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Rodolfo

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Viewing 15 posts - 826 through 840 (of 1,190 total)
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  • in reply to: OBAMA CONTINUES TO PLAY DANGEROUS SHIELD GAMES #1784474
    Rodolfo
    Participant

    From http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/russia/ss-26.htm

    http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/russia/images/ss23-ss26.gif

    The 9K720 Iskander-M (SS-26 Stone) would certainly have a range to strike the Redzikowo missile defense facility in Poland, which is a bit more than 200 km from Kaliningrad. But only an extended range version would be capable of striking the Brdy facility in the Czech Republic, which is more than 600 km from Kaliningrad.

    The road-mobile SS-X-26 was the second attempt to replace the `Scud’, since the first attempt, the Oka SS-23 SPIDER, was eliminated under the Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. The operational requirements for the SS-26 are probably similar to those of the original SS-23. One of the major questions concerning the program is the missile’s range. The SS-26 may include a longer range (greater than 400 km) variant for the Russian forces, and a shorter range (less than 300 km) variant for export.

    The deployment of the new Iskander tactical missile systems closes a missile coverage gap caused by Russia’s participation in the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty. The Iskander-M (NATO reporting name SS-26 Stone) missile system, considered a successor to the Oka, has a range of at least 400 km (250 miles) and can reportedly carry conventional and nuclear warheads.

    The Soviet Union and the U.S. signed the INF Treaty on 08 December 1987. The agreement came into force in June 1988 and was of indefinite duration. The pact banned nuclear and conventional ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles with ranges of 500 to 5,500 kilometers (300 to 3,400 miles). The fundamental purpose of the INF Treaty was to eliminate and ban US and former USSR (FSU) ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles, as well as associated support equipment, with ranges between 500 and 5500 kilometers. By the treaty’s deadline of 01 June 1991, a total of 2,692 weapons had been destroyed, 846 by the U.S. and 1,846 by the Soviet Union. These included the Soviet RSD-10 Pioneer (NATO reporting name SS-20 SABER, with a range of 600 to 5000 kilometers) with multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle (MIRV) missiles, as well as the single-warhead Pershing II systems.

    The Soviet short-range tactical missile system (NATO reporting SS-23 Spider, with a range of 500 kilometers), was also destroyed under the INF treaty. Recent Russian claims that the SS-23 ” … technically did not fall into the category of missile systems slated for scrapping, since the maximum range of its missile did not exceed 450 km (280 miles)” or that “Nonetheless, the Americans insisted that the Oka be included on the list of systems subject to elimination” are entirely without merit, having no basis in fact or history.

    The missile is superior to its predecessor, the Oka. The launch carrier vehicle carries two missiles, rather than one. And each missile can be independently targeted, in a matter of seconds. The missiles can be retargeted during flight not only against fixed targets, but also against moving targets, such as a tactical missile launcher, a tank column, or a convoy. The Iskander has another unique feature: the optically guided warhead can also be controlled by a coded radio signal, including from an AWACS or an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV). This provides a self-homing capability. The missile’s onboard computer receives an image or images of the target. Then the missile, by locking on the target with its sights, will travel towards it at supersonic speed.

    The system can be used against small and large targets. The Iskander missile can easily overcome air defense systems. It’s almost impossible to prevent a launch of an Iskander missile because of the system’s mobility. Targets can be found not only by satellite and aircraft but also by a conventional intelligence center and by a soldier who directs artillery fire. Targets can also be found from photos, which will be put into a computer by means of a scanner. The self-direction device functions even in fog or darkness. Only the Iskander system can accomplish such tasks.

    According to Nikolay Guschin, chief and senior designer of the Machinebuilding Design Office, the complex is meant for covertly preparing and launching effective missile strikes at small-size targets of particular importance. A specificity of this complex is the high level of automation in the pre-launch preparations little time required to make it ready, and the high precision of shooting.
    Research carried out by specialists from the leading Russian military science centers is claimed to have shown that the lskander-E missile complex is 5 to 8 times better than its foreign analogs in terms of the “effectiveness-cost” criterion. As for its tactical and technical characteristics, it also poses a great improvement on the existing Russian tactical missile complexes. Capable of accomplishing tasks connected with the use of non-nuclear warheads, it’s the world’s first complex equipped with two-missile launch installation. Weighing 3800 kilograms each, controlled throughout the trajectory of their flight, equipped with various systems of correction and self-targeting, its missiles are capable of overcoming the enemy’s anti-missile defences and hitting targets at a distance of 280 kilometers.

    The TEL was likely based on the new BAZ-6909 family of trucks, first publicly displayed at a commercial transport show in Moscow in August 1995. Two missiles are carried on each launcher, though the delay between firing each round is unclear. The new TEL is apparently based on the the 9P71 Oka TEL, though the new SS-X-26 TEL has been designed with the INF Treaty in mind, with several external changes that clearly differentiate the two vehicles to prevent treaty compliance problems. The nose of the vehicle has been extended forward, the chassis lengthened, and the access door arrangement has been changes. The tactical parameters of the two vehicles are probably similar.

