dark light

Jonesy

Forum Replies Created

Viewing 15 posts - 2,071 through 2,085 (of 4,319 total)
  • Author
    Posts
  • in reply to: Report on China's ASBM worth a read i guess #1807230
    Jonesy
    Participant

    Your statement contradicts itself. You say “you need BAMS to do that job.” followed by “That being extra and over conventional assets.” So now BAMS is both needed and yet extra? Previously you said BAMS was critical. However, the job could clearly be done without the aid of BAMS. Therefore, BAMS is not critical. “Simple.”

    You need BAMS-equivalent to do the job. Nowhere did I say scrap all existing assets and just use BAMS?. Not sure how you have misread a very simple premise?.

    The Japanese were an exception as most of their boats were focused on achieving maximum surface performance, but this often came at the expense of submerged performance. They were also one of the least successful sub forces. You conveniently omitted the 9-10 knots cruise speed of U-boats because it proves my statement to be correct.

    I didnt omit them I just couldn’t be bothered looking the precise details up so I noted that they were less long-legged than the Japanese boats but much more so than a conventional SSK of today. Are you saying that the fleet boats of the Kriegsmarine didnt have superior transit range than modern SSK’s and didn’t predominantly travel on the surface just because I didnt quote the numbers?.

    Utterly absurd statement! For the most part, aircraft carriers (and many other warships) haven’t gotten any stealthier, but the sonar and radar systems capable of detecting them have improved enormously. Find me WW2 hydrophones or airborne radar capable of detecting a carrier at hundreds of kilometers! You can’t. A modern SSK can detect a carrier at ranges that WW2 SS’s could have only dreamed of. As a result, a modern sub can monitor an area vastly larger than one of WW2.

    The same modern sub can now be detected at a vastly longer range than in WW2 as well. Unless you will point out where SONAR2087 was fitted to period escorts?. Escorts have gotten significantly stealthier by the way and counter detection/signal intercept systems have increased at the same pace as search sensors. The analogy you are trying to make is deeply flawed.

    1) Far lesser susceptibility to air attack, so in contrast to a WW2 SS, it is capable of maintaining speed throughout the day thereby increasing area covered.

    Airborne sensors in WW2 were in their infancy. Detection chances against a surfaced U-boat were proportionately lesser than they would be today plus the boats back then had snorts just as todays do. Then we come back to the simple range equation that the WW2 boat is out on station longer and covers more territory.

    2) Dramatically improved sensor area. A modern SSK can monitor a vastly larger area than its WW2 predecessor thanks to huge improvements in sonar and esm.

    A modern SSK can monitor a larger area than a WW2 boat could do submerged – even now though an SSK’s footprint is pretty much limited to direct path on the bow, flank and intercept arrays. Japanese and Aussie boats with tails change that of course, but, we arent talking about Aussie and Japanese boats here are we!?. German U-boats had ESM which sufficed to the threat level posed by the ASV radar of the day and the visual horizon is pretty much the same limiter now that it was 65 years ago!. As stated above – the advantage in submarine sensors is easily offset by surface vessel sensors and escorts with organic aviation today.

    You should take your own advice and not put words into someone’s mouth. I never stated that Taiwan is the only scenario that applies (again, see my mention of a Korean scenario). Taiwan is focused on because it is by far the most likely scenario and hence any use of the ASBM is most likely to be in that situation. I’ve asked you several times now and I’m going to ask you again: Outside of Taiwan and possibly Korea, what other scenario is likely to occur? Why is the ASBM a “wasted investment” if it is applicable to the two most likely scenarios?

    Pedantry. The ASBM is a wasted investment if it is ONLY applicable to a situation which isnt even close to being likely in the first place!.

    You made a silly generalized statement that “ARH missiles dont get launched and left to do the discrimination all by themselves!. That is a great way of wasting missiles.” I noted an example of where that does happen and thereby proved your statement false. Instead of simply acknowledging that you were proven wrong or ignoring the point thereafter, you go on a tirade which has nothing to do with my response to your original post.

    Pedantry. The context was clear and you conjured up some tenuous linkage to a completely different operational environment. So, yep, points for technical accuracy but well done for the display of small-minded pettiness.

    1) If proven wrong by actual specifications, you’ll turn around and pretend that they are a conspiracy. Yes, let’s all believe Jonesy’s conspiracy theory that Kockums, HDW/TNSW, DCNS, etc have all independently managed to fool the Germans, Greeks, Italians, Koreans, Turks, Indians, Portuguese etc. Must be one of the greatest conspiracy theories ever devised!

    You think you are reading actual real-world performance specifications in the glossy brochures?. OK. You think that the Germans, Greeks, Italians, Koreans and all the rest dont have the experience to factor in a modifier based on their own operational environments?. You think a sub sailing in the Baltic gives identical performance to one operating in the Eastern Med?. More fool you if that is what you think!.

    2) Even the figures you present are in the days, not hours as you originally claimed.

    I never said single hours – you just assumed that – I said hours because that is the time unit that battery charge on the boats is usually calculated in and they dont go up as far as weeks with it!.

    Repeating this over and over does not remove the huge dependency on luck from your strategy.

    I never said that it did. I noted the difference between a defensive deployment of a weapon system that depends on luck and an attack strategy that balances risk and reward. Ignore what I write as much as you like, but, dont try to deny that I wrote it!.

    Common misunderstanding? You meant to tell us that the Americans, Russians, Germans, British, etc. have had a common misunderstanding all these years? Better let them know that!.

    Just because you dont understand it means that they dont?. Thats a fairly big claim to make!.

    As for the strategic bomber, its primary mission falls under the definition of strategic bombing (bombing to destroy the opponent’s capacity to wage war) therefore it’s – shock and awe – a strategic bomber!

    Nope. Is one bomber capable of destroying the oppositions capacity to fight?. No it isnt. Is the bomber, individually, a strategic weapon. Nope. Its range allows it to be used to deploy weapons strategically and, if you have WMD in your arsenal, it can be used to deliver strategic weapons. The aircraft itself though is not a strategic weapon.

    The two phrases do not mean the same thing. English Comprehension 101. A weapon can be part of a larger system and not alter the planning of an opponent.

    Again I never said they did mean the exclusively the same thing?. They dont have to for the point to be valid?.

    Yes, you did infer it. Which means that, to you, if the weapon fails to deter it becomes useless. In which case, it might as well be dismantled.

    Dismantled means they built it in the first place. I’ve already stated just above that I dont believe they would build the weapon unless it could do the job that would be needed of it – that job not being to scare a CVN out of the Taiwan straits but, rather, to stop USN carriers from breaching the first island chain without tacit agreement!. That is what an ASBM, done properly, would be capable of!.

