JackonickoToan,
Your numbers make no sense!
There are 195 F-22s in all, plus two YF-22s. Not 2 plus 187. (That would miss out eight aircraft)
You can’t count EMD and PRTV aircraft as ‘productional’.
NB The USAF and Lockheed say 187 PROCURED including 179 production, six PRTV and two EMD (I think they mean six PRTVII and two PRTV).
They clearly count production as distinct from EMD and PRTV.
But there are simply not 179 PRODUCTION (eg non EMD, non PRTV) F-22As. There are 178.
JackonickoAnd the UAE Rafale procurement is not dead either. So…
The point about the fiasco in the UAE, and what made it a fiasco for Rafale is that the customer made it clear that it needed extra capabilities, and was then mocked for doing so, and then found that in order to get these capabilities (many of which were pretty basic and core), it would have to pay the entire bill itself. As if that were not enough, pretty well the most francophile senior Royal in the GCC turned around and labelled the deal unworkable and uncompetitive.
The day that EF GmbH turn around and tell Oman that they will have to fund the integration of a helmet, and to get sufficient thrust, etc., and the day that Qaboos turns around and publicly labels the deal “unworkable and uncompetitive”, then you can compare the Omani Typhoon saga with the UAE Rafale fiasco.
24-36 months… I wouldn’t trust a schedule with a 30% uncertainty.
The uncertainty lies with the differing dates given for Rafale’s AESA service entry, and with the varying interpretations of service entry.
We will compare the 2 systems when the Typhoon will actually get its aesa+repositioner.
I’m happy to compare them now. One has a big enough antenna and a repositioner, and one doesn’t. One’s a 21st Century AESA, and one’s a late 20th Century compromise and lash up.
And the UAE Rafale procurement is not dead either. So…
The point about the fiasco in the UAE, and what made it a fiasco for Rafale is that the customer made it clear that it needed extra capabilities, and was then mocked for doing so, and then found that in order to get these capabilities (many of which were pretty basic and core), it would have to pay the entire bill itself. As if that were not enough, pretty well the most francophile senior Royal in the GCC turned around and labelled the deal unworkable and uncompetitive.
The day that EF GmbH turn around and tell Oman that they will have to fund the integration of a helmet, and to get sufficient thrust, etc., and the day that Qaboos turns around and publicly labels the deal “unworkable and uncompetitive”, then you can compare the Omani Typhoon saga with the UAE Rafale fiasco.
24-36 months… I wouldn’t trust a schedule with a 30% uncertainty.
The uncertainty lies with the differing dates given for Rafale’s AESA service entry, and with the varying interpretations of service entry.
And again BVR performance are not just related to the size of the radar antenna.
No, but it is related to absolute radar range (which is related to antenna size), to range at the limits of the scan (where the repositioner really comes in to play), and to supersonic acceleration, climb performance and rate of climb, and to supersonic agility. All areas where Typhoon trounces Rafale.
So what ? That does not make the A2G weapon integration less late, does it?
For a customer taking delivery of aircraft in 2015-2017, capabilities available in 2017 matter more than capabilities available in 2007…… And it’s better to have a capability late than not to have one at all. Eg a helmet mounted sight…..
and again Libya is not representative of sysmetric conflict not involving NATO/US extensive tanker fleet. With a standard tanker support and low altitude flights with heavy loads the Typhoon would show its range shortcoming.
Shorter range than Rafale does not necessarily mean inadequate range.
Share your sources. (not that it will change anything to the fact that the Rafale flew twice as much, anyway)
Shall we start a facile willy measuring contest about dynamic targeting, next?
JackonickoAll pretty well said, Vnomad.
In the interests of strict accuracy, I would just say that no PWIII variant has been integrated on Typhoon, nor is any such integration currently planned, though it would be pretty simple to achieve.
Also P1EA includes the PWIV integration.
It’s also worth pointing out that Typhoon’s CFTs have been designed, tunnel tested and structurally tested, and could be integrated on any new build Typhoon at the request of a customer, while all Tranche 3 jets will have structural provision and ‘plumbing’ straight off the line.
