michelfIch Dien’s post is very comprehensive but omits two crucial elements which damned the Tomcat even before it flew.
1) The F-111B’s cancellation had very little to do with the results of A2A combat in Vietnam. It had every thing to do with the Admirals, all ex-fighter jocks (in the F-8 mould) who testified before Congress that ‘all the thrust in Christendom could not make it into a fighter’ (Adm Tom Connolley.) This was the culmination of a long campaign by the Admirals to try to get Congress to see that the type of airframe the Navy wanted should be specified by the operators, not by the poltical masters in the White House and their whipping boys at the DoD. NavAir had always epxressed its view that the F-111B was not what was needed on the deck. Bear in mind they had first hand experience of ‘innovative’ large aricraft on carrier decks not living up to thier billing (Vigi anyone) and had resolved that the use per deck spot had to increase and that the F-111B did not offer that efficiency. The fact it was not a good ‘fighter’ was a god send to make it go away.
As by this time the prime sponsor of the F-111 programme had left office (McNamara) Congress was loath to support a politcally motivated programme against the express wishes of the operation. However the staff at the DoD (whose careers had been built by McNamara) marked theTomcat’s card at this point…even before one had flown. (Also remember that regardless of F-111 or F-14, Grumman was going to build it….
2) Following this the DoD constructed a procurement process that locked Grumman into a contract price with little or no mechanism built in to cover cost increases (ie problems to be resolved) or inflation.
As you will recall the late 60s and early 70s suffered relatively higher inflation than the previous decade, this, in addition to a very quick and somewhat abreviated cost exercise on Grumman’s part, meant the contract as agreed left all the risk on Grumman’s side. This meant that quite soon on it became clear to Grumman that they could build the F-14 to the price, but that they would become bankrupt in so doing. (Their cash flow to full scale production would mean they would have expended more than the net worth of the company to resolve the issues and get production under way. This expenditure ould be made prior to payment of the sums due for production birds…as ever cash flow rules…)
Grumman then effectively went back to the DoD and made it clear that the contract as it stood would lead to the disappearance of Grumman. They asked for a revision of a non-revisionable contract and they got it. The DoD was able to report to Congress that their favoured programme (the F-14) and supplier (Grumman) were in need of rescuing and that Grumman was ‘blackmailing’ the DoD for more cash to stay in business. The final price of the F-14 as delivered was similar to the F-15 to the USAF, but McD had a more flexible contract and had always quoted a higher price….so the final price was ‘as predicted’ not a ‘shock’.
This action destroyed the wide base of Congressional support that Grumman had enjoyed heretofore. So the result of the short term solution was to kill the F-14 programme. Any DoD and Congressional support, not NavAir support, vanished and the F-14 development effectively stopped for a decade.
(Remember that the envisaged Carrier Air Group by the mid -70s was only Grumman products, F-14s, A-6s and E-3s, with Sea Kings as the rotary wing component)
The net result of this action was, as Ich Dien states, the new VFAX programme…which lead to the F-18; which benefitted hugely from funding and support beyond the merits of the airframe. This continued well beyond the A-D models and gave the impetus for the E/F programme at the expense of the update versions of the 14. These, encapuslated in the Tomcat 21 made use of the 14’s inherent advantages to expand the built in the A2G role, in exactly the same manner as the 15E used the 15’s inherent advantages over the 16 to gain the prime interdictor role in the USAF inventory over the proposed 16XL…
The F-14 programme was born of an operator demand, its delivery forced by the manufacturer and as a result its life was blighted by lack of high level political support.
michelfI’m pretty certain that a well worded and polite letter to the Collection advising them that the guide was in error would have worked wonders.. Even a polite and knowledgeable school kid is a ‘customer’ and certain ‘school kids’ know far more about planes than their age would belie…or that guides would believe possible.
It always amazes me that people can even consider climbing into static or operational aircraft…it does not occur to them that its like a stranger climbing into their car, ‘just to have a look’. I would love to see their face as a overall clad mechanic ‘nipped in’ to check it out….
michelfJolanta,
Take a step back and ask yourself the following questions:-
Why was the project cancelled in the first place?
When was the F-111 proposed aand what was the state of THAT project at the time?
In answer to the first the TSR2 was ostensibly cancelled as it was more economical to cancel, pay damages to BAC and order an equivlent number of F-111Ks from the US than to pursue the TSR programme at current cost projections to service introduction.
However look at the state of play of the F-111 programme at the time, it was already running late, over budget and encountering very critical inlet/ engine issues which was adding time and cost to that programme.
Whilst this was not ‘public knowledge’ it was known in the industry by the RAF and the Government at the time the F-111K was mooted as a viable replacement aircraft.
