The follow on question is of course: why should people not be thinking about changing the way the RN and RAF operate if it proves to be in the better interests of the nation? Surely that’s the point of the SDR?

The services themselves….least those with the responsibility for defining the response to requirements. The beauty of STOVL is nothing to do with F-35B in terms of sexy DACT performances, sustained turn rates or any of the characteristics so hotly disputed on these hallowed portals. Its the fact that it can do a lot more than a Harrier but requires no previous training or experience, in its pilots, to land on a big grey ship.

That one fact is they key enabler for the CVF’s ‘purple’ characteristics. The vessel can be deployed with a peacetime airgroup of a stovie squadron plus pingers, junglies and a few companies of troops as an EMF but, within hours, have landed unnecessary units and be fully configured as max-effort strike carrier, logistics already in place, even if the additional sqdns hadn’t been near a carrier in a year!. That represents massive operational flexibility and efficiency.

Simply, with CATOBAR, to do the same you would have to rotate pilots through continuation training and deck quals every three months or so no matter what their current deployment. Massive operational headache…especially if you dont happen to have a spare carrier deck handy to undertake quals on. If you cant do that with your general pilot pool then you have to maintain a seperate pool of deck rated pilots continually…which means a full dedicated naval aviation capability extra and over that necessary with STOVL.

Surely nowhere near a Nimitz sized carrier is required, we have managed before with small carriers such as Centaur and Hermes, and even Ark and Eagle weren’t huge, think of the aircraft they operated, being comparatively poor take-off and landing performers.

The size is required to support the sortie rate. You need so many aircraft in the airgroup and so much quantity of expendable stores stowage to maintain the rate. Simply put the smaller vessels you indicate could not do the job a CVF is designed for,

Also considering a catapult equipped carrier does have the advantage of considering other role types onboard such as AEW etc.

Hawkeye is a great capability but is needed a lot more in Red Storm Rising than Op Allied Force, Op Granby or Op Palliser. ISTAR in the future needs to be more persistant and more deployable than E-2 can offer. A high endurance UAV based solution utilising a Mantis-like platform capable of lofting a Searchwater class radar and imaging/passive-EW sensors and/or comms relay kit is more like what is needed going forwards. Most importantly a platform that can be embarked in greater numbers than the 3 E-2’s you’d be lucky to have as your AEW det.

What I still don’t get is this idea that it is guaranteed that the F-35B will be this superb all conquering fighter.

It doesnt have to be though. Its got to be more surviveable as a platform than Harrier….with better performance, better sensor fusion and easy to operate. If it meets those criteria its a winner.

Imo we should buy conventional a/c…F35/F18/Rafale all sound more sensible options than a single engined a/c with a 90 deg driveshaft/gearbox just waiting to fail…I am an a/c technician and IMO the lift fan system on F35B is just bonkers

…as opposed to the Pegasus with its dainty little 90 second water reserve to stop the engine melting in the hover and 4 nozzle swivels the fail of any one of which would make a VL attempt novel and different!. We’ve managed to keep that beastie operational well enough over the years!.

…plus £0.5 billion for EMCAT and an increased annual costs of say £250,000 for additional training and ground crew

Just to put this in the correct context you would have an extra 100 crew for aircraft launch and recovery teams…salary costs alone at an average of £15,000pa will equate to £1.5mn a year. Then you have logistics and support costs for those personal afloat and ashore. Then you come to support costs for the emals and arrestors…..arrestor cables will need to be dumped overboard after so many traps just as with current ones and will have a recurring cost and you’ll have usual sparing and training costs with the major subsystems. That doesnt even touch the aviation training, attrition and the cat cycle airframe lives across a small fleet. Whole-life F35B will be cheaper and far more operationally efficient.

Fixed for you. And I disagree for the reasons which I have presented here.

Wilk, you’ve fixed nothing. Your entire point is predicated on the fact that a ship (carrier) can’t detect the inbound torpedo so would not turn and would not outrun the inbound.

The problem is that you are using an indefinite variable to base your argument on. The OPERATIONAL experience from the Falklands is that naval forces can take a sensitive stance to torpedo detects and turn on contact even before that contact is fully appraised, this was what was happening, by definition that means that even if the contact is a torpedo that evasion is already in progress. You point about late detection is rendered moot by the tactics employed in the fleet under attack.

You cannot bring Cheonan or Belgrano in to this as examples of undetected torpedo attacks because we are talking about maximum range launches. Conqueror launched at a couple of miles range and the Cheonan was steaming in waters too shallow and mucky for long range accoustic conductance in the first place. I actually said myself, if you remember, that a close-in launch was needed for the target to be in the torpedoes NEZ.

My point was that, even for a 650mm weapon, ensuring that the target is in the torpedoes NEZ (if you prefer that to the word ‘guarantee’) means that you are not firing at the 50k yards value listed for the weapons range at the 50knts performance setting. That is not my opinion, IF that value is accurate for torpedo performance, that is a simple mathematical fact.

The rest of what you write really is semantics – as stated I’m not going to spend hours arguing whether, for example, a He-115 is more or less legitimately termed a ‘low-performance’ type just so you can try and cover up the fact you forgot about that type!. Or dispute whether 25000yds is close range or not just because the mathematics is clear on that.

