We’ll see how long the Philippines keeps those FA-50’s operational. :p They’ve struggled to keep simple C-130Bs, UH-1Hs, S.211s and N22 Nomads operational due to funding difficulties.
And the F-5s went out of service years ago (last flight about 2002) – the FA-50 is indeed the attempted rebirth of a capability due to increased issues with China.
As for sale of single seat subsonic attack jets since 1990 (includes second hand):
Italy – AMX
Brazil – AMX
Czech Republic – L-159
Indonesia – Hawk 200
Malaysia – Hawk 200
Argentina – A-4AR
Oman – Hawk 200
Brazil – A-4KU
Macedonia – Su-25 (since retired)
Armenia – Su-25
Iran – Su-25
Chad – Su-25
DRC – Su-25
Ethiopia – Su-25
Peru – Su-25
Kazakhstan – Su-25
Sudan – Su-25
The Thai AF also brought dual seat Alpha Jets to use in the tactical role.
As you can see some of those air forces are from developed countries or at least reasonable development status.
I think what’s killed part of the subsonic market is large amounts of cheap MiG-29, F-16A/B MLU and Chengdu F-7.
However that’s changed – the stores of cheap MiG-29S and F-16A/B MLU have been largely sold off whilst F-7 is nearing end of it’s production run.
As stated there’s plenty of F-5, MiG-21/F-7, A-4, MIII/5/F1 etc that will need replacing post 2020.
The available options are:
Yak-130
M346
T/FA-50
Hawk 1XX.
JAS-39 (though E/F model moves away from cheap fighter model).
I’m sure there is a market here for a cheap, rugged, subsonic jet.
Dunno anything about this so will ask some questions:
1. How capable were NATO bases of operating if non-HAS infrastructure was destroyed – e.g. maintenance workshops, control towers, communications equipment.
2. Was there provision for underground crew quarters – no points in storing aircraft in HAS if the crew is dead in an above ground barracks.
3. How common are HAS’s in Europe?
I know the Yugoslavs and Swiss had fully contained underground airbases but I’ve not heard anything about Europe/US.
F-22 and F-35 are intended to operate without AWACS for two reasons:
1. Cold War studies showed the AWACS fleet is completely destroyed within 48 hours. Most AWACS airplanes are destroyed in their parking spots by Scuds within the first 30 minutes.
Anything that’s wiping out AWACs on the ground is also wiping out F-22s and F-35s on the ground too.
F-35B is actually at an advantage here if operated the same way the Brits were meant to operate their Harriers from in Cold War.
Whilst basing title on role makes sense, it still doesn’t explain DDG1000. It’s role seems to fit a Cruiser role.
Or given the ship is the ultimate jack of all trades, perhaps it should be a Battleship (BB). :p
I suspect it all comes down to politics just like F-16CJ and F/A-18E/F and just like reclassification of Destroyer Leaders to Cruisers in the 1970s due to the “Cruiser Gap.”
Lol CAS/strike missions tend to happen once air superiority has been won. I don’t see a tucano, A-10 etc. flying around with Su-30s nearby still posing a danger.
Who mentioned enemy fighters?
These current drones are far more vulnerable to traditional AAA, MANPADS etc than fast jets.
Also in a proper conflict against a semi-capable opponent, they might also have EW capability that could shut down drones.
But in the the real world it’s not F-22’s slugging it out with Su-30s. Airforces are used generally against insurgents, rebels, terrorists and narco-paramilitaries.
In the conventional conflicts that do happen (i.e. use of conventional forces by both side – e.g.Balkans, Ethiopa-Eritrea, Abkhazia-Georgia, Cenapa War), equipment and tactics are usually quite primitive. The technology is usually1970s vintage whilst the tactics aren’t that far removed from WWII.
Even in Ethiopia-Eritrea where Su-27/MiG-29 was used, the combat missions flown were not modern style with guided bombs or modern electronic support. BVR was also useless and air combat was resolved in WVR. There was no AWACS, ISTAR etc.
The wars fought by US/NATO are exceptions to the rule. They require incredible amounts of logistics and technical expertise as well as excellent social infrastructure such as education.
Most countries cannot afford this level of expertise.
Furthermore air superiority in the fashion known by the Americans often doesn’t happen in wars involving smaller players as they lack the resources for all out strikes and often keep significant combat assets in reserve.
Look at Cenepa War in 1995 or Ethiopia-Eritrea where neither side had total air superiority.