    The composition of the complex makes it possible to ensure the full cycle of its use in combat, including its combat control, information base, technical servicing and the training of its crews, without the involvement of additional remedies.

    in reply to: OBAMA CONTINUES TO PLAY DANGEROUS SHIELD GAMES #1784476
    Rodolfo
    Participant

    you can’t be sure it WON’T work.

    you can’t be sure it WILL work. You know,The Lord of Likelihood rules.

    What’d be interesting is an ABL over the GBI site.

    Well, this is the best imaginable invitation to place an S-400 battery in Kaliningrad. It will be nice for testing the capability of 48N6DM (aka 40N6-?-).

    in reply to: OBAMA CONTINUES TO PLAY DANGEROUS SHIELD GAMES #1784492
    Rodolfo
    Participant

    That is an entirely uninformed statement. PATRIOT had issues in DESERT STORM, yes. But the weapon being used by the system now is far different from the PAC-1 and PAC-2 missiles employed back in 1991. Basing the system’s effectiveness on how it performed with different software and with different missiles in 1991 is ridiculous.

    OK, but the key is: Can the Patriot batteries here provide a reliable protection against a coordinated attack of Iskander? The answer is simply “NO”. May be they can intercept a percentage, i.e. about 50% (being utterly optimistic), but the end result will be absolutely the same. In fact the Russian planners predicted the deployment of Patriot batteries in Poland as the next NATO move but they,… simply don’t care.

    In the end, as far as the GBI site starts to grow, its Nemesis, the Iskander deployment in Kaliningrad will also start to grow. Time to recognize this reality (on both sides).

    in reply to: OBAMA CONTINUES TO PLAY DANGEROUS SHIELD GAMES #1784499
    Rodolfo
    Participant

    Name a threat they *have* been impressed with. Russian attitude towards a thing in public doesn’t necessarily equate to reality. Poland is a prime example. BTW if any system had a chance it would be PAC-3 as it’s hit manuevering RVs in testing.

    A Pershing manoeuvrable warhead seems far less manoeuvrable than new ones because its purpose is just to improve the CEP. Anyway, and in spite of Patriot performance in Desert Storm, you can believe you want. It’s OK for me, but I don’t like to lose when gambling. So, my bet in on the Iskander side.

    in reply to: OBAMA CONTINUES TO PLAY DANGEROUS SHIELD GAMES #1784501
    Rodolfo
    Participant

    Good thing Poland will get PAC-3 and THAAD as well.

    I don’t think Patriot will have a chance against Iskander. Russians seems absolutely unimpressed with the “Patriot threat”. THAAD may have better probabilities.

    in reply to: OBAMA CONTINUES TO PLAY DANGEROUS SHIELD GAMES #1784512
    Rodolfo
    Participant

    Medvedev words:

    “I would add something about what we have had to face in recent years: what is it? It is the construction of a global missile defence system, the installation of military bases around Russia, the unbridled expansion of NATO and other similar ‘presents’ for Russia * we therefore have every reason to believe that they are simply testing our strength. Of course we will not let ourselves be dragged into an arms race. But we must take this into account in defence expenditures. And we will continue to reliably protect the safety of the citizens of Russia. Therefore I will now announce some of the measures that will be taken. In particular measures to effectively counter the persistent and consistent attempts of the current American administration to install new elements of a global missile defence system in Europe. For example, we had planned to decommission three missile regiments of a missile division deployed in Kozelsk from combat readiness and to disband the division by 2010. I have decided to abstain from these plans. Nothing will disband. Moreover, we will deploy the Iskander missile system in the Kaliningrad Region to be able, if necessary, to neutralise the missile defence system. Naturally, we envisage using the resources of the Russian Navy for these purposes as well. And finally, electronic jamming of the new installations of the U.S. missile defence system will be carried out from the territory of the same westernmost region, that is from Kaliningrad. I want to emphasise that we have been forced to take these measures. We have repeatedly told our partners that we want to engage in positive cooperation. We want to act against common threats and to work together. But unfortunately, very unfortunately, they did not want to listen to us.”

    http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/russia/images/ss-26-kaliningrad.jpg

    in reply to: OBAMA CONTINUES TO PLAY DANGEROUS SHIELD GAMES #1784517
    Rodolfo
    Participant

    Now the Russians seem exaggerating:

    http://en.rian.ru/russia/20081117/118359856.html

    I think a dozen Tu-22M3 launching Kh-15 from Belarusian airspace as a more logical neutralization move.

    in reply to: OBAMA CONTINUES TO PLAY DANGEROUS SHIELD GAMES #1784662
    Rodolfo
    Participant

    On the Iskander-M

    http://www.defense-update.com/products/i/iskander.htm

    http://en.rian.ru/img/118288575_free.html

    Notes: No control on the midcourse phase. Just maneuvers in the boost and in the terminal phases. So, rather than Patriot, the American should be interested in THAAD, to improve their interception chances.

