Wanshan… and I quote from this article:
The US Naval Air Systems Command’s top cost estimator has warned in a new internal briefing obtained by Flight International that the Lockheed Martin F-35B/C variants are getting harder to afford
the NAVAIR briefing, presented to US Navy officials on 4 January
That top cost estimator would be mr. Burgess and the briefing contained the slide presented earlier. Just so we get that straight.
:D:p
WanshanFlip me
Is it really true that Seawolf’s have 8 torpedo tubes?
Seems to be absent any VLS though so mayhap this is why Virginias have dropped back to 4 tubes.
General Characteristics, Seawolf class
Armament: Tomahawk missiles, MK48 torpedoes, eight torpedo tubes
(according to Norman Polmar’s ‘ Naval Institute Guide to the ships and aircraft of the U.S. fleet’ p. 78 and p. 80, these are amidships mounted outward angled 670mm tubes with 50 weapons total)
General Characteristics, Virginia class
Armament: Tomahawk missiles, twelve VLS tubes, MK48 ADCAP torpedoes, four torpedo tubes
(according to Norman Polmar’s ‘ Naval Institute Guide to the ships and aircraft of the U.S. fleet’ p.75, these are amidships mounted outward angled 533mm tubes with 27 weapons total)
http://www.navy.mil/navydata/fact_display.asp?cid=4100&tid=100&ct=4
WanshanWhat is the source link on that?
Wanshani still cant see where the naval acknowledged report is coming from
FYI, the text of the NAVAIR document is included at the bottom of the page to which you linked:
http://www.flightglobal.com/blogs/the-dewline/2010/01/lockheed-says-leaked-f-35-stud.html
It is acknowledged as such by LMCO in its reponse, which at the same time authenticates the source:
“The NAVAIR figures cited in the leaked internal document are an independent assessment and are not definitive.”
IMHO that means it is a) from NAVAIR, b) not an official standpoint (i.e. possibly dissenting but not necessarily incorrect) and c) subject to discussion (as a lot of internal documents tend to be in a large government organization)
Also, as is explained, it is a leaked, internal Naval Air Systems Command document. Now, if it is a leaked internal study, that means it is not (or at least not yet) officially released. Hence, it CAN’T be navy acknowledged. In fact, you can’t trace the document in public sources as you could with e.g. an official government publication such as a CBO or GAO report or an offical agency release.
Also, if someone leaks a report (first page: ” intended for official use only” ), do you think the leaker generally wishes people (including e.g. their superiors) to know they (usually a person typically professionally required to keep certain matters secret untill explicitly authorized to make public) are the source, especially in a large bureaucratic organisation, in which the individual can easily be sanctioned?
Finally, how unbiased do you think Lockheed Martin is in all this? Don’t you think they have a stake? And how would that affect the position they take?
ps: googled Burgess and Navair and got a lot of credible hits, which indicates this is a real person in a real position. Even if the document doesn’t represent the official organizational point of view, imho you don’t get to be director of a unit within NAVAIR unless you know your business, and that imho makes Burgess’ pov a lot more credible than that of anybody posting here, including myself.
Wanshanyes i always use eric palmer as a creditable sourse when i’m drunk and strung out on drugs in a psychotic state
when i’m sober and sane, he is just another pedaler of nonsensedo you have a link to his claim, i’m sure it will be falsely presented nand biased
See also: http://www.flightglobal.com/blogs/the-dewline/2010/01/chart-f-35bc-operating-costs-v.html
A Pentagon briefing dated 4 January shows a larger number F-35B/Cs in 2029 will cost more to operate over dramatically fewer flying hours than today’s fleet of AV-8Bs and F/A-18C/Ds.
The presentation is authored by David E. Burgess, director of the cost department for the Naval Air Systems Command.
The chart shows predictions that the F-35B/C fleet will cost more to operate from Fiscal 2020 to FY2045 than the aircraft they replace. The data could be significant as the F-35 program has been justified primarily as a cost-saving effort, with three variants sharing a common design.
Wanshanyes in exercises, our own collins has shown a thing or two
exercises and real war mode are 2 different things
you dont think usa knew the sub was there and they wouldnt react to give range detection info to the chinese
at this point of time, even though russia, through japan has usa screw tech, both can be heard from miles and they sneak nowhere
Now now, there there:
– where did I say war and exercises are the same?
