Whatever you may think about hiding carriers in the open sea, you greatly overestimate this capability especially against opponents with sufficient recon and intelligence assets.
Who has sufficient recon and intelligence assets?. Russia? No – they are in the process of trying to build up their own version of BAMS – or were until the price of oil yanked the rug out. China?. No – they have less ocean recon than the Russians. India, Holland, Myanmar perhaps???.
Echo we’ve been through this before and we both know you haven’t a clue about what ocean reconnaissance actually is and fall back on talking about coastal surveillance systems like AWACS. Then, when you are asked what happens if the carrier group initiates strikes beyond the ranges of those coastal systems, you start talking about SAMs destroying every TLAM that the USN could possibly launch…as if saturation doesnt enter in to the picture. Then you just tell us all it would never happen anyway and that we would be fools to doubt the mighty Russian armed forces.
Can we just skip forward and pretend that we have already done all that this time eh?.
Stop living in your fantasy world of the US pulling of some clandestine attack on another powerful nation. No such garbage will happen, and any such event will be preceded by very evident political or economic tensions between the nations in question.
Why do you think its clandestine?. The Soviets knew on many occaisions that US CVBG’s were operating off Vladivostok and off the North Cape. They didnt find them. Knowing that a naval group is around somewhere and engaging it are two completely different things. USN wrote the book on deceptive manoeuver and are evolving and refining it all the time….new technology is helping this.
Seriously the only system I’ve seen that offers the potential to stop a US CVSG from theatre-entry is the US BAMS system and I’m not wholly convinced it could do the job every time either. To put it into some kind of context for you just the UAV-only portion of BAMS is going to cost over $1bn. Who else is spending that on ocean surveillance right now?.
As you say – still a big bang – perhaps more in keeping with any possible usage of the weapon.
I do agree with that…which is my biggest driver for thinking its a bad idea. Do we really want the powers that be having an inkling that they have ‘easy-use’ nukes close at hand!.
Are nuclear capable missiles allowed to be exported? Is there not something in a treaty – perhaps only to non-nuke nations. How big is an ASMP relative to storm shadow, what is its range.
No treaty restrictions apply. You cant proliferate to a current nuclear capable state!. ASMP and Stormshadow are about the same length, but, ASMP is slimmer and lighter. Range is listed at 80km-300km dependent upon launch profile – the difference being the flight performance. Stormshadow is subsonic while ASMP is listed as M2-3. Against land targets minimising the window of engagement for countering air-defence systems will be the key factor in getting the warhead on target.
I would have thought a proliferation of such air launched missiles on the carriers and on land would be a good deterrent as it would be difficult to take them all out in one go. Possible a few nuke tipped tomahawks carried by an expanded fleet of Astutes.
Deterrence is based on the assuredness of getting a warhead to target. No matter what the enemy does, within reasoned limit, nothing will stop those targets being obliterated so finding alternate courses of action, to force, becomes the necessity.
ASMP’s and nuclear-tipped cruise missiles are emminently interceptable therefore they offer no real deterrence factor. An opponent just has to ring his most sensitive sites with double-digit SAM batteries and airborne radar to render ‘our’ nuclear strike capability impotent. Therefore no significant threat exists and the limits on the target states actions are removed. Deterrence fails and we need then to, expensively, build up a conventional force to offset potential aggression like-for-like.
The only assured way, with our current technology, to get a nuclear warhead onto a target, anywhere in the world, is with ICBM re-entry vehicles and in sufficient number to saturate ABM defences where they exist. The side benefit to that is that, as ICBM’s come with bucketfulls of range, we dont need many of them or many launch platforms. A system with lesser-range needs more platforms deployed more of the time and so, consequently, the ‘cheaper missile’ could very simply be a more expensive solution!.
Frogmen ops are clandestine by nature, something went wrong if they need suppressive fire support, especially from a ultra-short barreled 30 mm gun with no range whatsoever.
I dont know about that. If I’ve got divers in the water and there’s a harbour patrol craft pootling along with a couple of guys lobbing hand-grenades off the back (a fairly standard anti-inflitration measure if the threat level gets up) then the ability to briefly pop up a mast, put down a quick 20 rounds, then pull the mast….might just save me some very valuable SF troops!.
OK. If you knew that there were serious ASW forces about you would think long and hard about the ramifications of confirming your presence for the opposition, but, having the gun would give you some novel options!
