JonesyJust for any of those out there who may have missed it hopefully the below link will put paid to any more speculation on a sub-90m, circa 2000ton OPV(H) type vessel for our Oceanic Patrol requirement.
http://www.bmtdsl.co.uk/BMT/bmt_media/bmt_media/33/2008_Pacific08_Paper_BMT_Venator_1.pdf
Kev,
I think that deckhouse is needed for the telescopic hanger.
Could be – looking at the design I think thats where I’d want the aviation fuel lines to run up as well. Dont fancy the idea of AVGAS leaking into a 2 deck high garage space!.
AE90,
one thing puzzles me regarding Venator, i thought we had already established that while a single CAMM would fit in A35 quadpacked CAMM would need A43
Not so I think we took the conservative view that the most likely Sylver module to be designed to accept quad-packing for missiles like CAMM would be A43 as it presents the highest commercial opportunities. A35 was obviously going to be a smaller, lighter system for specific installations where size/weight parameters were significant. Given those parameters loading up a lightweight launcher with quadpack missiles wouldnt necessarily seem logical.
Given the BMT imagery of CAAM Venator with a 4×1 configuration VLS containing quadpack CAMM the supposition seems to be that this may be a Sylver A35 arrangement that supports the quadpack.
JonesyKeep ’em doing what they are used for now – squadron hacks and taxi’s for any commissioned rank in the light blue who needs a hop down to Cranwell for an eye-test or similar such vital tasking.
Cant make the biggles brigade resort to lowly rail warrants after all!.:rolleyes:
JonesyGH with 2 engines??
Same design challenges – same solution. Put two turbofans on BAE Mantis and it’d look close enough to this and GH!.
JonesyTheir remains plans for CAMM i think to be canister mounted so their is potential for it to be mounted like a RAM mount. It planned to be the replacement of Rapier so if there’s lightweight mount available it could be very handy if your building the VT Ventors FFBNW CAMM
Cant see any requirement for a trainable launcher for CAMM. The missile is being designed for a vectored tipover from a VL so why go to the expense of designing a RAM style mechanical launcher?. Even the land-based variant artwork I’ve seen is for a vertical launch pack like that employed for VL-MICA.
BMT show the Venator CAMM variant as having the quadpack VLS in a deckhouse forward of the flight deck. The non-CAMM variant would, presumably, either remove the deckhouse or, more likely, simply just omit the VLS!.
JonesySize isnt the issue here gents – equipment is what really costs. The key factor is that we are looking for a transformational move in capability in support of the warfighting fleet.
You may say that a 3k ton hull is going to be scoffed as a replacement for a 500ton Single Role Minehunter. When its pointed out that the SRM needs to be carried into, and back out, of theatre on a semisub transporter and has no other mission value worthy of note its suddenly hard to make that point stick.
C3 as a multirole….even swingrole….droggy, MCMW and Patrol vessel makes too much sense to ignore. Fitting all that into one hull needs something akin to Khareef/Venator to accomplish.
The Venator is probably the optimum solution in terms of capability package and it was noteworthy that BMT defined a variant with CAMM and a variant without it in its marketing literature. Without the GWS I see little reason to expect a 3k ton diesel-powered minor combattant to weigh in with all that high an acquisition or running cost. Khareef would actually be a much more comprehensively outfitted hull and VT have signed on to deliver 3 for £400mn.
Even a limited order 8 of a more austere hull, with Khareef as a yardstick, would be difficult to conceive of as much over £100mn per unit and we are all aware that the ultimate requirement for C3 will not stop at 8 hulls. I would be very interested to see what numbers BVT could come up with for a non-CAMM ‘batch1’ of 8 hulls plus a CAMM variant ‘batch 2’ of another 8 to be built as the Sandowns pay off.
The structure would be for a two tier combattant fleet, as earlier alluded too, with the T45, C1 and C2 replicating the fleet structure we had with T42, T22 and T21. Then a two tier minor war fleet reflecting the diminished home waters role with active threat and benign-environment patrol taskings supporting and offloading the C2 force where necessary. For the cost of ‘just’ adding the already ‘designed-in’ CAMM VLS to the second batch of Venators we get a very, very flexible fleet.
