On the general premise I think you are probably right. Especially seeings as the hulls were most likely to lose in the current blood letting are the ones that are doing a lot of the general patrol work the 22’s and remaining 42’s.

If we’d have planned things properly a T45 based C1 would have followed right after the Daring’s for maximum efficiency. As it is CVF build will block that.

C2 is the most necessary new type of escort certainly. It needs to be ‘cheap’ and numerous. There are a few notions running around at the moment – the one I like is for a latter day Leander class but with propulsion more optimised for economical cruising than outright performance. The opportunity to develop that hull into a deep-range, low-intensity, patrol asset for C3 is just simple common-sense. We missed the opportunity to pull through T45 into C1 – we shouldn’t repeat that mistake.

but I am saying that a type t23 is not a great “multirole frigate”. I’m sorry it really isn’t, frigates are the obsession of navies and they bring so little for costing so much.

Wrong on every point. A frigate is not a ‘multirole’ platform its either a specialist or ‘general purpose’ design. Its role is either ASW or patrol. There have been AAW frigates but they are rare and modest in capability and the current crop of European APAR/SPY-1 hulls are DDG’s in everything but name. T23, far from costing ‘so much’, ran in at roughly £110-120mn per unit which is fantastically good value for the capability set offered.

A t23 relys on its helicopter because if its down to using its own torpedos against a sub then frankly its screwed. Its a very expensive platform for a single helicopter. Seawolf is for defending itself so brings little to the fight, it carries 8 harpoons which can’t be effectively used without airborne support and the less said about the Mk8 the better.

Also wrong on every salient point. T23 is one of the few hulls that could venture into the littoral to dig out SSK’s in their environment. This is because of its CODLAG propulsion and acoustic quieting. Poor acoustics hamper SSK sonar as well as those of a surface vessel. You would certainly push a T23 into SSK patrolled waters far more readily than a big COGAG multirole destroyer!.

It is not an expensive hull and its ‘one helicopter’ could be a Merlin HM1 equipped with a FLASH dipping set. The self same aircraft type that gave an RN T-class SSN such a bad time on the AUTEC ranges that the skipper was on record expressing the view that he was glad the Merlins were on our side!.

Also saying a 2087 is a great hull mounted sonar is comparing the best of a bad job, hull mounted sonars on surface ships are not the best way to hunt subs, totally reliant on favourable conditions while a sub or helicopter mounted sonar can just move to a better position or depth.

You might need to do some reading on 2087. The hull mount set on T23 is a very good unit too. Both sets work in conjunction in optimal environments. T23’s ASW suite is, in my view, yet to be bettered on an escort of any size.

VL Seawolf is a point defence missile. Same as SM-1MR, same as ESSM, same as Shtil etc, etc. Current active short range weapons like VL MICA and Aster15 may offer a ‘local’ area capability, but, that is a very new capability in the field. Against peer frigate AAW weapons – notably ALL point defence weapons and not area ones – GWS26 is easily competetive.

Frankly the best way to hunt subs is aircraft, helicopters, satilites and OTHER submarines, definately not frigates.

A frigate is part of the sub hunting TEAM. The best way to hunt submarines is with a TEAM. The frigate provides persistence in theatre and allows for the deployement of heavier sensors, like the LFA SONAR2087, than could be deployed by aircraft. Moving forward non-specialised ASW ships with ASW UUV’s may offer more than T23, but, thats not here yet. T23 is therefore credible and valuable as a key part of the ASW plot.

What about if they are simply varying the existing contract so that for an agreed price (which could not be less than the two carriers) they build QE and something/s else – this would look like cancelling PoW to the press, but it would not be cancelling the contract!

1, The point of cancelling the carrier is to save money. You dont save anything if you reapply the money saved on one project to a different one.

2, There is nothing else ready to build. T26 has just been awarded to BAE at development stage. MoD are paying a mere £127mn for a multiyear programme leading to build.

Actually Jonsey, the Brazilian Navy has just bought up the last Grumman Traders from the US to convert to turboprop as per their trackers and then use them as AEW and COD aircraft foe San Paulo !

Interesting solution, not sure how viable it really is though 😀

Indeed on the viability. More AEW than COD I’d imagine and certainly more justification to put them in the carrier airwing than maintaining a single-role COD type like Greyhound!.

An excellent description Verbatim

To reinforce your point you say:

Even a large naval group cruising, let’s say, 200 nm from the shore will be over the horizon for any land based surveillance network and still capable to menace both a country’s shipping lanes and to strike targets on land, at least targets located very close to the sea,

At 250nm range a 50ft masthead is below the radar horizon from an AEW aircraft orbiting at 30,000ft. So if the AEW platform is not being risked overwater its easily conceivable (and has been done) that a naval group less than 300nm offshore can operate, emission controlled, completely undetected.

