The Avon was the pre-eminent engine of its generation – eventually! Trials and tribulations (eg in the Hunter F1 and F4, and in the Swift) resulted in many improvements and in the engine’s further refinement and development.
The Atar was a bloody good engine, too, and compared well with most contemporary engines. But the Avon was even better.
And it’s not just about thrust and sfc – it’s about throttle handling, surge resistance, battle damage tolerance, and it’s about Rolls Royce’s then-peerless support.
With Avon-engined Canberras and experience of the Avon in the CA-32 Sabre, it’s no wonder that the Aussies looked at an Avon-engined Mirage. For a brief snapshot in time, you might have said that such an aircraft would have been the world’s best fighter engine in the world’s best fighter airframe.
Bung Aden cannon in it and you’d really have been cooking with gas….
They may be F.Mk 4s (as opposed to FGR.Mk 4s)…..
If there are any RAF Block 8s – eg if they don’t all go to Saudi.
You’ve asked this before, and the answer is the same.
Block 8 has the same software as Block 5, but hosted on the new hardware, and without the Austere software package.
Block 8 could be upgraded later, but there are no plans to do so, nor is there any contract for industry to rehost the Austere A-G software on Tranche 2.
If the RAF take any Block 8s, they ought logically to be T.Mk 5s and F.Mk 6s, with Block 10s being T.Mk 7s and FGR.Mk 8s.
“The french did it the right way. Taking experts from different fields (Recce, AA & AG) put them in one squadron and you have a multirole unit with specialists for all tasks.”
That’s what the RAF have done, too. 3 and 11 have blokes from a wide variety of backgrounds – teen series on exchange, F3, Jaguar and Harrier, even a handful of GR4 blokes.
That’s not enough. It makes a multi-role capable unit, but the individual pilot won’t be as competent across all disciplines as a specialised single role guy will be.
And what the French have done is manage the individual careers of particular pilots to give those individuals cross-role experience. Posting a Mirage 2000C pilot onto the 2000N or D for a year or two before posting him to the Rafale for example.
Some RAF pilots do have AD and OS/GA experience, but there hasn’t been the same organised and structured programme to deliberately give individuals this sort of ‘mixed background’.
$120 m?
That’s more than a Tranche 2 Typhoon, flyaway (£42.42 m, roughly $84 m).
As predicted……
Scorps.
Using an FGR designation for the Block 8s would be a bit odd. They won’t have the Austere A-G capability and will effectively be AD only.
One can only hope that all of the RAF Block 8s are given to the Saudis.
And like the RAF, I believe that there will be a loss of capability resulting from having all-MR squadrons – in that, even in the Typhoon, it’s not possible to train people to the same pitch in all roles as it is to train dedicated role-specific pilots. Is that a significant loss, though, and is MR capability worth more than having the absolute ultimate capability in a single role? That’s harder to judge…..
The only way to spend more on defence is to pay more tax.
Yes, you could spend the money more wisely, but that would free up relatively little funding for the equipment programme. At the end of the day, what is needed is more, new money.
And in the real world, health and education spending won’t be reduced.
And somehow, I don’t see another penny in the pound for defence being much of a vote-winner.
If you’d spoken to a senior officer with Typhoon in his job title eighteen months ago, chances are you’d have come away with the idea that Leeming was dead, insofar as the Typhoon was concerned, and that the force would be divided between Coningsby and Leuchars – perhaps with OEU activity at Waddington. That would, of course, have meant a four squadron wing and a three squadron wing. Or you might have divined that squadron six and squadron seven might find themselves at Cottesmore or Marham. But not Leeming.
Talking to a senior officer in October, I was surprised to hear him quite deliberately not rule Leeming out as a base for No.6 Squadron (the next to form) when it does become operational.
Personally, I think that it’s academic, as I see little realistic prospect of a seven squadron Typhoon force.
(Thanks Ken)
Teej
Block 5s are T.Mk 3s and FGR.Mk 4s.
(NB: All Tranche 1 jets are being brought to Block 5 standards under the R1 and R2 programmes).
Portagee,
6 are next. There is no air defence version of Typhoon. Even Blocks 1/2 have some A-G capability, and the Block 5 has the full austere capability with LDP, PW/EPW, strafe and dumb bombs.
Mosschops,
11 will soon be a multi-role unit, 3 will follow. 6 will be multi-role from the start. We will soon have the 12 squadron FJ force that we all thought was a pessimistic prediction (it goes down to 13 in April).
We had 30 at the time of Desert Storm.
Nils,
There has been no OFFICIAL change from the original plan, which was for 7 squadrons, EXCLUDING 17(R) and 29(R).
Numberplates have not been decided beyond the first three (3, 11 and 6). 25 looks MOST unlikely to make the jump, even if we get the full seven squadrons (expect 43, 111 and 56, and perhaps 92 or 74, while 54 or 41 may still re-join the frontline fast jet fleet).
Anyone who tells you a definitive answer doesn’t know.
Anyone who knows won’t tell you.
Not least because plans are still fluid, and in the air, and depend on what happens with Tranche 3.
Even Leeming, once written off as a Typhoon base, may still re-enter the equation.
All that can be said with any degree of certainty is that No.6 Squadron is going to be the next unit to stand up, but that won’t happen until at least twelve months after the Tranche 2 jet enters service (and perhaps MUCH longer than that), which won’t happen until the tail end of next year.
Early on, when the RAF was fully expecting to get the full three Tranche buy, according to the original schedule, the 232 aircraft were to support a 137 aircraft fleet. 24 with the OCU, eight with the OEU, and 15 with each of seven squadrons, IIRC.
