Patrol requirement? Maybe none. However boats and ships are not only used for patrol duties.
All SSK’s can do is patrol. If we have no requirement for a Patrol Submarine as we used to with GIUK why are we wanting to spend a couple of hundred millions per boat on them?.
It is significantly quicker and cheaper to build SSKs than SSNs. Which means that they can be put in to situations in to which no one would place an SSN.
They cannot do the job of an SSN though, so, if we need SSN’s (which we do) what is the value of having an SSK or even two or three in its place?.
Littoral patrols (as defensive spoliers or as interdiction) are not suitable for SSNs (especially our beautiful, new but huge Astute class).
Littoral patrol of where though?. Home waters?. We didnt do much of that when we had Patrol Submarines and the Red Banner Fleet to contend with. So who’s littoral are we needing to patrol?.
Insertion (and recovery!) of special forces, minelaying, operations in enclosed bodies of water (Baltic, Mediterranean, Irish Sea)
We have other methods for covert Special Forces insertion. We have no need to go to the expense of a seperate class of SSK’s for that.
We’ve not had a requirement to mine the Irish Sea in a while. The Baltic is the last place the RN would need to be putting British mines not least as its likely to put noses out of joint amongst our allies who have a coastline there!. Similarly in the Med apart from around Gib we have little interest there that would require us to covertly deploy mines and we’d not be popular if we decided to close the Gib Straits :).
SSKs can inherently be quieter than SSNs (diesels can be turned off* pumps for nuclear reactors cannot)
They can be indeed. For very short intervals close to home. Factors which are absolutely no use to us. If we want to deliver special forces we generally have to do it a very long way from home. Prolonged transit is not something SSK’s do well. SSN’s are the right tool for spanning oceans.
IF we ever get back to the Red Banner Fleet threatening to pour down into the Atlantic Basin then we have a mission for SSK’s and a reason to divert funds from the Fleet boats. Until then any funds we can spend on submarines NEEDS to go on the Astutes.
(Although I reserve the right to disagree with some of their procurement decisions I still think that they were wrong in going for the USS Insane Inflationary Pressures skimmers and in doing away with SSKs, and I certainly think that the RN dropped the ball in binning SSKs)
Why did we drop the ball binning SSK’s?. What patrol requirement do we have now that we could possibly use an SSK for?.
As far as the news report are concerned, the test was successful. So you might wait for further report before posting BS…
I think you need to know that Brahmos is already in service of the Indian Army and you must watch this video as well…… Show me any other high speed cruise missile with such accuracy…..
The Block-I version was a great success. This is Block-II, they are doing something new and the first country to do so. Do you know how may failure US/Russia do have when developing something new???!!!
How many countries has a missile similar to Brahmos Block -II???
Rajan,
Before you start waving your little flag again on this understand that the test shown in the video, even if it does show a Brahmos impact on a target, is not a difficult achievement for a missile with an active radar seeker regardless of its speed. Neither is it representative of many targets that the Indian Army would have to shoot at in time of conflict. In simple terms its not something you really want to be boasting about too much as a triumphant feat of Indian arms.
The block II weapon is one that no-one seems entirely capable of describing. The test, if it has been successful, and used the seeker from the Blk1 (not a simple JDAM-like use of GPS guidance onto a fixed target) would be a quite staggering achievement as its one that the technology should not allow – no matter how clever ones processing routines are.
Suffice it to say when you find a video of a Brahmos, using its antiship active radar seeker, striking a discrete target amidst a high-RF clutter background then we’ll agree that an achievement has been made. Until that happy event occurs understand that many people will be less excited than yourself about these ‘successes’.
http://en.rian.ru/russia/20090304/120415599.html
If they’re getting rid of five thousand officers they must’ve been pretty top-heavy. It fits in with what I’ve heard before, and I believe the Army is doing the same, but it’s a fairly eyebrow-raising number anyhow. I wonder if the same cuts will occur to the other fleets, and if not, why not?
The article says 5000 officers and NCO’s doesnt it Cdr?. In a conscript force the number of ‘permanent’ Officers and senior NCO’s is always higher than in a professional force of equal capability.
I have heard that they are trying to shift from a conscript to an all-volunteer force generally in the Russian armed forces – this news could just reflect a higher percentage of motivated ‘volunteer’ personnel in the Pac Flt ahead of the others allowing for the thinning out of the old permanent cadre of officers/NCO’s.
Sure it would be – if the current administration had any intent on going forward with it. It doesn’t. It will only be deployed once it’s “proven” and “cost effective”. Two very aribitrary and subjective terms.
