JonesyProblem is flight profile not RCS Austin.
Brahmos, to get the standoff range, is flying way up high on ingress and is unmistakeable for anything other than a Brahmos – even before seeker light-up. Seeings as the weapon is so indiscrete the only important figure to be concerned about is how many the launching platforms can deploy in a single attack cycle as saturation is the only possibility for success with the weapon.
This isnt the case with Club. Seaskimming all-the-way at least offers the opportunity of clutter/horizon-masking if the opposition’s look-down radar coverage is degraded for any reason. If the opposition doesnt have look-down radar the missile is going to be a very difficult proposition to cope with – which isnt the case with Brahmos. If you can coordinate a swarm attack with the turbofan weapon and force defenders to split their fires even an advanced defending force will have an unenviable task.
Looks like the Russians know what they are doing with the whole Club weapons system going forwards.
JonesySave for the one small point there Swerve that the only way we now know that there were no weaponised stocks of WMD ready at hand was that the Iraq Survey Group finally got the unfettered access they were always meant to have after the 2003 action.
Had we not done the job we would still likely be in the dark as to what was there and what wasn’t and it may even have been one of Husseins sociopathic offspring at the helm by this time.
The way I see it the mission is nearly done over there now anyway. We know there is no WMD threat to the oil reserves, when we didnt before, and the populace is finding its voice sufficient to tell us to poke off – which you cant imagine them doing under the tyranny of Husseins Mukhabarat. The majority Shi’a population will get the state they always wanted, the Iranians will get all the influence in their neighbour that they could have wished for and the Kurds will keep right on doing their own thing which pretty much suits them anyway.
The only big losers in the whole thing being the Iraqi Sunni population who will learn that you really do reap what you sow….oh and us and the Yanks, of course, who will be shown to have spectacularly failed at creating a democratic and friendly state in the region – ho hum!. We do have the benefit of keeping the oil safe and available in the marketplace though!.
JonesyIn a rare departure from normality I find myself leaning more towards PLAWolf’s position here.
The veracity of what YF has posted about the limitations of China’s shipbuilding industry cannot be disputed and the reports of utterly unfathomable design mistakes in China’s export hulls equally indelible, but, I honestly do not see any reason why China would have an issue building two carriers in the timeframe detailed – if they have the plans ready to go now and if they keep everything simple.
They have certainly been studying the layout and design of aircraft carriers for long enough. Once you understand the processes involved in operating fixed-wings off a ship then replicating it, at a modest level, shouldn’t be all that difficult if you can build big enough.
Much has been made about how the ‘French knew what they were doing and still stuffed it up’. That almost implies that the French were somehow suprised to find that the CdeG was a bit lemony when she was completed. They weren’t. They knew that they were building a very compromised design as soon as the political decision to go nuclear was foisted on them and they realised what kind of installed power budget they were looking at. Essentially they did the best they could with an almost impossible set of design criteria to satisfy – garbage in garbage out as they say. The one thing it wasnt was a suprise though!.
Returning to the China context Distiller makes the crucial point – what are these carriers to do?. Soviet/Russian doctrine was almost for the carrier to be a very long range area AAW vessel protecting forward deployed fleet units with powerful shipboard air search radars controlling high endurance CAP fighters in a very active area defence stance. This type of vessel can be very much simpler than a multirole fleet carrier as it doesnt need to support high sortie rates, have voluminous air ordnance magazines and handling systems and strike planning capabilities. If the Chinese limit their first attempts at carriers to this kind of forward support role, and dont try for a Nimitz straight out of the gate, then there is no reason why they cant get useful vessels in the water. They wont be competing with the USN with these ships but then they arent going to be doing that for decades anyway.
Short version?. Can China put two carriers in the water, operational, with even partially trained up airwings by 2015 – no chance. Can China put two carrier hulls in the water by 2015 and starting a few years of workups – probably yes and, as the Indians have observed with the Gorshkov, any carrier is better than none. The next interesting observation will be to see what their next area AAW missile destroyer is and whether it carries through the PPAR system embarked on the current hulls.
JonesyIn the current vein of the conversation I can add a personal observation from a friend actually attached to the Harrier force at Cottesmore. It was a couple of years back now, but, she was marked down for a tour, with one of the light blue sqdns, and was going to embark on a CVS for a run out east of Suez. All the standard remarks were trotted out….’joined the RAF not the bloody Navy’….’what do you do in the evening if your stuck on a bloody great boat’…etc, etc. I told her to give it a chance and see what she made of it while out there.
Now, its only one example but, I got emails from all round the ME theatre of operations telling me how much she was loving it. She gushed about ADEX’s with French M2000’s, all the formation stuff with NATO escorts, actually going on alert as they transitted Suez for fear of snipers, standing in just the wrong place behind an accelerating jet and damn near ending up in the netting etc!. Doing it permanently wouldn’t have suited her, but, as a step outside her normal routine base life it was a good experience and to quote a later comment it beat the hell out of a tour in MPA, Basra or Afghanistan.
This is from a girl who, one slightly drunken evening, ceremonially burned a copy of Sharkey Wards book, that I’d lent her for education purposes, because it slagged off the RAF!.
