Spitfire9they asid that price negotiations will start only after they cleared technical (liability among others) aspects.. so, the final price will most certainly be lower than what’s been announced by Dassault recently (if you want to negotiate, you must leave yourself a margin, or otherwise you either stick to your price or loose money)
so, for now, we may as well let the price aside as they apparently didn’t even start negotaiting it.
To me, the most crazy thing is that liability issue.. asking an impossible condition (and most of all, which wasn’t worded that way in the RFP) is quite hard for me to understand. if they didn’t want a new fighter, they could’ve just said so and spare everybody a lot of time and money. Nobody can/would accept a liability over something that one can’t control in any way.
What’s more, even if some say that India has had some bad experiences with BAe for example, as far as I remember, they were always happy with the service provided by Dassault over the fleet of their Mirages, which makes me wonder why insisting on a totally unreasonable condition?
I did not realise that price negotiations had not yet started. If so, the reports one reads that a deal is soon to be finalised seem groundless.
I note that HAL would like to double Tejas Mk1 full scale production rate from 8 per annum to 16. I don’t think this is because Mk2 is ahead of schedule and Mk1 production facilities will be needed earlier than expected.
Spitfire9It also noted that as money for high-value acquisitions like the MMRCA is not available under the current allocation, additional funds will be sought. It has to be seen if the defence ministry makes the additional demand this fiscal or in the next, beginning April 2015. – See more at: http://indianexpress.com/article/business/economy/defence-purchases-to-be-hit-as-funds-go-for-overheads/2/#sthash.Tsj8tpFe.dpuf
This makes it sound like additional funds will need to be approved and found for MMRCA procurement to go ahead. Not surprising if the cost has increased dramatically.
Spitfire9“As things stand, increasingly the Rafale is not being seen as delivering a good return on investment.”
Regarding the “return on investment”, a 100% TOT of a operational modern warplane involving decades of development from a firm well known for decades to make a very good aircrafts to a country who have no real experience in making this own fighters except trying since 1983 to make a light fighter (basically a cheap Mirage 2000) with US technologies like engine or FBW control, and fail, i think that even $40b would be a good deal for them, but i may be wrong.
Whether the idea that “$40b would be a good deal for them” is valid or not, it would be foolish for GOI to pay enormous amounts to Dassault for TOT if they could have achieved a transfer of technology from another MMRCA contender at a lower price.
I think it was dumb to select any OEM as L1 with dozens of items unpriced.
I think it was dumb not to address the notion of “vicarious” liability as item 1 on the agenda before going any further with negotiating anything else.
I think it was dumb not to address TOT as item 2 on the agenda.
Spitfire9Regarding Dassault’s liability, I don’t see it as onerous in the RFP document shown. What does seem strange to me is this: if Dassault’s contract is with the GOI, what is the point of stating that the ‘Production agency’ can sue Dassault if Dassault falls down on the job? To me it is obvious that all parties are entering to legal relationships so a remedy to failure to perform according to contract can be sought in the courts. eg in contrast to an arrangement where parties are not entering into a legal relationship such as A promises to lend B his pen if B lends him his pencil. A borrows B’s pencil then refuses to lend B his pen. I think in English law a court would say to B, if he took A to court, that there was never any intention for the laws regarding contract to be invoked should one party refuse to honour the deal so neither can sue the other if things go wrong.
Spitfire9IIRC the IAF is losing aircraft through accidents at a highr rate than projected peak Tejas Mk1 production rates (8 per annum). Based on past and present performance, it seems that almost nothing adheres to or vaguely adheres to schedule with LCA, ergo Mk1’s will not fill the gap left by non-delivery of Rafales and IAF fighter numbers will continue to fall.
Spitfire9There is factor of diminishing returns but here the cost has been consistently been falling before the production ‘ramp-up’. As the production increases, the fall in costs will only accelerate. Also, cost only need to fall for another three or four years (not 30 years) before target costs are met ($108M to $85M).
(a) target cost was $69M IIRC
(b) the current $108M is without engine, isn’t it? So current cost is $120M+, isn’t it?
Spitfire9So the MKI Update is a very strong candidate. That and the Teja now taking (real) shapes, makes India enough self sufficient and confident to rely on more restricted tech. What exactly was at the very basis of the Fr deal as marketed by Dassault itself…
Even if the Tejas Mk1 is now taking shape, HAL is scheduled to be producing them at a very low rate. IIRC planned ramp up is only to 8 frames per annum. The first and second deliveries, scheduled for 2014 Q1 and 2014 Q2 then re-scheduled to delivery 2014 Q4 were not delivered as far as I know. Hardly inspires confidence and to be realistic, what are the chances of HAL ever getting Mk1 deliveries back on schedule? Not that it would make any material difference to arresting the decline in IAF fighter numbers whether it takes another 5 or 6 or 7 or years to deliver 40 frames.
Spitfire9Wonder how F-5’s would measure up against Typhoon as it is and later with Meteor and an even better radar than it has now. Given the stand off between Argentina and the UK over the South Atlantic Islands, the most likely scenario for hostile use of the Argentine air force is in a conflict over those islands, isn’t it?
On the other hand 79 F-5’s would be an economic way of replacing decrepit aircraft and keeping the Argentine air force functioning in the air for another decade or more. Cheap way of keeping an airspace policing capability to me.
I also wonder whether Switzerland might have an interest for the same reason: a low cost replacement for F-5’s that RUAG could upgrade and something that might not get vetoed in a referendum. Must be a lot cheaper than flying more hours on the F-18’s (depending on how much they need to bid to acquire the surplus Saudi aircraft in the first place).
