JackonickoNow for our english friends and other typhoon nations there could be a positive development this year from Saudi arabia or even britain if things accelerate. Just that today in those early days of february 2013 typhoon roadmap still looks uncertain.
There’s a difference between what has been announced, and what is actually happening.
Especially when it comes to Storm Shadow and AESA.
JackonickoThe UAE can sell M2K without permission, but in any case don’t need to sell them to buy a new fighter.
They started looking seriously at F-15, F/A-18E/F and Typhoon in 2010, putting Dassault on notice that it was no longer a one horse race.
They issued RFPs/RFQs to Boeing and BAE Systems late in 2010.
They publicly rejected the French Rafale bid as being uncompetitive and unworkable in November 2011.
Renewed negotiations with the French side were subsequently abandoned.
Concerns as to the ability to integrate Black Shaheen or another long range cruise missile were allayed by the news that Saudi Arabia was funding an early Storm Shadow integration on Typhoon (2015 ish rather than 2018 ish).
BAE have just appointed an in-country campaign lead for Typhoon.
As to Kuwait, they did their evaluations in July. We’re now waiting for them to conclude their process… It may or may not be a long wait, but Typhoon performed well in the 52° heat and sandstorm that it encountered!
The big surprise is Qatar, who evaluated Rafale, F-15 and F/A-18E/F and have so far failed to rearrange their planned Typhoon evaluation (originally expected in April 2011, before Libya kicked off). Like everyone else, I took this as pretty conclusive evidence that Typhoon was no longer in contention, but Qatar has been bending over backwards to say the opposite to BAE Systems, emphasising that they are “still interested in Typhoon”, though maybe they’re just being polite!
JackonickoOman signed earlier this morning.
12 new, Tranche 3 Typhoons (nine single, three twin-seat) and eight Hawk AJT.
They’ll start manufacture in 2014 for delivery/entry into service in 2017.
That’s a third export customer for Typhoon, and a seventh air force operator.
A follow-on order is likely.
Moreover, that’s two out of six GCC nations now settled on Typhoon, with a follow-on from Saudi now almost guaranteed (the only question is the size of the Saudi follow-on – 48 or 72?) and with the UAE and Kuwait looking very promising. Would that be enough to bounce Qatar into following suit? And even Bahrain?
JackonickoIn theory, it’s about avoiding big up front capital costs and costs of ownership, and risk, and instead paying the PFI service provider to shoulder these, in return for an annual service charge.
I’m not expressing support for PFIs, PPPs and contractorisation, I’m just putting the case that is made for these misbegotten arrangements.
JackonickoSorry to react but the UK is planning to use the F35 as an a2a platform off of its carriers (which is why we are buying the F35 rather than sticking to a Typhoon fleet).
F-35B will have an air defence role on board the carriers, certainly (and we are integrating Meteor at great expense), but its primary role will be power projection and air-to-ground.
JackonickoThe Gripen is a valid contender, but what can it do that the F-16V or even F-16E could not?
Lower operating costs and RCS coupled with the ability to out-run and out-turn said F-16? Free Meteor integration too.
And:
Less reliance on the USA, less vulnerability to US restrictions and/or sanctions.
A superior BVR weapon.
An AESA radar with ‘wider’ look angles and greater range at azimuth limits.
An alternative to MIDS.
Compatability with US, European, ‘Eastern Bloc’ and other weapons ‘out of the box’.
Better dispersed/austere field operating capabilities.
Supercruise capability.
Membership of a user group that is actively pushing joint activities like the planned Gripen Fighter Weapons School.
Gripen NG is, on the face of it a very compelling proposition. But it isn’t American, it doesn’t give the buyer ‘that’ relationship with the USA and it is notionally less ‘interoperable’ than an F-16V. And within NATO, it doesn’t give Denmark the membership of that club of nations operating the ‘top rank’ F-35.
JackonickoThe comparable unit cost of Typhoon is somewhere south of £73m, let alone $120 m, and certainly no where near Spitfire9’s stupid figure of $300m.
A figure that ought to be easily agreed is £73 m – ($116 m as of today), though it’s not accurate as a UPC. (see below)
It’s inaccurate as a true UPC because £73m is calculated on a resource accounting basis, and includes certain programme costs that would not normally be included.
The T2 contract (signed on 14 December 2004) was €13Bn for 236 fighters. This makes €55.08 m per aircraft. On that day the exchange rate meant that one pound was worth €1.448687 – making the Tranche 2 UPC £38,023,911.14.
