crobatoNo it’s not a Sunburn. It’s much closer to a Harpoon class missile.
The C-803 is an evolution of the air breathing C-802 missile (120km sea flight), which itself is an evolution of the rocket powered C-801 (47km and 80km for the second version.)
Its size means it can be launched from air, sea and by land, as well as by sub (Song subs have launched C-801 and C-802 AshMs before.) This using the standard launchers for the C-801/802. and it can be launched from ships already using the C-801/802. The datalink is to provide over the horizon control from external sources like aircraft or helicopters, particularly for ships that cannot provide OTH support.
YJ-12 appears more like in the Kh-31 class.
crobatoOriginally posted by Vympel
Why C-803? Oh, it’s Chinese, I got it – never mind that it’s only a mockup and it’s specifications aren’t exactly remarkable :rolleyes:
It certainly isn’t a mockup, and the 255km range isn’t a paper spec which isn’t backed up by actual observable performance.
It is currently in production (backed by pics of an assembly line), and it’s been caught in flight by US intelligence with a range of 255km.
http://asp.washtimes.com/printarticle.asp?action=print&ArticleID=20021120-2387
The Washington Times
http://www.washingtontimes.com
——————————————————————————–
Chinese missile has twice the range U.S. anticipated
Bill Gertz
THE WASHINGTON TIMES
Published 11/20/2002
——————————————————————————–
China recently test-fired a new cruise missile with twice the range U.S. intelligence agencies initially estimated, intelligence officials say.
The test comes as Chinese Communist officials last week appointed a top general in charge of China’s missile buildup to a new post within the leadership that runs the military.
China fired a YJ-83 anti-ship cruise missile from a JH-7 fighter-bomber earlier this month over Bohai Bay, off northern China.
The test results surprised U.S. intelligence officials. Until recently, the estimated range of the YJ-83 had been assessed to be about 75 miles. The new missile test showed that its range is about 155 miles.
The last time the missile was tested was July 4, when the People’s Daily, the official Communist Party newspaper, announced the testing of a beyond-visual-range anti-ship missile. This weapon is believed by Pentagon officials to be part of Beijing’s efforts to develop a long-range strike capability against U.S. aircraft carriers and ships.
Officials say the missile represents a new capability for the Chinese military in conducting “over-the-horizon” attacks on U.S. or allied ships in any conflict with China. The YJ-83 is believed to be a derivative of the C-801 anti-ship cruise missile but can travel at supersonic speeds, making it very difficult for ships to stop.
Defense specialists say the YJ-83, sometimes called the C-803, also has the capability to receive target information in flight
Richard Fisher, a specialist on the Chinese military with the Jamestown Foundation, said the new YJ-83 will probably be outfitted on the upgraded JH-7a fighter-bomber.
“With a range of 250 km [155 miles], it gives the PLA and its export clients a new anti-ship missile that can fire beyond the reach of U.S. Naval anti-aircraft missiles like the Standard SM-2, which will soon equip Taiwan’s Kidd-class destroyers,” Mr. Fisher said.
“This test also indicates that longer-range land-attack cruise missiles are just around the corner,” he noted.
crobatoGot this from Motif in the CMF. Motif said they’re J-11s, but they look like MKKs to me. Note something hanging in the wings, which is likely to be a PGM of some kind.
crobatoDual mode is good. Even if a radar shuts down its emissions, an infrared seeker can still home in on the heat still present in the antenna.
crobatoCould be, although I didn’t expect it to be this early.
Could this be fitting with the new processor to support the Kh-31A, the new DSP to extend radar range, new navigation system, support for SAPSAN and M400 pods, and a new digital cockpit similar to the SU-27SKM (the latter we actually first discussed this possibility right in this forum months ago) ?
I do expect that PLAAF would only upgrade their MKKs but not acquire new MKKs for a while, while it will be PLANAF’s turn to acquire the new MKKs (at least with a roadmap of 3 or 4 regiments).
The MK2 sounds like a simple, relatively inexpensive upgrade, more akin to refining and plugging the holes.
crobatoI’ve heard of too many contradictory statements about the order being 24, 28, 30, 38 and 40 aircraft.
I’m likely to believe the order is for 38-40, for 19-20 aircraft per regiment. 24 and 28 don’t seem to fit any pattern, unless 24 means 20 planes for one regiment, plus 4 set aside for use in training or evaluation.