I’ve answered Wanshan’s question hopefully to his satisfaction and I’ve answered you as fully as I intend to. Have fun with the nit-picking Wilk.

Wilk,

Performing drills does not in any way guarantee successful evasion of torpedoes let alone their detection in actual combat!

You brought up the Falklands though. We saw there that an alert force could be ready to undertake evasion drills at the first sign of a potential inbound torpedo. If we were evading things that weren’t even torpedoes a legitimate inbound would have needed to be fired from within a range that escape would be impossible to guarantee a strike on target wouldn’t it. That would be a close range – as per the initial point made.

That’s like saying AAMs can be outrun. Sure torpedoes can be “outrun” – but you need to detect them a long way off to do that. And if you’re trying to do that with a supercarrier, that’s going to have to be a very long way due to the factors I noted.

Agreed to an extent. Carriers dont steam alone so the ASW picket presents the tripwire that the submarine must evade before being able to fire. Sink the picket and the carrier turns regardless. Leave the picket in place and the carrier gets the further range on the detect and extra time to turn.

These are not WW1 boats we are talking about; the compressed air is internal to the system and is insignificant in terms of external noise. Further it is not “throwing” a torpedo it is pushing it out.

You have compressed air in a closed system you get heat and vibration….unless you can repeal the laws of physics….you have dump valves that need to snap open to provide launch impetus to the water slug. Bottom line you are accelerating a 5ton mass from a dead stop to a sufficient speed that the screws can bite the water and accelerate the weapon before it gets caught up by the launching submarine. I dont think the word ‘throw’ is all that inaccurate personally and I’m not about to get into a debate over semantics with you regarding it!.

You’d imagine? Yes, the Germans were so “aware of the efficacy” of torpedo bombing capital ships with biplanes that they built a whole twelve of them – imagine that!

…and they also built north of a hundred He-115 floatplane torpedo bombers….not exactly a high performance type!. The idea that the Kriegsmarine somehow dismissed the notion of Swordfish torpedo bombers being a threat to their ships at sea is absurd in the extreme. They may have held the view that, given their lone wolf tactics, the ships would be hard targets to locate and pin down long enough for airstrikes to be flown off, but, to suggest that they would ignore RN Swordfish on the basis that they were antique biplanes is ludicrous.

Relying, of course, on “evasion drills” and “operational factors” to “mitigate technical vagueries.” We all know how that went…

…and is related to the topic that discussed evasion drills, operational factors and technical vagueries how?.

I’ve said that torpedoes can be outrun and, in response to Wanshans question, that Russian 650mm weapons are not likely to be fired at 50-100km ranges against 30knt warships as the chances of them simply turning and outpacing the fish is too great.

Now, I’ve shown how close the launch HAS to be, for a torpedo to have a 30knt surface contact in its no-escape-zone. The maths are clear on that. You can trust to luck that the target doesnt detect the “silent” torpedo all the way through its run and steams blithely into it if you like…if you are lucky and the target is stupid then the long range shot will work. Myself I’d make the point that the submarine will try for the most guaranteed shot first time out as, after that, everyone is aware of his presence. To GUARANTEE the hit, if the target detects the launch transient and begins immediate evasion then the submarine is firing from 25,000yds or so not 50,000!. Thats just simple maths and isn’t an attempt to denigrate fondly regarded Russian weapons systems in the slightest.

Remember I am the one who said that I thought the weapons were capable of greater performance than is being admitted to in the published characteristics!.

Try amending the title to ‘UK looking at ditching F-35B for Super Hornet’.

Part of any procurement review are a list of ‘what if…..’ analysis options. One will be replacing F-35B with Hornet, another will be replacing F-35B with Rafale and, yet another, will be replacing -35B with -35C. All options will be studied.

….and yet again it will be pointed out that STOVL is the cheapest way to accomplish the requirements of the Carrier Strike tasking just like every other time the government has asked MoD to undergo this process.

Does the strike optimisation not entail the risk of being caught out by unforeseen circumstances though, A Fleet carrier of the same size as CVF might not be quite as efficient at strike operations but offers more flexibility to respond to a changing operational environment.

Without flippancy the only thing CVF wont do is bluewater sea control. Who is there who will contest bluewater with us who we could even potentially be going to attack on our own between now and, say, 2025?.

Russia has a handful of competent SSNs but most are ageing….we are cracking along quite nicely with the Astute class boats. Those Russian SSNs are about the only meaningful bluewater threat out there. The Chinese can build ships as fast as they like, but, are 50 years back in operational experience. They aren’t going to build a fleet and get it up to speed in two decades….even if they try it the signals will be very clear of their intent and we can alter our stance as necessary. Regardless of this I cannot conceive of a situation where we would engage them in bluewater anyway…its not like we could achieve anything putting 3Cdo Brigade ashore in either country!.

I can see how deck space and a single catapult will drastically hold back a 20k or 30k flat top compared to a STOVL carrier but providing a decent sortie rate should be feasible on something as big as CVF. Similarly, I doubt the difference in terms of airframe life between the F-35B and C would be that extreme.

