Six NF,

You’ve variously cast slurs on the RAF’s war record, its post war record, you’ve compared it unfavourably to the FAA and the USAF, you’ve made baseless and unsubstantiated accusations that the RAF did not practise ACM and did not do proper DACT, that the RAF was so hamstrung by budgetary cuts that combat capabilities and readiness suffered and you’ve claimed that the RAF had a ‘profound inability to fully explore all of the Phantom’s capabilities’.

You’ve said that:
“RAF Phantom pilots never distinguished themselves in ACM.”
“air to air fighting was not one of their strong points.”
“RAF Phantoms tended to get flogged in ACM practice.”

All unsubstantiated. All untrue. All offensive.

All mark you as an anti-British troll, with a particular axe to grind about the RAF.

The RAF’s professionalism and competence in the 70s and 80s speaks for itself, and is backed up by the trend of results from Tacevals, NATO TAMs, TLPs, Elder Forests, and countless other exercises (which support the contention that the RAF was generally a more competent and capable force than the USAF at that time). From 1979 I saw it first hand, for myself, from ‘inside the wire’, and I know all about the 70s from relatives and friends, and from my flying instructors, all of whom had come from frontline tours during the 70s.

If you want to know about the competence of the RAF Phantom force, go and talk to John Allison, ‘The Scottish Officer’ (it’s bad luck to type the B-word’s name), Chris Coville, or Ian Macfadyen, or if senior officers intimidate you, then try Andy Cairncross, Dave Hunt, Russ Jones, Chris Lackman, Ian McCombie, Rick Offord, Bob Prest, Ian Rounce, Al Thorogood, etc.

There – some names plucked at random from my memory, notebooks and logbooks. All pointless, as you haven’t talked to them, and don’t have access to them.

Again, I don’t need to waste any more of my time defending the RAF against your biased drivel, and I’m entirely happy to let people decide for themselves who is telling the truth.

Six NF,

I’m far better informed as to the state of RAF training in the 70s and 80s than you are, chum, having been on the receiving end of it, and having been instructed by blokes who were on the frontline at exactly the time we’re discussing (when, incidentally, my father, godfather, uncle, and many family friends were all RAF pilots and officers). I’ve flown in the types under discussion, and have been a first hand witness to (and an occasional airborne participant in) exercises and tacevals involving both types.

There were budgetary constraints at various times, and flying hours were sometimes restricted. But even during those times, the RAF inevitably made a better showing in NATO weapons competitions and meets than the USAF did.

You, by contrast, rely on prejudice and third hand knowledge, and on the laughably biased nonsense churned out by Sharkey Ward.

Which is why you are aware of the Spey Phantom’s drawbacks, and are entirely unaware of the advantages for UK ops. And which is why you can seriously repeat Ward’s silly claim about RAF Phantoms doing air combat without ‘burner.

Your claim that the RAF had a ‘profound inability to fully explore all of the Phantom’s capabilities’ is an outrageous, witless, provocative and offensive slur, is utterly untrue, and marks you as an anti-Brit, anti-RAF troll who deserves no ‘civilised and professional’ treatment. (And which is something that you don’t extend to others, in any case).

And in any case, the ill-prepared RAF Phantom crews regularly bested USAFE’s finest, and honours were even or better against other NATO F-4 operators.

You also ignore the fact that the Harrier GR1 was acquired specifically for CAS and BAI (a dedicated replacement for the Hunter FGA9), and thus wasn’t equipped for air combat. There was no requirement or budget for it to carry Sidewinders, which would have taken up a valuable pylon. Evasion and BFM were practised from the start, however, in the knowledge that guns could be used to counter an unexpected threat or to gain an opportunity kill. The Harrier squadrons also had a secondary local point defence commitment in the transition to war phase. The changing nature of the threat in Germany (with an air threat to low level ground attack aircraft, which hadn’t existed before) dictated a change – to both Harrier and Jaguar, which both gained ‘Winders at the same time.

Your agenda is clear. I don’t need to defend the RAF against your biased drivel.

Six NF,

1: Crusader versus USN F-4.
The F-4 supplanted the F-8 in the Fleet because the F-4 (with its RIO/NFO) was a better BVR aircraft – radars and BVR weapons of that period demanding a second crewmember, and because it had a real night/all-weather capability. It was widely acknowledged that the F-8 was a better day dogfighter, but at that time, the USN viewed dogfighting as a dead and irrelevant art. This led to the US Navy’s poor showing in Vietnam (which was essentially a poor showing by the F-4 squadrons, which had generally neglected DACT), and to the need for Topgun.

I’ve interviewed a number of old F-4 and F-8 pilots from those far off days (Julian Lake, first CO of VF-74 as an F-4 unit, Joe ‘Hoser’ Satrapa, Dick Bellinger, etc.). I’ve never met anyone who’d actually experienced the two types in DACT who claimed that the F-4 had any advantage outside BVR.

Such was the F-8’s suitability for the kind of air combat found in Vietnam, that the Crusader was credited with the best kill ratio of any American type in the Vietnam war, and the best kill/flying hour ratio, and many wanted to delay the continuing conversion of F-8 squadrons to the F-4.

2: Lightning versus SHar/Harrier.
Both types got kills against each other. I have lots of friends who have flown each type, and a handful who have flown both. Low and slow, and when the SHar/Bona Jet could use its unique capabilities, it had a huge advantage. High up, if the Lightning used its speed, acceleration, thrust, or vertical performance to dictate the terms of the engagement then the Harrier was dead meat.

The ‘shootdown’ of the unmanned Harrier is not confirmed. Since the Lightning (like the F-106) never went to war in a shooting war, it never scored a combat kill.

