Please dont drag the IAF into such dire predicaments just coz your ppl dont have the warewithall to deal with complex technologies.

Main reason I don’t read/post in this place anymore …………..

How did I miss this one….. :confused:

Oki, guys! Got this from the NORINCO website.

155 mm LASER-Homing Artillery Weapon System (Highlighted in Red)….

Any info/details?? Specs?? Nothing given in the website.

Check, CDF, it is Chinese RED EARTH.

fair use

Aviation Week & Space Technology
November 8, 2004

Trading Up

China plans a more sophisticated line of military exports as it
continues to
buy Russian technology

By David A. Fulghum, Washington

U.S. officials are closely studying what was displayed at the Zhuhai
air
show. They’re looking for clues about what China is selling and buying,
and
how those transactions may change the makeup and tactics of its
military
forces.

At the top of the items of interest that have already caught the U.S.
Defense Dept.’s collective attention is a 7% increase in value in arms
agreements during the last year that include spending $1 billion for 24
Sukhoi Su-30 fourth-generation multirole fighters and $500 million for
the
advanced, long-range, high-altitude Antei-Almaz S-300 PMU2 (SA-20)
surface-to-air missile.

OTHER WEAPONS of interest include the Chengdu J-10 fighter (which bears
a
resemblance to the Israeli Lavi fighter and reportedly benefited from
that
country’s technological transfers), the continuing development of the
indigenous HQ9 SAM (a variant of the Russian S-300) and the development
of
land-attack cruise missiles for theater and strategic missions. Cruise
missiles are a cheaper, more survivable alternative to developing a
modern
bomber.

In fact, classified studies began circulating in the Pentagon in 1992
regarding the emergence, about now, of stealthy cruise missiles on the
world
export market. As a defensive measure, the U.S. developed the active
electronically scanned array radar (for the F/A-22, F/A-18E/F, F-35 and
E-10
aircraft) that can detect and target small, stealthy flying objects,
and the
AIM-120C-6 version of the Amraam for more precisely striking small,
slow
targets in a head-on attack. The system has been flying for the last
couple
of years on 18 F-15Cs specially modified by Raytheon and Boeing to
develop
cruise missile defense tactics.

Overlaying the interest in weapon systems are Pentagon analyses of
Chinese
plans for modernizing the country’s military forces. Chinese military
leaders are still assessing their “lessons learned” from observing U.S.
operations in Kosovo and Iraq, according to the Defense Dept.’s 2004
report
to Congress.

They are “rethinking the concept inferred from [Kosovo] that airpower
alone
is sufficient to prevail in a conflict,” the report says. An important
addition to the formula for success is the “integration of
psychological
operations with air and rapid ground operations . . . to target enemy
leadership, its ability to communicate and its will to fight.”

The two conflicts have reinforced the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA)
decision to accelerate acquisition of improved information technology,
weapons mobility and precision weapons. Added to the fast track will be
advanced C4ISR (command and control, communications, computers,
intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance) and interservice
cooperation,
say U.S. analysts. The Chinese also are expected to continue research
into
electronic warfare, long-range radar surveillance and aerial refueling
aircraft.

The new J-10 fighter (pictures of which are circulating on the
Internet) did
not appear at Zhuhai, but it’s expected to debut soon.

“At some point they are going to have to get it out there, especially
with
their future goal to sell more sophisticated weapon systems,” says a
Defense
Dept. analyst. “It would be the first quality weapons system they have
for
the export market. But it’s still in development, and I don’t think
they are
actively trying to seek contracts right now.”

If the Chinese can field a high-performance fighter, it is considered a
logical step for them to compete with the Russians. However, the
competition
is going to be fierce, especially against MiG, which is pulling out all
the
stops to gain market share, according to international aerospace
officials.

“The Chinese will have to start offering some viable, modern pieces of
equipment to stay competitive,” the defense analyst says. “They’ve been
somewhat successful with the K-8 trainer, but it’s going to be very
difficult for them to keep market share with F-7 and J-8 variants.”

China has made a recent sale of F-7s to Pakistan, but that was partly
because no one else would sell to them during the crisis with India.
There
have been no international sales of the J-8-II.

