ASRAAM integration was demonstrated on Nightcat, but did not make it to the frontline. The helmet did. A Jaguar did get at least one kill against a Rafale, and the Jag Force often downed F-15s and F-16s, but as a function of tactics rather than agility. The Jaguar was optimised to fly low and fast, and to jink around terrain, not to turn.

Bill’s status as an award winning defence writer are demonstrable, as is the fact that McGraw Hill saw fit to poach him from Jane’s.

That’s not “my assessment”, it’s simple fact.

His charm (and the quality of his thinking) is my opinion, though I don’t think you’d find many industry insiders disagreeing.

I’m a tad upset to hear anyone say that they “don’t like the man”, as he’s a thoroughly decent chap, self effacing and generous, always ready to take the time to show interest in his fellow writers, when someone of his calibre might be expected to be an arrogant twit. Disagree with him by all means, of course, but expressing dislike will upset his many friends.

And the size of his ‘following’ is irrelevant.

Though why I’m arguing with someone who can’t punctuate or spell;), I do not know. :rolleyes:

“Haven’t you heard there buddy’s!”

Please write:

Haven’t you heard they’re buddies.

200 times! Like Bart at the beginning of the Simpsons. :diablo:

I hope there are enough smilies to give you a clue that this is gentle teasing rather than deadly insult.

Scooter,

Bill Sweetman has been awarded the ‘Aviation Journalist of the Year’ award more often than anyone else, and for good reason.

A dedicated truth-seeker, with a brain the size of a planet, great contacts and an unusual degree of personal charm in what is an often charmless business, Bill’s move from Jane’s to Av Week was a disaster for one organisation and a triumph for the other.

Comparing him to Dr Kopp just shows how very little discernment and judgement you have.

An M-scan radar antenna has the same range wherever it’s pointing, across its full range of movement.

As soon as you phase shift to steer the beam of an electronically scanned antenna, range is reduced. As soon as you use multiple beams (for simultaneous A-A/A-G) range is dramatically reduced.

Not always important or significant, of course, but the advantages of AESA are not a ‘free lunch’.

I’ll donate it to the RAF Museum when I return, perhaps?

The first line reads:

OTR NFP as attrib ***** (AAIB) says BH precny grndg all 225. Tlbm (contns CVR + FDR) ny recvd.

which translates as

Off The Record, Not For Publication in any attributable form. ***** from the AAIB said that Bond Helicopters had made a precautionary grounding of all its EC225s. The tailboom (which contains the Cockpit Voice Recorder and the Flight Data Recorder) has not yet been recovered.

My conversations with Henry Ploszek were some time ago. I’m writing from memory as it would take some time to find the relevant note book.

I do remember that the intercepts were at extreme height – sufficient for the U-2 pilots (who were not ‘co-operative targets’) to be shocked that they’d been ‘joined’ and ‘passed’, and to complain afterwards – afraid of structural damage.

On at least one occasion, Ploszek had expected his target to be a PR9, with the height misreported as being above the Canberra’s 60k ceiling (with Davis helmet and partial pressure jerkin), or an errant met balloon.

In that case, the Lightnings were operating from Cyprus. Lightnings also intercepted UK-based U-2s.

Incidentally, the PR9 was too tough a target for RAF Phantoms (whether Spey or J79) when flying at very high level, and it used to be great sport on 39 Squadron to ring the F-4 squadrons to offer them a high level target. The F-4 boys inevitably went very quiet on being told what altitude the PR9 would be flying at!

If the S-92 had been selected, you’d be in an even worse situation, needing even greater mods to accomodate the gear required, and almost certainly needing a major fuselage stretch, a redesign of the sponsons to accomodate a full VIP door, and a five blade main rotor, and you’d have a less powerful, less capable machine.

But the S-92 is what you should have bought, because POTUS should be seen to step from the door of a US designed, US built helicopter, and not a European design, because it doesn’t matter of Marine One is the inferior type. It’s good enough, and you won’t disadvantage the warfighter by buying the lesser machine.

XN923,

There’s an interesting historical link, albeit a tenuous one.

One of the Spitfire pilots (who, with no ammunition loaded, pointlessly and fruitlessly outmanoeuvred his attacker and got on his tail before being shot down!) was Tim McElhaw.

20 years later, as a Wing Commander, Tim was OC 14 Squadron, flying Canberra B(I)8s in RAF Germany, and regularly tussling with the Gutersloh Lightnings.

The US (who supplied the weapons) were very concerned that the RAF was still relying on ancient Canberras for the vital role of nuclear strike and tactical recce (a 20 year service life was extraordinary by the standards of the day) and sent a high level delegation to look at the B(I)8 and RAFG PR7 squadrons. This reported back that, thanks to their very low level flying and tactics, the three B(I)8 squadrons were no less survivable than USAFE’s own F-4Es when flying in the strike role, and that the PR7s were felt to offer a better recce product than the RF-4C. Replacement of the Canberras by Buccaneers and Phantoms was very much looked forward to, however, as the new types promised greater performance and versatility, and that the Canberra’s future survivability was threatened by anticipated evolution of the threat.

Six NF,

The RAF’s Spey Phantom cost a great deal of money, but saved some dollar expenditure (and if you remember the sixties, you’ll remember the obsession with the ‘balance of payments’) by comparison to buying ‘off the shelf’, and kept employment figures healthy in the UK companies that participated in the programme.

The Spey promised to allow the F-4 to operate from Britain’s relatively tiny carriers (and remember that Eagle was planned to be a Phantom carrier) in a way in which the F-4J could not have done, and – for the RAF – the Spey’s much higher ‘grunt’ promised better acceleration and performance at low level (and the RAF was a low level air force) which would be invaluable for the RAF’s anticipated F-4 nuclear strike role, and for the AD role (which was anticipated as being primarily directed against low level Soviet fighter-bombers and strike aircraft). It also promised to be significantly less smokey than contemporary J79 engined Phantoms – a major disadvantage, albeit one which could have been solved very much more cheaply and simply.

The F-4’s service in the strike/attack role was brief, and the RAFG fighter Phantoms were numerically insignificant, so with the benefit of 20:20 hindsight it may well be that it would have made economic and operational sense to buy J79 engined F-4s off the shelf. But the decision is by no means as illogical nor as ‘cut and dried’ as is sometimes suggested.