– where did I say the US didn’t know the sub was there (they couldn’t very well sink her in peactime in international waters, could they now and they certainly wouldn’t want to give the Chinese a clue as to their actual ASW detection capabilities 😉
In fact, in relation to this incident:
Rear Admiral Hank McKinney, the former commander of the U.S. Pacific Fleet’s submarine force, tells us not to be to hard on the sub-hunters:
“I have no inside information on this event, but it is very difficult to detect a quiet diesel submarine and the Song–class submarines are quality submarines. Operating in international waters in the vicinity of a US battle group is perfectly normal — good operational training.
The Chinese very well could have staged this event to make a point about the vulnerability of the Battle Group to submarine attack. The US Navy is fully aware of [those] vulnerabilities…The Chinese are building a credible submarine force which will make it very difficult for the US Navy to maintain sea control dominance in or near coastal waters off of China.”
http://defensetech.org/2006/11/14/behind-the-kitty-hawk-incident-updated/
There simply is no denying that submarines pose a credible threat, even to USN (after all, they openly recognize it as such).
Also, there’s no denying that detecting and countering a sub is not the same as detecting and countering a torpedo launch by a sub.
As for the article I referred to earlier to look up:
The Navy Searches for a Way to Detect Antiship Torpedoes Well Before Impact
2006-09-06
Article from Navy League of the United States
By Richard R. Burgess, Managing Editor…
The antiship torpedo — a century-old weapon — remains the most dangerous, stealthy threat to a surface ship in hostile waters. That threat has risen with the proliferation of a new generation of diesel submarines, which are difficult to detect. Countering incoming torpedoes is a serious challenge for ships unlucky enough to get too close to a hostile submarine. They must determine the range and direction from which the torpedoes are approaching, and respond rapidly enough to outmaneuver or destroy them.Effective detection, classification and localization of torpedoes are critical to protecting high-value ships from torpedoes.
…
the focus of antisubmarine tactics is to avoid submarines so as to “not get shot at” before the submarine can be attacked.
…
The only torpedo detection system for surface ships currently in use by the Navy is passive acoustic software on Arleigh Burke-class destroyers. However, it is not used by other Navy ships and lacks an active acoustic feature necessary for the rapid and accurate location of an incoming torpedo.Even when torpedoes are detected, the Navy currently has no dedicated means of destroying them, though an antitorpedo torpedo is under development (see Seapower, June issue). The only countermeasure system currently available to surface ships is the SLQ-25A Nixie, an electro-acoustic decoy designed to deceive acoustic torpedoes which home in on a sound source such as the ship’s propulsion plant.
http://www.aactech.com/article.jsp?id=36
As for other material on the state of torpedo defences:
David Howard & Scott. C. Truver (2006) Anti-Torpedo Defense: Defeating a Ubiquitous Threat to Naval Superiority, in: Undersea Warfare, the Official Magazine of the U.S. Subrmarine Forces, Fall 2006, Vol. 8 No. 2
Wanshanthey have to use stand off torps, as their subs cant get in close, you dont think the west has effective anti torp capability ?
I think you are underestimating SS(K) capabilities and overestimating ASW prowess.
In NATO and other naval exercises at least, SS(K)s have (more or less routinely) managed to score quite well against US carriers and their escorts. You might also remember the incident where a chinese Song class sub popped up within a few miles of USS Kitty Hawk a couple of years ago. You might also recall USN leased a Swedish Gotland class SS for ASW training: there is a reason for that you know.
As for anti-torp capability in the USN: IIRC, with respect to surface ships, only USN Arleigh Burke DDGs can detect weapons launches. Most ships have a Nixie-decoy (noise maker) for self defence against accoustic homing torps. That is about the extent of passive countermeasures. There are no active torpedo countermeasures in service at this time. ( I read an article about this recently, which I will try to find a link to). See also the last link of my previous post about torps: it has some discussion of torpedo defences.
Straight Runners: These HWT have no homing sensors ,are launched at Short to Medium ranges run in pre-designed patterns and don’t have re-attack capability. In terms of acoustic signatures ,they produce high level of radiated noise and are comparatively easy to attack ,Due to lack of intelligence in them they can only be countered by maneuvers or hard-kill defense.