    Bottom line though Wilk if this is going to just come down to more pedantry and a thorough investigation of semantics I cant be bothered with it. You also argue with the same style as someone I thought was an utter moron when I argued with him under his original posting name and I have no time for muppets who keep coming back to forums, where theyve been banned, under different posting names. So reply if you wish, but, I’ve made all the points I need to on the original topic so dont be suprised if you get the last word ok?!

    in reply to: Report on China's ASBM worth a read i guess #1807250
    Jonesy
    Participant

    I just asked you: If it’s not Taiwan, then what is it? In the Soviet case, national survival was at stake. In the Chinese case, it’s additional US air support for Taiwan. Colossal difference.

    Carriers. Theatre entry. Both cases. Simple.

    Fighters and bombers, surface warships and submarines are not “squadrons of MPA aircraft and UAVs.” Even if we pretend that fighters and bombers are, that still doesn’t account for a large portion of carriers/capital ships detected/sunk that they were not responsible for… and even some of those that were sunk by air power were in fact initially detected and tracked by submarine or other sources (e.g. the Yamato). Clearly the fact is that these assets were capable of doing the job you claim couldn’t be done, and they did it with far lesser capabilities than their successors possess today (not to mention the variety of new systems which can also do the task eg. Long range passive sonar).

    I introduced the need for long range passive sonar as part of the detection assets required for one!. I dont recall saying that ALL you needed was BAMS….I said you need BAMS to do that job. That being extra and over conventional assets. You can try and make out that surface ships and submarines are every bit as important as a BAMS-like system if you wish, but, to that I’d point out the limited sensor footprint of those assets and, especially in competent blue-water capable surface platforms, the paucity of assets the PLAN has to call on.

    Sensor efficiency is extremely important. Claiming otherwise indicates that you have no real understanding of this topic. Even the “covers far more ocean” claim is far from the truth. The typical fleet boat, for example, had a cruise speed of 9-10 knots. Exceeding this speed for any significant amount of time would dramatically increase the risk of running out of fuel….As a result, a modern SSK will be far more effective in detecting enemy movements than the WW2 boats before it.

    No. Look at the ‘average’ SSK today – a Type 209. Bout 1800tons displacement – good for about 8000 miles on surface transit at about 10knts. An uncomfortable 8000 miles too. Look at the equivalent sized WW2 German and Japanese boats. The Japanese were doing 14,000 miles at 16knts on the cruise, German boats less but still far in advance of an SSK of today because their mission back then was different. They were designed to run on diesels on the surface – they were Submersible Ships, SS’s, as opposed to the true submarines we have today. Sensor efficiency is meaningless because that of surface vessels has kept pace with that of submarines. The gradiant that existed in WW2 still exists today more or less. To state that an SSK of today is covering more territory than the old wolfpack hunters of WW2 is simply a false statement.

    So now your argument has come down to “the war is not going to happen so this is a waste of money!”.

    If you are going to try putting words in my mouth dont blame me if they are wrong!. You said that this system was relevent only to Taiwan. I pointed out the fallacy in that logic. The system would, by necessity, have to have a wider employment i.e anti-access otherwise the failure to materialise of the one-specific scenario, that is an enabler for the weapons system, reduces the weapon to wasted investment. The notional ASBM, naturally, has wider theatre impact that just Taiwan and the attempt to skew the argument to just that one scenario is stupid.

    An AIM-120C has been pitbulled. In it’s fov it sees several clouds of chaff and a MiG. It ignores the chaff and proceeds to hit the MiG. What did it do? Well, whatever it did, it must be impossible since Jonesy said so!

    A bloody air-air missile?. No difference between a ship target in a cluttered enviroment against a mulitpath reflective backdrop and an aircraft in flight is there?. Mix some civil air traffic in the vicinity of your BVR AAM shot – you still take it do you???.

    Fixed for you.

    My point has been made on that score.

    This is completely false:
    1) Even non-AIP diesel-electric SSKs have days (usually about 4-6) at ~4-5 knots on batteries.
    2) On AIP, it is weeks (~2-3 weeks depending on the system/submarine) at ~4-5 knots.

    You read that in a magazine did you?. Using HVAC in this region, if for no other reason than keeping the computers cooled, you contend that you get 6 days on a full battery charge at a steady 4-5knts before a snort?.

    OK, there is no corroboration possible here because this kind of performance data is not public source. So I’ll leave it to say that I believe your figures sound like brochure values of ‘test conditions’ and not operational figures with hotel loads imposed – in reality you are looking at high discretion periods of 60-70hrs, at a few knots, between snorts and that doesnt cover much territory!. Also note that prevailing currents, like the Kuroshio out to the west, can get up to 2-2.5knts. Steaming in to 2.5 knts on the bow with revolutions set for 4-5knts doesnt get you much more than steerageway!.

    So instead, you’re going to risk elements of your national defense on an attack strategy that relies totally on luck! Brilliant!

    This is sarcasm I assume?.

    Perhaps you should realize that any weapon system may turn out to be ineffective, regardless of it being offensive or defensive. That’s why redundant systems exist!

    Ahh yes it might all never work in the first place?!. Does kind of limit debate that one doesnt it?. For the purposes of the exercise, to study system effects, I think it fairly elementary that we assume all components work and do the jobs they are advertised to. Only then can the system be analysed and functional weaknesses identified.

    In other words, you have no way to counter my five points which proved your plan was entirely dependent on luck. That’s why you didn’t even quote them.

    I had said that I’d explained it as simply as possible several times. I didnt quote anything because if you are not understanding the concept by now its likely a few more lines of copied text aren’t going to help!. I’ll try and put together a reading list for you so the concepts become clearer if you like?.

    Yes, let’s wave our hands around and say “it’s all part of the plan” and therefore there can’t be anything wrong with it!

    Sarcasm again?. Deceptive maneouver is an elementry part of naval warfighting and has been for centuries. Assigning resources to such a tasking in support of strategic objectives is hardly a revolutionary concept?.

    The classic “standard” definition of Strategic Weapons is weapons that strike at the source of an opponent’s power – his cities and economy. Hence, strategic bombers.

    Common misunderstanding. The term ‘strategic bomber’ is a contraction. It is more properly ‘strategic-range bomber’ as the individual bomber itself is scarcely a strategic platform. It just has the range to be considered as a platform capable of employment in a strategic system i.e within the framework of the Strategic Air Command.

    These days the definition is generally applied to WMDs – see the SALT treaties for example. Again, defining the term as “weapons that alter the strategic planning of an opponent” is silly since it can apply to anything in that case.

    Once again it can’t apply to anything – only systems capable of altering the strategic balance – of which there are very few.

