I seldom agree with Ron, but it’s absolutely clear to me that the USMC requires its own, organic CAS in order to support its role. Even as ‘leg infantry’, operating in a conventional campaign without an amphib landing, the Marines fight best with their own support.
Given the constraints of the dedicated assets it has access to, and with a real need to operate well-forward, only a STOVL aircraft will fit the bill (whether or not STOVL aircraft were relevant in GW 1 or another specific campaign), and the USMC cannot rely on air power based on a CVN – unless two or three of the CVNs were to be dedicated to the USMC full time.
And the USA has a requirement to mount large scale ops autonomously, without relying on coalition partners or allies for particular capabilities, so if STOVL JSF is required, the US must have those aircraft itself.
Moreover, with the record of the F-16 et al when operating from many more primitive bases during the war against terror, the real question should surely be why the USAF isn’t buying STOVL JSF in larger numbers? You need deployable air power, nowadays – and though some aspects of JSF would lead me to question the costs of supporting it in deployed ops, there’s no doubt that you need STOVL or a jet in the Gripen/Typhoon class for deployed ops – combining both short field performance, a short logistics tail and small footprint, minimal GSE and low manpower requirements.
And if you need and can afford carriers, and if you have no concerns about operational sovereignty, then STOVL JSF makes a great deal of sense – and whether its unit production cost is $10 m, $50 m or $100 m is neither here nor there for the USA, which is paying the total programme cost including R&D.
There are plenty of questions about the need for JSF in other customer air forces, but the USMC is the only customer I can think of where there really is no other option, and where F-35 would be the best option even if it had competition.
It’s nonsense.
Production aircraft are lighter than the DAs and IPAs, not heavier.
French magazines are mistaken in claiming that the airframe was ‘beefed up’ post design.
The aircraft always had an Air to Ground role, and air to ground capabilities were planned for FOC.
“When the original Air Staff Target for a STOVL replacement for RAF Germany based Harriers and Jaguars was replaced by the issue of a new document, AST 403, in 1972, this added a secondary air superiority role, making the aircraft a Jaguar and an F-4 replacement – until then it had been seen as a Jaguar/Harrier replacement.”
“When the UK turned to Germany and France, hoping to share the development costs, Germany’s requirement for a pure air defence fighter, and the Anglo-French need for a Jaguar replacement were reconciled, forming the basis of what would become the Eurofighter. Once France had left the programme, the role priority switched, and though the Eurofighter remained a multi-role, swing-role aircraft, the initial emphasis was on getting the aircraft in to service in the air-to-air role.”
Dassault, EF GmbH, Boeing et al would have given evaluating nations all sorts of data that they wouldn’t give to mere journos, or release on their websites.
“That figure of 9700Kg was before the strenghthen of the airframe when Eurofighter group start to include some A2G capabilities.”
1) A-G capabilities were planned from the start, and the aircraft are capable of carrying bombs now, though no-one is actually exploiting this capabilities, and weapons and an LDP will not be cleared until Block 5.
2) No such airframe strengthening has occurred.
The heaviest jets are the DAs and IPAs, which are laden with test equipment, telemetry gear, recorders, etc. The next heaviest are the ISPAs.
There may be a marginal difference in weight between the Block 1 (T1) and Block 2 (T1A) two-seaters.
Many of the quoted figures date from a time when only DAs and IPAs were flying, though which aircraft released spec figures applied to was never made clear. Neither industry nor the air forces have released a specific, accurate empty weight figure for in service Tranche 1 production aircraft.
Flex,
It’s probably the World’s most advanced M-scan radar.
All evaluations show that it outperforms the E-scan radars it has been compared with.
It may be old fashioned, but it’s performance that counts.
Moreover, CAESAR is making great progress, and it’s clear that adding an E-scan antenna will be easy.
I suppose Rafale is the world’s greatest, and F-22 second?
Your Flight Sergeant was talking bol.locks, I’m afraid, Fedyakin.
At a pre-RIAT press briefing at Fairford, the Nimrod IPT leader gave chapter and verse on exactly how long the R1s will last, and why there is no need for them to be replaced even by MRA4s, let alone by another airframe.
Your NCO chums were also guilty of talking common sense on A-G capabilities, when we all know that isn’t what dictates procurement policy.
The MRA4 could do all sorts of things, but the aircraft are being paid for out of the Underwater Warfare Equipment Capability kitty, so anything that dilutes their usefulness as ASW platforms will be resisted, tooth and nail, and even transferring the existing multi-role capabilities of the MR2 will be far from guaranteed, at least initially.
Average F-35 LRIP cost $113 m.
Average Production Unit Cost $94.8 m.
Program unit acquisition cost (PUAC) $112.4 m.
USAF estimate of ‘stable’ unit production cost $89 m.