Personally though I still think its a massive mistake to seperate C3 from C2 seeings we are actually tasked so heavily for patrol duties around the place.
JonesyWhile, the flight operations are different. The rest of the process is the same………… I’m not suggesting that the RAF should actually ‘drive the ships’ – just that the air power professionals are the obvious choice to own and fly the aircraft – which will spend most of their time operating from land bases.
Hmmm thats not quite true either. Read the report of the loss of GR7 ZD462 by, IIRC, CO 1 sqdn and you’ll note that there are unique challenges to putting even STOVL jets down on a ship. F35B will doubtless be a different proposition to GR7 but it will still present challenges especially if bringback does engender the adoption of SRL’s!. Of course a far reduced challenge from STOBAR/CATOBAR but noteworthy nevertheless.
Then their are mission considerations stemming from operating in the naval environment that dont apply to land-basing. Deceptive ingress/egress to the ship, commo procedures etc, etc. Actual strike planning may be almost the same and, along with RAF precedent, largely accomplished within the individual squadron but the operating environment does alter the equation somewhat.
JonesyScot,
As you make is sounds like any idoit can take-off and land from a Carrier or Command a Major Ship of the Line!
.
While I dont think the intent was to corroborate what you say about ‘idiots’ exactly what Jacko says above is almost entirely accurate. This has been laid out in other threads you have been party to as well.
CVF has been described as a ‘golf bag’ capability with unerring accuracy. It is designed to be a fully self-contained and self supporting forward operating base under the RN Carrier Strike requirement and intended to deploy components from Joint Force formerly Harrier, Joint Helicopter Force, FAA and other capabilities as they evolve. It is not, currently, optimised or intended as a Fleet Carrier. Any comparison to USN or French Fleet carriers is therefore unsound….no matter how much they may appear similar.
Where I disagree with what is written above is the frequency with which fastjet deployment will go out with the carrier. NATO basing for coalition ops, sure, austere basing….well the past two times thats been utilised, that I can think of, has come after carrier-air forced theatre entry!. Plus naval air offers the opportunity of multiple attack vectors that solely land-based tacair may not.
Edit: There is also the small matter of a need to maintain a pool of deck qualified pilots with real-world experience of deck operations under a range of environmental conditions to form a training element for non-deck qualified pilots as they join the ship. So, whilst STOVL is a very different issue to STOBAR or CATOBAR, some practise, outside of the simulator, is naturally called for.
JonesyBut you’re going to see Mr Iceberg at quite a distance right? It doesn’t matter either way I was just messing about with that last post, of course someone qualified should be at the helm of a multimillion pound warship.
Of course mate…..I should’ve banged a smiley, or something, in there at the end of the story. Was just relating an appropriate experience of the danger of having someone on the helm who, in my case, should have had adult supervision if given access to a TV remote control! 🙂
JonesyAs long as you understand that any idiot can turn the ship to avoid it. The mid Atlantic doesn’t require too much precision manoeuvring…unless there’s an SSBN you desperately want to ram. 😛
From personal experience issuing helm orders, not on the war-canoes though I hasten to add, I would beg to differ on that one!.
On hearing the shout from the lookout, in increasing pitch and tone, ‘Object in the water, fine on the port bow, CLOSE ABOARD!’
…and, subsequently, issuing the order to put 20 degrees starboard wheel on, at the rush, the very last thing I wanted to hear back from the wheelhouse was:
‘…..what?!’
Turned out to just be a semi-submerged old truck tyre that looked like someone had been using as a fender and hitting it was obviously a different proposition than aforementioned ‘big white block’ but the point still holds good!.
JonesyIf you read my post you’d see I mentioned the Antarctic, where I think we will be involved since we have a territorial claim to a massive area, a lot of which overlaps with Argentinian and Chilean claims. The Arctic however is not our business, we have no claim to it and have no reason to get involved in border disputes or trade disagreements up there unless the Russians decide to really act up and NATO member that IS involved asks for help.
