Sean,
We should be more than used to different prices being used by different people for the same aeroplanes by now – even different branches of Government.
We should be used to prices that seem to be the same thing (‘unit flyaway’) incorporating different elements. Typhoon’s £64.8 m T1/T2 UPC quoted by the NAO including fixed production costs and even advance Production Investment costs from Tranche 3, for example. From preliminary investigation, it seems as though the Typhoon £40.5 m cost includes elements of what would be a unit weapons system cost in the USA.
These prices are hard to nail down, and hard to compare.
There may be all sorts of reasons why a budget line referencing the addition of four F-22s might appear low – does it include radar and engines? Does it take account of long lead items ordered years ago? Was it a ‘one off deal’ like Boeing’s recent C-17 discount?
Fortunately we do know that the USAF has said that the flyaway costs of the 24 jets ordered using FY2006 funding totalled $3.77 Bn – that’s $157 m each. You can do the ‘math’ yourself.
And even if the FY2006 price was lower, so what? We know that FY batches vary in cost (largely because of variation in numbers from the plan, that leads to different consumption of long lead, etc.) and that the important figure for F-22 in this context is what the US would have to charge for an export aircraft.
The figures we’re bandying about are simple UPCs, not even UWSCs, and as such they don’t include any contribution to development test and evaluation, nothing for production investment, and nothing for R&D. They may even exclude some long lead items….. They certainly don’t include the costs for developing an export version, with the £1Bn for the required tamper-proof technology, the foreign weapon/systems integration, etc.
And even if the cost of F-22 in FY2006 was a lower figure than $157 m, we know that the export price will be based on the last price paid by the USAF, or the average, and not on the price from a random year. The last batch in FY2010 will cost $166.035 m, and the average price over the whole run is $156.356 m (flyaway), or $185.372 m (unit weapons system cost).
Whatever the answer is, it isn’t $127 m!
And the most important problem with your figures was your bull$hit claim for Typhoon, which was inflated by about 50% or $40 m.
No it doesn’t.
Page 1-1 gives JSF flyaways of $176 m at the start (5 jets in FY 07) declining to $86.735 (31 in FY 2011). Interestingly, the unit weapons system cost is at least $30 m higher throughout.
The average F-22 flyaway is $156.356 m, with $185.372 as the average unit weapons system cost. Interestingly, this gives a lower flyaway for F-22 this year than the DoD source I referenced.
The flyaway price over all previous years has been $184.773 m, the price in 2005 was $134.784 m, in 2006 $129.949 m, in 2008 $141.507 m, in 2009 $141.447 m, and in 2010 $166.035 m.
Unit weapons system costs for those same years were: $221.605 m, $167.750 m, $154.728 m, $171.775 m, $169.406 m and $203.306 m.
I don’t see any chance of LM charging less than the $166.035 m FY2010 unit flyaway ($203.306 m average unit weapons system cost) for export aircraft.
SOC,
Your figures are demonstrably wrong for F-22 (the FY 2006 jets cost $157 m each, not $127 m), they are wrong for F-35 (the $112 m is an LRIP average, the stable APUC for production air force F-35As will be below $90 m), and for the Typhoon (the jet costs $80 m, not $118.6 or $124 m).
Apart from that, we’re good….. except on Rafale.
Now you might believe the Rafale cost of a $62 m flyaway, but it ws said at the time that they did not beat Typhoon on price in Singapore (inferring an export flyaway price higher than $80 m), and not many people believe that Dassault have managed to achieve zero cost growth since 1997, which they would have to have done if your price were still valid.
In eDefence Online, JM Guhl quoted “a list price given at some $66.5 million for the basic “naked” aircraft and almost $145 million with its complete set of sensors and weapons.” Other sources have suggested that the oft-quoted unit system cost (not unit programme cost) of FF 600 m (€88-€91 m or $113.46-$117.33 depending on exchange rates) is actually accurate as a unit production price or flyaway. That sounds high, to me, and I suspect that the jet was offered for about $80 m in Singapore, and will now be offered for somewhere around $75 m).
But we don’t actually have a good, attributable alternative to the official French figure, however improbable!
It’s perhaps worth putting the Typhoon price lie to rest.
So let’s not compare anything with “their $118.6 million unit price for the EF-2000 as paid by the RAF.”
Because the RAF hasn’t paid $118.6 for the EF-2000. Nowhere near. Nor has it paid the $124 m sometimes quoted.
The equivalent flyaway for Typhoon is in the region of $80 m. Sit comfortably, and I’ll explain.