Now the adamant assertion by the Treasury and the Civil Servants that the F-111 was going to offer significant savings to the UK tax payer were even then threatened by the issues facing the F-111.
It would have been unacceptable to any Government, faced with an increasing financial commitment to the F-111…to be forced into cancallation with, in storage a UK alternative which had flown, which had proven its capabilities. Any other alternative (in this case the F-4K) would have been greeted with a level of scepticism that was entirely appropriate and a UK only solution would have been sought…especially one that was already amortised to a significant extent…
To be proven wrong in such a fundamental fashion was a risk no Government was prepared to accept and did everything to reduce the risk. This included the removal of any option ot recommence the programme in an economical fashion. The destruction of the physical means to build the craft as well as the paper information that would permit a restart were part of that risk reduction.
Remember also that whilst it was a Labour Government who actually cancelled the TSR2, the Conservative Government prior to them offered no cast iron guarantees that the programme would be continued. Pressure was mounting from the Chief of Staff and even from the RAF to cancel. Certainly Geo Edwards had no illusions about the chances of the TSR entering service.
With that wider vision it becomes clear that the only logical explanation for the wholesale removal of the means to restart the programme is the real fear that the proposed replacement was going to be found wanting and that the restarting of this previously too expensive programme was then discovered to offer the most financially advantageous solution to the issue…..
michelfYou are perhpas looking at the C-5 short field performance from the wrong end…
It was destined to be able to take off State side and deliver heavy/ bulky loads directly to the front…and then return with a much lower payload to base or a staging location.. hence t/o at MTOw is far less onerous than the landing performance…and this in turn is far less dependant on the engines….
But back to the pallet carrier issue…
I makes financial and operational sense to have a specialized outsize cargo airframe dedicated to military missions….the flexibility and ownership is primairy here.
As for ‘general’ cargo remember the CARF programme in the 80s and 90s, were US arilines were contracted to to the USAF, they were guarantedd a certain number of ton miles per year in return they made a certain number o airframes and crews avaliable with little or no notice to create air bridges as needed…not certain if this programme is still active or not..but there is a certain amount of sense in the USAF acquiring and operating a dedicated general cargo carrier, in this case a 747F would be the most logical, as it represents and already operated type (E-3B, VC-25 and YAL-1) as well as one of the most widespread airframes globally, which pases almost unnoticed at many airports….
The use of dedicated military cargo craft for the majority of general cargo missions is always a controversial one.. a C-5 will always be less efficient than a straigth 747F… merely because it offers capabilities that the 747 cannot.. but then the C-5 does not use them the majority of the time….But when its needed a C-5/C-17 is vital and cannot be replaced by another cargo craft…
I think this debate will only be resolved once the tanker programme is underway, this then opens a window to have a primary tanker version and a primary cargo version of the same, modern airframe..
michelfNot untrue; a map was created which used artisitic licence to make the avalaible range cover more that was the case.
Its always easy to blame influence from overseas.. but the truth lies far closer to home..
The attitude, on both sides fo the political fence at the time was that the airframe side of the industry was not worth much (the truth being exactly the opposite…).
The avaition industry as a whole was also percieved as being:-
a) Very warlike…..
b) highly dependant on government investment on long term projects. (which provided handsome rewards further down the line)
Both of these are not good vote winners, and lets face it that is what Government wants.. to win votes to remain in power. The long term viability or growth of a highly skilled and profitable industry is only a notion that has become policy in the last couple of decades.
For proof look to the civil side of the industry…the scrapping of the V1000, the BS surrounding the Trident, Vanguard, the VC-10…all at the behest of the Government owned, operated and run airlines. The belief was the UK = rubbish, US = best thing since sliced bread.
The destruction of the entire programme has to be viewed in that light. The poitical dogma was that UK products were no good… and nobody was going to take the risk that the industry was going to prove them wrong…destroying everything was a simple and easy way of making sure that the ignorance, inconsistency and at times incompetence of the Government Ministers and Senior Civil Servants was hidden for good, or at least long enough to not matter at the next election.
The role of the US in this is a smoke screen to the reality that the damage was in the majority self- inflicted….and avoidable.
michelfJoe
Grumman spent most of the 80s and ealry 90s proposing follow -ons from the A model…in fact the B model was already flying before the A entered squadron service.
The reality is that the USN, in particulat NavAir were never going to let Grumman forget that the initla procurement debacle and the additional funds.