And as there is going to be more free ice (icebergs etc) then building new Ice ships won’t make that much difference since they’re designed to cut through pack ice, not icebergs. Thanks to modern technology, it is now possible to spot and steer around icebergs so as not to need a strengthened hull.
If you argue that it helps to reinforce the hull against ice as a safety precaution as some people might, that’s fine if you plan on sailing through regions heavily dominated by it, but the RN doesn’t operate in areas like that and never has (-Endurance) because it doesn’t have reason to. It is an unnecessary cost in building ships that will spend most of their lives in either the Atlantic, Med, Indian Ocean etc. The most likely they are to meet ice is crossing the Atlantic to the USA and hit an iceberg like the Titanic did, and I don’t recall that having happened for a very long time.
In short, I just can’t see the point of preparing for a conflict we are unlikely ever to fight in an area where we have no interest whatsoever.
+1 and underscored!.
You dont try and ice-strengthen your hull to play bumpsies with icebergs!. You have a radar watch set backed up with a regular rotation of lookouts and you keep the helm manned by someone who knows how to answer orders quickly and accurately!.
JonesyFair enough.
From my own perspective I’d like the C3 on its own in your sub combat situation to be able to look after itself for a while should things turn nasty.
Obviously we’re looking at this from opposite ends, and reaching opposite conclusions we should probably agree to disagree.
Enjoyed the debate though:)
Likewise – rare to get all the way through a debate without disappearing of into hideously obscure little tangents on here of late.
I want the C3 to be capable of reacting to a developing situation and exerting an RN presence ahead of the main fleet units that would, naturally, follow it up. Its an interesting balance to strike between costs and capability at any rate!.
JonesyThe romantic idea that the Fisheads have any idea as to how to run fast jets is equally silly, too. The RN does not view aeroplanes as anything more than a weapons system parked on a ship, and has signally failed to adequately resource and man its fair share of Joint Force Harrier, having insisted that it should have 50% of the organisation’s squadron numberplates and executive positions.
Unfortunately this is a common view in the light blue. At the same time they declare all encompassing wisdom on everything aviation related they fail to recognise that they have no understanding of the naval environment and the differences involved between working in a shore based environment and the quite different challenge of undertaking the same work on a ship, with limited space, without the full resources of an airbase, with 24hr ops and with a moving deck!.
Originally the idea was for Joint Force Harrier to be commanded by either a light blue or dark blue officer by equal token. From memory JFH has had precisely 1 RN officer heading it up. After that deft footwork has left it light blue all the way!. JFH is an RAF benefit session with an RAF aircraft type on an RAF base that does not represent RN requirements in virtually any regard. Is there any extraordinary effort being undertaken to build up NSW in that context….no there isnt. Frankly, comments of what squadron numberplates go where when we have a Fleet with no meaningful air cover are representative of the RAF mindset.
The issue is going to come, and the RAF are well aware of this, when kids see flashy F-35B’s operating off 60k ton CVF’s. Recruitment in that context is going to be a considerably easier proposition. Adding in the current issues that the RAF are having with the non-commissioned ranks deploying to sea and the scope for the F-35B’s to naturally shift towards the dark blue is quite plausible.
As with the Harrier today, boat operations should only represent one (relatively minor) part of what the F-35B ‘does for a living’, and, that being the case, it will make for a more effective, more efficient force for the F-35B to be run and owned by the light blue.
Another stereotype, and quite professional, disingenuous comment. Current Harrier ops do not cover the full remit of what Harrier does and has done in its service life. It is just what Harrier GR has done recently in the context of ops in Afghanistan that would lend any credence to the comment. Op Corporate, Op Allied Force, Op Palliser, countless Purple exercise serials etc, etc all swing the needle of percentage of ‘Harrier operations’ have been boat-related.