    Hilarious! You’ve just changed your own definition of strategic weapons. First, it was “weapons that alter the strategic planning of an opponent”, now it’s become “weapons that are part of a strategic system.” But please, keep going! Maybe at some point you’ll finally stumble upon the correct definition.

    OK you clearly need the help!. Weapons ‘that alter the strategic planning of an opponent’ ARE ‘weapons that are part of a strategic system’. See the example above. B-52’s raining JDAM’s on Iraqi positions in 03 were acting in a tactical role….when tasked to SIOP with a fleet of bombers supported by defence suppression assets etc they become strategic as part of a strategic system. Its really quite simple if you take the time to study real warfighting doctrine instead of looking at the pretty pictures in the magazines!.

    So according to Jonesy, the Chinese are going to dismantle their (real or not) ASBMs if a carrier is not deterred from trying to enter the Taiwan theatre.

    Did I say that or even infer it?. Nope. I dont think that the Chinese would deploy it until they could field a BAMS-peer system capable of exploiting the weapons assets. I dont think they are so stupid to develop a weapon and then see what they could try and do with it!. I’m utterly amazed that, in the absence of such a targetting system, that anyone gives these ASBM stories any credence whatsoever. Guess PT Barnum had it right?!.

    in reply to: General Discussion #344538
    Jonesy
    Participant

    That looks very much like an RAF 60ft GP Pinnace. More general purpose boats used for seaplane tender and safety boat duties than dedicated A/SR. Not a lot of information out there on them on the net it seems.

    Good luck in your search.

    in reply to: Identify this vessel – HELP! #1915365
    Jonesy
    Participant

    That looks very much like an RAF 60ft GP Pinnace. More general purpose boats used for seaplane tender and safety boat duties than dedicated A/SR. Not a lot of information out there on them on the net it seems.

    Good luck in your search.

    in reply to: Report on China's ASBM worth a read i guess #1807296
    Jonesy
    Participant

    This USN is only “kidding around” unless it’s firing nukes? The USN is going to start a nuclear war over Taiwan? If not Taiwan, then what situation do you expect the US to be nuking China that doesn’t involve a Chinese ICBM launch?

    What has Taiwan got to do with this?. You are simply trying to obfuscate the fact that, in both cases Chinese and Soviet, the challenge they faced was to prevent USN theatre entry with their carrier groups. As a technical problem the situation is identical. Throwing up all this nonsense about nuclear or conventional attacks is not going to work.

    Please point out where I said that their contribution (to the war effort) was meaningless. You made the claim that they were critical in sinking carriers. You were clearly wrong. Now you’ve changed your story into “well they made a contribution doing other stuff.”

    Pedantry and obfuscation. I said, from the kick off, that squadrons of patrol aircraft and UAV’s i.e BAMS-like components were necessary. You howled and said that wasnt the case. WW2 showed this apparently. When it was pointed out the assets that were used in WW2 were precisely squadrons of aircraft you now try taking the point down to the fact that we were talking solely about carriers and not the general problem of finding ships at sea in WW2. If you want me to be equally pedantic look back at my post – I stated ‘capital ships’ in my post as there was so, relatively, little anticarrier work done in WW2!.

    Bizarre references? Submarines provided one of the greatest contributions to detecting and sinking carriers. According to you, that’s impossible since they are not BAMS! As for operating patterns, do I need to explain to you that sensor and weapon ranges have increased dramatically since then?

    You are the one trying to make a comparison between WW2 sea denial and that of today so you can forget comments of sensor and weapon efficacy!. The simple fact is that WW2 subs were surface raiders running on diesels predominantly. They could cover far more ocean than todays boats, designed for discrete submerged performance, could achieve. Your attempt to draft them in to support your argument about BAMS is exactly ‘bizarre’.

    If it’s not Taiwan, then what is it? Korean conflict? In either case the theater of operations is relatively small in comparison to the size of the Chinese coast.

    Irrelevent is what it is. Unless you are going to say that the weapon system is purely intended for the Taiwan scenario…when its blatantly obvious that Taiwan is not going to be a militarily resolved issue…so the missile is a collossal waste of time and money by your reckoning is it?!.

    Why would they need to be spread out to cover the entire coast if the theater of operations only accounts for a portion of the coast?!

    Usually because you cant predict the theatre of operations with 100% certainty.

    Nope, wrong. Please try again. What part of “supplementary system to improve target identification in a situation where many vessels similar to the target would be in the scan area” is difficult to understand? Obviously, if you’ve got two small frigates and you want to differentiate between them, SAR helps greatly. But this discussion is irrelevant. I presented Moskit as an example that even a small radar decades ago was capable of accomplishing things you implied were impossible.

    Small radar….Moskit….really?. What you have inadvertently managed to do is confirm what I was saying. Try the obfuscation all you like but the fact is that ARH missiles dont get launched and left to do the discrimination all by themselves!. That is a great way of wasting missiles.

    Even IF the RV seeker has an ISAR mode to correctly define the target in its FoV the fact remains that the missile would need to be launched on a confirmed target box in the first place. That means your ISTAR must be up to the job I originally stated – it HAS to complete the targetting cycle.

    Yes, additional information before launch can increase PK. So for any autonomous weapon, it is desirable, but not required.

    So its not required…..unless you want a high probability of a hit?.

    Hours? Try weeks.

    Hours. All AIP does is charge the battery remember – the more you use the battery the quicker you drain the AIP tanks. Bottom line you get to stay discrete but you dont cover much territory.

    If if if… funny that for a guy who bashes any strategy that seems to rely on even a hint of “luck,” your own is totally dependent on it.

    …and still more obfuscation. I ‘bash’ defensive plans that rely on luck. You cannot hinge your national defence on weapons that may or may not be effective!. The difference is that attack strategy’s can, and do, balance varying degrees of risk against varying degrees of reward. Warfighting 101.

    Even if all of that miraculously works out, that STILL doesn’t answer how the SSKs are as valuable to the attacker as to the defender.

    Its been explained to you in very simple terms. If you have a comprehension problem I’d suggest a spell in remedial education.

    The SSKs are not going to go down without a fight and the ASBMs are still going to hit something. In addition to that the attacker has been forced to commit and perhaps lost a significant number of ASW assets/decoys/SSNs.

    SSK’s against SSN’s the gradiant generally favours the SSN….especially if the SSK screen has to come out of the shallows to undertake sea denial. The attacker is forced to commit resources, of course, but those resources are committed in support of the strategic aim which is the general idea anyway.

    No one in their right mind uses that as an overall definition of “Strategic Weapons” because, as you yourself agree, any weapon can be used to do that. Therefore by your definition any and every weapon can be defined as a strategic weapon!.