Average flyaway price still claimed at ‘$50 m’ by Lockmart, though that’s in 2002 dollars, and excludes inflation.
It is nevertheless claimed to be the price that the USAF and export customers will pay.
I don’t understand how the aircraft can be sold for less than it costs to produce (the APC already excludes ‘sunk costs’ like R&D, production investment etc), but I’m not a US taxpayer so I’m not ‘Bovvered’ if Uncle Sam wants to subsidise the jet.
The bottom line, though, is that even at the higher end of the estimated price range, an F-35A will cost about $89 m, whereas an F-22 costs $144.5-$156.356 m (range = next batch-average flyaway).
JSF is about half the price, in other words.
It’s bit early to be talking about prices when all we have to go on are guesstimates from the Times and FT.
I suspect they got their £5 Bn figure by multiplying £64.8 (NOT a UPC) by 72 and ’rounding up’ anyway, rather from any leak or tip, since people VERY close to the programme will tell you that all of the detail on this is still as tight as a drum.
Even if it’s accurate, the initial figure is not a Flyaway, it does include an initial instructor training package, probably includes an ASTA, and includes the initial support and ready spares package, with the second figure including weapons and longer term sustainment/support and larger scale training arrangements.
Moreover, production investment will be required for the local assembly, and that will be included in one of the figures.
1) it seems you are closer to singapore MoD than any peoples here?
No, I’ve just been lucky enough to meet and talk to RSAF people in Singapore, and a few of them have talked about the evaluation. A number of journalists have talked to Singaporean sources, I’m far from unique. But the Singaporean MinDef doesn’t hold any journalist at less than arm’s length!
2) largely reported from? when no press are allowed to sensitive flights and evaluations?
While the evaluations themselves were very much ‘behind closed doors’ people from the RSAF, Dassault, SNECMA, Thales, and BAE (and from other companies and organisations) have first hand knowledge of what went on, and small numbers of these people have spoken to journalists, leading to reports in all sorts of places.
3) Why singapore MoD stated that the french bird was more impressive than 2t overweight eurocanard?
The Singapore MoD stated nothing of the sort. The evaluation team’s report to Mindef reportedly said the reverse. Nor were the Typhoons deployed ‘two tonnes overweight’.
4) Why is Rafale was rated highter in any foreign evaluations? i’m curious!
Rafale stayed in in Singapore when Typhoon was dropped, because there was perceived to be a real risk that Typhoon’s air to ground capabilities would not be available in the required timescale, whereas the expectation was that Rafale’s capability roadmap was more likely to happen in the timescale quoted. However, on technical grounds, according to every report I’ve read, and everybody I’ve spoken to who knows, Rafale was not ‘rated higher’. To simplify, Typhoon was preferred by the RSAF evaluators on technical grounds but was rejected by Mindef because of timescale and risk.
Rafale ‘beat’ Typhoon in Korea because it was mature and in service, where Typhoon was simply too immature, and would never have been available in the timescale required. I have no proof, and have not seen the detail of the RoKAF requirement but I suspect that Rafale may have been better suited to Korean requirements than Typhoon.
I wouldn’t be remotely surprised if Dassault’s excellent Rafale were not to be rated higher than Typhoon in some requirements – the two aircraft are slightly differently opimised, and for the foreseeable future will offer a slightly different balance of capabilities. Typhoon remains some way from having a robust stand-off powered PGM capability, for example. Moreover, if those evaluating the aircraft in a particular competition are from a Mirage 2000 background, Rafale may enjoy an edge.
If you wanted an entirely personal opinion, I’d suggest that Typhoon might appeal to a slightly wider range of potential customers than Rafale.
Easily done
That makes perfect sense, Ron, though figures would be more transparent and more useful if they were presented in NOW dollars as well. I can see the value of using a constant value unit for internal programme use, and for comparing the 2006 price (say) with the 2002 estimate of the 2006 price, but there is a need to compare JSF costs (say) with F-22 costs, which may be in a different baseline year’s dollars.
What empty hardpoints?
1 tank, six Paveway, 2 IR AAM, 4 MRAAM = 13.
Blimey! I wonder if that initial growth from the 2001 figure is the same as the 31% increase that triggered the Nunn McCurdy warning?
The eight year thing is interesting, but a little harsh. Just because there has been cost growth doesn’t mean that such growth will automatically continue.
But even if it is, if Ron is correct, then any increase in COST may not result in an increase in PRICE.
Like you I suspect that no-one knows what the final cost or the final price will be.
– and I believe that the costs for Gripen that you quote are more than mere ‘flyaway’.
I doubt the Hungarians or the Czech deals were in $US, so you need to take currency fluctuations into account. The extent of the training packages were significantly different, too.