A bizzarely attractive bird.:cool:

Indeed.

I recall putting together an Airfix kit of one of these. I had motorised it and added lighting and was trying to work out how I could make the tip-jets scream like the real thing.

I think it was a remarkable concept which should have been developed further IMHO.

I know Peter Twiss did some of the early test flying on the Rotodyne – quite a difference from the FD2 eh!:D

Stormbird:

You may find the following of interest, if you have not come across them already, in shedding more light on the behind-the-scenes activities of the hierarchy of all combatant nations, and those of significant neutrals (USA, Switzerland) by searching out the following:

‘Double Standards The Rudolf Hess Cover Up’
‘War of the Windsors A Century of Unconstitutional Monarchy’ and
‘Friendly Fire The Secret War Between the Allies’ all by Lynn Picknett, Clive Prince and Steven Prior with additional historical research by Robert Brydon.

Also Martin Allen’s ‘Hidden Agenda: How the Duke of Windsor Betrayed the Allies’ provides more that will give some idea of what was probably going in the upper echelons of society and some elements of the royal family.

The truth is possibly explosive and is why it has been so well hidden and why some documents are under long term lock. By the time the folios are made available most documents of any value or interest in providing the full picture within will have surely been ‘lost’.

Google on the titles for synopsis and reviews but I would suggest taking the reviews by Thomas Dunskus(Faleyras Frankreich) with a ‘pinch of salt’, is he really commenting on the books by the titles concerned?

…bad idea to keep goldfish down there HAHA, all it does is deposit alot of crap…

Shouldn’t that have been carp?;)

My sympathies are with all those affected including Deano. At least it looks like having solid floors has minimised the extent of the damage but that is probably small compensation.

I should imagine that many are now considering the wisdom of spending large sums, and depleting tropical forrests of hardwoods, to fit out with laminate flooring.

I recall the wood blocks of the flooring in accomodation blocks at Yeovilton collecting around my cabin door one morning as I splashed my feet out of bed into about six inches of unexpected water, that was the summer of 68.

During that same summer a mess car treasure hunt around the Somerset countryside developed unexpectedly when a terrific storm broke. A bridge on the A37 north of Shepton Mallet (over the R. Chew at Pensford IIRC) was brought down and the roads downhill into Yeovil became a watercourse as the water streamed off fields down banks either side.

It was well into the early hours of the morning before we had news of all those who had gone out on the hunt.

Oh lighten up 😀 The poor FAA continued to be supplied with real crocks even after WW2 in which both the Americans and the Japanese had amply demonstrated that carrier borne aircraft could perform with somewhat more capability than a wounded snail.

What you have just highlighted, and which would have been one of a number of points which I would have amplified but for topic drift, is the difference between the rationale between the three nations. The US Navy had appreciated the need to have an indigenous air capability and having done so ensured the development of aircraft suited to operations at sea. The JIN also arrived at similar conclusions, ironically with not a little help from a British aid contingent which included Rutland ‘of Jutland’.

Have a look at ‘The Aircraft Carrier Story 1908-1945’ by Guy Robbins for a thorough appreciation.

The reasons for Britain’s failure I had indicated and I strongly suggest that you read Professor Till’s book for this will illuminate on the genesis of the Fulmar which was envisaged prior to WW2 at a time when British radios of suitable capability for fleet operations were rather bulky and heavy and required an operator. The Fulmar was intended to fill the needs of the role for a fighter-reconnaissance aircraft, not a fleet defence fighter per-se. By the time of the Firefly the difficulties of providing a two-seater with the performance of a ME109/FW190/Zero interceptor and dogfighter were understood with the Spitfire being mutated into the Seafire to fill the gap. The Firefly, in turn, was intended for the fighter-reconnaissance role. Also radio equipment was improving a factor which had enabled the American’s to develop successful single seat fighters such as the Wildcat(Martlet), Hellcat and Corsair (although the later was very nearly dropped as a ‘clunker’) which were taken into RN service under Lend-Lease.

The Roc was from the same Air Ministry (not Admiralty) muddled thinking as the Defiant. The Skua was also initiated by the Air Ministry as a dive bomber but the AM had not the wit to ensure it was fitted with a bomb sight and if allowed to have the engine originally intended would have been perhaps a more successful type, at least for a short while as the war developed.

To be sure the Flycatcher and Nimrod were useful fighters, unfortunately the advent of monoplanes and advances in metal structures was enabling the genesis of higher performance land-based fighters. Unfortunate because the Air Ministry (aided by ignorance or disinterest at higher levels in the Admiralty) did not concern itself (as it should have under its then remit) to tackle the special requirements imposed on similarly capable aircraft operating at sea. As the RN only regained full control of its own air arm on the eve of war it was poorly placed for equipment and personnel.