“I think part of that is, the J-7 is a common airframe [with the
MiG-21] and
everybody has them, so it’s easier to bring into the inventory and
integrate,” the analyst said. “The only country that operates the F-8
is
China; so for support, [a foreign operator] is going to be lined up
behind
the Chinese units, since that still is one of their premier fighters.”

The Chengdu FC-1 lightweight fighter is being built jointly with
Pakistan.
“We don’t know what China’s plans are for taking it into their [own]
inventory,” the analyst says. “I think that with the pace of Indian
modernization, the Pakistanis realize China is the only way of getting
advanced aircraft with full-up systems, and they are going to have to
push
for something a little better than the J-7 they have now.”

India bought upgraded MiG-21s from Russia while the Pakistanis were
getting
the upgraded J-7s from China. However, there’s a big difference. The
Russian-modernized aircraft have a beyond-visual-range air-to-air
combat
capability.

In addition to the J-10, U.S. officials will be watching to see if
China is
marketing the HQ9 strategic SAM, a variant of the SA-10.

“They are the same class of system,” the analyst says. “I wouldn’t
expect to
see it marketed because it’s still in testing, but it would be
interesting
to see if there were feelers out there–if they were trying to develop
that
niche along the lines of the J-10 project.

“I wouldn’t expect them to try to sell the J-10 and HQ9 as an
integrated
package because there’s no real market,” he says. “China’s market right
now
is South Asia and Africa. There are a lot of people buying in Africa,
and
not just from the Chinese. But they aren’t full-up systems. A lot of
sales
we’ve seen over the last several years are status buys. Most of those
countries aren’t able to adequately train and develop the capability.
They
are purchases just to give them a modern showpiece. It’s primarily
small
batches of F-7s and K-8s and [shoulder-fired antiaircraft missiles] all
over
the place.”

THE U.S. REGARDS Iran as the most likely customer for a strategic
surface-to-air missile since it’s one of the few countries that could
afford
them.

“They have received equipment and technological support from the
Chinese in
the past,” the analyst says. “Strategic air defense systems are a big
money
pit. While the training requirement is lower than developing pilots for
an
air force, it does cost money to send your operators over to get them
trained, and with a large country, even a long-range SAM only gives you
limited coverage.”

Coming full circle, the Chinese military has its own shopping list.

“It will be interesting to see what the Russians are marketing to the
Chinese,” the defense analyst says. “It has only been a couple of years
[since the Chinese received the first Su-30] and they have already had
deliveries of the [more advanced] Su-30MKKs and Su-30MK2s.” The latter
is a
naval variant with modified Slotback radar with a maritime mode and the
AS-17B antiship missile.

“There were 24 MK2s and 78 MKKs contracted for and delivered, and there
are
rumors of more purchases, possibly including an MK3,” he says. “It
makes
sense that they will enter into further contracts because it will take
them
a while to get the production line going on the J-10 and to build the
number
they need to fill out their air force. There are probably a dozen or
fewer
J-10s, but from what we’ve seen, the development program seems pretty
successful. “

The Pentagon tells Congress that rising personnel costs and the
enforced
divestiture of a number of PLA enterprises have crippled the military’s
funding sources, but planning is still ambitious.

The J-10 may turn out to be more than just an interceptor.

“The Chinese want multirole aircraft,” the analyst says. “It may be
that the
J-10 comes out as an air-to-air fighter initially and then transitions
to a
multirole aircraft. I cannot get into Israeli input into the aircraft.
Since
the Phalcon deal [which triggered U.S. opposition to Israel building an
AWACS aircraft for China], the Israelis are very careful about what
they
have been doing.”

So far, China has not been able to integrate its advanced aircraft into
a
modern striking arm. “They are transitioning from the J-7s and J-8s to
modern designs,” he says. “With that many new aircraft, it just takes
time
to train pilots. As far as the level of tactical proficiency, they are
improving but they are at an early point in being able to employ those
aircraft. The radar on the Su-30MKK is as good as the one on the Su-27
that
has been recognized as a very capable fighter by Western air forces.
But
we’ve not seen them moving away from the ground-controlled intercept
type of
operation. That is still the norm. They have not demonstrated the
tactical
flexibility displayed by the Indian air force [which also flies the
Su-30].”