Makes no difference if the Russians believe it would be fielded or not. The outcome is still the same. The US ‘made the approach’ to work with Russia on the issues at hand. IF the Russians prevaricate the US has carte blanche to do what it wants in E.Europe with regards missile defence.
The actual weapons wont be ready for emplacement for a period nearer the far end of Obama’s term anyway from my last reading of the program notes!. Whether the current administration deems the system immature and unproven or not is largely irrelevent at the moment as, at most, its a delay of less than eight years and quite possibly half that!. A fully weaponised, mature and surviveable, Iranian IRBM/ICBM capability is at least that far away in itself.
Win the political battle on this one and the rest of the pieces fall into place by themselves.
Ken
Today’s lot are trying to reach such a balance. OWR says: tilt towards insurance; SLL (and BTW, I) say: put the effort into not-CVF and role-share with the willing. Like W.Germany and Japan have done since 1954, to their immense benefit.
Its an interesting analysis you put forward. The flaw is in the last line though. We’ve done this already and found it to our detriment.
We became the North Atlantic ASW team and were very good at it. We had a Defence Minister, Nott, who was so impressed with what we could do in the GIUK that he decided that there was no point doing anything further. 3Cdo plus the amphibs were to be drawn down, CVS sold on and a navy heavy on tailed escorts and SSN’s to be pressed on with. With the persuant benefits to UK exchequer that Lawrence would find admirable.
The problem is that this over specialisation cost us lives the next year. We forgot that a Navy’s prime responsibility is to undertake the missions it is tasked with. Not the missions that we feel we are able to accomplish. We are not able to go back to the Prime Minister and say ‘not today mate….you didnt give us the money for the systems we need to do x tasking properly so we aren’t going’. Doesnt work that way.
That was then also when we had a clear principle tasking that we could specialise in. As an island nation we will always be vulnerable to sea-denial to some extent so retention of core ASW skills will always serve us. After that what?. Amphibious operations? – yep we’re good at that, but, you need forward tacair to achieve it. MCMW – were good at that too, but, this is what the real poorer nations in NATO contribute so its a bit mean of us to try and steal their crumbs and, lets face it, we should be doing better than that. So the question is what do we role-share as?.
I don’t know why they would when it’s a virtual certainty they could give him the finger and it still wouldn’t get deployed.
I dont know about that. Looks like quite an elegant solution for the US there. Trade something that doesnt yet exist for tangible support from the people making the most racket about the issue.
If the Russians dont go for the deal then the US sites the missiles and gets to dismiss any lingering Russian whining by pointing to this ‘missed opportunity’ to do something to address legitimate US/W.European security concerns about Iran together.
If the Russians do go for it and suddenly find that they dont have the pull with Tehran that they think they do then the same thing happens. The US deploys the GBI’s and points to Russia’s failure to achieve anything substantive by way of alternate solution.
If the Russians go for it and CAN bring Iranian missile and WMD development verifiably to a screeching halt everyone’s a winner. The US has no need to deploy Missile Defence and gets kudos for ‘pulling back from the brink’ and Russia gets the plaudits for bringing the Iranians back into the ‘good lads club’.
Three potential outcomes and, it seems to me, the US cant lose with any of them. Could be a very smart play.
Lawrence,
The question is not ‘Does the French navy need PA2 to have an effective carrier force?’ but ‘Does France need a an effective carrier force?’. The fact that they do not currently have one answers that question.
Utter nonsense. They have built a carrier force and have yet to complete it!. The requirement was always for the second vessel – a porte avions 2 – to be built to provide guaranteed deployed naval aviation. That they have put it back continually is as a result of the protracted development of DCN’s Romeo/Juliette work, the study as to optimal propulsion choices and the obvious financial issues.
Project Julliete was, IIRC, the conventional successor to the follow on CVN ‘Romeo’ and was shown as the preferred option as recently as the end of 04!. By 05 they had come onboard with UK CVF and thats dragged on through the usual mire that tends to happen when you try to make one design do two jobs for two different customers. Now their design is as mature as ours just their priorities are different as their naval aviation component is not ageing as ours is.
In direct contention with your claim that the French Navy is quite capable of performing its mission they need to recapitalise their escort fleet and generate an enhanced SSN capability. Wisely they are addressing that requirement before commiting to the carrier spend.
In the absence of threat there has to be a desire or need for power to act as a driver for such procurements, without it they do not occur. Defence policy is not made by Military’s or even Defence Departments but by public and political class perceptions of need and want, consequently whether France gets PA2 is not a question of whether the French navy needs it for an effective carrier force but whether the French people decide they need or want to spend the money on it.