The Q-5 to SU-30MKK is way too big a jump in every other way from seating configuration (one seater vs two seater), to the range and power levels, to the technology level to the size of the aircraft. Are these the Q-5s with the antiship radar that could fire C-801s? I thought those are only with the Navy and are for experimental purposes only. I never knew if they were actually operational.
Replacing H-5 or H-6 units with the MKK is also a major leap in my book.
I suspect if a naval unit that may be converted for the MKK is likely to be using a large supersonic aircraft, with two seats, a fair level of technology and avionics, and with established antishipping capability. You are likely to use the best and most technologically adept crew for the newest and shiniest toys. I can’t think of no other unit but the JH-7 reg in the 16th in Dachang. I greatly suspect, they may be converted to the MKK and their JH-7s moved to somewhere else, perhaps to convert a naval Q-5 unit.
crobatoThe PLA won’t be making foolish exhibitions like shooting missiles across the straits. They have learned that lesson since 1996. Since then, the mainland prefers to use verbal sparring and statements to make their point.
crobatoIf Taiwan attacks China first, Taiwan will lose the high morale ground and the US has no legal or treaty justification to intervene in behalf of the Taiwanese. Bush has made it clear to Chen Su Bien that Taiwan has no right to put or force US soldiers in harms way for Chen Su Bien’s own political purposes and of CSB’s own time and choosing. It is made clear that the US will only defend China, if China attacked Taiwan without any provocation.
Even so, China does not have the resources to invade Taiwan by sea, but Taiwan’s ports and bases will be left in a smoldering ruin after a hail of missiles, air and sea attacks, that will lead to a coup in Taiwan and a pro-China party taking over in Taiwan.
crobatoThis is actually more bloody confusing.
What is being painted as the “SU-30MK2” or “MKK2” appears to be two seperate aircraft.
The first aircraft is the one that appeared in MAKS 2003. This is the plane with the M400 surveillance pod and the SAPSAN pod. This plane however appears to be much more enhanced for ground attack, which is the jurisdiction of the PLAAF, not the PLANAF.
The second aircraft appears to be the one certified with the Kh-31A antiship missile, and perhaps a sea optimized radar, intended for the Navy.
So which is which?
It could be both are the same plane, a kind of one size fits all type of package, although planes for the PLANAF would not be equipping with the ground attack equipment and pods, and the planes for the PLAAF won’t be using antiship missiles.
So far it seems it sounds to me like this:
1.) Existing planes with the PLAAF have been given the go ahead for the upgrade.
2.) Concurrently, new SU-30MK2 planes are being delivered.
Also have a question with the number of deliveries. The delivery of planes usually means 2 batch deliveries for one regiment. 12 planes imply there may be a second batch of 12 for 24. When did the regimental numbers for bombers changed to 24? Usually the numbers are 19-20.
Should this be 10 for 20 later? Or a complete 19-20 aircraft in one single delivery?
crobatoOriginally posted by plawolf
anyhow, back to the dogfight report. there was a simliar report a few months back, apparently on the offical handover cerimony for the J10 in which it was supposed to have beaten flankers in dofights. however, the value of these dogfights remain to be seen as they could have been ‘staged’ for show.even if they werent, the pilots flying the J10s would almost certainly have had experience flying flankers, which would given them an advantage in a dogfight as they are familiar with flanker tactics and limitations.
The story is not too dissimilar from those of J-7s shooting down SU-27s. When you look closely to the story, the J-7 pilot happens to be an SU-27 pilot, often an instructor, and a top gun at that, and who knows the ins and the outs of the SU-27 intimately.
And remember always, a smaller plane has an advantage in WVR fights.
crobatoOriginally posted by SOC
1. Seeing as how the J-8II and JH-7 were offered for export, I would say that the J-10 will be offered for export at some time in the future, after the PLAAF has been operating the type for a bit.2. They will likely use the FC-1 to replace some J-7s and Q-5s I think, someone correct me if I’m wrong here.
3. Yes, the PLAAF uses the K-8 as a basic trainer.
4. The FTC-2000 will compete with the L-15 for the advanced/LIFT trainer spot in the PLAAF.
GoldenDragon, crobato, plawolf-those guys have a better hand on some of this stuff than I do, hopefully they’ll offer some more insight.
No need to add. You got it pretty much down pat.
crobatoOriginally posted by Rick
[B]I’ll take you word on the 2nd Div plane with the 1st Div as I’ve not seen it.
You’ve seen this pic. This is the CCTV captured one with J-10 #10 of the 1st, with a tailfin of “33” in the background. Later the video continued with #33 and #32 UBKs. Planes #27 to #50 used to be all in the 2nd Division. They may still be. Getting #51 to #53 does explain this number in the article: 26 planes in all.