Wake Homers(HWT): These torpedoes are intended to follow the wake of the target vessel and use this information for their closing-in procedures .Depending on detection ranges they are typically launched at medium range distances and can only be countered by course/speed changes ,loss of wake ,or by a hard-kill defense.
Acoustically Homing Torpedoes(HWT,LWT): These represent the majority of today’s modern torpedoes ,They are quite and difficult to detect when passive. Depending on the degree of sophistication they can utilize their own target information and easily overcome false target situation; they are capable of re-attack . When wire guided (which in essence is the case for HWT) they can be assisted by the launching platform in order to enhance attack performance .Torpedoes defense requires Soft-kill and or/ Hard-kill measures.
Modern torpedoes are quite and radiate little noise , therefore ASW forces have to use active sonar for torpedo detection .Torpedo detection is difficult in general due to :
1) Large launching distance. 2) unfavorable sound propagation conditions in particular in littoral waters ,yielding torpedo detection ranges from ‘very large’ to ‘very short’ and high false alarm rates, 3) low torpedo detection probability.
WanshanDo any torpedo’s even have a 40km range at a decent speed?
IIRC the russian UGST has a range up to 50km/27nm with speed 35kts and range up to 25km/13.5nm with speed 50kts.
See:
http://www.naval-technology.com/projects/kilo877/
Cold War submarines: the design and construction of U.S. and Soviet submarines (Norman Polmar & Kenneth J. Moore)
Submarine Technology for the 21st Century (Stan Zimmerman) NB: has table comparing various torpedoes of different nations.
Also: DM2A4 Seehecht (export designation “Seahake Mod 4” is a new heavyweight torpedo developed by STN Atlas Elektronik for the German Navy. It features an electrical propulsion system and a fiber optic cable for torpedo guidance. The weapon is armed with a 260 kg PBX, (hexogen/aluminium) warhead (equivalent to 460 kg of TNT) with magnetic influence and contact fuzes, a wake homing sensor is also included. The weapon is able to achieve a range of more than 50 km (27 nm) and a speed exceeding 92,6 km/h (50 kt). The torpedo can also be used as ROV for unmanned reconnaissance missions.
http://www.defenceweb.co.za/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=702&Itemid=363
Mk-48 ADCAP:
Range 38 km at 55 kt or 50 km at 40 kt (according to Janes)
Range 42,530 yd at 55Kt and 54,685 yd at 40kt (according to FAS)
Spearfish:
The Spearfish torpedo from BAE Systems is wire-guided with an active / passive homing head. The range is 65km at 60kt. Spearfish is fitted with a directed-energy warhead. Spearfish is a submarine-launched heavyweight wire-guided torpedo that is noted for its speed; it has reportedly reached 80 knots in short-range tests.
http://www.naval-technology.com/projects/astute/
http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/Britains-2009-2019-Torpedo-Support-Contract-05687/
Overview and comparative data: http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/MONITOR/ISSUE3-4/joseph.html
WanshanIF the SSK has the sensor capability to take a shot without direct path then the answer to the question of dealing with a 40km inbound wakehomer is to outrun it!. Wakehomers follow a zig-zag or snake pattern in order to fix the wake boundaries. A 30knt ship with a 40km head start has a good chance in a flat out race with a fish that has to bounce around an indirect tailchase course!.
Ok, fair enough, but that does assume the CG/DDG can tell a launch instantly, doesn’t it. Is that normally the case? Or can it be a while before the target ship detects the incoming torp (if at all).
Alternatively, how about a wakehomer running at shorter max range e.g. 20-25 km rather than 40-50km but higher speed e.g. 50kn rather than 35kn (I’m thinking UGTS variants)
Alternatively, how about a near simultaneous launch of one or more wakehomer(s) and one or more SSSMs by the same sub (just to add a bit of complexity 😉
Also, does a wakehomer have to be launched from the rear aspect? Could it be launched from the forward aspect (in which case the target ship would have to turn before it could start running, or continue heading straight into the direction of the torp in order to force the torp to have to make a turn).