I know exactly where you got that figure, as it’s a simple conversion of the £64.8 m figure in the last NAO Major Projects Report. Unfortunately, however, that NAO figure is not a Flyaway cost, nor even a proper unit production cost.
The MoD have acknowledged that it includes ‘fixed production costs’ (which the F-35, F-22 and other unit costs don’t) and it includes those costs from all three tranches, while averaging them over only two Tranches, making it simply wrong!
As if that were not enough, EF GmbH have challenged the figures, with the Programme Director saying: “This leads me to question whether the NAO price is really a Unit Production Cost” and pointing out that “Typically in Germany recovery of production investment and two years of support and operating costs have been included in what effectively becomes a unit system cost. My suspicion is that the UK MoD has moved towards a system cost while still calling it a Unit Production Cost. This £64.8 million figure is much higher than any unit cost, flyaway cost or purchase price that I would recognise. It’s something quite different.”
So how much does Typhoon cost?
The one ‘export’ flyaway cost that we know for Eurofighter is the Typhoon cost to Austria. It was leaked, along with the Gripen price and we know that it was €62 m. That’s $79.85 m at today’s exchange rate. Or £41.86 m.
We know that EF GmbH are legally obliged to charge more to export customers than to the partner nations, whose basic flyaway price HAS TO BE LOWER. There is a legally defined minimum profit margin and a specific export levy on all export sales.
There are other indications that this Austrian price is fairly accurate. Previous UK NAO prices have been closer to a genuine Unit Production Cost than the 2005 MPR figure, though because they have included “those costs that are not part of the collaborative programme, such as the Austere A-G contract and the R1 and R2 retrofit, and other national contracts,” they are not directly comparable to the export price.
With that proviso, however, it is known that the UK paid £45.45 ($86.7 m) for each Tranche 1 jet, and that the ‘global’ unit flyaway for Tranche 2 averaged £40.5-million ($77.25 m).
So no more with the bull$hit $118.6 m or $124 m, please!
And how much does Raptor cost?
When it comes to F-22, it’s absolutely clear, in black and white, that it costs way more than $130 m.
Even Lockheed’s single F-22 for development cost more than $130 m, and that did not include many items that Lockheed procured separately from the vendors, or already had in place. This may have included the radar and the engine nozzles.
Flyaway costs on the 24 jets ordered using FY2006 funding totalled $3.77 Bn – that’s $157 m each. And that doesn’t include any development test and evaluation money, nothing for production investment, and nothing for R&D. It’s a simple flyaway cost, and it may exclude some long lead items…..
Any export customer would also have to add the cost of the required tamper-proof technology on top of the $157 m. The export price is going to be more like $160 m – more than double the Typhoon price, and almost twice the cost of a JSF. Even if the JSF price hits $100 m, the F-22 still costs half as much again, and will give higher operating and support costs.”
“As for the cost with the current Typhoon selling for 124 million……”
It doesn’t sell for $124 m. It sells for about $80 m.
I know exactly where you got that figure, as it’s a simple conversion of the £64.8 m figure in the last NAO Major Projects Report. Unfortunately, however, that figure is not a Flyaway cost, nor even a proper unit production cost.
The MoD have acknowledged that it includes ‘fixed production costs’ (which the F-35, F-22 and other unit costs don’t) and it includes those costs from all three tranches, while averaging them over only two Tranches, making it simply wrong!
As if that were not enough, EF GmbH have challenged the figures, with the Programme Director saying: “This leads me to question whether the NAO price is really a Unit Production Cost” and pointing out that “Typically in Germany recovery of production investment and two years of support and operating costs have been included in what effectively becomes a unit system cost. My suspicion is that the UK MoD has moved towards a system cost while still calling it a Unit Production Cost. This £64.8 million figure is much higher than any unit cost, flyaway cost or purchase price that I would recognise. It’s something quite different.”
So how much does Typhoon cost?
The one ‘export’ flyaway cost that we know for Eurofighter is the Typhoon cost to Austria. It was leaked, along with the Gripen price and we know that it was €62 m. That’s $79.85 m at today’s exchange rate. £41.86 m.
We know that EF GmbH are legally obliged to charge more to export customers than to the partner nations, whose basic flyaway HAS TO BE LOWER. There is a legally defined minimum profit margin and a specific export levy.
There are other indications that this price is fairly accurate. Previous UK NAO prices have been closer to a genuine Unit Production Cost, though because they have included “those costs that are not part of the collaborative programme, such as the Austere A-G contract and the R1 and R2 retrofit, and other national contracts,” they are not directly comparable to the export price.