    Its a standard definition. I said any weapon can be strategic in context not just that any weapon can be strategic!. Convenient misinterpretation on your part?. IF the weapons system is powerful enough to alter the strategic planning of an opponent then, by definition, it is a strategic weapon. If it is not powerful enough then it is not.

    Did you see the Germans and the British redefine their fighters as “strategic fighters” when they forced the other side to switch to night bombing? Of course not! And even if they had, that still wouldn’t have removed their capacity to be used tactically!

    You really dont understand this do you?. The ‘fighters’ you talk about were the effectors in a strategic system which was the British integrated air defence system. The fighters were tactical but the system they were part of was strategic. It is a failed comparison with the ASBM because the fighters could be used independently outside of the IADS in tactical roles. The ASBM has no role outside of its system. It is designed for a task – access denial – not just potting ‘small frigates’ 100km downrange!.

    Your assertion that a weapon becomes valueless if it fails to alter an opponent’s strategy is preposterous!

    No. To develop a weapons system like the ASBM and use it to try and take potshots at carriers steaming around Taiwan is preposterous. That is why the system would not be used for that. The Chinese understand that just as the Americans do. This is why it is talked about as an anti-access weapon.

    YOU made up the context of theater denial. I think I’ve repeated this a dozen times now: an ASBM does not become worthless just because a carrier has entered the theater. Claiming otherwise is total nonsense.

    You have repeated it a dozen times and been wrong a dozen times. Go and learn something about the nature of warfighting. Understand what anti-access systems are and what their value is. Then you might just expand your mind to the point where you understand why this is not just another antiship missile….IF it is anything more than a Chinese fantasy that the USN have latched onto for a 21st century Missile Gap scare story!.

    in reply to: Report on China's ASBM worth a read i guess #1807320
    Jonesy
    Participant

    The Soviets needed to deny theater entry because any conflict between them and the US would likely be nuclear. A conflict between the US and China (over Taiwan) is almost certainly not going to be nuclear. Therefore, the types of weapons used (nuclear vs conventional) is 100% relevant because national survival either is or isn’t at risk.

    So because the USN is only ‘kidding around’ and not planning to go nuclear or anything then its fine for the Chinese to just let them into weapons range is it???. That does seem to be what you have written?. I trust you meant something else and its just a little cryptic finding your real meaning?.

    But according to you these assets are critical in detecting a carrier! If so, why were they not responsible for doing so in WW2? The answer is, of course, that they alone are not critical, no matter how much you keep pretending that they are.

    They were critical. Squadrons of aircraft were critical in finding all manner of naval targets and identifying them. You are the one trying to make out that if they weren’t trying to find a carrier per se then their contribution was meaningless?.

    So you admit that fighters did perform the task in WW2 (although you are omitting the huge role subs played too). That contradicts your earlier claims that only BAMS could do it. Also, your present-day China example would actually mean something if fighters were the only asset the Chinese have. They are not; consequently it’s unlikely the PRC would dedicate large numbers of them to that task.

    No. I said that carrierborne aircraft performed SURCAP – fighters amongst them. I went on to suggest that such a comparison to today is asinine because the level of asset commitment necessary to replicate that kind of operational pattern is wildly inefficient to the point of stupidity. Now you need to build BAMS and do the sea control job that, in WW2, was undreamt of. Or you build lots of fleet carrier groups and have them out patrolling large swathes of seaspace – BAMS is likely cheaper all round though!.

    As for your continual bizarre references to submarines do I really need to explain to you the difference between the operating patterns of WW2 boats and today’s submarines in terms of theatre mobility?. You understand what is meant by theatre mobility?.

    I take it you haven’t looked at a map? In a Taiwan scenario the entire force would be able to cover the theater of operations (Taiwan). Suggesting ASBM numbers based on the current number of DF-21s in service is not a good benchmark as the DF-21 primarily carries a nuclear warhead. Most Chinese conventional BM production has focused on SRBMs which already have sufficient range to hit Taiwan. Not that it matters, as I’m not quite sure what CVBG would like to face 48 inbound ASBMs…

    Whats the fixation with Taiwan?. I’m talking about defending the Chinese coastline. You NEED to start that a lot farther out than Taiwan!.

    What other benchmark is there – the PRC dont tend to build large numbers of advanced missiles when there is a limited scope target set. The USN has less than a dozen CVN’s these days – I’d say thats a limited target set. The whole point about the limited number of missiles is that they need to be spread out to cover the coast ok?. Last time I looked at a map the Chinese coastline was quite long and has a fairly well spread range of potential targets along it. Please correct me if I’m wrong on either count there!. The carrier group is not facing 48 missiles then – it is facing the operational number of missiles in the sector it is trying to penetrate this being 48/x where x is the number of launch sites necessary.

    The only idiocy here is yours. The Moskit’s SAR datalink capability was only a supplementary system to improve target identification in a situation where many vessels similar to the target would be in the scan area. The datalink was optional and not required for successful detection and destruction of a target. For example the air-launched version of the missile did NOT possess this datalink but was perfectly capable of identifying and destroying targets as noted before.

    Only one of us here is screwing fighter radars into the nose of missile RV’s so, by all means, keep calling me an idiot!. So what you are saying, just so I get this right, is if Moskit wanted to discriminate targets it needed offboard targetting support via datalink right?!. Raduga never converted 3M80 into ASM-MSS in anything other than mockup form, it ran out of funds to do so in the mid-90’s, so I’m not certain where you get the idea that an air-launched weapon existed that would or wouldnt use a datalink?.

    Every single LOAL weapon suffers from the possibility that the target may no longer be in the sensor’s scan area by the time it activates the sensor!

    True. That is why their users are trained not to volley fire missiles off in the hopes that the onboard seeker will undertake all the discrimination itself, but, rather have a POSID on the target before launch. Now if we walk that back to your contention that the ASBM seeker would sort out any target discrimination necessary…where does that take us do you think?.

    LMAO! Did you just equate SSKs to a minefield? FYI: Unlike mines, SSKs are actually capable of differentiating friend from foe… not that I would expect you to consider that.

    So are mines. Influence mines are very, very sophisticated these days they can not only tell who friend and foe is, but, distinguish between types of ship and whether the target is advancing or retreating. Maybe you need to brush up on your mine warfare – its not all mooring chains and contact exploders these days!.

    As to SSK’s they have very little threatre mobility if they wish to stay discrete – even AIP only gives them a certain number of hours at low power levels before it is depleted and needs refueling. Mobile minefields are a common description of SSK ops and one I agree wholeheartedly with.