Hence whilst the US probably does not need a manned subsonic attack jet, it’s probably a good investment for smaller operators who don’t have the expertise and funds for UCAVs.
In fact as stated previously, they’re finding EMB-314 and Mi-25/-35 to be excellent investments. They’re also getting as much mileage as they can out of their F-5A/B/E/Fs, MiG-21/F-7s, Mirage III/5/F1s and other older aircraft.
Very much a case of “death-by-NATO” or to be more precise “death by European decline.”
I wouldn’t be surprised if they don’t even get these UAV’s and simply don’t replace the Su-22.
Not really.
It is possible to replace a Destroyer with a Cruiser (just as it’s unfortunately possible to replace a frigate with an LCS :p ) or for something to be changed during production/design.
US designation system is going down the toilet since F/A-18 (should be F-18 or at least FA-18). Then it was F-16CG/DG (should be F-16G/H), F-16CJ/DG (F-16J/K) and then F-35 (as opposed to F-24) and KC-767. At least they canned F/A-22.
Oh and F/A-18E/F – probably should’ve been F-24/A/B and F-35 should’ve been F-25A/B/C.
http://theaviationist.com/2012/08/28/poland-ucav/
They’re looking at 30 UCAVs to replace about 45 Su-22s.
Systems mentioned include:
General Atomics MQ-9 Reaper
IAI/Malat Heron TP
Elbit Systems Hermes 900
TAI Anka.
Egyptian/Tunisian L59s and Czech L159s have greater weapons capability due to uprated engines and other enhancements. The L159s can carry AIM-9s, AGM-65s.
The way Western strike UAV systems are set up makes them financially totally inaccessable for most countries, let alone 3d world have-nots. Maybe that changes once the stuff from Denel and TAI becomes available, but for the time being that’s it.
And you all forget about the social angle. The typical 3d world air force pilot is a son of the nomenclatura or some local bigshots. Sitting in a basement or a container and playing real-world computer games is totally unsexy for these people.
Western Air Forces aren’t exactly embracing UCAV’s either on any grand scale.
Every one except Poland is still looking at replacing tactical jets with new manned tactical jets (and if finances allowed Poland probably would’ve preferred new manned tactical jets to replace their SU-22s than UAVs).
In 2030 the mainstays will still be manned jets – F-35, F/A-18E/F, F-22, B-2, B-52, Rafale, Gripen, Eurofighter as well as many older F-15, F-16, F/A-18.
UCAVs are in all reality unproven in a proper combat situation.
The assassination missions and CAS flown in Afghanistan are very pedestrian missions in completely uncontested airspace. They are not much different from doing bombing runs on a test range.
Throw in a contest with an enemy with an IADS as well as EW capability and drones might be unviable.
Insurgents have shown to be able to hack into drone feeds. Iran might have downed one with electronic warfare equipment.
So what would a capable military be able to do?
Ecuador.
Sure they brought some recce UAVs.
They also replaced Mirage F1 with Cheetah and Strikemaster/A-37 with EMB-314.
Current UCAVs do not offer same level of capability as manned aircraft in terms of performance, payload or flexibility.
Oh and Brazil brought 99 EMB-314s and 12 Mi-35s and not UCAVs.
Only countries buying larger UCAVs ala MQ-1 are top of the line airforces.
Losses to MANPADs, trash fire
I suspect a UCAV with capability of a Harrier/G-91/F-16/Su-25 or whatever would be as expensive as one of those jets.
Complexity
Whilst an Avenger might be more mechanically simple than a MiG-21, it’s electronics are certainly more complicated as is its ordnance (Hellfire, LGB v dumb bombs, rockets).
It’s operation also adds a third element of complexity in terms of electronics. A MiG-21 (or better an F-5A or Hunter) can still operate without most of it’s electronics – indeed some of these don’t have radars etc in the first place.
A UCAV on the other hand cannot operate if the electronics are down.
Even many middle size airforces place very little emphasis on maintenance or training.
“Backwards” air forces
Most of the air forces in the world belong to this category. And this includes some that buy quite expensive hardware but do not invest in logisitics and human infrastructure.
A lot of the European air forces are heading this way too. This includes Western ones ala Portugal (selling chunks of F-16 fleet), Spain (selling 1/4 of Eurofighter fleet and delaying others) and Greece (A-7, F-4, Mirage 2000 fleets to be retired or cut in numbers without replacement).
Other countries such as Netherlands etc are going to make themselves combat inneffective by buying extremely small numbers of gold plated F-35s.