The U.S. is currently most concerned about the high-quality deliveries
from
the Russians that include the R-27 (AA-10 Alamo), R-73 (AA-11 Archer)
and
R-77 (AA-12 Adder) air-to-air missiles as well as precision
air-to-ground
weapons.

“IN CERTAIN AREAS [like semiactive air-to-air missiles and
air-to-surface
weapons] the Chinese will try to reverse engineer, but I would expect
the
purchase from the Russians to continue for quite a while,” the analyst
says.
“The Su-30 really opened the door to a lot of weapons they never had
before.
I would be surprised–particularly with their desire to develop a
precision
strike capability–if after they received those weapons they chose not
to
pursue them any further, whether through additional purchases,
agreements or
reverse engineering.

“Right now, we don’t know what the weapons load on the J-10 will be,
but we
imagine that after purchasing the Su-30 with all its capabilities we
will
see them trying to incorporate those systems on the J-10. They’ve
stated
clearly that it’s the capability they want to move to. Their ability to
do
all the integration is a big question. Can they put all the weapons on
the
J-10 and make everything work?

“From a perspective of the entire [Chinese air force],” he says, “there
are
massive holes in capability, including electronic warfare [jammers in
particular], information warfare, precision-guided munitions, advanced
air-to-air weapons and command-and-control systems. I would say they
are
starting to cover those bases.”

China to further military cooperation with Egypt: defense minister

PLA Daily 2004-09-21

　　BEIJING, Sept. 20 (Xinhuanet) — The Chinese armed forces attaches great importance to its military ties with the Egyptian army, and is willing to enhance exchanges and cooperation between the two sides in various fields, said Chinese Defense Minister Cao Gangchuan here Monday.

　　Cao, also vice chairman of the Central Military Commission and state councilor, made the remarks in his talks with Mohammed Hussein Tantawi, commander-in-chief of the Egyptian armed forces and minister of National Defense and Military Production.

　　Cao said the Chinese and Egyptian people enjoy profound traditional friendship. The two countries have conducted sound cooperation in various fields since the establishment of diplomatic relations 48 years ago.

　　The two armed forces have kept frequent high-level visits, he said, adding that the cooperation fields have been continuously expanded.

　　Cao also briefed the guests on China’s stance on the Middle East and international issues, China’s domestic construction, army construction and the Fourth Plenum of 16th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China.

　　Tantawi said the two armies have many similarities and the Egyptian side is willing to enhance exchanges and cooperation with the Chinese army.

　　He spoke highly of China’s stance on resolving the Taiwan issue, noting that Egypt will unswervingly adhere to the one-China policy.

　　Before the talks, Cao held a welcome ceremony for Tantawi’s China visit.

　　Tantawi arrived in Beijing Sunday for a six-day official good-will visit to China as Cao’s guest.

GoldenDragon, his formal rank in CF is Lt Col Yu. not a general yet.

Richard is one but many CDF members who publish regularly on PLA related affairs. To be honest, I’d enjoy going to Washington DC on all those all paid conference on Chinese military affairs. I got invited not because CDF, but rather on some other items I been working on.

Yes, photos are mostly from ML, but you are only seeing the surface.

I can tell you that for a fact, writers from janes, goblesecurity, RAND, etc, (including Pinkov) did not get their photos from CMF, they got them from the “other” English based Chinese Defense fourm. :-).

Here ya go

*** FAIR USE NOTICE. This message contains copyrighted material whose use has not been specifically authorized by the copyright owner. It is being made available without profit to those who have expressed a prior interest in receiving the included information in their efforts to advance their understanding of arms trade activities, for non-profit research and educational purposes only. I believe that this constitutes a ‘fair use’ of the copyrighted material as provided for in section 107 of the U.S. Copyright Law. If you wish to use this copyrighted material for purposes of your own that go beyond ‘fair use,’ you must obtain permission from the copyright owner.
For more information go to:
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–^^—————————————————————

REGIONAL SECURITY ISSUES

Date Posted: 07-Sep-2004

JANE’S INTELLIGENCE REVIEW – OCTOBER 01, 2004
China emerges as a maritime power

Dr. Lyle Goldstein and US Navy Lieutenant-Commander William Murray

Surging domestic economic growth has provided funding for the long neglected Chinese navy. Dr. Lyle Goldstein and US Navy Lieutenant-Commander (retired) William Murray investigate the latest developments in China’s drive to build a modern, potent maritime force.

