May be with extremely powerful IR seonsors.

From RIAN

On April 8, 2010, Presidents Barack Obama and Dmitry Medvedev signed the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms.

The new document replaces the 1991 Soviet-U.S. START-I agreement, which expired on December 5, 2009, 15 years after its entry into force, and the May 2002 Russian-U.S. Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT).

The media has already reported that the treaty stipulates 1,550 warheads on deployed intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), on deployed submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and nuclear warheads counted for deployed heavy bombers.

Under the treaty, “each Party shall reduce and limit its ICBMs and ICBM launchers, SLBMs and SLBM launchers, heavy bombers so that the aggregate numbers do not exceed 700, for deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs, and deployed heavy bombers; 800, for deployed and non-deployed ICBM launchers, deployed and non-deployed SLBM launchers, and deployed and non-deployed heavy bombers.”

A study of the treaty’s text makes it possible to single out the following aspects determining the new configuration of the strategic nuclear balance:

1. Unlike the START-I agreement, the new document stipulates no restrictions on the area and number of basing areas of land-mobile ICBM systems of the RT-2PM Topol (SS-25 Sickle), RT-2UTTKh Topol-M (SS-27 Sickle B) and RS-24 Yars (SS-X-29) class.

2. The Treaty sets tough limits on non-deployed launchers of ICBMs, non-deployed ICBMs and non-deployed SLBMs, and seriously reduces overall delivery vehicle ceilings. This largely evens out the difference between U.S. and Russian capabilities for maintaining their respective nuclear potentials.

3. The Treaty sets no limits on the development of U.S. missile defense systems but notes the link between defensive and offensive arms.

Under a special statement signed together with the Treaty, Russia reserves the right to exit from the treaty in case it feels threatened by the development of U.S. missile defense systems. The parties have also agreed that existing missile defense systems do not undermine the effectiveness of strategic offensive arms.

It should also be noted that the lack of restrictions on basing areas of land-mobile ICBM systems virtually rules out the creation of an effective missile defense system capable of intercepting such ICBMs in the foreseeable future.

4. The parties are free to determine the structure of their respective nuclear triads comprising aerial, naval and ground-based delivery vehicles. In this situation, Russia is free to resume construction of ICBM trains.

5. The Treaty sets no limits on the deployment of ground-based ICBMs with multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRVs). Consequently, Russia will be able to retain its ICBMs of the RS-20 Voyevoda (SS-18 Satan) and RS-18 (SS-19 Stiletto) type and to develop new types of MIRVed ICBMs.

6. Under the document, strategic offensive arms subject to this Treaty shall not be based outside the national territory of each party. This caveat rules out any incidents similar to the 1962 Cuban missile crisis and considerably simplifies mutual verification of strategic offensive arms.

7. The 1,550 warhead ceiling does not mean that each party will have the same number of nuclear warheads. Under the Treaty, one nuclear warhead will be counted for each deployed heavy bomber which can carry 12-24 missiles or bombs, depending on its type. Consequently, Russia will retain 2,100 warheads and the United States, which has more heavy bombers, will have about 2,400. This gap will be reduced as the United States decommissions B-1B bombers serving with its strategic nuclear forces and converts them into conventional bombers, which are unable to launch nuclear warheads unless subjected to lengthy refitting.

The new START Treaty is organized in three tiers of increasing level of detail. The first tier is the Treaty text itself. The second tier consists of a Protocol to the Treaty, which contains additional rights and obligations associated with the Treaty’s provisions. The basic rights and obligations are contained in these two documents. The third tier consists of Technical Annexes to the Protocol.

These documents define the Treaty’s terms and stipulate new verification procedures for monitoring compliance with the Treaty. Although the voluminous Protocol has to be studied in great detail, the first impression is that Russian and U.S. negotiators have done a good job and have specified mutual positions to the greatest possible extent in order to avoid any uncertainty.

In conclusion, one can agree that both the United States and Russia have benefited from signing the Treaty, which can serve as an example for other nuclear powers now expected to join Russian-U.S. agreements.

The opinions expressed in this article are the author’s and do not necessarily represent those of RIA Novosti

In a war against Transnistria, Moldova and Romania have the advantage that any Russian support has to go through Ukraine, which is anti-Russia at the moment.

:eek::p

2010 elections. Oranges collapsed. Furthermore Crimeans are… well you should know.

Soobrazitelny coming soon:

St. Petersburg’s Severnaya Verf shipyard will float out on Wednesday a new corvette featuring stealth technology, a Russian Navy spokesman said.

The Soobrazitelny is the second Project 20380 corvette designed by the Almaz Central Marine Design Bureau.

“The corvette features innovative solutions regarding hull design, armament, communications and electronics,” the spokesman said.

The first Project 20380 corvette, the Steregushchy, was put into service with Russia’s Baltic Fleet in October 2008, and two other ships of the same series, the Boyky and the Stoyky, are under construction.

