The absolute weight of additional equipment isn’t so important compared to the stability reserves of the vessel. Obviously stability reserve varies according to consumables carried (fuel, water, stores, munitions, ballast condition etc.) but if the stability is already close to acceptable limits then whether the extra equipment is light or heavy is not important, the reserves aren’t there.
In 1982 the Type 42’s were sent South to face a threat of Exocet sea skimming missiles, the Exocet threat was fully recognised, and the RN were well aware of the qualities of Exocet by virtue of having selected the missile themselves for use. The counter measures were already in service, and the UK themselves had developed a SAM with anti-missile capability against the weapon in the 70’s (Sea Wolf), the Phalanx was available. Bearing in mind that the UK suddenly found funds and sources of certain other systems very quickly, for these ships to be sent into combat against air and sea launched Exocet with nothing more than chaff and jamming to protect them was criminal. Most of the developed navies were working on counter measures against this threat in the 70’s, and the development of Sea Wolf is enough evidence that the UK RN was fully aware of the risks and need for a defence. By building these ships to a minimum possible spec, and then settling for a hull design that made even future upgrades dificult, was pathetic.
At least in the Type 45 the RN has avoided this mistake as that design has a large amount of reserve capacity for future upgrades. I’d like to have seen them fitted with Harpoon when new, and the ASW torpedo tubes, in this case though the RN have done it pretty well, concentrated on the core mission (air defence) with adequate in built upgrade potential to imprve the ships capabilities later.

While Sea Wolf was available, it was’t installed on the Type 42s. What are you suggesting? That they should have fitted Phalanx before sending the Type 42s south? Did the RN own or had it ordered any at the time? How long would it have taken to install and integrate into Type 42?

What I was saying is that many navies were aware of the SSM thread, and that still many didn’t get around to putting CIWS or anti-ship missile missiles on board their ships untill well into the 1980s. Look at the german F122s: they borrowed containerized Dutch Goalkeepers for 1992 Gulf deployments because they still hadn’t gotten their RAM launchers. These are newer ships than the Type 42!

The prototype of the Phalanx was tested aboard USS KING (DDG 41) in 1973. These tests resulted in some improvements. The Phalanx underwent operational tests and evaluation onboard USS Bigelow in 1977, and exceeded maintenance and reliability specifications. Phalanx production started in 1978 with orders for 23 USN and 14 Foreign Military Sales (FMS) systems. The first of the new installations was installed aboard USS AMERICA (CV 66) in 1980. The first ship fully fitted out was the Coral Sea in 1980. Think! 23 systems, first going to carriers. NBy 1982, not even the USN had many surface combattants with Phalanx operational.

The short hull Type 42’s barely had space for their original equipment outfit, never mind additions. Argentina has placed the Exocet launchers in the position that Phalanx occupies on the RN vessels and have followed the same procedure of removing the ships boats to make room. The RN obviously decided CIWS was more important than Exocet, and given the limitations of Sea Dart it’s probably a good call. CIWS was available when the ships entered service, given that the low altitude/short range performance of Sea Dart was limited, and that the ships had no close in SAM (such as Sea Wolf) the omission of CIWS was criminal, especially when they were sent to the South Atlantic to face both the surface and air launched versions of Exocet. The Type 42 had no space for extra equipment, and any upgrades have had to be traded off against existing equipment (like the ships boats) and stability was very close to the limit. In most respects other than aesthetics (I do really think them a most elegant looking design) they were dreadful ships and were nothing more than the cheapest way possible of getting Sea Dart to sea. Type 82’s would probably have made a lot more sense longer term as that design did have some upgrade potential.

Phalanx underwent operational tests and evaluation onboard USS Bigelow in 1977. Phalanx production started in 1978 with orders for 23 USN and 14 Foreign Military Sales (FMS) systems. Development of the Goalkeeper system began in 1975. The system entered service with the Royal Netherlands Navy in 1980.

The ship-launched variant MM 38 which entered service in 1975.
Production of the Harpoon began in 1975, and the first version to enter service was the shipborne RGM-84A in 1977, followed by the AGM-84A on P-3 aircraft in 1979.