Teer,

Politeness is the only reason I will refrain from using accurate language to describe your position here. I will reiterate the journalist has been invited to see a T45 launch. There is no CVF to see in Glasgow or anywhere else. Yet he makes the fantastic leap in logic that he is going to be party to the great CVF sell off. Something which s utterly baseless save for further hysterical meanderings from equally agenda-led journalists.

You then go on to support Kramer’s interpretation of this journalists house of cards telling your tale of nods and winks. No substance anywhere just a tapestry of self-supporting delusion. You then go on to say:

” Yeah, I see where this is going, namely that your argument so far is as dodgy or as reliable as the one saying that the CVF is meant for India.”

OF course it isn’t. The only people saying that India might WANT a CVF are idiot journalists be they whatever nationality and former commanders of whichever outfit. If they publish rubbish then they are idiots simple as that. The Indians have a long-standing requirement for AAW, they have opted for a development solution with the Israeli’s to induct an MR SAM. The Israeli’s have no experience with naval area defence SAMs or that operational environment. The IN have selected a no-risk evolution of an existing hull to mount this developmental AAW weapon system to.

There is ample room for the AAW system not to match requirements and the hull to be unspectacular when compared to current state of the art. If that were the case a journalistic article comparing what was SEEN on the BAE T45 against what is seen on a P15x may be advantageous to BAE’s cause. Certainly worth the risk of a few journalists on the expense account to BAE.

Simple easy straight-line logic. Yet you completely miss it and reinforce an idiots ramblings?. Hmm curious that one?

So called ‘flyaway’ costs on STOVL F35B are largely meaningless the aircraft is not operational at that ‘cost’. Only unit costs give some idea of real -upfront- costs. And the USN predicts that STOVL F35B unit costs will start out at $157 million and will never fall below $111 million. F35B will be significantly more expensive to buy than, more capable, F35C, and will probably, even allowing for the costs of EMALS, have higher through life maintenance costs, etc.

You are certainly only looking at one QE possibly going CATOBAR to start with. EMALS should most certainly be available by the time it is needed for, the second Carrier, PoW. Cost of one set of two EMALS Catapults, plus arrester gear, is about $385 million (that is, at best, three-four STOVL F35B).

http://www.defense.gov/co…act.aspx?contractid=4061

http://www.defense.gov/co…act.aspx?contractid=4158

And, just to repeat on supposed ‘austere’ land basing of STOVL F35B: USN construction guidance still calls for a 100 x 100 foot VL pad made of heat-resistant, continuously reinforced concrete, ie, nothing like a Harrier, in that respect, at all.

Only unit costs give some idea of real -upfront- costs. And the USN predicts that STOVL F35B unit costs will start out at $157 million and will never fall below $111 million. F35B will be significantly more expensive to buy than, more capable, F35C, and will probably, even allowing for the costs of EMALS, have higher through life maintenance costs, etc.

According to the figures in the blog you linked, for a like for like buy, the difference between the two types, in direct costs, would be less than 2%. Less than the initial buy of the CATOBAR shipsets – let alone the cost of generating the build plans for CATOBAR, the extra power generation capability in the hull, the O&M costs for the catapults/arrestors, airframe cat/trap limit costs or the additional costs training the pilots.

And, just to repeat on supposed ‘austere’ land basing of STOVL F35B: USN construction guidance still calls for a 100 x 100 foot VL pad made of heat-resistant, continuously reinforced concrete, ie, nothing like a Harrier, in that respect, at all.

Pointless comment. There are videos on youtube of F-35B’s doing vertical takeoffs – not one of them shows a smoking crater blasted into the ground left behind afterwards.

Even if there was such an impact its meaningless as we aren’t talking about VTOL dispersal ops in terms of exped warfare. We are talking about STOL ops from an austere-site hard runway – just like GR9 has done in Kandahar. Just to reiterate GR9 hasnt been routinely using VTOL in Kandahar, but, its STOL characteristics let it use a strip no other UK fastjet type could.

Shallowest approach profile I’ve ever seen quoted for P-35, 500 or 1000 is 30m or, roughly, 100ft. That hole isnt 100ft above the waterline so, by definition, if that hole was caused by a weapon still massing best part of three or four metric tons doing M1.4 on a diving trajectory, and the weapon hit low on the beam, how come that target hull still is still afloat?.

You can clearly see where the less massive Moskit punched clean through the other beam. A diving Vulkan should have exited the other beam below the waterline taking a rather large chunk of the hull with it!. The damage just does not look consistent with an impact event of such a large weapon at the velocity advertised for the terminal phase does it?.

No attempt here to pick on anyones weapon systems just a genuine comment that this doesnt look right!