Requirements
By 2025 there will be lots of F-5s, MiG-21s/F-7s, Su-25s as well as a few Mirage F1/III/5 that will require replacing.
There’s also F-16s and MiG-29s as well.
Most of these operators will be unable to acquire expensive Rafale/Eurofighter/PAK FA or F-35 or will only be able to afford extremely small numbers.
A small subsonic jet (basically a small modernised A-4) or only borderline supersonic (F-5A) would probably sell well, provided it had some service in country of origin.
A few more things are unknown and not really be able to be determined by ELIT/SIGINT. Even HUMINT can’t really determine some of these.
1. Quality of training – e.g. Iraqi AF 1991.
2. Performance of certain weapons systems (e.g. range).
3. Operational status e.g. Serbian MiG-29s in 1999.
4. Quality of enemy C4 but does include human aspect of leadership.
5. Impact of doctrine – e.g. in 1973 Egyptians used a modified Soviet doctrine. Modifications to it made sure that one could not assess the Soviet model using the Egyptian experience.
6. Cultural issues that affect performance (either adversely or positively) -this includes organisational culture.
Compare performance of North Vietnamese pilots and Arab pilots flying similar aircraft or in the same period, USAF and Israeli pilots or even USAF v USN pilots in Vietnam.
7. Exact nature of tactics used. E.g. Argentinian Mirages might have been more successful if different tactics were used.
Furthermore ELINT/HUMINT/SIGINT is not always possible especially if the area involved was previously not monitored. E.g. when the US went into Afghanistan, current intelligence was limited and often flawed (e.g. general Dostrum was erroneously reported as gravely ill).
I believe the correct term is Fog of War and it’s a fickle beast – much vaunted Iraqi (1991) and Libyan (1986) air defences were easily defeated/avoided whilst the plucky little North Vietnamese gave the Americans grief and the Iranians managed to deny Iraqis air superiority despite sanctions and purges.
Moral of the story: exercise with potential enemies. 😛
I’d love to know what a manned type brings to the role apart from a nebulous ‘trust’ issue?!
Far greater responsiveness and awareness as well as a smaller C4ISAT/logistics footprint.
A pilot is on the scene and can evaluate far better than someone who is sitting hundreds/thousands of km away and whose only inputs are electronic imagery.
Also UCAVs seem a lot more complicated for your average military that doesn’t have the US’ C4ISTAR, logistics and special operations capability.
When you look at your average combat mission flown in the developing world, most are not that far removed from WWII CAS and interdiction missions – low level gun/rocket strafing and use of dumb bombs.
Even the Russians in Georgia didn’t use that many guided weapons (and Russia certainly isn’t a developing country).
Most such countries also don’t have very high levels of training – very often they’re conscripts and training isn’t advanced. In essence they need to minimise number of specialists (and UAVs require a lot of specialists including technicians trained in electronics).
In reality many operators have not progressed much past the Hunter/Freedom Fighter//MiG-17/-21 level of complexity either.
These operators require simple avionics, ruggedness with very few specialist staff as well as an ability to operate independently without needing to rely too heavily on well developed C4ISTAR or logistics.
Many NATO operators are headed down this path too. They can’t afford advanced jets or costly UCAVs and are on their way to helicopter forces only.
Of course lunatic acquisition processes end up in countries ala Uganda buying Su-30MK’s which in five or so years will most likely be rusting in the local air force grave yard.
In reality aircraft such as Su-25, Mi-25 Hind, EMB-314 Tucano and JF-17 are far more appropriate.
I think UAVs for reconnaissance are something a lot of poorer airforces will embrace. But recce UAV’s don’t require extensive ISTAR, guided weapons or ground troops equipped with targeting equipment (which can fail – I remember reading about early SOFLAM operations in Afghanistan where lack of experience led to bombs missing targets by several hundred yards).
Problem appears to be a lack of market.
For light subsonic strike we have the EMB-314 Super Tucano.
For poorer non-Western aligned we have F-7 and second hand Su-25, F-5E/F and Kfir (super sonic .
Western aligned “light” market – F-16, JAS-39.
Non-Western align “light market” – MiG-29, JF-17, upgraded Su-25
The market for combat aircraft is shrinking too. Those that can afford aircraft go for multi-role supersonics while the rest soldier on with what they’ve got or downgrade to turboprops and helicopters.
An interesting article about Israel’s testing of the MiG-29.
http://www.iaf.org.il/5642-35655-en/IAF.aspx
They were impressed with the aircraft.