more since they dont have restrictions on sorties and what they are allowed to do.

About MiG flying hour figures, each squadrons flying hours vary by role.

For example MiG 21 recce squadron pilots fly ~ 150 hours annually, with secondary ground attack role. However dedicated strike fighters fly much more (MiG-27, 23BN) to get to the 180 hours-200 hrs usual. Jaguars- 200 hrs. Mirage- same. Sukhois 200-250 and even more (all that extra fuel helps). So what counts are sorties, how many the IAF sets as the benchmark and if the training is spent in all up combat training. In this respect, the IAFs 20-22 sorties/ month set up, is very intensive. The hours I believe have really started spiking of late, thanks to the IFR induction.

The usual sortie used to last for 45 minutes (45 minutes* 20 sorties/ month *12/60 = 180 hours, 22 sorties gives you 198 hrs, per pilot, annually which matches what the IAF Western Air Command chief has stated is the usual- 20-22 sorties per pilot, per month & what we know of IAFs average pilot benchmark- 180-200 hours), but with IFR, Jaguars, Mirages and Sukhois all being so equipped, many pilots would now be pulling higher hours. Remember even the Sukhois do buddy refuelling, besides which, even without, they have a 3000 km range.