This sort of thing is the reason why I’m so heavily effed off with their air-marshallships and idiot halfwits who trot out the, cap doffed to Swerve, Douhetian claptrap about the overarching need to eliminate the carrier capability to save money for land-based air. The carriers offer the potential to make the RAF a very much more deployable and relevent force. They are just too stuck, in fairness as are the CATOBAR/FAA-only mob, in a very old and creaky mindset.
The sooner they realise that a sovereign airbase, capable of reaching about 75% of the earths surface, that comes with its own organic defence, logistics, maintenance and personnel infrastructure is a good thing the better.
JonesySwerve,
Jonesy: I have a nasty feeling the RAF is still wedded to Douhetian thinking, & honestly believes that it is the primary, war-winning service, with the army needed only to mop up & occupy ground, & the RN to transport the army & play nanny to merchant ships.
I think this is the absolute core of the issue. To borrow Baldwins analogy the belief is still that the ‘bomber will always get through’ now, of course, translated to the strike-fighter will always get through, but, the view is there that they will nip off and win the war before the rest of us get to theatre. There is a further general belief that the ‘bombs, bullets and gas’ will just be there and that a suitable airbase will be provided at whim. When the fallacy of this position is pointed out the answer ALWAYS comes back, and I dont know how many times I’ve had the discussion, that if there is no airstrip available its pointless trying to fight anyway. THAT answer, every time I hear it, trips all the fuses at once!.
This said I have no problem with the RAF in general, whilst their raison d’etre might be nebulous and stretched, the organisation exists, is paid for, and has well developed professional infrastructure and, at least in the non-commissioned and junior-mid management ranks, people of the very highest calibre – I know this as I count several very good friends and aquaintances amongst them.
The problem appears to creep in when you hit Policy level….whether there is some form of Trenchard-edict in the RAF senior command course I dont know, but, it does appear to the outsider that a good, open minded, officer goes in and a lunatic with a big hat and a persecution complex comes out the other end. I’ve had discussions long into the night with them in the RAF Club in Piccadilly (often to the dismay of the attractive, formerly commissioned, young lady who kept taking me there when we were in town!) and the paranoia was often quite worrying!. There is a fairly dark joke in Liverpool, where I’m from, about Scouse Judo – the art of attacking your opponent before he can even think of attacking you! – and I heard a little voice repeating it in the back of my mind frequently sitting in the bar upstairs in their Club listening to fine BBC english accents explaining how that, if they lost squadron numbers, they’d never get them back.
Fedaykin,
A fair answer Jonesy, believe me all three services have no problem putting the boot into each other it means getting a chunk of the budget. In respect of TSR2 there was heavy lobbying from dark blue circles to get it killed. The irony is both them ended up shooting each other in the foot.
By all means accuse me of bias here, but, on one hand we see the RN pointing out that a Buccaneer flying off a carrier is capable of far greater range and independence of action than a TSR2 that is reliant on forward basing. Wheras on the other you have a statement from the RAF they could cover the fleet wherever it was deployed such that carrier aviation was unnecessary. I’m happy to leave this there, but, just want to make the observation that an honest analysis that the RAF’s strike aircraft of choice has some limits in deployability isnt the same as a bare-faced lie to say that the deployed RN would have aircover wherever they’d need it.
Lawrence,
TSR-2 was not designed as a V-Bomber replacement, it was meant as a theatre bomber in the same vain as the canberra. The RAF attached to it a doctrine global power projection that would have relied on a network of airbases.
I’m not sure if that is the official line or not but the reality is that the V-bomber force would have been flying the TSR2 mission profile with less chance of success. In operational terms TSR2 would’ve taken over the V-bomber mission as well as that of the Canberra – the way I see it.
Short for what? What great enemy is just across the waves and poised to strike?
None. To complete the reorientation of our still Cold-War entrenched forces into a responsive rapid deployment instrument capable of servicing our foreign policy goals the expend is needed though. IF we are going to go ashore and cause other peoples things to expand rapidly we need to be properly equipped for task. We aren’t there yet. CVF will help as the enabler for the employment of a greater percentage of UK airpower – RAF, RN and Army. The alternative is that we lose the ability to act in this fashion independently and choose foreign policy positions that keep us nice and out of harms way!.
Jonesy10dme,
I will offer a correction, because I served alongside that officer during an earlier timeframe. He may not have seen the project through
to completion, however, I have no doubt the appointment was not a good way to restore confidence within the SHAR community.
As for the rest, I have no interest to further engage on this particular thread, where the vocabulary used has become unacceptable.
Your correction is noted with thanks. Things said on an internet forum such as this often have a habit of becoming gospel after repetition on three or four subsequent fora. Your comment would have been derived as ‘JFH was the RN’s idea’ within the week. Something which can now be intercepted at source.
I am genuinely sorry that you find the vocabulary on the thread unacceptable. I would have very much enjoyed reading your rebuttal on several points.