The Project 20380 corvette can be deployed to destroy enemy surface ships, submarines and aircraft, and to provide artillery support for beach landings. It uses stealth technology to reduce the ship’s secondary radar field, as well as its acoustic, infrared, magnetic and visual signatures.

Russia plans to have up to 30 vessels of this class to ensure the protection of its coastal waters, as well as its oil and gas transportation routes, especially in the Black and the Baltic seas.

Each corvette has a displacement of 2,000 metric tons, maximum speed of 27 knots, and a crew of 100.

MOSCOW, March 30 (RIA Novosti)

But first a few words on the Russian position: Even with the new limits the Russians can’t keep up with the U.S. Nowhere near. Their force level will continue to decline for the next 8 years, and they are clearly launch vehicle limited, not warhead limited. This treaty would give incredible freedom to the U.S., and Congress would be stupid not to ratify it. For the Russians it is more “face saving” than anything else. That’s probably why BMD didn’t make it into the treaty (besides the fact that strategic BMD does not work within reasonable costs limits with current technology!) – the Russian position is just too weak, they don’t have any real leverage on the U.S. (besides the threat of aggressive proliferation). The U.S. wouldn’t need that treaty.

Agreed, but the economic reality impose hard constraints to the Russian size of its strategic arsenal. Nevertheless, an “asymmetrical build-up” can assure an overwhelming retaliatory potential. I mean i.e. complete a redundant LPAR net, continue with the deployment of mobile MIRV ICBM, build the SS-19 size new liquid fueled missile and deploy FOBS and MiMARV on them, deploy point defense ABM on silo fields and so on.

And what I really criticize – again – is that it is a biletral treaty, without even a provision for other nuclear powers to enter into it. I think this is a strategic mistake.

Agreed. The British and French nukes count at such low warhead levels.

> 120 RS-24, each with 4 warheads, the number of reserve launch vehicles very low if any, as production capability is the bottleneck.
= 120 launch vehicles, 480 warheads
They would be organised in 2 silo division, plus 1 mobile division.

According Podvig RS-24 will have 3 400 kT warheads.

Mobility of the ICBMs and high readiness of the bomber/cruise missile force can offset the launch vehicle deficit somewhat. Survivability will remain the prime concern of the Russians. That’s why I think they will keep the SS-18 as long as possible, and at a very high alarm level, to keep the pressure on the U.S. The SS-18 is still a devastating weapon!

100% agreed.

On Russian scramjeting projects

“AS-X-19 `Koala’ (Kh-90/BL10)
Type

Intermediate-range, air-launched, turbojet-powered, single-warhead
cruise missile.

Development

The existence of the AS-X-19 `Koala’ had been reported by the US
Department of Defense (DoD) in 1986, but was confirmed by the Russians
in 1988, when the US Secretary of Defense was shown around a Tu-160
`Blackjack’ bomber at an airbase near Moscow. The AS-X-19 was believed
to have the Russian designator Kh-90 or BL10, and was reported to be a
high-altitude supersonic cruise missile with air-launched, ship-launched
and ground-launched versions, developed from 1976 and believed to have
started flight trials in 1980. The AS-X-19 must therefore be considered
as equivalent to the US AGM-129 advanced cruise missile programme,
though probably several years behind. The programme was terminated in
1992, and it is reported that there were in excess of twenty flight
trials. It is believed that AS-X-19 was a dual design for the Russian
Air Force and Russian Navy, similar to the AS-15/SS-N-21 programme, with
the SS-NX-24 `Scorpion’ (P-750 Grom) variant to be launched from
submarines. The AS-X-19 was expected to be cleared for carriage by Tu-95
`Bear-H’ and Tu-160 `Blackjack’ aircraft although it was reported that
the Tu-95 could only carry two missiles. It is believed that Raduga NPO
used the AS-X-19 design as a hypersonic test vehicle, known as GELA, and
this has been used for research since 1994. In 1998, it was reported
that the AS-X-19, or a lower cost variant, had been redesigned and might
still be put into production for the Russian Air Force.

Description

From reports in 1996, it appears that the AS-X-19 had two delta canard
foreplanes at the nose, delta fins and tailplanes at the rear body and a
long pointed slender nose. It is believed that the AS-X-19 was 10.5 m
long, had a body diameter of 1.2 m and a wing span of 4.5 m. The larger
delta-wings fold for aircraft carriage, and there was a vertical folding
tail fin. The missile weight was 2,800 kg, and it was ramjet powered.
The ramjet inlet was circular with a conical centrebody, and then a long
slender nose section was shaped from the upper half of the body.
Conventional flight control elevators and rudders were mounted on the
wings and fin. It is believed that the AS-X-19 could cruise at altitudes
between 7 and 20 km at M4.5, and then made a steep dive onto the target.
Unconfirmed reports suggest that the missile had two independently
targeted warheads, capable of attacking separate targets 100 km apart.
It is assumed that these warheads were to have been nuclear, but that
any redesigned missile would have an HE warhead. The maximum range of
AS-X-19 is reported to have been 3,000 km.