JonesySeems to me what is boils down to is this: The 57mm MK110 is a more effective means of a vessel protecting itself from seaborne and other targets in the particular environments that the C3 will operate; in littorals. The MK8 has more utility for offensively engaging land targets.
Personally I’d rather have the weapon system that contributes to the survivability of C3 and leaves the role of blowing stuff up in shore to C1/C2, LACM, Choppers, fast movers etc.
I think that you are correct in that this is what it ends up with. For me, as I understand the concept, the inclusion of a MCG on an OPV is not for self-defence. A traditional OPV should never be in the position that it must rely on its MCG for that defence.
The main gun is a mission tool used to facilitate the OPV’s main taskings – that of patrol and constabulary duties.
The C3 differs from the traditional OPV in that it is intended for forward deployment and not, exclusively, patrol of its own littoral/EEZ. It could therefore find itself in the position, alone – until principle fleet units arrive in theatre, of having to enter sub-combat situations where coercive force is necessary.
It also does have a principle combat tasking in the MCMW capability so, without being a warfighter, the vessel could find itself, under close escort, in a danger zone. If, at little expense, it can take a supporting role in that combat zone, whilst undertaking its primary function, I see that as no bad thing.
JonesyPeter,
The 155 seperate ammunition issue was resolved with a dual stroke autoloader. As its name suggests this uses a separate loading stroke for the projectile and the charge. Doesnt do much for the rate of fire but then its been a very long time since a ships main gun, of 100mm or more, has been considered a primary AAW weapon for the RoF to really make much difference.
Ed,
Making REMSIG compatible with the slightly larger AHEAD round would be a real pain in this context. The ordnance would need rechambering for the new round due to the changed dimensions and, I’d expect, increased pressure. The feed mechanism would also likely need modification. Then we come to the needs of the AHEAD function itself – a muzzle mounted RF fuse setter and a link back to a suitably competent FCS to allow for the rounds to be programmed. If the requirement is, mostly, for enhanced AAW capability then, as we discussed earlier in the thread, the simplest and cheapest option would appear to be switching out the REMSIG’s for SIGMA/AUTSIG.
Kev,
Since you didn’t specifically state why the 57mm was chosen for LCS over the 5″62cal I can only surmise that it is more effective against the small boat threat you’ve outlined.
That would be an entirely correct statement. The 57mm would be likely to be the superior weapon for engaging speedboats and that kind of threat….especially in concert with the Bofors intelligent ammunition.
That doesnt mean anything for C3 though as C3 isnt a warfighter. There is little need for C3 to actually engage a swarming small boat threat with direct fire. If there are few targets in number the REMSIG’s are very effective weapons and for larger, PG type, vessels that may be mounting a larger calibre weapon the 114mm offers decent range and weight-of-shell. IF the threat is that likely to fit the 57mm best the C3 has the luxury of leaving the danger zone where the LCS, as a combattant, is probably going to be expected to engage and destroy the targets.
Speedboats, Boston Whalers etc are pushed to beat 30knts if there is even a slight chop. I did my powerboat handling training in 5.5m RHIBs and can tell you that, with throttles cracked open, at 30-35knts you are hanging on for grim death and not aiming a weapon with any kind of accuracy. So if your C3 gets contacts at horizon range and can motor off at 25knts its probably 15-20nm offshore before the small boats can cause any real harm. If you are driving a speedboat in to such an attack you probably dont want to stray too far over the visual horizon from your shore for obvious reasons!.
Throw it away for something which offers more useable performance for the JOB IN HAND. MK8 may well be a viable weapon for a frigate or destroyer but doesn’t seem to offer much to a C3, there’s no real reason for it to be shooting at anything that requires the range or punch of a MK8 and if it did chances are you should of sent a larger vessel in its place.
This is what is leading me on to the general point about what is required of a forward deployed patrol ship. This kind of vessel is going to perform its taskings under peacetime conditions for, you would reasonably expect, more than 90% of its service life. So the ability to shoot down incoming BrahMos missiles is less significant than its ability to create coercive influence.