Sortie rate over time between PA2 and CVF is, I believe, comparable. Max rate sortie generation over a short period is better for the STOVL design, but, over time the French ship catches up IIRC. That may have something to do with the admirable low-maintenance qualities of Rafale though. The odds are pretty much even between the two designs in operational terms and the Frenchie is very definitely intended to be a Fleet Carrier.

Airframe life is a different matter though. There are stacks of ex-USN aircraft sitting in AMARC that have useable airframe hours, but, have exhausted their cat/trap cycle lives and cant operate from a ship ever again. EMALS is intended to be easier on airframes than steam cats and hydraulic arresting gear….but the loading of being accelerated to flying speed over a shortish catapult stroke is always going to hurt. Normal procedure is to cycle airframes to spread the operational loadings across the inventory, but, if we can’t afford all that many airframes in the first place airframe life will be a significant factor…..moreso when you consider the extra flying needed for continuation deck quals.

Keep in mind also that CATOBAR improves strike performance in a number of important ways – higher take-off and landing weights can be used to provide more payload, better range or longer endurance, as required.

The differences are operationally marginal. We arent the USN and manned deep strike is something that demands excellent ISTAR and prestrike prep. We arent going to have the assets to do that like the USN can. If we are shooting at fixed targets we have TLAM and CASOM on F-35B to deploy. An extra 150 miles on the strike radius in favour of the C model over the B is neither here nor there.

Although not directly strike related, the ability to operate off-the-shelf Hawkeyes for AEW should not be underestimated IMHO.

Hawkeye is critical for sea control missions, but, overkill for hunting down a couple of Toyota pickups with AK47 toting bearded chappies. Especially when there are only three embarked and perhaps as few as two more back at home!. The French have had E-2’s in their fleet for more than a decade…any critical missions they have undertaken yet?.

I can’t rid myself of the impression that the Strike Carrier concept was at least partially born out of financial realities rather than actual operational requirements.

It is but not how you think. The ship follows the requirement…..not the other way around. There really is NO need for a Fleet Carrier right now so there is no requirement to go to the expense of building one. If a STOVL strikefighter, with LO qualities, achieves operational status, as we have seen, there are considerable advantages to deploying them at sea. Provided the vessel itself is built with enough adaptability to be re-roled if, after a decade or so from build, the global threat picture changes why spend the extra money up front needlessly?. Especially at a time when we have real pressing operational needs in combat zones.

As the corvette was trying to get into deeper sea, the ship touched an antenna-shaped detonator of a mine, which triggered the explosion. It did not say whether the mine was North Korean.

Presumeably this is some kind of mistranslation?. Otherwise the question would have to be asked as to why such an obvious lie would be attempted and what good the Russians think could come from denying this was a torpedo?. After all they didn’t have to say that it was even a NK torpedo?!!.

Cheonan didnt hit a contact mine…such weapons dont explode in the fashion that caused the damage to the corvette and aren’t sown individually but in large fields. This ship wasnt in a minefield when it was recovered and it didnt have a damned great hole in one side…..as is what happens when ones ship hits a contact mine!.

http://navysite.de/lph/lph10mine1.jpg

The link shows the damage to the USS Tripoli from a contact mine strike. The same site shows damage to the USS Princeton after tripping a ground influence mine 16m under its keel. Neither damage replicates the weapon effects shown in Cheonans hull.

Jonesy,

How do you see the role of the Indian IAC carriers?

As I see it, they appear to be some flavor of strike carrier and will probably rely on screens of P-17 and P-15A/B ships for AAW. Still, lacking dedicated IFR assets they seem like they might have a harder time assembling biggish strike packages in the air if too far away from the enemy coast. Also, lacking Hawkeye like AEW would have a harder time providing fleet defence if brought too close to the enemy coast, not to mention the issues that this will pose to the screens.

Being a n00b, I’m having a hard time wrapping my head around it. I’m clearly missing the big picture on Indian carrier doctrine and strategy. (Or is it as simple as relying on buddy refueling the MiG-29K and NLCAs?)

Its a fairly good appraisal to be honest. The IAC-1 design is a highly compromised one and I think this stems from the original ADS concept that its evolved from.

I could be well off beam here but I am assuming that Indian carrier doctrine has evolved under a strong Russian influence. The ADS concept seemed analagous to Gorshkovs doctrine of forward support for a submarine force that represents the primary striking arm for combined air/surface/subsurface forward sea denial. The carrier would operate with a battlegroup emitting on powerful search sensors daring any opponent to attempt to penetrate their surveilled battlespace. Anything that does breach the ‘bubble’ gets pounced on by MiGs or SSN/SSGNs.

The IAC has, seemingly, evolved into a platform capable of steaming long distances maintaining a CAP slot or two for extended periods and low sortie rate airstrikes. The carrier therefore seems to support more of a patrol/coercion doctrine than a full strategic power projection one. Given India’s threat environment and the fact that its not really progressing an expeditionary warfare capability yet its probably a good fit. Especially if the IN, as reported, is working up to 65k ton EMALS-fitted Fleet Carriers for IAC-2, 3 and 4.