Spitfire9Kaveri isn’t completely dead really. The UCAV project is going to use it. It is going to be tested on board a MiG-29 testbed in Russia.
From the latest info it might be twin engined with 2D thrust vectoring.
Let’s see how alive Kaveri is in 2 or 3 years’ time. As far as I can make out from what I read from GTRE it’s definitively dead. Wasn’t it the director of the organisation who said that GTRE were taking the “bold step” (or something equally silly) of giving up on something that was beyond their capabilities?
AMCA’s engine for now is being called advanced Kaveri.
The advanced kaveri would be somewhere between what volvo did with RM-12 and completely designing a new engine.
GTRE was incapable of developing the engine intended for LCA. If the know how to develop the “basic” Kaveri was lacking, how on earth is GTRE going to develop an advanced Kaveri? If you have tried learning how to walk and failed, the idea of deciding that you will learn how to run instead is nothing but fantasy IMO.
Spitfire9Beyond AMCA, direct applications could include Tejas Mk. 3 and UCAV projects, but more important is for India to acquire design and production technology that it can leverage in creating its own engines of required specifications. The problem isn’t that India doesn’t have a world-class indigenous turbofan — even China doesn’t have that. The problem is that, unlike China, India has no credible path to get there.
So what moves are being made to decide on what path to tread towards a viable indigenous engine technology (not what moves are being thought about, being discussed, are having meetings to work out when to have more meetings to think about it)?
AMCA as currently mooted (200 aircraft for IAF) will require 1000+ engines all by itself, to say nothing of the potential for further orders from IAF, IN, or export clients, or through leveraging the Tejas/UCAV possibilities noted above. Filling a massive requirement like that via direct import (which would include funding the development of e.g. F414 EPE) whilst allowing domestic capabilities to languish would be foolishness of the highest order.
What chance is there of an Indian engine being ready in time for AMCA? Even with a decade or so delay with LCA, Kaveri was too late to be used. Has there been some radical rework in the way another engine project would be managed? Your comment that 1000+ engines may be needed for AMCA and allowing domestic capabilities to languish would be foolishness of the highest order makes sense to me. I would comment that 500+ engines may be needed for LCA and allowing domestic capabilities to languish was foolishness of the highest order. If the same decision (non)makers and project (non)management hierarchy are going to run the AMCA show, is it reasonable to expect it to have an Indian engine?
Spitfire9I am less concerned with the thrust rating of AMCA’s prospective engine than the acquisition model. If we are talking uprated versions of existing engines (F414, EJ200, RD33) the underlying technology should be aged enough to allow for comprehensive technology transfer, and mooted production scales sufficient to justify domestic manufacture, and these items should be pursued at all costs. Ultimately, solving India’s engine problem is more important than AMCA itself.
What else does India need an engine for? Missed the boat on Tejas Mk1 and Tejas Mk2 by failing to throw enough funding at Kaveri in good time to develop/buy in know how. Are there any other projects on the horizon requiring a military engine in the 80kN-110kN class?
Spitfire9Forget FRP then. By 2018, the F-35 will be competitive on acquisition cost with the Rafale.
Correction. May be competitive on acquisition cost with the Rafale.
The production rate is 11 Rafales annually. That figure is going remain unchanged. Between 2014 and 2019, only 26 Rafales are to be delivered to the AdlA. The remaining 40 will be adjusted between India and UAE.
I think you are incorrect. I think that French forces will continue to take delivery at a rate of 11 per annum UNLESS export deliveries are made, in which case deliveries to French forces will be reduced.
Spitfire9With most remaining F-5 users being in the developing world, it is not possible to list an accurate inventory of operators and numbers, or likely recipients of these Saudi aircraft. Whoever does receive them, however, should receive support from the original equipment manufacturer, Northrop, which in 2010 announced that it was teaming with RUAG Aviation and Astronautics to provide an F-5 Tiger and T-38 Talon support and sustainment programme.
I can think of one country where they make cuckoo clocks that might be interested. Especially since RUAG is involved with the OEM in maintaining/upgrading F-5’s.
Spitfire9I said:
I think I have heard the word “will” pronounced too many times where F-35 is concerned. Too often the words “will not” would have proved to be far more appropriate.
You responded:
The current flyaway cost is $108 mil. The target flyaway cost is $85 mil. Hardly an epic quest. Especially considering that the cost has been consistently been falling by about 4% every year, even before the production has been ramped up.
So that is your way of dismissing my comment? Where have you been for the last ten years? How often has Lockheed Martin NOT failed to deliver on its promises?
As for the cost falling by about 4% every year, does that include engine and extra concurrency costs?
Spitfire9Why the Rafale cost increased, is ultimately immaterial. What matters is that it did and that at FRP, the F-35A will be very competitive on acquisition cost with the Rafale.
I think I have heard the word “will” pronounced too many times where F-35 is concerned. Too often the words “will not” would have proved to be far more appropriate.
The primary factor influencing cost is the production rate not the the order book. Regardless of the Indian order, the Rafale’s production will stay steady at 11 units per year. No more. No less.
It was different when the Indian and/or Emirati orders were expected to boost the production rate. With the French MoD scaling back domestic orders, with exports expected to replace them, there’s no scope for new cost efficiencies owed to scale.
You think that with India drawing off Rafale components at a greatly increased rate the cost of components would not fall? If the supply chain is going to perhaps double its output over a number of years, why should Rafale defy basic economic laws of economy of scale? Even if no Rafales were built for France in coming years, unless India spreads Rafale procurement over more than 10 years, component production rates will have to rise.
PS Better a rider to that: IF the Indian deal goes through
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