Taking an embassy/civils evac mission similar to Lebanon 2006. The first responder is likely to be a unit in or near the theatre of ops – a C3 on patrol tasking could easily be that first responder. If you have nothing more than a direct fire weapon (30-57mm) you are fair game to any militia that has its hands on a couple of BM-21’s. The big grey boat flying the White Ensign in the harbour is a PR opportunity and only minimal threat. If that big grey boat is mounting a dirty great cannon on the front, with 25kms of range, firing 45lb shells then a pause for thought would be likely.
The same coercive value has been seen in antidrug ops in the Carribean where several ‘go-fast’ boats have been taught a lesson that running at 40knts for a couple of miles achieves very little when they see three rather large shell-splashes rapidly appear in front of them!.
Then there is, finally, the utilisation of the vessel in a combat framework. In combat where would C3 be found?. In the littorals clearing mines with the UUV’s under close protection from a C2 most likely. If a land target came up the C2 would naturally take on the task of engaging it. With a 114mm whats to stop the C3 joining in the shoot?. If the target is in range of course. Just because the ship isnt an Iowa class BB doesnt mean it cant have some effect….and with a Mk8 much greater effect than a 76mm etc. We were always told that an automatic mount like Mk8 was worth 3 full batteries of shore arty. Not something to be sniffed at – if the ship is going to be on the spot anyway!.
JonesyJonsey,
isnt the Mod1 just a new “stealthy” outershell for the gunhouse of the 40 year old mark 8 gun system? Remember that the first ship with the Mark 8 was Bristol commissioned in the early 1970’s.
Very definitely not. Its nearly a different mount at the gunhouse. Virtually all electric as opposed to the hydraulics used earlier. Even the gun control systems and feed mechanism are different. Word is its now the gun it was meant to be back in the 70’s.
Kev,
I am saying there is no point in installing a 114mm if the RN want to replace it with a 155mm, it’s a waste of money, it would involve paying money out to install something at build, then paying money out to have it removed and then replaced with something else when they could of just installed what they wanted in the first place.
That hinges on the fact that the Mk8 would be replaced on the vessels that dont need the 155. Thats a long way from assured. The program to install the mod1 gun is still under way and T45’s are being completed with it now. Mod1 could easily, given historical precedent, see the T45’s through to the end of their lives. There really is that much life left in the weapon.
Given the requirements on the limited no. of T45’s and the comparitive value of the Sea Viper – if the ship only ever uses its main gun to fire starshell – I think its a long way from assured that there will be any urgency to go to the expense of backfitting 155 to the Darings.
The Mk8 mod 1 might be a viable weapon but having a logistics and support structure in place is no reason for continuing to use something that the operator intends to change, and if it was a valid reason then the user would never change at all, they would continue to use the same piece of kit forever.
You think that buying a new weapons system, one that offers few useable advantages over the exisiting unit, and forcing a service to develop an entirely new logistics and support setup is the wiser option?. As stated we know the Mk8 – we know how to service it, have all the tools, parts and most importantly experience to keep it operational. We know the capabilities of the mount – we know the rounds and the performance figures. We have the ammunition and are practised handling it. Why, if the mount is still fully capable of delivering the results, would we wish to throw that away?.
Answer is we would throw it away for something offering considerably more useable performance. That is the 155 on gunline vessels. For T45 and C3 that doesnt apply though!. No matter what C3 is not going to get 155 so it means throwing the Mk8 away for a system that offers no more useable mission capability and, in some regards, far less.
I’m not knowledgeable enough about such matters to answer this but I do have a related question: why are the US Navy installing the 57mm on LCS instead of the 5″62 cal?
Simply because the LCS is meant to be a warfighter and is anticipated as having to fight back the swarming small-boat threat and needs something to back up RAM. That scenario doesnt apply to C3 as, in a major threat scenario, a C3 would have CAAMS backed by REMSIG to cover any air threat while it headed out of theatre, or toward the protction of the fleet, at the rush.
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