Grumman showed on numerous occassions that teh F-14 platform was being under exploited in both engine and avionic terms. It also provided detailed stuides that investment in improved F-14 airframes offered more capability per dollar than the F-18 programme, yet rightly or not the USN based its trust on Grumman’s studies on the original procurement issues, and admitted that Hawkeye and Intruder programmes, delivered by the same factory and the same people, were irrelevent as they were not fighters.
A cynic would say that the USN were intent on ‘teaching Grumman a lesson’ on the Tomcat programme.
As the Tomcat has been retired and will not be coming back we have to establish whether or not the SH is the ‘best’ plane for the USN.
If we compare it with its chronologicla contempories, the F-22 and F-35 it is lacking in key areas. Yet if we compare it with its aerodynamic contemporaires, say the F-15 or even F-16 we don’t see a clear advantage that the additional decades of progress have confered on the craft.
This supports the idea that the SH programme offers advantages in other areas, not in the tactical arena or its war fighting capability…leaving finaces and politics as the only other spheres of superiority.
We know that McAir were always far more politically able than Grumman, even before the F-14 issue. This advantage was rammed home with the initial F-18 and added to with the SH..and now with Boeing being behind both the F-15 and F-18 programmes we can see both being active in the US forces for a while longer..regardless of whether or not they are the most effective military machines..
michelfIts a ‘boilerplate’ plane, a mix of 747 feature, tail mounted engine, twin underwing engines etc..used to train fire crews…
Not a real plane..
michelfAnd for a carrier aircraft the lower left is also critical.. if not more so.
As an interesting data point McD were asked to prepare a proposal for an F-15N with 6 54s as a comparison to the overall efficiency of the 14….
By the time the mods had been considered and ‘weighted’ the overall figures.. empty weight, max TO, max bring home for a navalised F-15 were very similar to the actual 14 weights…but with the added disadvantage of higher landing speeds and characteristic in the groove.
It leads one to consider that for a heavy carrier craft the VG is not necessarily a weight penalty but confers advantages in the precise area where you need it every single day in ops, regardless of war or not.. bring the craft back to the deck.
I think the real issue is whether or not the SH is comparable in performance its land based equivalents…not the F-14 which is a generation behind…
The other question is then would an F-14, updated in a similar fashion as the F-15E, still be a credible fighter bomber?
If the answer to the last is a yes and to the first a no then the conclusion has to be that the SH is not the plane that the Navy should have….regardless of how good or not it may be…
michelfThe USAFNM ‘owns’ all of the A-12/M-21/YF-12/SR-71 airframes.
It ‘loans’ them to museums as ‘it’ sees fit, not as the loanees see fit. the loanees accept the offer, with all the conditions inherent therein or they do not.
All costs which result from that acceptance are the loanes’ responsibility, not that of the USAFNM.
They figure, somewhat arrogantly perhaps, that the attraction the airframes exterts on visitor numbers is not insignificant and hence can impose this condition on museums.
The museums are also well aware that if the USAFNM requires the return of an artefact they have no recourse but to return it.. irrespective of the cost of removing it from display or the diminishing of the attraction.
In this case its a real shame as there is an A-12 which is no longer on display at the moment and whose home is arguably completely inappropriate for an A-12. that one of course is 60- 6925, the first production article whose normal home is the deck of USS Intrepid.
It would possibly do less harm to the Intrepid offer, perhaps offset with the loan of a few more Navy jets, than the removal of the ‘Goodall’ article, which as we know is probably the best one out there from the museum there.
michelfMore info here….
michelfI think the F-15E missions were planned with an ‘tank’ just after t/o… so that MTOW was reduced…
Then one just prior to ingress and one immediately on exit…(total 3)
This meant reduced wear and tear on the airframe and engines at t/o…very important maintenance consideration…plus full tanks on ingress and knowing a tanker was possible just outside…
It also makes real range calcs impossible….
michelfAlertken,
Interesting point of view.. but the financial aspect is a sideshow to the real issue.. RR was encountering a technical problem that for possibly the first time it was unable to map out a solution to…at one point, certainly if I read Hooker’s bio they were unsure they could find a solution with the design concpet they had.
This was a far greater crisis of confidence to the aviation world… in addition to the financial one..
The issues of the C-141 and C-5 are separate as the USAF clearly stated they required a ‘civilian aircraft’ already certified and in service to provide the required airframe.. limiting it to the 747/ L1011 and the DC-10. This was precisely to avoid the risk of a bespoke airframe. The 747 was the ‘rational’ choice, capacity etc etc, but in order to ‘spread’ the dollars it was only going to be A.N. Other. The problems with the RB211 made it clear that Lockheed were not going to continue in the civil airliner market…whereas McAir were looking set to do so.