A watershed in the evolution of Chinese maritime power occurred in May 2004 when it was announced that the head of the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) would be assigned a permanent seat in the Central Military Commission (CMC), China’s highest national security decision-making body, which previously consisted solely of leaders of the ground forces.

China’s emergence as a possible maritime power and its strategic orientation toward its maritime flank really only dates from the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 and recent progress is predicated on a very low level of maritime competency to begin with. However, it is China’s exponential economic growth that is giving the PLAN an increasingly robust financial basis on which to build, aided by newly efficient extractive means for bringing China’s new wealth into state coffers. The first fruits of these efforts are now in evidence.

“These people are building ships like nobody’s business… It’s mind-boggling,” said a military attaché in Beijing, quoted in the Washington Post earlier this year.

Thus far, Beijing has opted to purchase much of its new fleet abroad, benefiting from the Kremlin’s fire-sale of advanced military technology. However, more noteworthy is the success that China appears to be having in fielding indigenous platforms to complement its foreign purchases. The latest generation of warships herald a new era in Chinese naval design and capabilities, while less tangible, but still significant, progress is also evident in the arena of military professionalism. Within the wider context of China’s evolving prowess in basic science and engineering and the stunning growth of its merchant fleet and shipyards, the extent of China’s maritime challenge is obvious.

Submarines at the centre

There are many indicators that submarines are the keystone of Beijing’s rapidly evolving area denial capability. In November 2003, there was a surfaced transit of a PLAN Ming-class submarine southeast of Japan’s Kyushu island and in July 2004 a new class of submarine, the Yuan-class, was unveiled.

Some analysts have dismissed Chinese submarine capabilities out of hand, citing the April 2003 Ming-class submarine 361 accident, in which 70 crewmembers died, as evidence of underwater incompetence. They argue that the PLAN submarine force has long suffered from antiquated and even dangerous platforms such as the Romeo-class diesel submarine and the Han- and Xia-class nuclear vessels. Such doubts overlook the pace of progress that has become increasingly evident. More indicative of Beijing’s underwater trajectory is the accountability to which the PLAN’s leaders were held after the 361 disaster. The senior naval leaders deemed responsible were quickly sacked and replaced. Admiral Zhang Dingfa, a submariner, became the new commander of the PLAN, demonstrating a firm national commitment to the undersea force.

One of the most visible indicators of Chinese modernisation programmes is that the Song class submarine following a somewhat troubled design phase, has now entered serial production. Seven to eight Type 039A Songs have now been launched. According to one source, submarine production is being accelerated: China reportedly recently placed a large order for German diesel engines to power these vessels. Future Song-class submarines will likely feature air-independent propulsion technology, which PLAN publications discuss frequently.

According to photographs published on Chinese internet sites, including some from a Hong Kong port visit in May 2004, there appear to be three distinct versions of Song-class submarines, distinguishable by significant alterations to the submarines’ sail shape and the number and orientation of limber holes along the hull. Close-up photographs confirm that Song-class submarines, like the most recent versions of the Ming-class, have an anechoic rubber tile coating for sound dampening purposes.

Images thought to be of the interior of a Song-class submarine control room show flat screen control panels, one of which is apparently configured as a 360º digital waterfall broadband sonar display. This tends to confirm Western speculation that the Song-class is equipped with a copy of the French DUUX-5 digital sonar system – a major improvement over analog predecessors. There also appears to be a digital fire control system with weapon presets or systems test options available for selection on additional flat screen monitors. Song-class submarines can reportedly fire the C-801 Anti-Ship Cruise Missile (ASCM) while submerged, as well as some of the PLAN’s most modern torpedoes. Other control room images depict a raised periscope, which features electrical or wave guide connectors near the eyepiece and handles that suggest the possibility of permanently installed cameras, night vision enhancement, thermal imaging, laser range-finding, antenna systems, or other modern periscope capabilities. There also appears to be a flat screen for some type of satellite navigation system.