Again nonsense. That kind of argument is nebulous and suggests that PA2 may not happen if the public will in France turns against it. The CdeG exists. France has committed herself to a carrier capability and for the maintainance of that capability PA2 has to happen else the spend already made is wasted. The French Defence Minister said exactly this publically a couple of weeks back.
This raises a much wider doctrinal issue, the usage of fleet carriers for power projection in the post Cold War era is largely defined by their usage in the 1990/91 Gulf War, in that instance there use was remarkably important, the platform for strike aircraft was vital. Unfortunately GW1 has turned out not be the model for intervention in the 2000’s, for continental European countries at least. Consequently vessels such as the Mistral class are more cost effective and why France is procuring three of them.
Not really. We have seen multiple issues with overflight and theatre base-in since 1980. The French closing of airspace in El Dorado Canyon, the similar act of the Turks in Iraqi Freedom. The utilisation of naval air in Allied Force. Our experience in 1982. The utilisation of naval air in the opening moves of Enduring Freedom before Kandahar was secured. All these have illustrated and underscored the value of naval air in the pursuit of foreign policy goals.
Whilst this thread has correctly identified money as the key reason for France having abandoned PA2 is has failed to recognise why that money has not been made available.
The fact is that France, like every other western European nation, has no real threat scenario, thus there is no driver to spend money on shiny toys.
And why would France care if India develops a powerful carrier force?
That logic hinges on the fact that a carrier is only a response to a direct threat though. Its not. It is an instrument of French foreign policy. An instrument that France has already determined has value for them as they have built and deployed their CVN. What they are doing with PA2 is completing that capability package as, at the moment, they have the most untenable situation of all. This being a national requirement, however nebulous it may appear to some, that has had a large expenditure against but provided a part time solution at best.
PA2 is not a new capability under the heading of ‘shiny new toy’ and should not be considered as such. PA2 is the completion of the requirement that saw the creation of CdeG and is about the only thing that would justify the spend for a navy to have a carrier capability that is not guaranteed-available 24/7/365.
4 500 feet (average of your numbers) = 0.74 nautical mile
This still puts it within the immediate effects zone. And yes, obviously, not an impact fuze but and airburst.
Again though Dionis that is only if the detonation occurs directly over the carrier. A half mile either side and the carrier escapes…..absolutely nothing!.
This is where you are looking at it crooked. Whether the carrier is inside the immediate effects zone or not makes very, very little difference. As Schorsch points out a 5psi overpressure is going to do all kinds of damage. If you want an illustration if you are looking into a 19″ monitor right now it is the equivalent force of 900lbs, the weight of a large touring motorbike, being applied to just the screen area.
The only thing that wouldnt happen is that the carrier is unlikely to have its watertight integrity breached. Then again though that is equally unlikely with Schorsch’s sea-skimmer detonation as the burst would not impact anything of the ship below the waterline. In both cases the ship would be effectively finished as a combat unit though.
The difference between the two being that the seaskimmer wastes half its blast energy pumping it into the biggest heatsink known to mankind….the ocean….and with the optimal airburst the blast wave is probably ripping the upperworks off every escort in the battlegroup within 3 miles of the detonation. That being why its called ‘optimal burst height’!.
Jonesy, your rhetoric isn’t helping your argument at all here. If you want to be even remotely credible here, I suggest you post some sort of yield-to-effect calculator for us to use.
Why am I doing the research for you on this?. I’m telling you what the physics are – not trying to argue with you or convince you of anything!. If you are interested enough – do the research yourself.
If you want something Janet and John to play with, to make it all a bit easier to understand, this gives a very basic idea of blast zones in pretty picture format: http://meyerweb.com/eric/tools/gmap/hydesim.html?ll=-73.9971,40.7223&yd=500&si
That will show you that for a 10kt weapon the 15psi blast zone is 0.33 mile or about 1700ft. For a 500kt weapon that zone is 1.21 miles or about 6300ft. So, for a 50-fold increase in yield you are actually looking at a blast effect increase less than a factor of 4. That figure is for a groundburst but shows the basic problem with your premise.
Airburst extends that figure perhaps 10% but you still have the issue of optimal burst height. The optimal burst height for the 15kt weapons dropped on Japan was 1500ft give or take. As yield increases that altitude increases and increases the distance from the burst to the target.
Remember that for a burst at 4-5k ft altitude that the detonation would have to be made within about half a nautical mile of the carrier for it even to be within the immediate effects zone. Nukes dont come with an impact fuse Dionis and even if it manages to burst directly over the carrier at 5000ft its still 5000ft away!.