First Type 42 in Service: 1975 …

So, theoretically, the Brits could’ve put 2 Phalanx in place where they currently are, yes, and could have parked 2×2 Harpoon (see Danish SF300) atop the hangar or someplace else topside (it’s not that much of a space & weight penalty). However, fact of the matter remains that both SSMs and CIWS were rather a relatively new item at the time.

Type 42 contemporary, the Dutch Tromp class, didn’t get their Goalkeeper until well into the 1980s. The french didn’t mount CIWS (see Suffren, Tourville, Cassard, Leygues classes), not did the Italians (Audace, Durand de la Penne classes). To say the omission of CIWS on type 42 was criminal … would incriminate a few more navies.

Well dual seekers are complimentary whereas a contact/delayed fuse and a proximity fuse would tend to oppose each other. How would you have the proximity fuse work in such a way that it was not triggered by proximity to the surface or waves? Like I said I’m sure the problems are not insurmountable but it does seem to add a significant new level of complexity for capability that is of dubious tactical utility.

Daniel

A proximity fuze (also called a VT fuze, for “variable time”) is a fuze that is designed to detonate an explosive automatically when the distance to target becomes smaller than a predetermined value or when the target passes through a given plane.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Proximity_fuse

So, you could program a missile flight path that does not bring the missile down to less than, say, 5 meters above the water and program the proximity fuze to respond when targets pass within 1 meter?

Proximity fuzes are intended to detonate missiles automatically upon approach to a target and at such a position along the flight path of the missile as to inflict maximum damage to the target…. Following initial exploratory investigations, two types of fuzes, optical (photoelectric) and radio, were selected for intensive development.

http://www.history.navy.mil/faqs/faq96-1.htm

Comparable to fuses used in certain top attack anti tank weapons, which have to determine when they are over the target to fire (e.g. BILL)?

The warhead contains both an optical and a magnetic sensor. The optical (laser) sensor functions as a rangefinder, measuring the height of the target beneath the missile and profiling the target simultaneously. The magnetic sensor measures metallic signatures and algorithms recognise the turret or centre of the target and determine the optimum position for the warheads to detonate. The missile has an inertial impact fuze for direct attack as well as a proximity fuze

http://www.army-technology.com/projects/bofors/bofors4.html

Right behind AK – 630 and ahead of the rail launchers. VL tubes in the deck.

You’re joking, of course…

Some ASMs can reattack a target. Have a proximity fuse means your missile is just as likely to detonate before hitting the target as after passing beyond. I imagine the idea is not impossible but it does seem to add an extra level of complexity, and new potentional failure points. Whatever happened to KISS.

Daniel

Agree in KISS. But still, there’s missiles with dual seekers (radar and IR) so why not dual fuses?

So I have heard, but what are you suggesting?

There was talk of the missile exploding above the heli deck. So, looking to see if that would be possible.

If some of the people killed in the attack were in the helo on deck, then it would appear that there was an explosion after impact, as an internal fire caused by unburnt fuel would be highly unlikely to cause fatalities on deck, a ‘pass through’ would have been even more unlikely to have caused those casaulties.

Also, considering the unburnt fuel theory, a C802 that hit a target after a dozen or some km would still have most of its fuel left. If that touched off, then it would have produced an explosion even bigger then that of the warhead detonating.

All this points to C701 instead of C802.

Don’t these missiles have a proximity fuse to complement their delayed action contact fuse?

IIRC, for Type 42, the addition of Sea Wolf was considered, using modified quad Sea Cat launchers. Not sure as regards guidance/director. May have been something along the lines of adopted for Tigercat (land based Sea Cat)

http://www.navweaps.com/Weapons/WMBR_Sea_Cat_pic.jpg
http://www.clash-of-steel.co.uk/gallery/pages/full/Sea_Cat_2.jpg
http://www.clash-of-steel.co.uk/gallery/pages/full/Sea_Cat_1.jpg
http://www.gunplot.net/armoury/seacat.jpg
http://freepages.military.rootsweb.com/~cyberheritage/tig.jpg