Complementing the Song-class programme is the PLAN’s ambitious 2002 Russian contract for eight Project 636 Kilo-class diesel-powered submarines. Along with 3M54E cruise missiles, delivery of all eight submarines will occur between 2005 and 2007. Battery problems with the China’s first batch of Kilo-class submarines did not forestall this purchase, suggesting that the PLAN has developed confidence in the appropriate maintenance practices. Acoustically comparable to the most advanced US Navy (USN) Los Angeles-class nuclear attack submarine (SSN), the Kilo-class submarines will be a force to be reckoned with.

Given the accelerating pace of Song-class submarine construction, defence analysts were surprised by the sudden and unanticipated appearance of the Yuan-class submarine in July. The photographs available show many similarities between this vessel and Kilo-class submarines, including the two-over-four torpedo tube arrangement, a larger and more rounded bow section that suggests an advanced passive sonar system and a flattened top of the hull. Unlike the Kilo-class, however, the Yuan-class features sail planes and an upper rudder, indicating that the Chinese have incorporated a host of Russian characteristics into their latest indigenous design. Although air-independent propulsion (AIP) cannot be ruled out, the Yuan-class is probably a conventional diesel powered submarine since there is little evidence of the PLAN actively experimenting with AIP technology. Nuclear power can likely be excluded due to the vessel’s limited displacement and also because all other PLAN SSNs have been built at the Huludao shipyard. The class’s weapons systems are still unknown but it will likely carry advanced torpedoes and be capable of sub-surface ASCM launch. It is not clear when the Yuan-class might impact Song-class production or further purchases of submarines from abroad.

The long-anticipated Type 093 SSN represents the high end of the Beijing’s prospective underwater fleet. With the flagship launched in December 2002 and preparing for imminent sea trials, this class of second-generation nuclear submarines will likely replace the PLAN’s ageing and noisy Han-class SSNs. A second 093 SSN was reportedly launched in late 2003. Another 093 is said to be under construction, as is the first of the Type 094 second-generation nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBN), the design of which is widely thought to be derived from the 093. The 094 will likely carry 16 8,000 km-range JL-2 SLBMs and sources expect two or three of them to be in service by 2010. Extended ranges for Chinese SLBMs implies the possibility of the PLAN adopting a ‘bastion’ strategy to protect these emerging deterrent capabilities.

Long rumoured to be the acoustic and technological equivalent of Soviet Victor III – and Delta-class submarines, the 093 and 094 can only improve on the troubled legacy of China’s first generation Han-class SSN and Xia-class SSBN. On the other hand, Western observers should not make the mistake of extrapolating from these earlier failures. The PLAN nuclear submarine fleet may be poised for revolutionary, as opposed to incremental, progress. With no 093 sea trials yet reported, the simultaneous construction of up to six of these complex ships is a remarkable testament to Beijing’s newfound confidence in integrating advanced technologies in weapons platforms.

Further augmenting the submarine fleet, Russian state shipbuilding company Admiralteiskiye Verfi (formerly known as Shipyard No 194) recently announced that on 18 August it had launched the second of five diesel-electric submarines it was contracted to build for the Chinese Navy. The first had been launched earlier this year.

Gaining respect

The PLAN is aggressively improving its surface fleet with a robust construction programme of destroyers, frigates, amphibious vessels and patrol craft. Widely available photographs chronicle the construction and fitting out of two new PLAN Type 052C destroyers at Shanghai’s Jiangnan shipyard. These two 6500-tonne ships, both launched in 2003, appear to share the same hull design as the two brand new Jiangnan-built Type 052B guided missile destroyers (DDG, and the previous decade’s solitary Type 051B. Both of the 52B and one of the 52C destroyers have undergone builder’s trials. Unlike their predecessors, the 052Cs are optimised for area air defence. They have phased array or planar array radars – a first for the PLAN – on the four corners of the bridge’s vertical superstructure and as many as six sets of rotary surface-to-air missile (SAM) vertical launchers – also a PLAN first – located forward of the bridge and adjacent to the helicopter hangar. Sources speculate that this is a naval version of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) HQ-9 air defence system, with a range of 120 km. The 052C’s helicopter hangar is large enough to carry two Z-9A or KH 28 helicopters. A pair of four inclined tube launchers oriented athwartships will house an as yet undetermined type of ASCM. Two of the new Type 730 Close In Weapons System (CIWS), said to resemble the Dutch Goalkeeper system and a 100mm main gun on the foredeck round out the apparent weaponry. Propulsion is probably provided by two imported Ukrainian gas turbines with two diesel engines. It is not known if more type 052C DDGs will be built.