I disagree on the Airbus issue…if BAC had been provided with the financial aid rather than RR, the British Airbus (3-11) would have been a possibility. The in-roads into the US, Commonwealth and Asian markets that were open to a British design took many years for the essentially ‘French’ (at least in perception) Airbus to match…like the Mercure; the A300 aould have fought against both US and UK compeition and the numbers would have been against it. As it turned out the A300 became the ‘only game’ in the European industry and recieved default support. Jobs both in airframe and engines were at stake.
The SP would have benefitted indeed…but not necessarily for long..Its success ironically may have brought forward the rise of the ‘big fans’ as the economics of quads (as opposed to tris) may have instigated the desire for 2 engined /2 crew intercontinentals earlier….
michelfSimply put…
If RR had not gone bust we would probably not have Airbus..but a Civil Airliner production in the UK (probably building aircraft that look very similar…) and Lockheed would still be active in the Airliner market…as the Tristar would have entered service earlier and overall in greater numbers.
The USAF may well have operated it in favour of KC-10s…as they were not going the 747 route regardless and the McAir were deemed to be more stable in the civil market than Lockheed. Based on that McAir may have been purchased by Lockheed earlier.. as opposed to going to Boeing, and the C-17 would have worn a Lockheed title.
In Uk terms I think that BAC would have been able to develop a range of products not dissimilar to the range of Airbus rpoducts today, possibly more focussed but the influence of early 70s UK design vision is still clear.. look thro that book and you will see how much was already there in ideas and concepts….
Certainly the thinking in France was along very different lines at the time as it was in Germany….Airbus adopted may of the concepts and turned them into reality, and a business.. not necessarily a skill the UK had…
michelfMelyvn,
In your first post you accused the writers of the report of not having a clue about preservation of aircraft….
Which as individuals they may not have, but they certainly manage to get sources of information that know a ‘certain amount’ about it.
In your second post you accuse those who know about preservation of being ignorant about restoration and operation of historic aircraft. Which may well be correct, however I doubt that those responsible for the FAA Museum and the National Civil Airliner Collection, usually known as hte Science Museum, would agree with you that they know little about restoration.. and that the PFA knows little about operation of rare, unusual etc aircraft.
For sure the conclusions are, to many unrealistic and unworkable for a variety or reasons. But those conclusions are the items that are vulnerable, as they are the interpretations of information…and in that interpretation you should find fault. The information was there…however it was not used in a way that you feel was reasonable, knowledgable or intelligent, but it was there.
However consider the issue of the crash of the last airworthy Mosquito, the crash in 1964 (not certain of the date) of the last pre WW2 RAF biplane fighter, the Bristol Bulldog….oh the angst, the wailing and gnashing of teeth 10 and 15 years later that this plane had been allowed to fly… to be damaged…. or even Black 6…restored to flight status, retaining a remarkably high % or original material….in fact it was deemed to be one of the most original 109s in existance….and after the crash it looks no different but is not nearly as ‘original’ as it was….
None of these incidents were necessary, as replicas could have been built. But no replica would have attracted so much interest and passion in either the teams or the viewers, which is why we still want to see original a/c flying, not replicas, unless the orginial no longer exists or is too precious to be released….Wright Flyer, Spirit of St.Louis, Vimy etc etc…
But how about a unique aircraft… the last one there is? Do we fly or not? Who is going to judge and make the call? The owner? The ‘Establishment’?
So whilst I think the conclusions are great in theory they are far too flimsy to withstand any critical appraisal from those who have far more specialised knowledge of the issue than the writers of the report. The danger is that rather than the message being taken to pieces dispassionately, the messenger gets it in the neck and the discussion goes off on a tangent.
I’d also love to know which architects have ‘done well’ from HLF funded museums…..certainly a number have gained high profile awards from them, but financially?.. I’d love to know…;)
michelfInteresting to note the ‘date’ of this report..
Heritage Lottery Fund
July 2000
But even better the information in Appendix 2- Sources of Information:
[I]Aviation
John Bagley, former keeper National Aeronautical Collection, Science Museum
John Berkeley, Vice Chairman, British Aviation Preservation Council
Chris Parker, Popular Flying Association
Dick Roberts, Secretary, Air Display Association Europe
Cdr. Dennis White CB, former Director, Fleet Air Arm Museum
Literature
UK and Ireland Civil Aircraft Registers, 1999 ed. compiled by Barrie Womersley published
by Air Britain (Historians) Ltd
Wrecks & Relics, 17th ed. April 2000, compiled by Ken Ellis, pub. Midland Publishing
National Aviation Preservation Register, First ed. may 1998 compiled by Ken Ellis and
others. Pub. privately BAPC[/I]
I leave it others to judge whether these sources are worthy or not….
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