#25 to #26 probably originally went to the 3rd when they were first delivered. It’s either the 2nd or the 3rd as these are the first two early SU-27 regs.
I don’t think you take a loaner and paint you unit emblem and unit number on the plane. This looks like a permanent transfer to me.
I’m not so sure, given the frequency of shuffling. I may think its actually a real transfer though, but this plane can still be doing round robins with other units as I may explain later.
Interesting. Where did the rest of the Su-27s go?
#1 to #26 used to be all of the 3rd, but you saw with some unit number changes, some of these went to the 19th. Among them are #3 UBK and #13 SK. Hui Tong’s site has the numbers but the numbers may be outdated, so it’s probable that #1 to #26 eventually all moved to the 19th.
But again as we saw with #24 sitting in a maintenance/overhaul facility, the tail numbers are still that of the 3rd.
Its hard to explain this. Perhaps all of #1 to #26 were eventually moved to the 19th, and the photo still have not showed #24 changing it bort number, or the 3rd actually kept some of the SU-27s, and therefore still has an SU-27 regiment. It does not make sense to me if some of the old SU-27s went to one reg, and the others are retained, only to have J-11s fill in the balance of both.
Why assume all the upgrade kits were the same. The Technocomplex rep only said China was a good upgrade market and that 100 upgrade kits were shipped. I didn’t see where he indicated they were all the same. Since Technocomplex handles upgrades for Su-27SK and UBK models upgrade kits for both could have been included.
That’s what I figured.
I do still have my reservations on this, and especially on the UBM upgrades. Very few UBMs (probably only about 6) were ever made—I can only remember one, but I’ve also heard as much as six were converted. Both SU-27UBM and SU-30KN were the planned upgrades for the RuAF before the head of the airforce is changed, and the new one was much more lenient (shows you the corruption in the Russian defense industry) to KnAAPO. The UBM and 30KN planes were the responsibility of the rival firm, IAIA, also better known as the Irkut factory. I am not aware if these configurations were ever fully certified—a KnAAPO official described their rival Irkut’s version of the upgrade, a “failure”.
I thought it was possible, but my feeling is that its less likely that China would adopt the Irkut version of the upgrade. They had already soundly rejected Sukhoi’s previous attempt to assign the second batch of MKKs to Irkut, which would have made the planes built to the SU-30KN configuration, and not KnAAPO’s SU-30MKK configuration. Yes, KnAAPO has legal rights and intellectual property to the MKK configutation, so Sukhoi actually cannot transfer the MKK configuration to another factory and make it. That other factory has to come up with its own version. Ditto with the SU-27SKM.
I have a hunch that what the Technocomplex guy was saying isn’t completely correct because of this. It would make simpler, cheaper and better overall sense that China ordered 100 upgrade its then applied them from the 100th aircraft to the 200th.
He didn’t say that. Those are two unrelated remarks. The 100 kits since 2001 was the Technocomplex rep. Mr. Butowski said he knew from KnAAPO that 105 J-11 kits were delivered since 1998. My point is the 100 Technocomplex kits are not necessarily, and probably not, part of the 105 J-11 kits Mr. Butowski spoke of.
No, Butowski did suggest on this forum that the 100 Technocomplex kits were part of the J-11 kits, since Technocomplex was also responsible for the avionics of the basic SK.
So even Fisher knew the numbers didn’t work and he was trying to rationalize them. If the Sukhoi officials numbers had to be explained then saying he was referring to the entire 200 J-11s under license production is just as reasonable an explaination. The main point here: the Sukhoi offical overstated the number of Sukhoi aircraft China had at the time he made the statement.
I suspected that the numbers were a bit high at that point, but I already did feel that at August 2003, the numbers were already exceeding 200. This was boosted by a July delivery of MKKs. The Sukhoi person may be overstating things a bit, with the typical Russian perchant of hyperbole, but the gist of the conversation, that China had a higher number of Flankers than previously assumed, was undeniable. He probably knew that if all current short term contracts were fulfilled, it would reach 300, and though it would be fulfilled anytime in the year. This would entail the delivery of the first naval SU-30MKKs and the completion of the 100 J-11 kits.
It would make more sense to send the pilots to the trainer aircraft than the trainer aircraft to the pilots. The only photo I have seen is the two old 3rd/19th Div trainers at the 7th Div. We don’t know those were not permanent transfers. Since the PLAAF has typicall had only FOUR trainers at a regiment the 19th would have had two extras since the 3rd originally had 6 UBKs. [/B]
um no. Your suggestion only makes sense if individual pilots needed to be converted.