    In this case, I’m going to use your favorite phrase: “Meaningless drivel.” You said the defender’s SSKs can work for the attacker as much as the defender. How does what you wrote above even remotely prove that ridiculous claim?…But you still haven’t answered why that would trigger a response if the SSKs have not confirmed a carrier. I’m still waiting for that!

    OK then, slowly, an established SSK barrier line is set out screening for opposition vessels in classic sea denial. It is expecting an attempt to be made to cross its line at some point along its length. If the boats along the line are detected, either by SSN towed-array or SURTASS etc, and attacked at one point….but nowhere else that will be reported back.

    If a decoying group start simulating carrier ops near that same position, relying on the inherent low-res of the OTH systems monitoring them that is reported back also. Two seperate reports – one of a hole punched in the SSK barrier line and another of suspected carrier operations at a posit roughly in the same area. How do you think those reports get analysed?. That is how you make the SSK line work for you. If you still cant grasp this then the problem is yours!.

    Under which definition of strategic weapons is a ~1,500 km conventional missile considered strategic? Do you even know what a strategic weapon is? So now access denial makes a weapon strategic? Any weapon can cause access denial if the opponent is threatened by it. That does not make a weapon strategic! I strongly recommend that you look up the definition of strategic weapons and educate yourself.

    OK, more basics it is then, a weapon is strategic when it causes an opponent to alter their strategic planning. In this case the use of carrier battlegroups. I can conceive of no other weapon that could force a change in US strategy with regard China – apart from ICBM’s which are, themselves, strategic weapons. Therefore what you say is partially true in that ‘any weapon’ can be strategic, dependent on context, but its also a collossally asinine statement when the context is the theatre-denial of carrier strike groups due to the significance of the weapons system needed to challenge such a strike group.

    in reply to: Cancelling the F-35C ? #2010353
    Jonesy
    Participant

    How does a CG or DDG deal with wakehoming torp fired at up to 40-50km range? AFAIK only AB has sufficient detection capability and no ship has countermeasures against wakehomers.

    IF the SSK has the sensor capability to take a shot without direct path then the answer to the question of dealing with a 40km inbound wakehomer is to outrun it!. Wakehomers follow a zig-zag or snake pattern in order to fix the wake boundaries. A 30knt ship with a 40km head start has a good chance in a flat out race with a fish that has to bounce around an indirect tailchase course!.

    in reply to: Brahmos #1807341
    Jonesy
    Participant

    Was it ever made public what SCAN was?. Last I heard was that it was either a software tweak on the original active radar seeker – in which case no-one could explain quite how it was capable of seeker perfomance utterly impossible from the frequency band the seeker was using. Or it was an entirely new seeker head with a secondary terminal phase sensor.

    Opinion seemed to be split about 50:50 as to which was the case and the official comments were so vague and tenous as to support both views simulataneously!.

    in reply to: Report on China's ASBM worth a read i guess #1807473
    Jonesy
    Participant

    USN carriers are going to be lobbing nuclear weapons into mainland China in a Taiwan scenario?! Obviously that’s extremely unlikely, and hence any comparisons to the USSR’s situation are totally invalid.

    Mindless pedantry. Your comment was, I believe, something to do with the necessity for the Soviets to strike anywhere globally etc. I have shown that what the Russians needed to do was to deny theatre entry to US CVBG’s. What the actual warloads deployed by the carriers would be is irrelevent.

    Solely at Midway? Do you know any history whatsoever? Why don’t you try listing the sunk carriers tracked by the supposedly critical aircraft you listed. Then, compare that to the list of aircraft detected and tracked by subs and fighters. Good luck with that. Actually, considering submarines alone accounted for about 40% of fleet carriers detected and sunk, you’re going to need a miracle.

    Further mindless pedantry. You are trying to make a distinction where none exists that carries any relevence forward. The point here is that in the range of ASV search operations in WW2 predominantly the search assets were long range patrol types. Luftwaffe anti-convoy, RAF surface raider hunts etc are no less applicable because they didn’t culminate in the detection of an aircraft carrier. The principles of broad area detection, contact evaluation and strike direction were identical.

    You’ve been trying to convince everyone that BAMS and “squadrons of dedicated MPA” are critical to tracking a carrier, but now you’ve just admitted that even a fighter on patrol can do that… what happened?

    Well you got me there. I hadn’t considered that anyone would propose the use of manned fighters, flying 1000km deep segments, on SURCAP covering the whole Chinese coastline 24/7 in the 21st century. I have to admit that would work just as well as BAMS would. It would be a fascinating exercise to calculate the number of fighters needed to undertake such a campaign – ballpark I’d guess at several hundred in relays – supported by continuous tanker sorties – how many tankers do PLAAF possess these days?.

    Or….back in the real world. You field a BAMS equivalent that does the job without tying up your whole damned fighter and tanker forces on monotonous overwater patrols!.

    What kind of argument is that? One would assume that if you’ve developed an ASBM, you’ve actually built a few of them and that they can, indeed, be fired.

    Its a simple question of logistics. How many ASBM’s do you have covering one sector?. These missiles aren’t going to be cheap and the PRC hasn’t historically built high numbers of the more advanced missiles. The baseline DF-21 weapons system is, according to DoD, about 60 launchers with, perhaps, 1.5 missiles per launcher. Look at the situation – say the ASBM build is similar at 60 missiles total – given ‘good’ operational availability rates of 80% you have a readiness force of 48 missiles. Spread over 4 firing points around the coast for coverage thats 12 missiles per sector. Is that kind of figure one where you believe you have missiles to waste on unidentified targets?.

    In its search mode, the Moskit seeker has a detection range of 75 km for a large destroyer or cruiser and over 100 km for an aircraft carrier…The radar is activated and all search and ID functions are performed in a short time frame at the end of the “hi” mode. Total flight time of the missile is about ~1-2 minutes max. This is what a small seeker on an ASM developed 15-20 years ago can do. But hey, Jonesy “knows the score!”

    So not a fighter radar anymore then?. Glad we’ve at least got you off that idiocy. The Moskit seeker uses range profiling for its target identification. Originally it fed this data back through the LIGHT BULB datalink for final target selection which was a huge achilles heel of the system – it was pretty much a LOBL weapon otherwise you could easily waste missiles if the target you expected to see wasn’t detected in sensor FoV on seeker switch-on. I would assume thats probably been resolved now, but, the range profiling factor remains. How do you use range profiling with a radar seeker on a weapon with the ASBM RV attack profile?.

    You said that the defender’s SSKs are just as valuable to the attacker. THAT is clearly nonsense. Unless you convince them to defect, no amount of strategy and tactics can do that.