With that proviso, however, it is known that the UK paid £45.45 ($86.7 m) for each Tranche 1 jet, and that the ‘global’ unit flyaway fro Tranche 2 averaged £40.5-million ($77.25 m).
And how much does Raptor cost?
When it comes to F-22, it’s absolutely clear, in black and white, that it costs way more than $130 m.
Even Lockheed’s single F-22 for development cost more than $130 m, and that did not include many items that Lockheed procured separately from the vendors, or already had in place. This may have included the radar and the engine nozzles.
Flyaway costs on the 24 jets ordered using FY2006 funding totalled $3.77 Bn – that’s $157 m each. And that doesn’t include any development test and evaluation money, nothing for production investment, and nothing for R&D. It’s a simple flyaway cost, and it may exclude some long lead items…..
Any export customer would have to add the cost of the required tamper-proof technology on top of the $157 m. The export price is going to be more like $160 m – more than double the Typhoon price, and almost twice the cost of a JSF. Even if the JSF price hits $100 m, the F-22 still costs half as much again, and will give higher operating and support costs.
As for ‘Distiller’s claim that: “And regarding the Eurocanards: Those short-legged fighterbombers are pretty useless in what looks to be the way conflicts are fought in the next 30 years or so.” It’s patently nonsense. The most useful post Cold War jets have been the cheapest-to-operate, quickest-to-deploy Paveway toting tactical jets – the F-16s and A-10As, the F/A-18E/Fs, Harriers, Jaguars and Tornados, Mirage 2000s and the like.
The ‘Eurocanards’ promise a step change in support and operating costs, while offering superior A2A and A2G capabilities than their predecessors.
Tranches are actually defined by funding, not capability, though in the case of T2, the chance was taken to introduce a step change in hardware.
Tranche 3 is widely assumed to be the point at which advanced capabilitys (TVC, AESA, etc.) will be introduced.
Capability improvements are introduced in Blocks.
DJJ,
I don’t know where you got your ISD information, but it’s rather misleading. ISD may still be 2014, but the first operational JCA squadron converts in 2017, and the remaining units follow at yearly intervals. Quite what the last units do with no aircraft (the last of the Harriers reach their OSD in 2017) has never been explained. In my view fighter squadrons with no aircraft represent a more worrying gap than carriers without their final intended aircraft, since there will be nothing to stop Harriers operating from CVF after 2012, if they haven’t fallen to pieces by then…..
Moreover, the last RAF Tranche 2 Typhoon (not the last Tranche 3 aircraft) is to be delivered in 2014, though since Spain and Germany will be taking Tranche 3 jets from 2012, all late T2 aircraft will probably be to the later standard.
What you say about Austere air-to-ground is quite right – it will be available at FOC in 2008, but the more advanced weapons integrations still aren’t signed up. The Tranche 2 production contract is squared away, but the Future Capabilities Package is not, and 2010 is the earliest that the full air to ground capable Block 10 will be available, and Storm Shadow would seem unlikely before Block 15, some time after that.
Good courteous reply, Ron. Thank you.
In essence, my problem is that you (and Lockmart) say that the current production forecast averages $50 m. I still suspect that that figure is given in 2002 dollars and so actually represents somewhere around $60 m in ‘real money’.
But the latest DoD Selected Acquisition Report says that the average production cost is £94.8 m, and the JPO says the eventual stable F-35A flyaway price will be between $89-92 m, while the GAO, the UK MoD and a whole slew of other folk all give average flyaway estimates lurking around the magic figure of $90 m.
And some of these bodies, frankly, have more credibility as accurate and impartial sources than Lockheed does.
The reason why I have so much trouble understanding the difference between the price you quote and all of the other costs we read is thus partly that the others seem to enjoy such credibility. When the DoD’s own Selected Acquisition Report gives an APUC of $94.8m, and when the JPO have used figures in the same broad ballpark ($70 m, $89 m), $50 m just doesn’t sound remotely credible.
And nor can I believe that inflation has had almost no effect. Lockmart simply do not operate outside the real world, and in fact, inflation has tended to be worse the more high tech you are, and the JSF is undeniably high tech. Even the materials that JSF will rely on have gone up in price more steeply than background inflation. I do not believe that better ‘Price estimates for components’ and better production methodology will have wiped out five years of inflation – to say nothing of the ‘more than 30% UPC growth’ that triggered the “Nunn-McCurdy” warning, and which is entirely real, and reported in the latest SAR, whether you were aware of it having been invoked or not. It just isn’t credible that there has been such little cost growth in five years.