But it does not make sense to send an entire unit to the training facility, if the entire unit needs to be trained up their skills, work together as a unit, and needs to be trained within thier operational environment.
So you take one hotshot with a UBK, and send them to the unit full of fresh pilots to “train” them up. That actually is much faster and brings the training right into the operational evironment of the unit itself. That really is much more important especially if sea flights will be conducted. Chongging is far from the sea, I don’t see the 33rd doing anything more than basic pilot conversion. But to work out the “advanced” part, including tactics, ACM, exercises, it might be much better to send Mr. Topgun instructor and a UBK to that unit that needs fixing up. The topguns are most probably the 2nd and 3rd reg veteran pilots.
As for the 33rd itself, if you take out 3 units (#51 to #53 sent to the 2nd), but keep the rest (#54 to #78) you are left with about 25 aircraft. Plus one J-11 for pilot certification, you end up with the 26 number, so yeah, its possible that the 33rd itself is rounded up to 26. But again, you probably need at least 26 UBKs to match the number of the needed conversions, and a small number of J-11s (not one) for the certifications.
crobatoLol. KnAAPO cranked out the majority of nearly 700 Flankers between 1983, when serial production began up to 1989, with peak years around 85′ to ’88.
And you’re right, SAC isn’t KnAAPO. SAC is much bigger, located in the center of Chinese industrial heartland, the former capital of Manchuria, while KnAAPO is in a small town of Siberian backwaters. KnAAPO still relies mostly on hand driven labor, commenting proudly about its only piece of automation is a pneumatic hand drill. SAC has benefited from modern investment, which includes precision machine tooling from Europe, the US, and Japan.
Yup, big difference.
If #53 is shown with 2nd div, it does not appear to be a permanent station. The UBKs appear to rotate among different units, mainly to help with conversion and training, before returning back to their original regiment, just as we have seen a plane from the 2nd Div, serving with the 1st Div. This only affects their distribution but not their overall numbers.
Furthermore, it only looks like only part of the aicraft that used to belong to the SU-27 reg in the 3rd are moved to the new SU-27 reg in the 19th, and J-11s were probably used to fill in the rest.
As for the Technocomplex kits, read this. The upgrade for the SU-27UBK called SU-27UBM is not the same as the SU-27SKM. Although the same radar set is involved, the UBM upgrade is basically the SU-30KN without the refueling probe, and is done by a different company, IAIA. It uses a different set of avionics from the KnAAPO upgrade.
As UBKs are not made in China unless it can be proven otherwise, kits for two seaters cannot be for the assembly line and must definitely be upgrades to existing aircraft.
It simply does not fit with what Butowski implied that these kits are for new aircraft being licensed for production in China. Otherwise the person would have said “100 kits delivered since 1998” not 2001.
As many of the older SU-27s, including two seaters are in the overhaul age, this would provide the opportunity to include any upgrades during those overhauls. We have already seen that the nature of these upgrades can be accomplished with the minimal of effort and cost, and use of existing components as much as possible. IAIA’s boasted that the conversion of the SU-27UB to the UBM standard took as little as 3 weeks.
I would however doubt that any upgrade conversion are made on already built newer planes, including the last 28 UBKs and the J-11s. It would have been a waste to discard fresh equipment.
From then, the balance of the upgrade kits are more likely to be applied right on the assembly line on new aircraft, so they come off the factory already equipped with the upgrade.
So if 100 upgrade kits were delivered, half of those may have went to already existing older fighters, while the balance goes to planes still awaiting to be built.
Unless of course the PLA decides to save them entirely for the still built balance of planes.
Read what Fisher has to say, the Sukhoi person probably meant 300 planes after the fulfillment of curent short term contracts. This probably meant including completion of the 105 SU-27SK kits and the delivery of another group of SU-30s. All in all, his figures still tallies.
The Strategy Page article did strike me in revealing about an undiscovered order of 20 new UBKs if the table is true. I like to see more reports on that. I have always suspected (and did write about) that they may actually need more UBKs than they have now, in order to laxen the training plane shortage, which you can see the PLAAF may be trying to alleviate by touring the two seaters from one unit to another.
crobatoOriginally posted by Rick
Where did the 40-48 a year come from? What Dr. Fisher said was the Sukhoi official said that since 2002 “several dozen” more J-11s had been produced. This is the same offical that said it would take 10 years to indiginize the J-11. You probably don’t believe that part though. All you have with this guy is a car salesman. Can’t believe much about what he says. Especially when put with other information. Just because he is with sukhoi does not mean he has insider information about what is going on in China.