That was two squadrons each at Coningsby and Leeming and three at Leuchars.
Credit must go to the Americans for winning the important battles, but in the UK we don’t get too worried about the War of Independence. There were enough British victories to salve our military reputation, and the end result was getting rid of a Colony that was in the wrong place, and that would have distracted us from the important bits of the Empire (India).
And I’ll see Sean’s Cornwallis and raise him Sir George Cockburn…..
(the man who burned the White House in 1814).
1) The ‘sources’ I’m referring to know a whole lot more than you or I about the content of the original agreement and the recent ‘solution’. I take their concerns seriously, certainly more than I take notice of bland reassurances from politicians, which rarely count as ‘tangible factual information’ in my experience.
2) The main practical objections to the invasion of Iraq were that it failed to remove an immediate WMD threat (there was no such immediate threat), it has cost us dear in lives and cash, it has resulted in massive casualties among innocent civilians, it has destabilised the region, it has diminished the USA’s international standing and reputation and it has only exacerbated the Islamist threat to US/UK interests.
Apart from that…..
3) Putting aside the tired and barely concealed anti-British sniping that I’m coming to expect (is it the Irish American in you, Sean?) I fail to see any evidence of any ‘reneging’ on undertakings by the British in Basra.
In any case, as I said, even if the UK Government were to renege on an agreement, that would not excuse the USA doing so. The USA should surely be able to set its own moral compass, which should be absolute, not relative.
I haven’t read the agreement. Nor have you. But I do speak to JSF programme insiders from both industry and the UK customer, and there is clearly real concern among senior officers and industry folk here that the underlying issues have not been addressed, and that this may be a political, face-saving band aid.
To paraphrase your good self:
You clearly place far too much faith in the press releases about this and are clearly not cognizant of the real workings of the inter-Governmental agreements and processes.
:p :dev2:
NB: Legal and practical objections.
Re Basra: We still have some forces in place, but have handed over responsibility to Iraqi forces as agreed, and as we were required to do. I fail to see any evidence of the UK reneging on any commitment re Basra, nor of our failing to abide by any agreement.
Insofar as the time and date of the handover was a judgement call, I suspect that our judgement was flawed, and that we were over-optimistic in our assessment of the fitness of local forces to take over, though my understanding is that the Iraqis (whose ultimate decision it was) were not keen to delay the hand over.
Sferrin,
“What? Surely the UK is it’s own country and can decide for itself if it wants to signup or not.”
The UK was invited to become the only other Level One participant because of the technology that it could bring to the party. The UK signed up to the programme on the basis of undertakings given – and the problem is that the US has reneged on those undertakings.
SOC,
“Well, then I guess you’d have to insist that the currently elected UK government supports those initiatives that the ousted Blair regime supported, such as the efforts in Iraq, correct? Or are new US governments the only regimes in this transatlantic quagmire that are expected to abide by the agreements made by their predecessors?”
1) The ‘Blair regime’ has not been ‘ousted’. Blair himself has gone, replaced by his own No.2, but the Government is still drawn from the same party that won the last election, and continues to follow the same broad policy approach.
2) Though I personally didn’t support the invasion of Iraq (on legal and practical grounds), like most Brits, I did support the US/UK presence in Iraq and Afghanistan once the initial mistake had been made. Having invaded Iraq and ousted Saddam we had a responsibility to put things right. Naturally, one has reservations about some of the ‘detail’ (short-sighted and wrong-headed policies that don’t work, prisoner abuse scandals, some of the placing of contracts, blue on blues, collateral damage and civilian casualties, etc.) but that doesn’t mean that one doesn’t support the broad aim of maintaining order while restoring peace and stability to Iraq.
I see no evidence of HMG reneging on ANY commitment made to the USA with regard to Iraq. I see absolutely no evidence of the UK failing to abide by any such agreement. I do believe that complete disengagement from Iraq, leaving the problem to the USA, would be in the UK’s narrow national self interest, but having given undertakings that we would fulfill particular missions, and take responsibility for particular areas, we are obviously obligated to see the mission through. You don’t leave an ally in the lurch.
But even if the UK Government were to renege on an agreement, that would not excuse the USA doing so. Right is right, after all, and we do not run our Governments according to the ‘lowest common denominator’ example. And we expect so much more from the leader of the free world, and the world’s most powerful democracy.
The word of the President of the USA ought to be enough.
And when it comes to JSF, a great deal isn’t written down – from the price we’ll pay, to the standard of the aircraft we’ll receive, but we’re expected to sign up anyway….
But addressing the US default is exactly what we have been trying to do behind the scenes.
SoC/sferrin
The USA made particular undertakings to the UK when the JSF programme started.
As the only Level 1 partner in the programme, and having received promises on ITAR from Clinton, we had a right to expect the USA to keep its word and to treat its most loyal ally properly.
All we ask is that the USA abides by its word and treats us with respect.
The USA has failed to do so. And pointing out this piece of dishonourable chicanery is not “whining”.
SOC
You really should apologise for the line:
“Why should the US go out of its way to make political decisions favorable to a nation next in line to leave Iraq?”
Because it diminishes and disrespects those who have stuck by the USA, as loyal allies, even in the face of evidence that the war was illegal, and even against their own national interests. It’s beneath contempt to be quite so dismissive of Britain, which has uncomplainingly lost servicemen in blue on blue incidents caused directly by US incompetence, and which has paid a proportionally higher price in Iraq and Afghanistan than the USA has.