    Of course it can. Just like a defensive minefield can be used by an attacking force, on land, to convince defending ground troops of an attack from a false threat axis. Just like Saddam Husseins coastal defences were used, in Desert Storm, to convince the Iraqi’s that an amphib attack was under way – you show the enemy what he is expecting to see. In this case the SSK screen would be sited looking for something…if you attack that line and, at the same time, provide indications of precisely what that line is there to look for you can trigger a predictable response. The most basic tenent of warfighting is to get the other guy to react to you and to do so in the fashion you can most readily predict and counter.

    Your own post where you claimed it would trigger a response:

    No, I said this: A heavy and concerted attack by SSN’s on an identified barrier line could be made to look like an attempt to penetrate a specific sector was underway – coupled to decoy ops nearby triggering a response. See above.

    Why develop SSBNs when you’ve already got silos with ICBMs? Why build tanks when you’ve already got men with guns and cannons?

    Meaningless drivel. The weapon is strategic in nature. It is an anti-access weapon….understand what this means.

    The power of any weapon is both in its ability to threaten and in its ability to destroy. No weapon becomes worthless just because the other guy decided that it’s not a threat. You need to understand that.

    More drivel. If a weapon is not perceived as a threat by an attacker then it serves no deterrent effect.

    There’s an ASM that can destroy a target 1500+ km away in about 10 minutes from launch? Can you let us know which ASM can do this?

    So you do know that the value of the weapon is that it can engage targets at strategic range within a practical launch-to-strike cycle time – why do you say this is a tactical weapon then?. Its value is in the very fact that it can achieve a strategic aim, access denial, which normal ASM’s cannot?.

    in reply to: Report on China's ASBM worth a read i guess #1807555
    Jonesy
    Participant

    1) You completely avoided my point. You still haven’t answered why China needs to have the level of assets the US has in order to threaten a carrier – which was the point of your previous post.

    I answered your post. Dont blame me if I cant make it simple enough for you to understand.

    No they do not. Unlike the USSR, they have no intention of annihilating a dozen CVBGs anywhere on the planet within minutes of WW3 starting.

    What kind of Clancy-esque statement is that?. USSR needed to stop SIOP-tasked carriers closing in on its coastline and lobbing B61’s in. In both cases, Chinese and Russian, theatre-entry denial was/is the mission goal.

    Seems like you’re the one who doesn’t know. The vast majority of carriers in WW2 were detected, tracked and sunk either by carrier-borne fighters and torpedo/dive bombers or submarines, not dedicated MPA aircraft. And certainly not Legenda or BAMS (why did you neglect to mention those?) which you claim are necessary to track a carrier.

    Ludicrous comment. You are looking solely at the Midway action and wilfully ignoring the thousands of sorties by Condors, Catalina’s, Sunderlands, Liberators, Kawanishi H8’s etc. Even your point about the carrier aircraft is tenuous as it could be easily pointed out that those aircraft, whether technically MPA’s or not, were undertaking maritime patrol taskings. They were exactly the resources you try to deny being critical.

    On the topic of wastage, the cost of an MRBM is a tiny fraction of the cost of a carrier. A few (or even many) missiles “wasted” is still a good trade off for the destruction of a carrier.

    IF you have the missiles. IF they are ready to fire. IF the opposition doesnt decoy you out knowing that you will fire on spurious contacts and create a window of opportunity while new missiles are deployed in theatre etc.

    Of course you are using a seeker head. However, on an MRBM with a capacity for anywhere from 750-1600+ kg in the RV one could place a 200 kg seeker with relevant performance approaching an existing 200 kg fighter radar. On re-entry/glide it will have anywhere from about 1-3 minutes to find a target (depending on detection range and speed) in an area of about 30 x 30 km, give or take. Perfectly feasible.

    OK so, on a 750kg throw weight weapon, you are going to give a full third of the RV over to a fancy radar seeker. This is in the hopes that it can sweep a 900km2 surface area, detect, identify and reject incorrect targets in that area, locate and identify the correct target and make sufficient cross range ‘glide’ (RV’s glide do they???) to make the intersect. All in a minute. I think that tells me all I need to know on that score to be honest!.

    Please indicate which decoys will be in use, and how you expect them to accurately simulate the naval air movements around a carrier.

    Remember all you are getting off OTH is a general bearing, rough elevation/aspect, and speed. OTH doesnt give size, raid count or any form of discrimination.

    http://www.navy.mil/management/photodb/webphoto/web_060608-N-9851B-005.jpg

    This image show a surface vessel with a number of, recoverable, reusable 400knt capable air targets. What do you think that might look like on OTH?.

    The defender’s SSKs can sink the attacker’s ships. Can they sink the defender’s ships for the attacker, too? Of course not, so how could you possibly claim that they “can work as much for the attacker”? Complete nonsense.

    No. Not nonsense. Strategy and tactics – the operational art. Deceptive manoever, strategic and tactical misdirection. All those things that dont show up in your Janes or Milparades that dont have pretty pictures and performance figures alongside them!.

    How are those SSN’s going to make a concentrated attack on a line of SSKs they don’t even know are there? If the defender is using SSKs to confirm or deny the presence of a carrier, why would he launch when those SSKs don’t report one? Your scenario makes no sense, and, ironically, seems to rely on luck!

    I dont know where you would get the idea I said that a launch would happen off the SSK screen?. I said that an SSK barrier line, something fleet SSN’s and ASW assets would be actively hunting from a long way in advance of a carrier group attempting theatre entry, could be used in conjunction with OTH decoying to simulate the appearance of a penetration in a specific sector. The reasons for doing so are basic and manifest.

    While the carrier exists, it is a threat. If the carrier is neutralized, it ceases to be a threat for the duration of the war, irrespective of how much damage it has or hasn’t done. Hence, any weapon that can sink a carrier is valuable throughout the entire war. Period.

    Again ludicrous. Why go to the lengths of developing an ASBM to do something they can already do with conventional antiship weapons?. If all you want to do is scare away a single USN carrier off Taiwan send over a couple of regiments of tactical strikers and another couple of air superiority types. Disperse them over a number of airbases to reduce the USN counter-air threat and you hold the carrier group at risk – if you are tracking it. ASBM is simply unnecessary for that mission.

    Where did I or anyone here say that they were “serious about exploiting ASBM’s to keep the USN out of weapons range of the Chinese coast”? You made that up. No one here has claimed that ASBM and current Chinese assets will with 100% certainty sink a USN carrier before it’s in range of China. That does not stop ASBM from being a threat and capable of sinking/mission killing a carrier. An ASBM is a tactical weapon. Maybe you are going to claim that ASMs aren’t tactical weapons too?