    in reply to: British nuclear sub incident #2061518
    Rodolfo
    Participant

    I can imagine the incredibly high noise in the Western media if this incident would have happened to a Russian submarine. 😮

    in reply to: Indian navy – news & discussion #2061588
    Rodolfo
    Participant

    The Gorshkov for Russia, now? :confused:

    http://en.rian.ru/russia/20081113/118299115.html

    in reply to: OBAMA CONTINUES TO PLAY DANGEROUS SHIELD GAMES #1784700
    Rodolfo
    Participant

    Iskander

    The Iskander was developed in the 1990s as a replacement for the OTR-23 Oka (NATO designation SS-23) missile system, which was eliminated under the 1987 Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. Russians still complain that the SS-23 should not have been banned under the INF because its range was below 500 km, the cut-off definition for intermediate-range systems; however, it was included due to the intense pressure exerted by the United States. The INF Treaty left Russia with only the Tochka tactical missile system, with a range of 120 km, but did not prevent it from developing a new system with a range below 500 km.

    The widely advertised Iskander-E (“export”) version of the missile has the range of 280 km and was developed with an eye to exporting it (the guidelines established by the Missile Technology Control Regime, MTCR, prohibit exporting missiles with a range of 300 km or more). The range of the “domestic” Iskander and Iskander-M missiles has not been announced but is without a doubt higher than that of Iskander-E, probably about 400 km. Deployment of the new system has been delayed for several years, primarily for funding reasons. The first brigades of the basic model have only begun to be deployed this year, in the North Caucasus Military District. Deployment of the modernized (“M”) version of the missile is planned beginning in 2009.

    Iskander’s launcher carries two missiles, which can be launched at an interval of about one minute; the missiles have a very advanced guidance system and are reported to be protected from enemy countermeasures. Iskander is equipped with conventional warheads that weigh about 480 kg; it is possible that with a lighter warhead its range could be further increased. Sergey Ivanov noted, somewhat quizzically, that the missile will have “variable” warheads, hinting perhaps that it could, in the future, be equipped with nuclear warheads.

    While the standard Iskander is a ballistic missile with the capability to maneuver along its trajectory, the May 29 test added one more feature to the system – the ability to launch cruise missiles, R-500. Accordingly, the new designation of the system is Iskander-K (for “krylataya,” or cruise). The missile launched during the recent test flew at about 100 meters altitude or less at a speed of 250 meters/second; it performed several maneuvers during the flight, and at the terminal phase deviation from the target trajectory was less than 30 meters. The range of the cruise missile developed for the Iskander missile complex is unknown. However, under the INF Treaty, which banned not only ballistic, but also land-based cruise missiles, it cannot exceed 500 km.

    in reply to: OBAMA CONTINUES TO PLAY DANGEROUS SHIELD GAMES #1784708
    Rodolfo
    Participant

    No it hasn’t. I already gave you some of the apparent inaccuracies of that report.

    Where? As far I know T. Postol is a highly respected scientist. He includes in the slides some detection-tracing delays for the interception simulations. Anyway, I always affirmed that have some limited anti-Russian potential (not that was designed to be anti-Russian). This potential is to be handled in the Russian nuclear planning. They decided that Iskander are a cheap “insurance”, just in case. Russia also doesn’t seem impressed by the Patriot in Poland

    in reply to: OBAMA CONTINUES TO PLAY DANGEROUS SHIELD GAMES #1784724
    Rodolfo
    Participant

    Well Sferrin, we agree here. Time to end this Byzantine discussion.

    in reply to: OBAMA CONTINUES TO PLAY DANGEROUS SHIELD GAMES #1784730
    Rodolfo
    Participant

    The polish ABM site is to intercept ballistic missiles coming out of the Middle East, live with it.

    If EEUU-NATO want the ABM base in Poland they will have to live with the SRBM in Kaliningrad. Simple. Time to accept that reality, like it or not.

    in reply to: OBAMA CONTINUES TO PLAY DANGEROUS SHIELD GAMES #1784738
    Rodolfo
    Participant

    We can summarise the topic in the following points:
    1. It has been demonstrated that the Pole site HAVE some anti-Russian potential (http://russianforces.org/files/BriefOnEastEuropeMissileDefenseProposal_August24,2007_FinalReduced.pdf)
    2. This potential is negligible in case of a Russian first strike and moderate for a Russian counter-strike.
    3. So, the deployment is mainly of political nature with the aim of i.e. strength the NATO roots in east Europe.
    4. Since point (2), the Russian answer (deployment of Iskander in Kaliningrad) is also of political nature. I.e. any unilateral NATO move with some aniti-Russian potential (even a low one) will not go unanswered.
    5. As far as the Pole ABM site will go ahead, its “Nemesis”, the Kaliningrad Iskander deployment also will go ahead.
    6. The Iskander affair seems more like an answer from Medvedev to the Bush plans. So we should wait and see. Mr Obama view on the affair is unknown so far.

Viewing 15 posts - 826 through 840 (of 1,190 total)