Problem with that is the 7″ diameter of the missile. Same problem the US had with their 155mm nuke arty shell – the supercritical mass achieveable is quite small. You would be looking at a yield in the tenths of a kiloton at best.
Still a rather large bang naturally, but, for the purposes usually perceived for such weapons its on the low end of useful.
Better bet would probably be a straight off-the-shelf buy of a few dozen ASMP missile airframes off the French and fit our own warheads to them. Mating them up with the GR4 force wouldnt be a dramatic proposition either!.
Solid, concise information good stuff lads. Deepest appreciations!
Closer to the Med for deployments?
That would imply deployments against NATO and Turkish or Greek SSK’s would murder them when they tried to break out into the Aegean. Nuc’s in the Black Sea, unless they mean RTG-powered Kilo’s, is a very odd one!.
I’d rather assumed it would be similar to the old SLAM/Blowpipe concept (pic) with a deployable mast carrying the weapon mount and a collimated optronics package of some sort.

The suggestion was that the cannon could be employed while the sub was submerged. Even so, as you say, the cannon rounds coming down would be a dead giveaway that there was a sub out there!.
T45 cost is closer to £600mn when you take out the RD. Seeings as UK MoD have already paid for that with its 6 hulls any exports would be round the lower figure!.
Price on the NH90 you have there seems very low too Stan. The TTH variant is meant to be around Eur 16mn. NFH variant is supposedly closer to 30mn.
Anyway am bored so I’ve fiddled around with this for half an hour or so. If I’m an island state thats about to go poking its nose into others business then submarines scare me. SSN’s are right out on my budget and, probably, at my level of technology. My force then, to meet key requirements, is as follows:
Carrier Strike
1 Fincantieri Cavour class CVL
Amphibious Lift
1 Navantia BPE class LHD
3 Navantia Galacia class LPD
UNREP/Auxilliary
6 Fincantieri Etna class AOR
5 T-AGOS19/Victorious class
Escort Fleet
6 BVT Type 45 DDG
6 Hyuga class DDH
12 BVT Type 23 Batch2 FFG
Coastal/Minor War Fleet
16 Fincantieri MOSAIC 1.7 corvettes.
Submarines
4 Type 212A SSK
Naval Aircraft
28 F-35B
18 AS 555SN
36 NH90-NFH
All do-able on the equipment budget as edited. The T23B2 is, naturally, a new build run with SONAR 2087 as standard plus VL MICA replacing GWS26. Hyuga’s would retain the Mk41 for VLA and gain 32 A35 cells for VL MICA.
The unfortunately named ‘Gayduk’ corvette has been around for at least 5 or 6 years and was created by the Nikolayev ’61 Communards’ yard as a hull that could be outfitted with any blend of western/Russian systems the buyer wished. There were images of a model outfitted with an OTO76 and MM40 pipes with a Lynx parked on the flight deck somewhere on the net.
Musson looks a great deal like the BPS hull the Vietnamese bought. Might be an interesting story if the Ukrainians get any sales on that one! 🙂
The 61 Communards yard also used to advertise a couple of OPV class designs in the Serviola mould that I always expected would find a buyer somewhere….but strangely didnt?. Looks like they’ve been dropped entirely now!.
Looks like they are trying a bit harder with the marketing now at least!.
Edit: Original designs from the Nikolayev yards here: http://www.shipyard61.com.ua/war2-eng.html – actually from 2000!.
Can someone give me the specs on the Khareef’s? Weapons systems etc.
And what were the proposed changes for C3?
That VLS is making me think it’s expensive. But it does look ideal, it would just need room for 2+ ISO’s.
Pretty much what you see on the video.
99m hull, displacement about 2500tons, CODAD plant for 25knts and 3500nm range. Crew complement allegedly about 100 strong – prob inclusive of the aviation dept.
Electronics fit is almost exclusively Thales sourced – TACTICOS CMS fed by a SMART-S Mk2 MRR, STING FCR for the gun plus Link Y – comprehensive for the class and size of vessel.
Armament is the OTO76SR, VL MICA in two 6-pot VLS packs for 12 rounds total, Exocet MM40, a pair of REMSIG DS30’s and a full MASS offboard softkill suite – on the heavy side for an OPV, but, understandable for boats that will live in the Gulf of Oman. Rounds off with a permanent embarked aviation capability of a Lynx-class chopper with AVCAT bunkerage and air-ordnance magazines.
