What may be the case and is generally supported by the comments is that the Battle was a product of a tactical theory that was rendered obsolete, if not fatally so, by the realities of land war in France in 1939 -1940. The fast monoplane single-engined fighters used by the protagonists quickly demonstrated that a slow single-engined bomber, forced by its operational specifications to carry extra and redundant weight in the form of crew other than the pilot was going to be a sitting duck.

Especially as one of the crew was given the unenviable task of trying to fend of multi-gunned fast fighters with a single hand held machine gun. The Battle’s defensive armament was even worse than the pedal operated single gun turret in the Blenheim turret and that was no deterrent. The extra drag created by these ineffectual defensive aids only added to the problem not to mention the inevitability of the gunner being either killed or wounded once an attack commenced. The same may equally said for the Stuka and the Il-2 – but the latter at least had realistic armour fitted. The toll of Il-2 rear gunners was particularly out of proportion to actual losses of the complete aircraft. One wonders how many wartime volunteers and conscripts willingly went for those tasks.

As for their task in the aircraft that preceded the Battle and in the Battle itself, if any consideration had been applied to the role it would have been apparent that fabric or light alloy aircraft skin simply couldn’t stop bullets and once the gunner was disabled then the slow single-engined bomber was easy pickings because it was still encumbered with all that redundant weight. All sides displayed a reluctance to come to grips with the reality that their defensive practices were flawed to the point of being realistically non-existent.

The realization, as the war progressed, that single-seat fighters with powerful engines and proper defensive armour plating was one step forward. The other was the development of the cab rank system which allowed close tactical support, which is what light bombers and fighter bombers were designed for, to best utilise the tactical effectiveness of this tactic. Oddly however this was a lesson learned in the closing stages of WW1 but for some reason inconveniently ignored until 20 years later. Perhaps a product of the role of the RAF in the 20s and 30s where its combat was largely directed at bombing recalcitrant tribes in the ME. Life for the single-engined bomber and the crew was simple, fly over a village drop a few bombs, then return to base and not an enemy fighter in sight. One wonders what direction RAF light bomber policy might have taken if some of these annoying tribes had had access to fighters to defend themselves.

Gee have they put Beaverbrook back in charge of aircraft production 😀

One thing I note is that despite the media repetition of the claim the overwhelming mood across the aviation forums is pure scepticism. Perhaps he has gone to the well once too often.

Well there is always the problem that at the time the Battle proved hopelessly inadequate which was the Battle of France, the British retreated to Britain and for the foreseeable future there was no need for a short range ground attack aircraft. Especially one as anachronistic as the Battle. The necessity for such an aircraft first arose after the BoB in the Nth. African campaigns and there it was fighters which did that particular task and did it well. In the west these would continue that role. I’m afraid I can’t see much of a parallel between the Battle and the Il 2 and the Stuka. Both of those types suffered very heavy losses but on the other hand were capable of delivering a far greater punch than the Battle and had better crew protection. A Battle bought up to their standard would have been a totally different aircraft, but still would have suffered high losses. This becomes an exercise in finding a WW2 version of an A10 – and the A10 is not designed for operation in an interceptor rich environment.

Aside from the difficulties with the USN, I would hope that if recovery of some aircraft takes place then the USN makes sure that appropriate preservation is undertaken so that these historic aircraft don’t wind up rotting because of lack of funds. The recovery of the DO 17 in the English Channel shows just how complex and expensive the process is.

Yes it’s the USN that causes the problem – most countries write off war losses. For some reason the USN doesn’t. I suspect it’s not for sentiment’s sake but something to do with fiscal matters.

Bruce said “He could elect to pass the cockpit (s) down to the children now, if they wanted to keep them, so as long as he lives another seven years, there would be nothing to pay. The same applies to any gift. This is completely legal tax planning. Of course, the children might not want the Lancaster; in which case the estate sells it before it comes to the accounting stage.”

Exactly. In my reply to Cees I alluded to my collecting interests. I also know full well from the actions of other families that few children share their parents’ hobby passions. The problem here is simply do the kids want to keep the cockpit reproduction or not. My experience tells me that the moment dear old dad drops of the perch, their carefully and lovingly developed hobby interest will be disposed of very quickly. If the kids are interested then this chap should give the cockpit to them now while he is still compos or give way to the inevitable and arrange for its donation to a suitable museum when he does what is inevitable for all of us.

IIRC for British aircraft at least, the useful life was calculated around the actual number of combat hours an aircraft might be expected to accumulate or not. The airframes themselves were built to best standards but this was rendered rather nugatory because of the incalculable factor of combat or accidental loss. Also IIRC one of the things that came as a bit of an eye-opener in the early days of flying preserved WW2 aircraft was that despite their age many were structurally sound (that is the ones that had been looked after). Again IIRC I seem to remember reading many years ago that a standard mid to late war production Spitfire was considered to have a maximum combat life of about 50 hours, but this was simply a guesstimate based on loss rates due to combat or accidents.