And even with the economies of scale offered by an overall 2,500 aircraft programme, and even though the F-35C has only one engine, I simply do not believe that anyone will EVER be able to build an advanced F-35C, with all the titanium, RAM, Stealth technology and advanced avionics for just $7 m more than Boeing are currently charging for a Super Hornet. And they’re only building 430 F-35Cs, so the economies of scale are not going to be that significant …..
Of course we understand that LRIP jets are going to be expensive at first, and that these will distort any average – just as the more expensive F-35B and F-35C raise the average. But while you could, at a stretch, describe AA-1 as “hand built from hand made components” this will be an increasingly inaccurate description with each successive LRIP batch, and will be actively misleading within 40 or 50 aircraft.
Though LRIP represents a huge number of aircraft (424, do I recall?) this is still less than 10% of the total, is still smaller than the total number for the US Navy, and so the LRIP average (which we know is $116 m, giving an LRIP total of $47 Bn) cannot distort the overall average that much.
In fact, you can work out that the average APUC without LRIP would still be $91 m ($185.1 Bn for 2,034 aircraft). And if the average price for all non-LRIP aircraft is $91 m, we can assume that the F-35A will come in at about $4 m less than that, and the F-35B and F-35C at about $9 m more.
And if the USAF paying $87 m for each of its F-35As, on average, I don’t believe that the price will ever reduce by another $40 m, and it’s not credible that Congress would be happy for export customers to be paying $40 m less than Uncle Sam, per jet.
Moreover, an organisation like LM will have driven the vast bulk of excess cost out of the production programme long before the end of LRIP – and indeed has already done so to an unparallelled extent by adopting lean practises from the start and by rigidly sticking to a ‘best value’ approach when selecting suppliers. That’s not to say that the average cost of batches won’t go down – Eurofighter has shown what we can expect by slashing average UPC from £45 m in Tranche 1 to just over £40 m in Tranche 2. But if the average is close to $90 m excluding LRIP, I simply don’t see it getting as low as $50 m.
With so many aircraft, mathematically you’d exect that the low price would be close to the average. And if the high price is $150 m, and the average price is $94.8 m, then I don’t believe that even the last off the line will cost as little as $50 m, and the USAF JPO’s estimate of an eventual stable F-35A flyaway price of $89-92 m sounds eminently realistic.
And all of the above pre-supposes that the GAO and the appropriators are wrong about the risk inherent in the programme, and that despite pushing for production steps before the appropriate R&D and flight test milestones have been achieved, there won’t be any serious problems, and there will be no extra cost resulting from this.
Finally, if the $50 m average was so obviously correct, then surely the GAO, the SAR, the Air Force Times, the JPO, the Air Force and the UK NAO and MoD would have caught on, and would be as relaxed about the price as you are. And they are not remotely relaxed.
1) You shouldn’t speculate as to who I am. Especially when you do so inaccurately.
2) Your claims on JSF price may be more accurate, though if so, then you need to convincingly explain why it could be that the latest Selected Acquisition Report gives an APUC (excluding R&D and sunk costs like production investment) of $94.8m. It excludes support. That’s a flyaway cost. There’s a clear discrepancy between that figure (which is a properly attributed and official figure used by the Department of Defense) and yours/Lockmart’s. It’s close to the figures used by the GAO, and it’s closer to the official USAF estimate of ‘stable production cost’ and to figures used by the JPO than your $50 m figure is.
Perhaps you’d stand up the figure you quote, prove that it’s valid NOW, and explain the discrepancy. You’ll also need to explain how $50 m in $2006 is the same as $50 m in $2002, because here on earth, we’ve had steady, if modest, inflation, with higher than average inflation in the defence sector. You might also explain how the JSF program has has breached “Nunn-McCurdy” cost growth limits – eg it has exceeded a unit cost growth of more than 30% of the original Acquisition Program Baseline, yet the cost has, at the same time, according to you, remained absolutely static since 2002.
Err, it’s not, actually. When Lockheed had to buy one for development use, with no support, no costs, and without some key GSE (cos they already had it) they paid far more than that.
Flyaway on the 24 jets ordered under FY2006 totalled $3.77 Bn – that’s $157 m each. And that doesn’t include any development test and evaluation money, nothing for production investment, and nowt for R&D. It’s a simple flyaway cost, and it may exclude some long lead items…..
So JSF still looks cheap, even at $90 m.