As you’ve been told all along weapon designers know, even the Russian ones, that damage from a nuclear warhead, to a ship, comes from blast wave and shock effect not from trying to get large lumps of steel to change state into plasma. Understand that that is what the designers have aimed to achieve with their missile warheads.
I can assure you that I am well aware of many from both countries who despise both
I work with people all around the world – one of my team members is German, another Nigerian, another Congolese, another Italian, another Pakistani another a Kiwi etc – and I have never encountered people so sensitive without a context of directed persecution. I had Chinese friends as a kid and, again, unless a specific attempt was made to be derogatory the issue just did not come up. There are epithets that are indisputably unacceptable in any civilised conversation, but, I think this might be stretching it just a bit.
Why would my name have to be misleading? The global transport network makes it entirely possible and indeed frequent that someone from one ethnic or racial backgorun could carry the name of another.
Again I work with people from all over the planet and I’ve yet to make contact with a Chinese person called Lawrence! :). I know many Chinese and Malaysians who ‘adopt’ western first names to make email and such communication easier for business purposes – something that irritates me greatly. I’ve never yet though, after at least 5 years in the job I do currently, encountered someone from that region who’s given name is Lawrence or even genuinely western-origined.
Seeing as this is now devolving to personal views only I’ll anticipate your reply and leave it alone after that my curiosity satisfied!.;)
Cheers,
‘Chinaman’ holds its historical usage with derogatory descriptions unlike Englishman or Frenchman. A more direct comparison would be the usage of the word ‘hun’ to describe Germans, although that is a rather self inflicted name.
Its usage holds association with historical social ignorance regarding race and whilst not the most offensive term out there it is far from acceptable.
I find it amusing that you automatically assume that I am not of Chinese origin when you have never met more or have any knowledge of me beyond the internet, that is not a criticism just a curiosity?
Surely this is a perspective issue – in your estimation the term holds that connotation Lawrence. Can you assume that as a general rule for everyone?. Your ‘hun’ example is a perfect illustration…how many contemporary Germans would necessarily be all that bothered about being called that?. If they stopped to look up the derivation then perhaps….even then context and intent apply.
Following on from this if you went back a couple of centuries and spoke to an English soldier the term ‘Frenchman’ would likely be spat out and derogatory just as would be the reverse term on the autre side of La Manche!. That the connotations that existed then no longer apply in contemporary scenarios, well not so much at least!, is surely indicative that these terms are hardly fixed one way or the other?.
As to the assumption of your racial heritage, simply, the name ‘Lawrence’ isn’t one of Chinese origin. Why would I assume you would be if your assumed identity is deliberately intended to be misleading?. 😎
Anyway, as stated before and referred to by the Doc, this is just a little wandering as I found it curious that the term mentioned could still give rise to disquiet when in and of itself it seemed, to the outsider, relatively innocuous. If the mods wish to purge please chop away!.
Just a brief, off topic, mental meandering but why is ‘Chinaman’ considered derogatory when ‘Frenchman’ or ‘Englishman’ would not be?.
Any Chinese men able to corroborate whether Lawrences’ indignity on your behalf is warranted or not?:cool:
A Granit’s 500kt warhead will cause massive destruction
http://www.magnetbox.org/archive/aol/nuclear.html
Site that 10kt (50 TIMES less) than a Granit, vaporizes .5 miles.
Go figure. The Nimitz would be reduces to nothing – for the most part. I’m not suggesting it would disappear though 😛
As Schorsh states Dionis that site is suspect. You need to be a bit more careful with your sources – maybe you should find a website that is a bit more authorative than that of a student with an anti-nuclear agenda!.
As stated before, even if the student knew what he was talking about, you are trying to directly scale off yield and, once again, nuclear detonations do not do that. By this, keeping it at its very simplest level, I mean that doubling the yield of the weapon does NOT equate to a doubling of blast effect/radius. Look at Schorsh’s formula and you will see how it works.
We then come to Gary’s point that if you could place a nuke aboard a CVN or on a barge alongside it and detonate the weapon – then you might get the effects you are anticipating – annihilation of some areas of the ship through the heat pulse. You are not going to get that off a missile warhead though. The need to do that kind of damage to a ship is simply unnecessary and would be a waste of the nuclear warhead.
Again as stated the warhead would detonate at optimal burst height for its design yield so that the maximum coverage area possible with that warhead would be achieved. An airburst a few thousand ft up will see the carrier largely out of the immediate-effects zone, but, the blast will still knock it out of action, kill crew, destroy aircraft etc, etc.