The 3500-tonne diesel-powered Type 054 frigate is another conspicuous PLAN construction programme. The Hudong shipyard in Shanghai and the Huangpu shipyard in Guangzhou have each launched one Type 054 since 2003. Both of these vessels have undergone sea trials. Sources indicate that both yards have at least one additional frigate under construction, although there is some debate about whether these newer ships will be further modified to include a 32-cell VLS system for SA-N-12 or comparable missiles on the foredeck, as a recently displayed design model indicates. Notable for their sloping, stealthy superstructures and superficial resemblance to the French Lafayette-class guided-missile frigates (FFGs), the two current 054s are thought to carry the HHQ-7 point defence SAM missile system, as well as two quad-launchers for the PLAN’s indigenous 120 km-range C-802 ASCM, a 100mm gun forward, torpedoes, four AK-630 CIWS, and a KH 28 helicopter.

Also noteworthy among Beijing’s indigenous surface programmes is the recent launch from Shanghai’s Qiuxin shipyard of the PLAN’s newest missile patrol boat. According to one analysis of available photographs, this vessel features a wave-piercing centre hull and two outer hulls that each house two water drives that look very similar to those that propel Sweden’s new Visby-class missile corvette. Armed with a 30mm gun forward, it also has two enclosures aft that each appear large enough to house two ASCMs. This vessel’s superstructure is heavily faceted to provide a reduced radar reflection. Other photographs show this new catamaran moored next to a commercial wave-piercing ferry of similar design. It is not clear how many of these commercially-derived ‘missile catamarans’ – seemingly the latest derivation of the classic Cold War fast missile patrol boat – will be built.

Another PLAN construction initiative is a marked increase in amphibious ship construction. As chronicled by photographs on the internet, in the past two years Beijing has built at least seven new landing ship/tanks (LST) that are enlarged upgrades to their 3,400-tonne Yuting-class, increasing their inventory of LSTs from 16 to 23. During this same period, the PLAN has launched at least six new medium landing ships (LSMs) that appear to be modernised versions of their solitary 1,400-tonne Yudeng-class. This influx of new construction raises the PLAN inventory of LSMs to 42, most of which are quite modern. It is not known whether this rate of construction will be sustained. There is, moreover, credible evidence of ambitions to construct a 12,300-tonne amphibious transport dock (LPD) capable of carrying up to three landing craft air cushion (LCAC) and several helicopters. Finally, the relatively new PLA Marine Corps is now equipped with what is reputed to be the most advanced amphibious light tank in the world. Considering that the PLA rehearses the use of merchant shipping in military roles, the above building programmes imply a robust amphibious capability in the near term future.

In April and July 2004, observers in Russia reported the launch of the third and fourth of China’s four Sovremennyy-class destroyers. The PLAN seems to be seeking to realise synergistic benefits for its surface fleet through parallel programmes of indigenous production and foreign acquisition, similar to the Song- and Kilo-class submarine and J-10/11 aircraft development efforts. It has been suggested that major investments in a surface fleet are wasted until the PLAN can develop a viable force to control the air in its operating area. However, incremental steps are already widening this potential area of operations – at least to encompass China’s Economic Exclusion Zone. This area will expand in the future. Moreover, the PLAN surface fleet remains potent for threatening the smaller navies of some of China’s neighbours. Perhaps most important, China’s surface fleet enables Beijing to claim a seat at the table during any major crisis in the Asia-Pacific, as well as the mantle of the premier rising regional power. Even in the absence of conflict, the PLAN serves China’s growing range of national security interests.