In fact, a torp like UGST is programmable (active/passive homing or wire-guidance). Unless the choice is either/or, it might be possible to switch from one to the other while running, thus eliminating the need to zig-zag for at least part of the run. (Thinking along lines simular to AShM, whose flight trajectory can be programmed, with active radar guidance or IRH kicking in only in the terminal phase. Applied to torpedo guidance)
WanshanDamn, I thought you could make the logical conclusion without a pop-up book. For the mentally challenged then. The SSNs won’t let the SSKs sit there all day taking pot shots at Aegis ships and the Aegis ships can certainly deal with the few they manage to get off before the SSKs destroyed. Clear enough for you?
How does a CG or DDG deal with wakehoming torp fired at up to 40-50km range? AFAIK only AB has sufficient detection capability and no ship has countermeasures against wakehomers.
WanshanThat sounds like ships comparable to the Norwegian Nansen class Aegis Frigates.
Better probably, at least with more firepower (more VLUs plus not just ESSM but also SM2). Though AEGIS version KDII might use SPY-1K rather than SPY-1D antennea
WanshanWe only took the two, and after the way the RAN got stung with the newports I doubt the RAN would ever consider the “cheap” route of purchasing ex-USN ships at the end of their USN service lives ever again.
But rather than just use them as they were, you chose to CONVERT them for AUS$ 400 million. Many nations adopted ex-USN vessels succesfully over the years, e.g. frigates and destroyers. But somehow this doesn’t work with larger unit? Come on.
WanshanAustralia didn’t buy from Spain to support Australian shipbuilding. Its past experience with old US amphibious ships was that it cost at least as much & took as long to refurbish & upgrade them to the standard the RAN expects as buying new ships. You see, the RAN is not content with harbour queens that need long layups at frequent intervals, nor with worn-out machinery which needs constant nursing, & for which spares are no longer made, & have to be fabricated to special order, or the other drawbacks of very old ships which have not been modernised.
Re. cost: But is that because of the conditions of the ships, or because of the condition of Australian shipyards/defence industry/politics?
The RAN elected to purchase two Newports LSTs in 1994 for the combined price of AU$61 million (US$40 million), with the intention of converting each into a combined pocket helicopter carrier and amphibious warfare transport.
After transferring into the RAN and arriving in Australia, Kanimbla and Manoora spent two years docked at Fleet Base East before they were moved to Forgacs Dockyard at Newcastle, New South Wales in June 1996, where they underwent conversion from tank landing ships to amphibious warfare transports. The conversion required the main features of the Newport class, the bow doors, derrick, and tank ramp, to be removed. A hangar for three Sea King or four Blackhawk helicopters was added, while the aft helicopter deck was reinforced.The deck forward of the superstructure was converted to carry two LCM-8 landing craft, which are launched and recovered by a single 70 ton crane. When the LCM-8s are deployed, the area would function as a third helicopter landing spot. Accommodation was provided for up to 450 soldiers, while improved medical facilities and an upgraded galley were also installed. The refit was planned to last from 1995 to 1996, with Manoora upgraded first. However, extensive corrosion was discovered in both ships.[gee, no one saw that coming] The refit cost for the two ships increased AU$400 million. Both ships are based at Fleet Base East. They are predicted to have a service life of fifteen years after the conversion.
Now, what was the main cause of the costs: the corrosion or the decision to convert the ships from LSTs to helicopter capable amphibious warfare transports? AFAIK, other navies have generally not made such drastic conversions of ex-USN equipment received
WanshanYes, but how many of them are still finding takers, & who are those takers? Apart from India, which has never operated any ship with a dock, & wanted experience while deciding what new amphibious ships to build, recent transfers have all been to navies with a habit of operating old ships at very low tempos. Countries which used to accept old US amphibs (e.g. Spain, Turkey, Australia) are no longer interested. Add to that the very different size & role of the LHA/LHDs from the LPDs, & the potential market disappears.
Other takers of ex-USN LPDs Greece, Taiwan (untill 5 years ago operating 1) and Brazil (the latter still operating 2). Australia got much smaller LSTs with no dock from the US, not LSDs.
Otherwise, I agree, but then the issue is not ‘too old and worn out’ is it? Rather, the issues become ‘too large’, ‘too manpower intensive’ or more in general ‘not suited to naval requirements of receiving countries’.
WanshanAs for the Tarawas, they are pretty worn out, and are not being offered for sale.