3: RAF vs USAF.
In Lightning/Phantom days, to put it kindly, the USAF had an unmatched reputation for size and great equipment, but rather less so for professional competence. Many here will remember airshow flybys miles from the display line – sometimes even at the wrong airfield altogether. Others will recall the poor showing of USAF squadrons at NATO competitions. Before the days of the more professional USAF (a relatively recent but welcome and indisputable development) the USAF’s idea of low level was laughable. They weren’t always the highly professional and competent operators we see today, poling their F-15E’s just as low in the weeds as anybody else.

That’s a generalisation, of course, there have always been exceptional USAF and USN aircrew and squadrons, and I say that with some due humility, having had ‘my’ attacking Canberra TT18 ‘shot down’ quite conclusively by a Phantom from Hahn (if my creaking memory serves correctly) during an exercise in 1980.

The fact that you choose to highlight Steve Griggs’ unfortunate experience at the hands of an F-4 (he was the 14 Squadron Jag pilot involved) demonstrates to me that you have an ingrained anti-RAF prejudice. During the same exercise, RAFG Phantoms had shot down dozens of F-16s, Jags and Harriers, mercifully without making the ‘switch pigs’ which led to the actual shootdown. It amuses me that a defender of the US forces should choose to point fingers over ‘blue on blue’ episodes.

When they couldn’t use radar missiles, RAF Phantoms were usually clobbered by smaller, more maneuverable fighters because their ACM training was insufficient.

Half true. When they couldn’t use BVR tactics, Phantoms generally were usually clobbered by smaller, more maneuverable fighters – whether the F-4s were USAF, USAFE, USN, RAF, or German.

The ACM training of RAF Phantom squadrons was not insufficient, and though it had no formal Topgun course, and though CFE and its successors operated differently to the USAF’s FWS, the RAF’s F-4 squadrons conducted more DACT than USAFE units did, usually against TWU Hunters and Hawks, Lightnings, and allied air forces.

This isn’t about ‘national superiority’ it’s about correcting unsubstantiated, Xenophobic, anti-RAF propaganda. You make it easy, by insisting on comparing RAF Phantoms with mediocre opposition. Compare them with the Dutch F-16 squadrons, or the German-based Canadian F-104 Wings, or JG71, or the French air defence fighter squadrons (which were as much an ‘elite force’ as the Lightning force had been) and I wouldn’t be inclined to insist on RAF superiority!

Seahawk, the RAF ground-pounder F-4Ms were very much multi role, and practised the AD role religiously. They expected to self escort, and even kept fully up to speed with use of the Sparrow and BVR tactics. The only thing that they didn’t do in RAFG while the Lightning was there was ‘Battle Flight’.

Six NF,

You’re starting to waste my time with all of this F-4 propaganda.

Re F-4 vs adversary. On Top Gun and on ‘Flag, the various F-5s, A-4s et al were being flown as MiGs, with the pilots using enemy tactics. When ‘flown’ unlimited and unrestricted (as sometimes happened at the end of a given course) the F-5 could wipe the floor with an F-4, WVR.

Re F-4 vs F-8. Yes, Phantoms sometimes beat F-8s. But the Crusader won more often. The F-4 was a better, more versatile aircraft, and more useful to the Fleet, but the F-8 was a better close-in gunfighter.

Re ‘Flag. The Lightning never went to ‘Flag. If the RAF F-4 did, I don’t remember it. But they demonstrated what they could do on countless Tactical Air Meets, Elder Forests and all the rest. (And fighting Belgian, Dutch, Danish and Norwegian F-16s, and French Mirage 2000s was no less ‘challenging’ than the opposition faced on ‘Flag. These opponents didn’t limit themselves to Soviet style GCI tactics, and perceived Soviet AAM engagement limits.

Re ACT and DACT. Yes the F-4 Phantoms did it, just as much as USN squadrons did. They may have done less live, hot gunnery (they only went against the banner for one two week camp in Cyprus by the end of the F-4’s career). But they were dogfighting other RAF squadrons and NATO air forces week-in, week out, with all participants ‘going for it’, claws out and without limited tactics.

You’re right to say that the Lightning wasn’t more “maneuverable than other airshow favorites like the A-4, F-5, and MiG-17 and MiG-21.”

But it did have better acceleration and better performance in the vertical, which could be used to its advantage.

And it was more manoeuvrable than an F-4.

There were some ex-Lightning blokes on the F-4 force – especially after Wattisham went over to the F-4. And there were tactics to deal with a Lightning.
1) Survive the merge and get enough separation to smack him in the teeth with a SkyFlash (or Sparrow). Unfortunately, that wasn’t as easy as it sounds.
2) Run him out of fuel and nail him as he bugged out. Unfortunately, that wasn’t as easy as it sounds.
3) Use your radar to manage a complex multi-bogey fight.

The bottom line was that 1 vs 1, in an engagement requiring visual identification, the F-4 would usually lose.

Re 74: The point is that by 1984, the F-4 was no longer a viable close in fighter in the NATO context. Every NATO man and his dog had F-16As, and USAFE was wall-to-wall F-15s.

The RAF may have known that “they didn’t have to fear to meet superior “turn & burn” Soviet pilots”, but the MiG-23 was never under-estimated, and in any case, the philosophy was always to be able to beat the best opposition you could find – not just the likely enemy.

Schorsch,

The F-15 had many advantages over the F-4. Acceleration, a much better radar, and better pitch rates, for starters. Closer to carefree handling at low speeds, and much better visibility from the cockpit.

It’s not all about g.

(And when the F-15 was limited to 7.33 g, the F-4s (with their ageing airframes starting to exhibit all sorts of structural problems) had lower peacetime limits themselves.