The human factor

As the PLAN fields a potent, new generation of surface and sub-surface platforms, there is also an overall Chinese recognition that the ‘human factor’ remains decisive in warfare. At the broadest level, this amounts to a fundamental turn away from ideology and towards the objective study of naval warfare – a trend that has been two decades in the making. Capable institutions are emerging that have the potential to significantly increase the PLAN’s fighting effectiveness in the years ahead.

In 2003, the naval command expanded its recruitment programmes to draw in 1,600 university graduates as part of what appears to be a successful replication of the US Reserve Officer Training Corps programme. These technologically competent cadres will officer China’s growing fleet. Salaries have been raised to retain personnel. The formation of a capable force of non-commissioned officers is another high priority for the naval command. In general, a climate of intellectual openness is spurring the military reform process.

A host of naval-interest publications such as Jianchuan Zhishi (Naval and Merchant Ships) and Dangdai Haijun (Modern Navy) serve as forums for debate and also acquaint naval personnel with worldwide naval trends. These and other Chinese military publications are engaged in a broad effort to inculcate officers and the broader public with a detailed knowledge of modern military history, emphasising campaigns at sea. Lacking its own indigenous naval history and quietly shelving the confines of Maoist strategic formulations, the PLAN appears to be engaged in the creation of a community of sophisticated maritime strategic thinkers.

The current atmosphere of relative openness is also evident within the PLAN’s educational institutions. This is clear, for example, from recent reforms undertaken at the Qingdao Submarine Academy. According to a 2002 report: “All the traditional modes of instruction, including long-applied teaching practices and well-taught textbooks, were set to be scrapped within a short time.” After an assessment that “basic theories have often been stressed at the expense of operating skills” teams from the Submarine Academy set about undertaking thousands of visits to fleet units in order to reform the curriculum to better serve those who will “fight under high-tech conditions”. Internet images seem to show the new and powerful influence of computerised simulation technology on PLAN education and training facilities. These images, reportedly from the Qingdao Submarine Academy, show students developing their piloting skills in a surface navigation computer simulator and operating a bank of digital sonar or fire control screens. Although the PLAN submarine force evidently receives priority focus, the reform spirit – in particular the zealous exploitation of new technologies – is likely to impact all aspects of PLAN operations in the near future.

The move away from rote, scripted drills toward more free play ‘confrontational training’, apparent across the PLA may culminate in revolutionary change with respect to the effectiveness of Chinese military exercises. Specifics remain sketchy and many Western analysts remain sceptical that the PLA is actually any more joint than before. However, some recent training innovations may be suggestive of a new training ethic. For example, cross-posting, or the exchange of personnel from different warfare specialities, is commonly reported in PLAN routines, involving submarine, surface and aviation elements. Inter-theatre exercises involving elements from the three main fleets also appear to be increasingly commonplace. Several innovative exercises recently involved logistics operations from remote ports. Such exercises would appear to fuse technological and organisational developments to yield genuine doctrinal innovation. A recent Chinese account of a Ming-class submarine sortie off the southeast coast of Japan suggests a new and bold intention to operate beyond the first island chain. Recurring ‘research activities’ of Chinese hydrographic vessels in waters near Japan are also strongly suggestive of this tendency, as are other recent PLAN deployments to the waters east of Taiwan.

Finally, it should be recognised that a firm foundation for China’s naval modernisation has been laid with respect to creating the massive infrastructure for basic and applied research. Chinese universities grant nearly half a million science and engineering degrees each year. Furthermore, some of Beijing’s myriad labs devoted to naval weapons research are led by Chinese holding PhDs from Western universities. A recent RAND appraisal of China’s defence industry noted that shipbuilding was at the forefront of impressive industry-wide technological and quality-assurance progress. Beijing’s wide-ranging investments are starting to pay dividends, as demonstrated by the array of capable platforms described above.

Weak points

The emergence of China as a significant sea power is not a foregone conclusion. Many significant shortfalls are apparent in the PLAN modernization programme – especially if one considers its potential for blue-water operations.