* USS Tarawa (LHA-1) (decommissioned, Category B reserve), San Diego, California, Years from Commission to Decommission: 32.8
* USS Saipan (LHA-2) On October 28, 2009 departed Philadelphia under tow for the International Shipbreaking Ltd yard in Brownsville, Texas, for scrapping.
* USS Belleau Wood (LHA-3) Expended as a target, 13 July 2006
* USS Nassau (LHA-4), In commission, Norfolk, Virginia
* USS Peleliu (LHA-5), In commission, San Diego, California
Mmm, speaking of old and worn out, perhaps you should look into the history of the old USN LPDs classes: they’s always found takers. Lastest case in point: INS Jalashwa L41 (former USS Trenton LPD 14)
Ordered: 17 May 1965
Laid down: 8 August 1966
Launched: 3 August 1968
Commissioned USN: 6 March 1971
Decommissioned USN: 27 September 2006
Struck USN / Transferred IN: 17 January 2007
Commissioned IN: 22 June 2007
USS Tarawa by comparison is newer and has had a shorter operational life:
Laid down: 15 November 1971 (5 years and 3 months later)
Launched: 1 December 1973 (5 years and 4 months later)
Commissioned: 29 May 1976 (5 years and 2 months later)
Decommissioned: 31 March 2009 (2 and 6 months later).
Other cases:
Thomaston Class Dock Landing Ships:
– USS Alamo (LSD-33) commissioned 24 August 1956, decommissioned and loaned to Brazil 12 November 1990, renamed Rio de Janiero (G-31), struck from the Naval Register and sold to Brazil, 24 January 2001, remaining in service.
– USS Hermitage (LSD-34) commissioned 14 December 1956, decommissioned and transferred (on loan) to Brazil 2 October 1989, renamed Ceara (G-30) and sold outright to Brazil and struck from the Naval Register, 24 January 2001, remaining in service.
Casa Grande Class Dock Landing Ship:
– USS San Marcos (LSD-25) commissioned 15 April 1945. Decommissioned, 19 December 1947, laid up in the Pacific Reserve Fleetat San Diego, CA.
Recommissioned, 26 January 1951 and Re-decommissioned, 1 July 1971, at US Naval Amphibious Base, Little Creek, VA. and simultaneously turned over to Spain, renamed SPS Galicia (TA-31), renumbered (L 31) circa 1980. Sold outright to Spain and struck from the Naval Register, 1 August 1974. Struck from the Spanish Navy list in early 1988. Final Disposition, scrapped in 1989
– USS Fort Marion (LSD-22) commissioned 29 January 1946, decommissioned, 13 February 1970, at Naval Station Bremerton, WA. Struck from the Naval Register, 31 October 1974 and sold to the Republic of China, 15 April 1977, renamed ROCS Chen Hai (LSD-192). Decommissioned by the Republic of China Navy in May 1999. Final Disposition, sunk as an artificial reef, 9 December 2000
– USS Comstock (LSD-19) commissioned 2 July 1945 and decommissioned in early 1970s, being struck from the Naval Register, 30 June 1976. Laid up in the National Defense Reserve Fleet. Sold for scrapping, 17 October 1984 by the Maritime Administration (MARAD), towed to Taiwan for scrapping but instead of being scrapped the Taiwanese Navy replaced ex-USS White Marsh (LSD-8) with ex-USS Comstock (LSD-19) and renamed ex-Comstock as ROCS Cheng Chung (LSD-191), the same name and hull number the ex-White Marsh carried. Current Disposition, still active in the Taiwanese Navy in 2004 and will remain on active duty until replaced by an Anchorage class LSD
– USS Fort Mandan (LSD-21) commissioned 31 October 1945 and decommissioned, 16 January 1948. Laid up in the Atlantic Reserve Fleet
Recommissioned, 25 October 1950 and re-decommissioned, 23 January 1971, then transferred to Greece under the Security Assistance Program 23 January 1971, renamed HNS Nafkratousa (L-153). Struck from the Naval Register and sold to Greece, 8 February 1980 and decommissioned by the Greek Navy in February 2000. Final Disposition, sold for scrap in November 2001 to be dismantled at Aliaga, Turkey
There are more cases: http://www.navsource.org/archives/10/12/12idx.htm
Sign In