    …and that is where this discussion ends. You think that an ASBM is just a big tactical antiship missile. You need to understand that the power of the weapon is not in sinking carriers, but, in keeping them so far offshore that the carriers are rendered impotent. If they cant do that they offer nothing more than the conventional missiles you confuse them with.

    Where did I say that they are “all focused in one spot”? Why are you arguing something I didn’t even say?

    You said that China had the resources to absorb strikes so it was meaningless if the USN got in to weapons range. I asked the question whether all of those resources were ready and deployable in one place to make good combat damage?. If you think I’m arguing something you arent saying maybe you should stop and look at what you are saying a bit closer?!.

    in reply to: Report on China's ASBM worth a read i guess #1807576
    Jonesy
    Participant

    No one here claimed that China is capable of deploying the level of assets the US is. Guess why? Because it really doesn’t have anything to do with this discussion. Saying that China can’t threaten a carrier because it doesn’t have “innumerable other assets like that other guy” is disingenuous.

    Absolutely not. You need surviveable assets to maintain presence. To cover the Chinese coastline to the depth required to prevent theatre entry you need a lot of assets. Until then you are trusting to luck that the carrier will wander into the sensor footprint of something that will be able to ID target, hold contact and relay back a posit for the ASBM shot.

    Why would they need a dozen MPA squadrons? Why would Chinese UAV’s be flying to the Persian Gulf? The Chinese have no intention of targeting carriers anywhere besides their own back yard. They are not the USSR.

    They have the same problem as the USSR though. I think part of your problem here is that you aren’t grasping the point of an ASBM. The whole value of it hinges on it denying naval task groups theatre-entry. That means engaging at ranges beyond that of the carrier groups weapons. Not much point waving the banner about how your ASBM has sunk a carrier when you have wrecked naval bases and disabled C4I from USN missile fire that is allowing follow-on forces cheap access!.

    Those assets are beneficial, but *NOT* critical, no matter how much you keep pretending that they are. UAVs, satellites, etc did not exist in WW2 but carriers were tracked and sunk regardless.

    Do you even know how carriers and capital ships were hunted and tracked in WW2?. Answer: Primarily with the dozens of MPA squadrons you said earlier were *not* necessary!.

    Rather hypocritical that you would say that, seeing as how you were the one calling this discussion “utterly irrelevant” whilst providing no supporting evidence whatsoever.

    There is plenty of evidence just not the convenient little soundbytes and links that you seem to class as ‘evidence’. It needs some comprehension and a little experience of the problems involved in finding ships at sea. Then it needs a sober look at the assets arrayed to achieve that function in support of the notional ASBM weapons system. The two, in the Chinese model as it stands, do not correlate.

    The problem with your premise is that you appear to assume that OTH-B is guiding the ASBM all the way to impact. This is simply not true and not required. OTH-B only needs to provide the ASBM with initial targeting information to get it to a point where the missile’s own sensor(s) stands a good chance of detecting the carrier.

    …and you are not understanding that it cannot do even that. You cannot go firing ASBM’s on the guess that the unidentified contact you have on the OTH scope is an aircraft carrier!. Even if you care nothing about the potential for non-combattant casualties surely you must recognise that as the most ridiculous wastage and something that a smart opponent would exploit.

    400km2 sounds huge until you realize that it is only an area 20 km x 20 km. Point any modern fighter radar at that… suddenly finding a carrier in the area is not difficult, in fact, it’s trivial.

    You arent pointing a fighter radar at it though!!!. You are pointing a seeker head on the nose of an RV with limited processing power and an extremely small scanning time-interval. That time limitation means that your seeker scan field has to be small and your targetting has to be done, principally, before launch.

    A carrier will be more easily identifiable due to the presence of aircraft, narrowing down the list of possible targets. This greatly increases the probability that an ASBM will be fired into an area with a carrier, as opposed to one without.

    Remember that skywave radar is range dependent in resolution. Optimal figures are within about 300-400km from the emitter. Beyond that and cell size increases – all you have is a surface return and a nearby air contact with a velocity readout. That is not hard to replicate for a decoy….especially when you consider that at pre-theatre entry ranges the carrier would not necessarily be launching all that many aircraft. then we come to the subtle point that USN carriers have, in fact, operated successfully in the face of Soviet OTH radar for a considerable time period.

    Furthermore, other platforms, such as SSKs (which the Chinese have no small number of) can be vectored at unidentified OTH-B contacts to confirm, or at least deny the presence of a carrier.

    Traditional search assets, as I alluded to earlier, SSK barrier lines would be a natural option for PLAN sea denial ops. Problem is that they can also be used in deceptive ops and can work for the attacker as much as the defender. A heavy and concerted attack by SSN’s on an identified barrier line could be made to look like an attempt to penetrate a specific sector was underway – coupled to decoy ops nearby triggering a response from OTH and a picture can be presented that is wildy inaccurate. What you need to counter this is lots of high-resolution capable assets to follow up initial detects….see earlier point!.

    Moments ago you were talking about Legenda as required. Now it’s BAMS. What will it be in your next post? What does “reliable” even mean? 24/7 1-meter-resolution realtime tracking anywhere around the world? Obviously, the Chinese do not need anything like that in order to threaten a carrier around Taiwan.

    Who is talking about Taiwan?. If the USN is anywhere near Taiwan the ASBM has already failed in its entire raison d’etre. If you are serious about exploiting ASBM’s to keep the USN out of weapons range of the Chinese coast you NEED 24/7/365 10m-resolution out 1000km offshore backed with very-long-range passive sonar. THAT is the real price of your miraculous ASBM!.

    FYI: You are not doing yourself any favors by making up one-sided scenarios that are not even applicable to the topic.

    Likewise you are not helping the debate by confusing an inherently strategic weapon, an ASBM, with a tactical one. When you understand what an ASBM actually means, in warfighting terms, come back and discuss.

    Assuming that the defender will just sit still and rely on luck is simply stupid. Woe to the admiral expecting to forever avoid “steaming blithely” over SSKs just because he was on a threat-reduction exercise.

    When you have stopped rolling your eyes go and find out what a threat reduction exercise is!.

    From the Chinese perspective, the group does not have to be destroyed or even engaged before it’s in range of its weapons. The sooner, the better, of course. But the Chinese certainly have enough resources to play a game of attrition.

    All focused in one spot these boundless Chinese resources are they?. No idea about the warfighting tenents of local superiority and manoevre warfare either???.

    in reply to: Report on China's ASBM worth a read i guess #1807706
    Jonesy
    Participant

    HAWX,

    May I ask how can you (possibly) know this? Surely the Chinese have not issued a press release… If you ask me, I too think this is the hardest part, if they intent to go for a direct hit approach instead of nukes. But hej! These guys recently sent a man in space and brought him back, they are not as primitive as they allow as to think.

