Large scale extermitation was, indeed, often provoked by partisans. On the other hand, official german doctrine was what all slavic, juwish, etc. natioanalities are “underhumans” and they was handled accordinly, including burning villages with all womens, childrens, etc for a single killed german soldier. The very some relation we can see from British, American, Turkish ,etc. goverements to they enemies. If even german WW2 behavior you dont accept as genocide, then i dont know what you mean by “genocide”. Certainly, there are no such examples in Iraq or Iran, or, for that matter, in other countries. So saying what West is supposely somehow different here is a bogus.

If you don’t want to understand, I can’t help you. If you read my text word by word and include key elements like ‘often’, you can maybe reconsider your post.

There are obvious advantages to having much of the aircraft in wing. Less bending loads by distributing the weight along the lifting surface, less parasite drag.

Airplanes have their fuel in wing tanks if they can and only have fuselage tanks if they have not enough wing volume. The engines are often mounted on wing rather than on fuselage – again, less structural bending loads. The main landing gear is accommodated in bays inside the wing if possible – having it all in fuselage is difficult.

People, however, like fuselage with windows and evacuation exits.

What about luggage? Is there any strong structural reason why cargo bays for checked luggage and other cargo cannot be made inside the wing?

Fuselage is circular, so their is lots of space unused in the fuselage. Luggage normally has low density. There is no point for storing it in the wing, especially the oprational disadvatage could not be offset by any gain in performance. Additionally is it very critical to have large rooms in the wing or anything like doors. Fuel doesn’t care if its room is full with spares and ribs, but luggage does.

here the HUD data in plain english

“alpha 19.5”: attack angle
“M 0.37”: Mach
“G 1.9 [currently]/7.6”: G force, maximum load 7.6

very slow dogfight.

Interesting how much people can write without having sligthest knowlegde (with some exeptions of course like the fellow I quoted).

With M0.37 and 19.5 degrees of alpha in 16.000ft the F-18 (or whatever) isn’t really in a favorable position. Next second it just falls out of the sky. If it was a dogfight, it was a very strange one and the F-22 (or whatever) was fooling around. In that altitude no F-22 (or any other fighter) would get so slow.
The “hunter” is himself in a pretty bad condition, having a miserable energy state and flying on the left edge of his flight envelope.

Alan Warnes mentioned in his article on Masroor AFB that the Grifo-M on the Mirage-III ROSE, gives an interception capability of upto 20-25 km (some can provide the exact figure if he has the issue) and this is pretty good for an airforce without BVR capability.

F-5 and J-7 (not Bison) comparison,

As I quoted one can assume that third world countries don’t use their air power in a professional manner. Hence we can assume that they don’t purchase it in a professional manner, either.
Supersonic fighters with performance like a J-7 are wasted money, short-legged sportcars without any use beyond point-defense interceptors. The F-5 is maybe more versatile (and was specially designed for poor countries), but still does not represent an optimum solution.

But third world leaders like to see their kingdom being equipped with supersonic fighters. So the enemy be fearful. That is doesn’t make sense is another story.

The article shows some sense for humor as the unability of BVR-weapons is reasoned with the inability of the USS Stark to defend against two Exocets. The Exocets are active radar homing missiles (like the AMRAAM) and were fired beyond visual range.

The problem is often less technical than tactical: The pilot needs to be aware and really understand the situation. Modern aircraft which offer battle-space information in an unmatched matter are key to BVR victory.
Calling fighters like early Phantoms or MiG-23 ‘BVR’ is rather optimistic. They have their SARH missiles because the early IR missiles were sueless beyond 5km or could only acquire the exhaust pipe.

Likewise. A very good discussion on the realities of air forces.

A little bit seperated to the ongoing smash on Singapurs F-5.

The following excerpts are from a text about the Iran-Iraq-War. They support your statements. The text is by Anthony Cordesman.

Losses is one thing. Effectiveness is another. Even if you limit losses, your effectiveness might not be there.
[…]
Ethiopia/Eritrea and Iraq/Iraq bombed each other but it had little effect either way.

A variety of factors sharply limited the ability of fixed wing aircraft to provide effective close air support, although helicopters were somewhat more successful.The main limiting factors were the target mix, widespread proliferation of area and point defense anti-aircraft weapons, problems in technology transfer, and problems in command and control and battle management.