As Robbins puts it, ‘…and wishful thinking on the aerial defence of the fleet. This reflected the low numbers of aircraft with the fleet and the lack of modern carriers and operating techniques. These were essentially a result of Treasury and RAF opposition. Another real problem was that of navigation over the sea by single-seaters. The Navy’s expansion plans of the 1930s were given second place to the RAF and were put back until 1942. Thus in 1939 the FAA did not have the aircraft [and ships and men] it needed.’

It could be argued that the Norway campaign and also the retreat from Greece and Crete and the supply of Malta could all have had very different courses if the RN had had full control of her air resources sooner, indeed by the early 1920s to recapture that senior expertise lost to the RAF.

The difficulties of adapting a land based fighter to carrier use were highlighted by the Seafire (note that the Mustang was not deployed at sea) which had poor carrier landing characteristics and short endurance (much to the embarrassment of Vian and the BPF) amongst other issues, but then British industry had nothing more suitable being developed because of shortsightedness at levels already highlighted. Furthermore, once Britain was embroiled on many fronts, there were not the resources to put into designing suitable aircraft. This is one of the baleful effects of the resources put into the European bombing campaign. Consider the number of Merlin engines destined for destruction as bomber command suffered.

One must always put the supply of equipment in context in order to make valid judgments and your single sentence (quoted in first reply) was vastly over simplistic and your follow up has been little better.

Till and Robbins will provide you with a more accurate perspective than you appear to have at present.

As for lightening up, you have raised serious issues the lack of timely attention to which caused the needless loss of countless lives during WW2.

The aircraft was the typical result of FAA specifications that guaranteed that any aircraft designed to satisfy them was overweight, overcrewed and underpowered.

That is an astonishingly erroneous statement on two counts.

Firstly the Botha was not an aircraft initiated by the FAA, sure it was intended as a torpedo bomber but with Coastal Command which was RAF.

Secondly there was a good reason for many FAA aircraft requiring a crew of at least two – operating from a mobile airfield required navigation and radio capabilities not required by those operating from an airfield.

As to the poor aircraft designs that the FAA began the war with this was directly as a result of the low priority put on equipping the navy by an Air Ministry pursuing their own restrictive agendas. Also, there was a dearth of high ranking naval officers who had direct experience of the operational roles and requirements of a naval air force – this was in large measure a legacy of the poor, short-sighted, decisions made when the RAF was formed from the combined RNAS and RFC where the fleet was stripped of its capable, experienced and upwardly mobile aviation officers. You may like to compare the respective sizes and capabilities of those two services at that time, the RNAS was well ahead in size and had initiated a number of farsighted tactical, and even strategic, air warfare concepts.

If you doubt the veracity of my thinking above then I refer you to: ‘Air Power and the Royal Navy 1914–1945 a historical survey’ by Professor Geoffrey Till.

Was the Botha not the aircraft that in a service test pilot’s report, it was noted that ‘entry into this aircraft is difficult, It should be rendered impossible’?

I don’t think so I recall that the remark was by Captain Eric ‘Winkle’ Brown on the Wyvern.

The Vigilante was fully carrier capable, thats why it operated of them reguarly.:rolleyes:

Two other proposals for a land based interceptor version of the Vigilante to the air force makes a mockery of some of your claims, apparently the people who designed it seemed to think it was capable of the mission.

As has been pointed out by TinWing, who made a number of very valid points (so I fail to see how your sarcasm is appropriate), there is a big difference between being able to use a carrier deck and being well suited to the roles required to complete the capabilities of a CAG.

Even on carriers as large as those in the US Navy it is desirable to minimise the number of different aircraft types carried. Any body who has served on a carrier with an airgroup appreciates the truth of that, not just from the space required to accomodate the aircraft but the storage space for the multitude of spares and equipment workshops required.

Each different aircraft type will also require its own maintenance personal contingent. This contigent needs to have all trades represented, of various levels of rank, training and experience and enough of each of these to create a workable watch system. Another aircraft type, of infexible capabilities would be a white elephant in this respect.

Of course much of that discussed above does not apply to a land based airforce. This is a facet oft overlooked by those without first hand experience. Consider that in the FAA there was one trade to cover both airframe and propulsion systems of aircraft unlike the two trades in the RAF the RN arrangement easing pressure on accomodation.

Any warship is a compromise between affordable size and capability, the space and weight penalty from supporting an indifferent aircraft type could induce a weekness elsewhere.

Finally. You asked the questions and then used sarcasm against a person who was attempting to provide you with answers, was that necessary?