The big news is the price. Contract value for three ships plus initial support is £400mn. Good guess that puts unit price in the £120mn region. Tweak that design a bit, dropping the missiles and adding a work deck aft of the chopper pad with space for a containerised UUV hangar/launch system plus a RHIB ramp/davits etc. Then put 16 on the order book and, IMHO, you wouldnt be looking at much more than £1.5bn for the whole class and, effectively, sort out a, hugely, economical and cost-effective minor war fleet for a good twenty years!.
Possibly one for the Navy News thread but it seems apt to go here first.
Vid clip of the newly launched 1st of class Khareef hull for the Omani’s. Needs a hull stretch for increased bunkerage, a work deck/garage space aft and perhaps a tweak on the power plant to keep perfromance the same, but, if someone put an order in for 16 of these for C3 tomorrow I’d dance a bloody jig!.
That’s why they have to be both unmanned and cheap, i expect some to get shot down but the trade-off to find the Carrier is worth it.
You need two tiers of UAV’s neither of which, in systems terms, would be necessarily ‘cheap’.
First tier is a conventional Global Hawk/Mariner style platform with active sensors. Numbers, endurance and network meshing are crucial with this tier. A carrier group making theatre entry would be obliged to engage these to transit. The UAV’s would need to be set up with a kind of ‘swarm logic’ – if one patrolling platform is lost from the network its neighbours swarm to the last known location. Several ‘belts’ of these UAV’s would have to be established so that swarming units could be replaced on station in order that a decoy attack wouldnt succeed in opening a hole for the carrier group to pass.
Second tier would be the real ‘exploitation’ platforms. Smaller in numbers and VLO/Passive sensor fitted. This would be the platform that the tier 1 UAV’s would cue in and would be the platform that would develop the target track and provide ID.
Developing both interlocking systems and the backend C3I system to manage the volume of data that such a system would generate would, probably, exceed what the US is spending on BAMS by a fair margin. Would go quite a way to keep an unfriendly carrier group off your coastline though!.
Thats fine and everything, I still believe they should be fitted with EMALS when they are launched and wires.
I think we should continue to look at ways to make the CVF more effective and without doubt the inclusion of these things would help. We could operate Hawkeyes, we could look to purchase a limited number of Growlers e.t.c
I know its fairy tale stuff but I would much rather they were fitted with than for.
Problem is though Stan the inclusion of arresting gear and cats means crew to operate them. Using the US CVN’s as a rough scale we’d probably be looking at another 100-150 personnel embarked. Then there is the logistics to support the equipment and lastly the acquistion costs. EMALS is still going to be relatively immature by the time CVF is launched so including it would be far from risk-free.
For the advantages of just operating a det of E-2’s, that we also have no budget for, or a det of Growlers that we’d have to acquire, support as a seperate type aboard ship and maintain an exclusive pool of deck-qual’d pilots for, its just not worth the cost at this point.
Come CVF’s first major refit things may be different. We may see an emerging or re-emerging blue water naval threat by then and EMALS may be nice and mature so, at that time, there may be justification for those systems and for CVF to switch role to that of a ‘proper’ Fleet carrier. At the moment the justification just isnt there.
Since the cost is going up anyway, why not add nuclear propulsion and catapults?:confused:
Which is what they should have done to begin with
Simply because those two factors would drive up the running costs year-on-year, which far outweigh initial acquisition costs, for no useable advantage.
CVF with STOVL is the best solution possible for UK Carrier Strike. Its not the best solution to make CVF a Fleet Carrier but thats not the RN requirement right now!.
Yes, if the Carrier is close enough to enemy airbases, so the fighters on the Carrier can slowly but surely be neutralized/saturated, it can be done that way, and the advent of UCAV’s will make it a whole lot easier to saturate Carrier fighters for sure.
Having dozens of potential kamikaze a/c will definitely cause problem for the Carrier battle group commander that got too close.
True enough Obligatory as the carrier closes in on the target coast the number of surveillance systems that can be trained on it go up.
The problem is though that the carrier group with TLAM, and stand-off missiles in the airwing, doesnt necessarilly need to get that close to start hitting targets. It can fire stand-off land weapons from a range difficult for the opponent to target at and only move in close when an adversary’s defensive potential is reduced/degraded.
Thats the beauty of mobility you can choose when and where you want to fight.