That is the UK UPC as paid and as such is unarguable.
Scorpion kindly provided figures of €4.18 bn for Germany’s 68 T2 Typhoons and €1.132 bn for Austria’s 18 T2 Typhoons.
That equals €61.47 m for each german T2 Eurofighter and €62.88 m for each Austrian EF. This is the fly-away cost for the T2 EF for these countries.
When the NAO used to produce proper UPCs they were aproximately £45 m for Tranche 1 and £42.42 m for Tranche 2 (including VAT).
SUPPLEMENTARY EVIDENCE FROM THE MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
TYPHOON PAC HEARING
Q23. Variations in Unit Cost of Typhoon (£73.2M v £120M).
As was evident from the Hearing, different methodologies for calculating Unit Cost can produce significantly different results.
The Unit Cost of £73.2M (an increase of 26%) given at the Hearing uses the methodology agreed by the NAO for the Major Project Report (MPR) process, where the NAO then validate the costs as part of that exercise. This methodology removes the Development costs and Cost of Capital Charges before dividing the Production phase costs by the aircraft off-take.
Development costs are removed to reflect that they are sunk costs from a separate phase of the project. The calculation used by the NAO in the Value For Money study report does not follow the MPR methodology. The inclusion of Development costs in effect creates a supplementary increase in Unit Cost because it penalises rather than recognises the increased effectiveness of reduced, more capable, aircraft numbers. Whichever methodology is chosen, the key points are that NAO analysis (para 2.4 of the Value For Money report) confirms production costs as being similar to comparable types of aircraft, and that we are paying the right price.
JackonickoA million miles behind.
Exocet’s as good as done on Rafale. EF GmbH have wind tunnel tested and fit checked a couple of candidate weapons on Typhoon.
JackonickoSo the planned conversion of JBG33 to Typhoon is canned?
Jackonickoand what about JBG 33 at Buchel?
JackonickoThanks Aurel, that helps a lot!
What’s the plan for ’73?
When training switches to Holloman will 73 become an operational wing, or will it disappear?
Are there dates for the next Eurofighter wing stand-ups?
JackonickoJane’s reported “Eurofighter gets its AESA act together” in the latest issue.
I was surprised. I came away from Farnborough less confident that Eurofighter’s AESA plans were cohesive and credible than I was before the show, more concerned by the fundamental arguments that have yet to be addressed, and more convinced that a 2015 ISD is utterly unachievable.
If I was a Rafale fan I’d have been pretty cheered, on the whole, though I do think that the EF GmbH consortium are gaining better credibility when it comes to the whole ‘advanced weapons’ and enhanced air to ground capabilities areas.
JackonickoThe French claims of five draws were dismissed by Pilch and by other participating pilots.
The Mirage 2000 ‘kill’ (which I believe) has never been validated by a named pilot.
Moussez and Edelstenne are effectively representatives of Dassault, and I take anything they say in that context.
You may hate him, but Lake is an independent journalist, though clearly one who rates Typhoon highly. He has sometimes written favourably about Rafale, and unfavourably about Typhoon.
Unnamed sources have their place, and journalists often rely on them or have to rely on them. But when there are named pilot sources on one side of an issue, and unnamed on the other (or named company sources), the credibility of one side of that argument is diminished.
JackonickoI recall named French pilots (Granclaudon and Romain count, Moussez is a PR mouthpiece, and does not) talking about Rafale versus Typhoon, while the RAF did not react at all, which added to the credibility of the French claims (though I believe them to have been exaggerated and misleading).
I do not recall named French pilots making claims about Rafale versus F-22 (I’m not saying that they did not, and I’d be grateful to anyone who wants to post attributed quotes), whereas I do recall that named USAF F-22 (including Lansing Pilch, the 27th FS CO) and F-16 pilots contradicted those French claims. That’s a pretty credible denial, though it doesn’t necessarily make it true.
In the case of Distant Frontier, we have three named Luftwaffe officers (quoted by several journalists, in several magazines) standing behind their claim that Typhoon had nothing to fear, once it got to the merge.
And I’ve seen only one journalist, quoting unnamed USAF sources, refuting that basic claim. In this case, therefore, the Typhoon claims have more credibility than the supposed USAF denials.
JackonickoIt’s worth noting that Grüne was one of three NAMED pilots quoted in the press so far to have commented on the BFM with the F-22, not the only one.
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