As to you Kovy, what Oman fiasco, exactly? The Omani Typhoon procurement continues according to the expected timescale. No-one who knows Oman was remotely surprised that they procured a second F-16 squadron.
Typhoon has good sensor fusion and it’s getting better. Captor-E will allow cooperative targeting, and will be in service within 24-36 months of the Rafale’s AESA, which is inferior. Rafale can’t make its nose bigger, and won’t get a repositioner.
The Typhoon’s ‘late’ integration of air-to-ground capabilities has still allowed it to clock up nearly 100 more export orders than Rafale….. And the required integrations are on track now.
As to range. Typhoon’s operations were not constrained over Libya any more than Tornado’s or Rafale’s.
And there was more than one Rafale diversion, Kovy.
JackonickoI am used to your usual spin,
If anyone is spinning…….
If it was deemed unsuited in terms of raw performance TW ratio or radar size then it would not have made the downselect : ………. I firmly believe that those alleged weaknesses are “myth”…certainly the Typhoon is better in these specific aeras but that does not make the rafale “lacking” in those aeras.
Then you don’t understand the physics and kinematics of BVR, nor the way in which range performance of a conventional fixed AESA falls off as you go any distance from the ‘boresight’, nor the importance of antenna size.
talk about risk ?
-There is not a single CAPTOR-E prototype flying nor being tested in lab and we are in 2012…
No but Captor-E is a Captor-M with a new AESA front end. The ease of putting such an array onto the existing back end was conclusively demonstrated in the CAESAR programme. The planned array, with repositioner, is already flying as part of Bright Adder, and (in effect) on Gripen NG as well.
This is pretty low risk stuff.
-I can’t see any meaningfull milestones achieved or a firm/signed commitment toward a full multirole Typhoon
P1EA and P1EB are signed and underway. P1EA will be in service later this year. As to the rest, there’s still some horse trading to be done to establish the order of particular integrations. India can influence that order, if it joins the programme, but by 2020, Typhoon will have Storm Shadow/Apache, Brimstone, SPEAR, etc.
-Without CFT the Typhoon will not even have the proper range to achieve strategic mission with heavy loads.
Depends on your definition of proper range. Typhoon over Libya didn’t struggle any more than any other tactical FJ platform – but didn’t need to divert to Malta quite as often as some other types……
With the Typhoon partnership it is : “come pay the upgrades that I am unwilling to pay and buy us aircrafts so that we can cut our orders”
Utter horse poop, as usual. The UAE fiasco demonstrated exactly which aircraft can’t be upgraded without major investments from export customers.
As for the rafale further required developments should come with just the fraction of the required huge investment necessary for the Typhoon.
Gentlemen’s dangly bits. Utterly unproven, untrue, and nonsensical.
JackonickoLower risk? Not if you want a decent IRST, a helmet sight, an AESA that doesn’t have the disadvantages of a too-small, fixed antenna, and enough thrust for hot and high performance.
Cheaper to buy? Not if you look at current figures.
But it does have an operational naval variant.
One out of three. Not bad compared to the usual bull:gen ratio I’ve come to expect from the Rafale fans.
AASM is a good weapon, but Brimstone is even more useful, as Libya demonstrated.
Dealing with Dassault is better than dealing with EF GmbH. Now that really is funny. Did you tell that one to Sheikh Mohammed? I just know that he’d laugh until he cried.
JackonickoMore tired and jingoistic b*ll*cks, with more of the discredited tosh about Typhoon costs.
Give it up, Eagle.
JackonickoBlack Shaheen,
I think you’re being over-sensitive to the point of paranoia.
I simply stated fact – the fact being that, like the RSAF and the RAFO, the UAE AF&AD still relies very heavily on foreign pilots and support personnel.
I made no judgement as to whether any nation was (or was not) a ‘loser’, and I showed no disrespect to the RSAF or the UAE AF&AD.
Jacko
JackonickoThe Saudi Air Force already relies heavily on foreign pilots – some of them under contract, some of them on ‘loan’ or ‘exchange’ from friendly air forces. An expansion of aircraft numbers will naturally mean an expansion in their numbers.