    ASBM is a system-of-systems – the missile itself is only one small component of the the system that allows for the engagement of surface ships at theatre-entry denial ranges. The enabling systems for the weapon employment are ones that can, permanently, provide surviveable theatre surveillance, target discrimination and tracking. In the US BAMS model – the best conceptualised seaspace positive control suite since Legenda – it involves layered and complimentary assets working in concert to deliver coverage.

    Those systems are visible. China has a couple of OTH sites, it has a sprinkling of disparate Y-8 platforms converted for overwater ELINT/MPA taskings. It is working on MALE/HALE UAV prototypes. It has, allegedly, dallied with the Russian RORSAT concept. Not enough is solid and delivered its all gossip, hearsay or, frankly, agenda led rot.

    The US has in excess of 150 P-3C’s and it will be replacing them with, IIRC, 108 P-8’s. Its has an order in for several dozen RQ-4N’s. It has OTH radar, aerostats, a wing of E-3’s and innumerable other assets. THAT is a capability set that enables full seaspace coverage. Not what the Chinese are capable of deploying.

    When you see a dozen PLANAF MPA squadrons, when you see reports of Chinese HALE UAV’s flying to the Persian Gulf and back and squadrons of them in operational service then you have evidence that not only the search and targetting assets exist, but, the backend C3 systems exist to channel the dataflow. At the moment there is nothing, whatsover, to suggest that any of these critical assets, in operational numbers, exist in China. Until that changes ASBM is a propaganda weapon for the Chinese and the USN’s best hope for continued funding!.

    Wilk,

    Since most sources indicate that one of the primary purposes of the PRC’s OTH-B sites is to provide surveillance and targeting information, please provide evidence to prove that this is not true.

    Most sources do not indicate that so you are on a faulty premise from the start. A skywave radar is not a targetting asset and never will be – technically it is not possible with the resolution provided by the operating frequencies of that type of radar.

    Unless you believe the misquotes about JORN identifying a C130 from 2000kms off that is. JORN identified an air target who’s velocity was noted to rise and fall at 2000kms. It was later found out that an RAAF C130 was in that vicinity flying circuits. Hey presto a lot of muppets think that JORN gives you pretty pictures of contacts 2000km downrange and a convenient blip on a PPI!. Dumb.

    Until you can prove that these sites are incapable of performing their primary functions (which are not revolutionary or unique), the only thing that’s utterly irrelevant is your claim.

    1. Wind your neck in.
    2. Research the limits of the basic physics here. Skywave is a low-res solution as it ever has been and always will be. It cues in other platforms nothing more.
    3. Advanced signal processing. Much has been written about newer and cleverer ways people have modelled tropobounce to refine the received signal. Doesnt change the fact that the most refined resolution cell for OTH is something like 400km squared.

    IF you have keyed in on the right target in the first place that is. Poor resolution systems are always vulnerable to decoying as they cannot discriminate between legitimate target and decoy. See points above about operational resources – if you cant discriminate off your wide area sensor you have to cue a higher-res platform – if you start with a small number of platforms you either gap coverage periods or patrol slots somewhere.

    So now BAMS is required to target a carrier (and by extension, any other naval vessel)?

    Broad Area Maritime surveillance as a concept is needed to reliably target a carrier that is trying not to be found. There is always luck, after all a carrier could always steam blithely over a hostile SSK or an opponent could attempt entry denial by mining chokes/shallows for example. Those kinds of approaches are conventional and anticipated in the most elementary threat-reduction exercise on deployment though. Bit tough to hinge your defense strategy on good fortune.

    What is being talked about with ASBM is very-short cycle time theatre-access denial. Willful ability to engage and destroy a naval task group before if can close to effects range of its own weapons. That is an incredibly tall order and I challenge you to outline the first hint of China’s operational concept to do so – with publically acknowledged resources.

    in reply to: RIP Harry #2422193
    Jonesy
    Participant

    You naturally assume, when a familiar ‘faces’ presence on a forum drifts off, that they have gone on to another, new, forum or they’ve had a lifestyle change such that they dont get net time anymore. A few names spring to mind from the ‘old days’ that fit that category of people who you would wish to know were happy and doing well in their lives somewhere.

    Harry was such a person and this news is miserable to read. A spirited opponent and a strong ally by equal measure. One of relatively few people I have encountered on the net who was able to cope with his natural bias and apply a sense of objectivity and perspective. The world could use more like him.

    On a personal note – wherever you are Harry – I changed my opinion on the E-2….you were right all along!. Rest easy.

    in reply to: Report on China's ASBM worth a read i guess #1807908
    Jonesy
    Participant

    Even so, it has been a few decades since. Technology, even for chinese standards, has evolved. Bottom line is, the concept “ICBM as ASBM” is definately possible, not just theory or “mythical super weapon”. It has been done before, it can be done again. Period.

    If you can complete the targetting cycle – detect, localise, identify and track almost any high-yield ballistic system is a capable antiship platform. Put a 2Mt RV at optimal burst height within 5000yds of the core of a carrier group and the carrier is going home – more than likely with a lot of fire damage and shock/EMP damaged systems.

    Two things make that statement, and yours above, utterly irrelevant to the Chinese ASBM as touted. First is that, despite a few one-off Y-8 variants and some work on OTH/Skywave radar, the Chinese have not solved the targetting problem. That part IS visible – look at what the US is doing with BAMS for your cues – and would support the ASBM deployment, but, its just not there. No targetting and no long-range antiship shots ballistic or otherwise.

    Second is the problem of making a ballistic RV coincide with the position of a moving ship. Looked at from the upper atmosphere a ship, even one the size of a carrier, is a very small target and one that can be situated agaist a very cluttered backdrop. Putting a high yield nuclear warhead into the RV means that any inaccuracies in the targetting solution are rounded out. The Soviet weapon, IIRC, used a targetting bus stage that keyed on an identifiable military RF signature and shot multiple RV’s in a pattern to cover the area around that signature with blast effect. Compared to the challenge of making a conventional warhead strike target its hardly in the same league. Use of submunitions, as PLAWolf noted – and imagery suggests has been tested – is emminently sensible here, but, still some way short of the efficacy of the nuclear solution.

    in reply to: Aer Lingus Longhaul Question #493430
    Jonesy
    Participant

    If you unlucky enough to end upon EI-DUB, it doesnt have PTVs, just screens in the cabin ceilings.

    That was what I was hoping not to hear!. Thanks all the same though Shamrock.

    Anyone keep track of which planes are assigned to which routes and what the likelihood is of EI-DUB doing the JFK-Shannon run on Sunday?

Viewing 15 posts - 2,071 through 2,085 (of 4,319 total)