Excuse me, but it is easy to disregard what that fellow said at first. Then you can wait for more reports to come in either to prove or disprove what he said.
More and more what he was saying, rather, seems correct. Just because a person is a car salesman does not mean what he is saying is true or not.
Here is a quote from Fisher’s article.
One Sukhoi official who was involved in their China business stated that the PLA already had about 300 Sukhoi fighters. This is a number double open published estimates—about 150. My personal estimate is about 170, based mainly on Russian press reports. If true this new Sukhoi number would constitute a considerable revelation and point to a hitherto publicly unacknowledged threat to Taiwan. However, this individual could also be referring to the total expected number after fulfillment of current contracts. This issue deserves greater U.S. government review.
Of particular interest this individual stated that he expected the PLA to sign a follow-on contract to continue the co-production of Su-27 fighters at Shenyang. He noted that since 2002 the PLA has produced “several dozen” more J-11 (Su-27) fighters, which could mean that co-production totals may now stand closer to 100 fighters—half the 1996 contract for 200. A production rate of 48 a year could support the formation of possibly two new regiments of fighters per year and fulfill the 1996 co-production contract by 2005 or 2006. The possibility of a second co-production contract means that the number of Sukhoi fighters in the PLAAF could grow well beyond 400 within this decade.
If you look at the Chinese media you clearly, without a doubt see there is no J-11 regiment in the 2nd Division. Recently on CCTV was an article about a young man of the 2nd Division who died in July 2003. In February, the Party Comittee of the PLAAF made this an issue. This resulted in broadcasts on both CCTV1 and CCTV7 this month at the unit that showed old J-7s in the 4th Regiment. The 5th Regiment has J-7Es, and the 6th Regiment has Su-27s.
And what is these SU-27s? Can you tell if these are actually J-11s or Russian made SU-27s? As far as visual identification cues, there are none except closeups of the plane. Or are you trying to say they’re SU-30s.
I suspect the 33rd Does have J-11s. I also suspect they don’t have 28 UBKs. I think some of them may have to go to other units, such as the 1st Division. A USAF delegation is in China right now. They will be visiting the 33rd Division (likely at Dazu and not Chongqing). If they get lucky, they might find out.
I have never found any of the UBKs numbered 5X-7X in any other formation. The UBKs with those numbers are the ones attached to the 33rd.
I agree about Dachang but don’t know about that 3rd Regiment of JH-7s. The photo that was going around a while back was a mockup used in training ground crews. I think the Navy is pretty much confined to two regiments per Division. This is just speculation on my part.
I suspect that mockup is used for seriously training ground crews. The number on the mockup may suggest that they are trying to make it as “actual” as possible, and may give clues that a regiment is currently in transition.
CCTV has shown JH-7As already in production. If a regiment is destined to get them, now is a good time to prepare for such and train.
I agree that the future J-11s will be upgraded and that is what the Technocomplex issue is about. I tend to think the upgrade will be earlier than plane 100, mostly because I still don’t think they have built 100. Especially since the Technocomplex deliveries went back to 2001.
So plane 80 perhaps is a good figure? Remember Jane’s saying from a Chinese spokesman back in Zhuhai 2000 that the basic SU-27SK production would end in the 80th plane—which Janes then assumed that the Chinese would convert the rest of MKKs.
Maybe not exactly MKKs, but if they did change the planes to the SKM from the 80th, its still fairly close.
I put a lot of credence in the information Piotr Butowski posted last month. His personal knowledge of information from KnAAPO seems more credible than a Sukhoi official at an airshow, maybe because I want it to be.
Yes perhaps, but there is nothing to say one is better than the other. Looks to me they’re all getting their info from the same set of fast talking Russians with a perchant for hyperbole, bluntness and frankness withiout really thinking of what they say. This is so unlike American spokesmen whose lines are carefully prepared, screened and rehearsed.
As a result, what the Russians may say is not exact, but contains gems of valuable information if you know how to get it.
Aircraft production will go up. It took 4 or 5 years for the F-22 production to get to full speed but Shenyang is not Boeing. To get to 125 from 2000 you would have to go produce:
15 in 2000
25 in 2001
35 in 2002
50 in 2003
Reach Fisher’s article again.