Operational status

The AS-X-19 was in development and some 20 or more flight tests had been
made by1992, when Russia indicated that the programme would be
terminated. There are, however, indications that this AS-X-19 design has
been retained, with the GELA hypersonic research vehicle, and that
smaller missiles with turbojet or ramjet engines are being developed as
possible lower cost replacements.

Specifications

Length: 10.5 m
Body diameter: 1.2 m
Launch weight: 2,800 kg
Payload: 450 kg
Warhead: Nuclear or HE
Guidance: Inertial
Propulsion: Ramjet
Range: 3,000 km
Accuracy: n/k

Contractor

It is believed that the AS-X-19 `Koala’ missile was designed by the
Chelomei and Raduga NPO design bureau. “

I don’t know if this is the correct thread to place the new, but …

The reorganization and re-equipping of the Russian army’s tank force has become a high-priority military issue.

Reductions in tank forces, the gradual expansion of T-90 tank production, the modernization of existing tanks and the development of the next generation T-95 tank – this gives much food for thought.

RIA Novosti learned more about it during an exclusive interview with Oleg Siyenko, CEO of Uralvagonzavod, a Russian engineering company located in Nizhny Tagil, the Urals Federal District. Uralvagonzavod is the world’s largest main battle tank manufacturer and the only tank manufacturer in Russia.

The T-90 has undergone continuous upgrades since it was first developed in the early 1990s on the basis of the latest modifications to the T-72/T-72B. It is the only mass-produced main battle tank in Russia.

Under the current state rearmament program, the Russian army is expected to receive about 1,500 tanks of this model. At present, the Russian Armed Forces have 500 T-90 tanks and receive 60 to 100 new tanks of this model each year.

This month, General Alexander Postnikov, Commander of Land Forces, caused a sensation when he announced the order for 261 T-90 tanks in 2010. Although all news outlets reported a steep rise in T-90 procurement, Siyenko could not confirm the story.

“There is no contract for such an order at present. Unfortunately, contracts between the Ministry of Defense and our company call for much fewer tanks. But I can say that we would be happy to receive such an order, as it would ensure the stability of our company and help it to expand,” Siyenko said.

The T-90 is currently the most commercially successful tank on the global market. The number of exported tanks, including tank-assembly kits, will soon reach 1,000, and more and more countries are beginning to import them.

India is the largest buyer of T-90 tanks, but they can also be found in the Algerian military according to media reports. Contracts have been signed with Turkmenistan, while preliminary agreements have been concluded with Cyprus, Libya and Saudi Arabia.

In addition to the production of T-90 tanks, T-72 tanks continue to be modernized for the Russian Armed Forces. The T-72BA is currently the main modified version. Modernization programs streamline the fire-control system, enhance hull-bottom mine resistance by installing an additional armor plate near the driver’s seat, standardize the platform and engine with the T-90 tank and improve the tank’s armor.

An upgraded T-72 tank has considerably greater potential and meets modern tank requirements, while at the same time being far cheaper to produce than a new T-90 tank.

Nevertheless, the army is hoping for a next generation tank to replace older models and reinforce the current fleet of T-90. Known as “Item 195” and the T-95, this new model has been under development for many years. Details remain classified.

During our exclusive interview, Siyenko commented on reports on the T-95, which was developed at Uralvagonzavod, where it will also be mass-produced:

“We’ve been working on this project for many years. Unfortunately, we are having problems with our parts suppliers, who are falling behind both in terms of product quality and quantity. We are working to solve this problem on our own. Our engineers are developing new units and systems for this entirely new tank and for intermediate versions. With the approval of the government, the first tanks could be displayed this summer at the Russian Defense Expo 2010 in Nizhny Tagil.

Although I can’t reveal the tank’s specifications, I would like to point out that we have met the technical requirements of the proposal in full as well as the requirements of the military.

Let’s wait until summer, when you will most likely be able to see the new tank for yourself.”

If the summer expo of the T-95 in Nizhny Tagil happens, Russia will become the first country to unveil a fifth-generation tank. This tank is expected to surpass all of its predecessors and rivals.

Despite the secrecy surrounding the T-95, some information has been leaked. It appears that the new tank will weigh about 55 metric tons and that it will have a remote-controlled turret with a 152-mm cannon capable of firing conventional rounds and guided missiles.

Tank design and performance, in addition to crew training, are becoming increasingly important at a time when Moscow has decided to reduce Russia’s tank force from over 20,000 operational and reserve vehicles to 2,000 operational and 5,000-6,000 in reserve.

It becomes even more important when you consider the vastness of Russia’s borderland as well as a hypothetical land conflict with a superior enemy. Consequently, the success of army reforms in Russia will largely depend on the success of the T-95 R&D program and subsequent tests.

The opinions expressed in this article are the author’s and do not necessarily represent those of RIA Novosti.

MOSCOW. (RIA Novosti military commentator Ilya Kramnik)