It’s worth remembering that although the Swiss evaluation included a second phase that aimed to assess the aircraft as they will be in 2015, that evaluation was conducted in 2009, and in this business it’s hard to look that far ahead.

Gripen has come a VERY long way since 2008, when the Swiss flew it (as has Typhoon) compared to Rafale, which was already mature, and which has therefore not needed to make such dramatic progress.

The Swedish AESA in particular has come a very long way. The ES-05 Raven wasn’t even flying when the Swiss evaluated Gripen (and CAESAR had only flown in Typhoon one year previously).

Maybe the Swiss were smart enough to realise this? Perhaps they reassessed some of the METs before signing a contract?

The report shows that in 2008, when the full evaluations were held, the Rafale held a decisive lead, with many advantages (and the extent of these was such that you can’t really claim that it was all a matter of how different variables were ‘weighted’). You might even say that the same situation obviously applied in November 2009, when the report was released.

But that was 27 months ago. It would not be credible for any air force not to consider what has happened in the intervening period. It’s entirely possible that the Swiss AF would now judge that Gripen does meet minimum expected standards. It may even have overtaken Rafale in some individual METs, or perhaps even in some whole roles, though I suspect that Rafale would still be the number one choice on technical grounds.

I’m sure that India did look at what has happened in the Rafale and Typhoon world since their evaluation, reaching the conclusion that Rafale was a better bet based on its view of the situation as it is today. Switzerland will have done the same, and will have reached the conclusion that Gripen was right for its needs.

This is not intended to be a deadly insult to the Rafale, just a realistic, open-minded, possible explanation of the Swiss decision.

I think that’s based on the report that I’m looking for, which explained more clearly and more definitely that if ‘Aircraft A’ was more than 5% cheaper than ‘Aicraft B’ it would be selected by default.

If the answer is the Times of India, then it’s the wrong answer for me, as I remember that journal confidently predicting that Typhoon was L1.

Reliable it isn’t!

It’s the criticism of Phil Collins that bugs me.

He was great in Genesis.

Again, I wasn’t making any comment about either aircraft, I was asking a simple question:

Can someone remind me of the detail of the MMRCA requirement that if one aircraft was more than a certain amount (5%?) cheaper than its rival, then it had to be selected/go forward to the next stage.

What stage was that at? (I think it was when they shortlisted, which was why they could not shortlist MiG-35)

What was the margin? ( I recall it being 5, 11 or 14%)

I’m sure I remember reading it somewhere, but Google isn’t helping me rediscover it?

But with Oman looking at buying 24 Typhoon, and the Saudis making noises about a second order for another ~70 Typhoon….

Oman is looking at 12-16.

It’s being described as an RFP issue, but BAE and UK TI sources say that’s misleading.

It’s not quite a done deal yet, but it’s MUCH further along than you’d normally expect from this sort of terminology.

Did I dream it, or did I see Japanese figures comparing the costs of F-35, Typhoon and Super Bug, coming out at $8 Bn, $6 Bn and $4Bn?

I can’t find any such figures now…

Anyone?

The big costs of any fighter are through-life, support, logistics, spares, etc. and the design and R&D phase that precedes it!

Wherever you can leverage a common airframe, then it makes enormous financial sense to do so.

That’s why one common JSF with three different variants is ‘better’ than three different aircraft types.

One design programme. One R&D programme. A near-common OT&E process. A single support and logistics network. The possibility of common training, or at least of common training elements.

For the smaller air forces, a single type multi-role fast jet force will be more cost effective than separate fleets of air-to-air and air-to-ground aircraft.

Just as long as the inevitable compromises do not unduly influence combat-effectiveness, as there is nothing more expensive than losing the war.