Efforts at interdiction of land forces and strategic bombing had mixed success. The interdiction mission presented many of the same problems as flying close air support. The strategic mission presented problems in range-payload capability, but the key problems were political and the result of a failure to commit sufficient resources to specific targets with the mass and consistency necessary to be effective.
[…]
By and large, however, the main lessons of the air war are lessons in the limits of technology transfer and in the critical importance of assessing the degree to which friendly and threat forces in the Third World can actually use the weapons they obtain.

Close Air Support
Both Iran and Iraq generally proved unable to use fixed wing air power effectively to provide close-air support of their military forces. The Iranian Air Force was marginally better able than Iraq in carrying out attack missions at the start of the war, but numerous observers confirm the fact that the Iraqi Army could still operate with near indifference to the risk of Iranian air attacks against anything other than large, fixed-area targets.

Interdiction
Neither Iran nor Iraq showed great capability to hit small to medium-sized interdiction targets, like bridges, although Iraq’s performance has improved since early 1987. Both sides also had trouble locating and attacking rear area targets like large daytime movements of armor, even when these movements were unaccompanied by any air defense.

to lessons learned from that:
First, one cannot assume that Third World airpower will be committed realistically or with a professional understanding of the results.

Second, forces with more sophisticated training, reconnaissance capability, attack aircraft and munitions, and command structures may be far more effective relative to Third World air forces than there numbers indicate.

Strategic Bombing
Iraq had a virtually monopoly on strategic bombing after 1982, but rarely achieved more significant strategic effects. This can be partly explained by the fact that many key Iranian targets were barely within range of Iraq’s fighter-bombers when they flew demanding flight profiles, and were difficult for Iraq to attack. The key factors limiting the effectiveness of Iraqi strikes, however, seem to have been a mixture of political restraint to minimize the risk of more land attacks on Iraq, Iraq’s exaggeration of the impact of limited attacks and failure to accurately appraise the limits to its success, and Iraq’s desire to reduce aircraft losses. There is little doubt that if Iraq had repeatedly attacked in the numbers required against key targets like power plants, refineries, water facilities, and less protected oil facilities, it could have had a far more decisive effect.

These are just quotes of a rather lengthy discussion. But it shows that despite the equipment of the Iraqis (MiG-23BN, F-1) the effects were limited. Same applies for Iran (F-4, F-5) while Iran had the problem of limited spares which reduced its sortie rates, which especially hampered interdiction.
Most interesting is the emphasis of the author on the limited recon and the inability to detect and interdict large movements of troops.

So, as contribution to the thread title one may ask what a third world nation can do with a modern fighter like the F-16, which has despite its small size a pretty good mission envelope. Any subsonic fighter (A-4 for example) is sufficient to do peacetime patrol tasks. Even if your neighboring 3rd world enemy has supersonic fighter-bombers, it is unlikely that he can make big use of it (see above). A subsonic fighter costs about half to one third of its supersonic conterpart.
Interestingly there is no modern A-4 (or A-7) one the market.

Well the MiG-29 is excellent at those speeds, i doubt what you are saying a lot so then why the Eurofighter is called the most agile fighter at supersonic speeds? or the F-22 has thrust vectoring or the Su-35 has it?

The F-22 was designed with TVC from the beginning on. Totally different thing than retrofitting it. You can reduce stress levels and achieve required manouvres different. If you already designed the aircraft it is less helpful. The Su-xx may use it to reduce airframe g-load as it is a little more “flexible” than other aircraft (due to its size and weight). If loaded the airframe can only sustain (or is only cleared for) ‘low’-G manouvres.

If you watch this video the Sukhoi company consider already the Su-35BM will handle so well the Eurofighter they made a video to show it

Low-speed performance looks well on air shows. What normally counts is the level manouverability (if it counts at all) between M0.8 and M1.2. Lower speeds were maybe useful in times with less powerful fighters.

The agility will not be the key driver for any decision on future aircraft. The -OVT is more a demonstration that this technology can be fitted to the airframe. I anyhow expect the fade of the MiG-29 and the manufacturer himself settled. It will be merged with Sukhoi in a few years.