Thus far, the Typhoon force is unusual in being all- (or maybe almost all- ;)) Saudi, but as it expands you’d expect to see it peppered with Pakistani and UK pilots, just like the UAE Block 60 F-16 force, for example, or the Saudi Tornado force.
Middle Eastern nations do not always only recruit foreign pilots who are already experienced on the type that they will be flying – Oman recruited ex-RAF Phantom and F3 pilots for the Jaguar, for example, and one could imagine Saudi doing the same for the Typhoon.
JackonickoThe F.Mk 3 has been replaced by the F-15C
29 Squadron disbanded in 2007. 34 Squadron converted to the F-15.
So far, the Tranche 2 Typhoons have replaced F-5Es with 3 and 10 Squadrons. Some of the remainder of the 72 aircraft initial order may be delivered to Tranche 3 standards, but this is not certain.
The remaining Typhoon units are likely to be given ex-F-5E unit numberplates.
Currently, the RSAF fast jet force has 12 Squadrons (the two F-5 units having almost certainly gone)
70 F-15S – 3 Squadrons
c.70 F-15C/D – 4 Squadrons
70 Tornado TSP – 3 Squadrons
24 Typhoon – 2 Squadrons
Since the Saudi Armed Forces are all expanding dramatically (by about 100%), and since the RSAF is expected to get 450-500 NEW aircraft, we can assume that the Fast Jet force will come close to doubling, and that we will eventually see:
150 F-15SE – 6-8 Squadrons
70 Typhoon – 3 Squadrons
70 Tornado TSP – 3 Squadrons
Plus six further Squadrons – probably from further Typhoon, and perhaps F-15, buys.
JackonickoB-58 and B-52?
“The final B-58 was delivered in October 1962.”
“The last production aircraft, B-52H AF Serial No. 61-0040, left the factory on 26 October 1962.”
The Canberra (built new until 1964, thereafter rebuilt and refurbished) out-lasted the Valiant, and the Victor (last one delivered April 1963).
JackonickoThe day that the Saudis and the US/UK no longer see eye to eye, the RSAF will grind to a halt, and none of the kit being purchased will stop that.
Yes, the Saudis have made some progress in gaining some degree of indigenous support capability (The Alsalam company is impressive enough to be inspirational), and in training locals, but without US/UK contractors and ‘loan’ personnel, the Air Force itself would be unable to function on a day to day basis.
They would be in a far worse position than the Iranians ever were.
JackonickoNice markings, and nice to see NN continuing. A great squadron with great heritage.
JackonickoIt depends which reports you believe.
Jackonickoonly if you believe Burbage rather than the GAO
JackonickoIt does seem that an inability to accept unpalateable truths, and a propensity to be a bit too selective with the facts is a Dassault disease.
The French figures (kindly linked by TMor on a previous thread) demonstrate that Edelstenne is in dreamland when he says that:
“According to the Ministry of Defence, the Rafale has remained in its original blueprint, the price range increasing only by 4.7%, while its competitors have experienced uncontrolled excesses of their costs.”
Rafale costs have increased by more than that, despite cost-saving measures like the deletion of Gerfaut and the reduced OSF buy.
And he’s either disingenuous or misinformed when he says:
“The British Court of Auditors, the NAO, denounced the years drift of 75% of the European EF-2000.”
The NAO were forced into an embarrassing climb down when it became clear that the 2010 figures were wrong. Typhoon has experienced cost growth, but not by that much, and it has been reported as being the cheaper aircraft in Switzerland and the UAE, and within 5% in India – and that could mean 5% cheaper, or 5% more.
“For those who still have regrets about leaving the France of this program, it should be understood that such a choice would have increased by nearly 50% the cost to the taxpayer in relation to the Rafale.”
While there may be many reasons for good Frenchmen to rejoice that they left the Eurofighter programme, it seems self evident that the French share of costs of a five nation Typhoon programme would have been much less than the 100% share of a single nation programme
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