The Super Bug, by contrast, really is bargain basement, especially now that Boeing have driven so much cost out of production with the new pulsed line.
Ron,
The latest Defense Department’s quarterly Selected Acquisition Report anticipates 60 for the UK. At one time we expected sufficient aircraft to support a frontline force of 82-85, but confusingly, the total then went down to 85.
60 seems a little slim to replace Joint Force Harrier, but perhaps not if we expect significantly higher availability from JSF, and if the training burden is likely to be lower, with greater use of synthetics and more training downloaded to the Hawk 128.
Britain has spent £2.5 Bn so far (£1.1 on SDD) of a total of £7-10 Bn. Final numbers will be dependent on price, and will drive the final cost of the programme. The Selected Acquisition Report gives an APUC (excluding R&D and sunk costs like production investment) of $94.8m. This tallies with the price reported by Air Force Times, is higher than the USAF’s last prediction, and is lower than price given by the GAO.
This is, however, an average across the entire DoD buy of 2,458 aircraft, which means that the F-35A price is lower (about $90.675 m) while the F-35B and F-35C prices are higher – somewhere in the region of $103 m. That’s £54.98 m, for UK readers.
The target in FY 1994 was $28 m for the F-35A, $35 m for the F-35B, and $38 m for the F-35C. By 2001 the prices were $40 m, $60 m and ??.
Lockheed now forecast $47 m ($ FY02) $60 m and $60 m. Add five years of compound inflation at Defence industry rates to those figures to get a realistic equivalent price in today’s money (about $60 m for the A, or $75 m for the B and C).
This is still a long way from the Selected Acquisition Report figure.
If you want to be really pedantic, you’d have to say that Britain will not place an order this year, it is merely due to sign up to the PSFD phase – which is a slightly different thing, as you may know.
Joe in Texas,
The above figures will doubtless be challenged by the JSF fan club, who will insist that $47 m is still the price (because they know better than what one observer listed as “the JPO, the GAO, the UK MoD, the NAO, The Defense Department’s quarterly Selected Acquisition Report, Air Force Times, and the Congressional Research Service” – and perhaps they and Lockheed do know better). But if correct, the figures might indicate that the JSF cost is already ballooning.
Alternatively, you could just note that the JSF program has breached a “Nunn-McCurdy” cost growth limit: clocking up a unit cost growth over 30% of the original Acquisition Program Baseline. The latest PUAC and APUC cost estimates are, respectively, (according to the US Government) 32.8% and 31.3% higher than cost estimates made in October 2001.”
However, it is worth bearing in mind that Government accounting procedures can wreak havoc on the appearance of figures, while these can also be distorted to suit political aims. Want to cancel a programme? Want to cut short production and procure a competing option? Make the first programme look more expensive. Perhaps Ron and his like are right to trust the manufacturer. Perhaps they are not. Without full access to all of the figures – and a high degree of expertise in government accounting, all that can be said is that particular organisations give different JSF prices, that JSF costs have risen significantly, and that price estimates vary wildly.
Excellent, I’ll look forward to seeing them.
Yes, the two seater can supercruise with 4+2.
No, it can’t go quite as far as Rafale.
“Just a thought. How would a Typhoon laden with 6 x 1,000lb / 454Kg bombs fare in close combat against a clean Tornad F.3???”
Dunno.
But helmet sight and ASRAAM would give Typhoon an edge regardless of loadout.
Stealth predicated on RCS is not a panacea. Even if F-35 comes in on time and on cost, some operators might prefer Rafale to meet their particular requirements – and F-35 will not be available to all!
The Rafale is competing in a crowded marketplace, but offers some compelling political and operational advantages to some operators.
Once PESA has been replaced, Rafale’s prospects may well become very much better.
I’d be astonished (and sad) if France remained the only Rafale operator.
But I don’t believe that Rafale has any real chance in Saudi, unless the UK Serious Fraud Office blow things big time!
“Standard loads are great for standard missions but what happens when you have to go that little bit further and your air-to-air refuelling capability is limited?”
Of course it’s a compromise. Everything is. Typhoon isn’t Rafale. Rafale isn’t Typhoon. And in fairness, it has to be realised that Tranche 1 Typhoon and Tranche 2 Typhoon will not be long range strike/attack aircraft. If you can’t get enough tankers, and if two 1000 litre jugs aren’t enough then clear the 1500 litre tanks (ok, they’re subsonic – so is a Paveway II/III), or carry two less PWs to save weight and drag, or send the spiker in with no bombs at all, or send a GR4.
Or make sure that Tranche 3 have Conformals!