I don’t think a factory that couldn’t assemble 2 aircraft correctly in 1998 has a chance in h-e-l-l of producing 50 per year within 5 years.
Not impossible. Go read Albert Speer.
Just remember, KnAAPO itself ramped up to 100 fighters a year in just a few years back in the eighties.
Mass production as you know, seems to be the forte of Chinese factories. Compared to KnAAPO back in the eighties, there are many things in favor of SAC such as availability of more modern machinery and tooling, large abundant labor forces and low wages.
crobatoWhat is more unbelievable—and I really wonder what is your stake in believing this—is that you keep assuming that the production has to be a fixed rate.
There is no reason why the production rates should be fixed. In fact, it should ramp up as time goes.
The Sukhoi official that spoke to Dr. Richard Fisher last MAKS that China has about 300 SUs, also told him that production rates have been ramped up to 40-48 a year. Old entries from Hui Tong, though long changed, also spoke that the planned ramp had a target goal of 40 per year.
As less and less components are imported from Russia, this becomes possible.
I’m not sure of the second J-11 regiment in the 3rd Div in addition to the SU-30 reg in the 3rd, but I’ve previously heard the second J-11 reg in the 2nd Div. This adds up to about four, and if the J-11 reg in the 3rd reg is true, then you have five of them.
I’ve also heard from forums that 33rd does have J-11s. It would make sense to have the single seaters for final pilot certification process.
Not sure about the SU-30 reg in Dachang. This group should have a third JH-7 reg, which should be the first formation to have the JH-7A. It’s either an SU-30 reg is joining the two existing JH-7 regs there, or either the SU-30 reg or the JH-7A reg is being deployed somewhere.
Its far too soon to have an SD-10 equipped J-11. I don’t expect this for at least two to three years or so. If there is such a thing as a J-11A, it’s probably based on the SU-27SKM template. But I want to see more information on that, and on the J-11 formation with the 3rd Reg. Because if this is true, the fifth reg should be J-11As and the planes would have the avionics upgrade.
Which brings us to a point that it would make logical sense that an SU-27SKM unit should be attached with an SU-30MKK unit since your logistical, maintenance, and even your training infrastructure would be similar. The SU-30MKKs can be used to train the pilots that would eventually be used on the SU-27SKM. Which also makes me wonder if the supposed J-11s on the 2nd Reg are also in the same boat, but I feel it’s less likely with the case on the J-11s on the 2nd Reg.
This may actually tie in with what the Technokomplex official spoke to Mr. Hewson, although he may not be telling the time rate right. 100 upgrade kits may be intended for the 101-200th, rather than the first 100 SU-27SK/J-11s China made or previously procured from Russia. It would also be cheaper that way, since you don’t have to remove parts from fairly new planes, you won’t have to order the same parts for the new planes, and you apply the upgrade directly in the production line, saving cost. This could explain the 100 “J-11A”.
Previously since 2000, there are rumors that China wants to convert the balance of the contract to SU-30MKK. Jane puts this number after the 80th plane; Fisher puts it either 80 or 120. Although the exact letter of the rumor is not enacted this does suggest that China intends to convert a balance of the contract to an improved configuration—whether its the SU-30MKK or SU-27SKM its immaterial, since the difference is only about a seat more or less. In fact, this fully enacts the spirit of such rumors.
I think this is China’s best recourse on the balance of the contract, which I don’t believe would allow the Chinese to add their own engines and radar yet. This fits to the 70% Chinese/30% Russian content requirement that RAND once described this contract as having. In order for the Chinese to have their WS-10A engine powered, SD-10 armed J-11s with domestic radar, they should finish the 200 planes, and negotiate a new contract. Such planes should be “J-11B”.
To make it clearer:
0-100 J-11s — Basic Su-27SK with localizations and perhaps minor avionics changes.
101-200 J-11s — J-11A (SU-27SKM)
Post 200th J-11 — J-11B (with WS-10A engine and SD-10 enabled).
Now there is one thing I must mention is that the Flanker deal for both countries goes all the way right to the top leadership in both countries. This makes the Flanker deal both having a political and a military necessity aspect—both sides can’t let go of it due to the political stakes. The Flankers are almost symbolic of the friendship between Russia and China, and signs of cutting back, etc,. can be taken as signs of cooling of the relationship which both sides would try to avoid. In other words, the program has a clear life and momentum on its own. In some ways, this also creates an atmosphere of political “deemphasis” on the J-10, which is considered a competitor to this contract, forcing the latter to be given a backwater, low publicity treatment.
Sign In