The following areas could be substantial weak points in the evolving PLAN: intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR); area air defence and naval air; anti-submarine warfare; and mine warfare. ISR capabilities remain rather limited, suggesting potential difficulties in finding targets for China’s newest stand-off weapons. The PLAN Air Force (PLANAF) has long been the poor cousin of the PLA Air Force (PLAAF), nor does much progress seem to be have been achieved under the last commander of the PLAN, Admiral Shi Yunsheng, an aviator who was replaced in 2003. Aircraft carrier projects appear to be on indefinite hold. There are some signs of recognition that helicopter operations will have to be vastly expanded and improved to keep pace with other aspects of fleet modernisation. This would help rectify uncertainty over Chinese anti-submarine warfare (ASW) capabilities. In this respect, the modest programme for maritime surveillance aircraft, akin to the P-3 Orion, remains a fundamental gap. There is also a clear shortfall in amphibious lift – far less than what would be necessary to deliver the requisite forces across the Strait of Taiwan. Finally, many analysts have noted that the PLAN appears to give short shrift to mine warfare, possessing mostly old-fashioned contact mines, one single dedicated minelayer and a not especially impressive fleet of minesweepers.

On the other hand, even in these areas of weakness bright spots are discernible. Concerning ISR, new reports suggest that China has, in fact, been aggressively pursuing development of an airborne warning and control system (AWACS)-type aircraft for early warning and airborne battle management. A number of aircraft, similar to the Russian A-50 Mainstay, are in various stages of testing. In addition, China already has as many as three over-the-horizon skywave radars for maritime surveillance.

Regarding naval air defence, the new surface platforms described above represent a significant improvement over their predecessors. With respect to naval aviation, the PLANAF will receive its first batch of fourth generation Su-30Mk2s from Russia during 2004. Armed with Kh-31 supersonic anti-ship missiles and with a highly respectable combat radius of 1,500 km, these aircraft may herald a new recognition of the PLANAF’s importance. Moreover, it may be significant that the PLAN’s new ranking political officer General Hu Yanlin is a transplant from the PLAAF. He reportedly retains excellent ties with the current PLAAF leadership. Such ties could enforce a more rational future division of labour between the PLANAF and the PLAAF.

In terms of mine warfare, minelaying and clearing exercises are taking place, and there is a definite, discernible interest in technology associated with advanced deep-water mines.

Outlook

China has accelerated its programme of naval modernisation. Not only is the PLAN benefiting from a host of lethal systems purchased from Moscow, but for the first time in modern history, China is deploying respectable indigenous naval platforms, especially new diesel submarines, destroyers and frigates. While considerable uncertainty surrounds the momentous commissioning of China’s second generation of nuclear submarines, given China’s new technical prowess, it would be a grave mistake to simply extrapolate from the failed first generation of nuclear submarines.

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YEAR VESSEL NUMBER BUILT
1964-1984 Romeo 84 (4 per year)
1975-1980 Romeo 20
Han 2
Ming 1
1981-1985 Romeo 16
Han 1
Xia 1
1986-1990 Ming 4
Han 1
1991-1996 Ming 6
Han 1
1996-2000 Ming 7
Kilo 4
Song 1
2001-2005 Kilo (Project 636) 8
Song 8
Ming 5
Yuan 1
093 SSN 1
2006-2010 (projected) Song/Yuan 10
Kilo 6
093 SSN 3
094 SSBN 4

Lanzhou – Luyan II (Type 052C) Class (DDGHM). Indigenously manufactured, Hull 170 and her sister 171 will be true area air defense ships when armed with a mature, vertically launched HQ-9 SAM.

Jiangkai (Type 054) Class (FFGHM) The two of this modern class have diesel propulsion, ASCMs, the HQ-7 SAM, and a helicopter hangar.

A new Fast Attack Craft missile was launched at Quixin Shipyard in April 2004. With a wave-piercing catamaran hull form and waterjet propulsors, the ship is probably of aluminium alloy construction while the design clearly incorporates RCS reduction measures.

The Yuan-class, built at over 200 km up the Yangtze river, shares similarities with both Russian Kilo and Chinese 039A class submarines. Its appearance was a surprise to Western observers.

Yuting II Class (LSTH)- In the past two years the PLAN has constructed at least 8 of these modernized vessels, raising their inventory of LSTs to 23.

The authors are faculty members in the Center for Naval Warfare Studies at the US Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island, USA.

Disclaimer: This work reflects the personal opinions of the authors and not the official views of the US Naval War College or the US government.