Fedaykin,
I know your feelings are very strong on this especially in relation to the RAF but all the major services can be just as conniving and naieve be it light blue, dark blue or green. All of the services have at some point launched some kind of deliberate and disingenuous campaign to get the politicos axe happy with another services pet project in the hope of getting the budget for themselves.
I honestly cant think of an example of the RN or Army angling for part of the RAF’s budget. I will admit here to not being fully versed with every RAF project that has been in the works, but, I honestly cant think of any where either of the more senior services have put the boot into the RAF. I know there was much dissatisfaction in the RN about being left to shoulder Polaris and the SSBN programme solely out of its own budget. As I recall though the RN’s argument was that, as a primarily political weapon system, the national deterrent should be funded outside of the Defence Budget and not draw funds from any of the services.
I know many from the RAF side who blame the RN for the loss of TSR2 and the big bombers.
At a push you could make a limited case that the RN Polaris force undermined TSR2’s nuclear strike mission, but, otherwise the comparison between that and the RAF’s very deliberate and dilligent machinations to undermine CVA-01 is a difficult one to draw. Certainly these are emotive issues, but, there is always an objective standpoint from which to view from and, as dispassionately as possible, I cannot comprehend how, when TSR2 was developed to take over the V-force mission, the RN could be blamed for the loss of the heavy bombers?.
We should allocate a fixed budget for each service like the Americans with maybe a seperate R&D budget to support industry.
Nice plan with the one obvious flaw. You would get one service lobbying, moving Australia etc, for a larger amount in its budget even if at the expense of a smaller one for one of the other services. The same situation would carry straight on.
JonesyAt the moment, I am following the Indian Navy Mig-29K evolution with more than passing interest, because they have a similar challenge.
…and the similar solution. Deck ops skills cross-decked from the Russian Navy and, IIRC, the USN. For flying skills I believe they have pilots in the USN programme. This really isnt a major obstacle in any way shape or form when you can keep a dedicated pool of naval aircrew for carrier ops.
The USN and Aeronavale have the advantage of more than fifty years-uninterrupted experience, operating from conventional aircraft carriers.
Your point is elusive. All that comment insinuates is that IF we were to go for CATOBAR or STOBAR then we would be well advised to seek assistance from the US or the French….which is such a facile comment its hardly worth making!. By the same token we have 25 years experience with STOVL naval aviation doesnt, by your standards, that mean we should progress down that route?.
The case for F-35B is not strong. Disregard the stealth properties. It is the single engine that is the important detail here, coupled with the fact
that the RAAF had to resort to espionage, when the United States refused to release the F-18 radar codes. There is potential for a similar scenario
between Great Britain and the United States over the F-35B. It would be better to have committed to the development of STOBAR Typhoon.
Point 1 STOBAR Typhoon is a BAE wet dream to try and get extra orders or shore up the numbers on the book. It and STOBAR were never serious contenders.
Point 2. The case for F-35B, extra to the comment above regarding our depth of experience with STOVL, is overwhelming. Like it or not JFH has been foisted upon all of us. The RAF dont like it and the RN loathe it – you play the hand you are dealt though. CATOBAR or STOBAR and JFH structures are mutually exclusive in any practical cost/benefit sense. IF we are to continue with RAF pilots operating ad-hoc with the carrier force STOVL is the ONLY solution available and that is absolutely irrefutable.
Single engine on a carrier is not the perfect solution but is hardly unusual. A-4, A-7, F-8 etc even, with most relevence, SHAR and F-35C all naval single-motor types and, bar 35C, all with long and honourable service lives. We can skip over the must-be-a-twin jet argument as it is patently absurd.
Here is one classic example of an MOD compromise over the F-35. http://www.flightglobal.com/articles…h-for-jsf.html For those who understand, no explanation is necessary, and for those who do not understand, no explanation is possible.
Again your point is elusive. Its news to no-one that STOVL brings a payload/range handicap over CATOBAR. What we see here, with SRVL, is a way to operationally minimise that – exactly as ski jump STO’s did for SHAR. Where is the huge problem with that?.
It is worth mentioning that the political decision, to merge the FAA/Harrier communities, was driven through to completion by a Royal Navy officer.
Who?. That is most DEFINITELY not the story. FOMA, Iain Henderson, took over 3 Group initially, but, to say he ‘drove JFH through’ is putting a massively biased spin on the events!.
JonesyAnyone who noticed the skill with which John Hutton steered a very unpopular legislation through the House during his time as Works and Pensions Secretary, will conclude that he is perfectly capable of canceling the carriers, if that decision is required.
The two year delay corresponds to the timeframe of an election campaign and possible change of government in 2010.
The relationship between the RAF and the FAA is a moot point. From where will the services build the skill base necessary, to operate conventional strike carriers. Flying from the boat, and working safely on the flight deck, are perishable skills.
The resources would be better directed toward the next generation SSBN nuclear deterrent. It is doubtful if, based on current
projections, the Royal Navy will even retain a Surface Fleet that is fit for purpose. It is unfair to criticise the RAF for the effects
of that catastrophic White Paper delivered by the Wilson Government in the mid sixties, which, incidentally, ruined both services.
As former Works and Pensions secretary Hutton will be well aware that the entire budget for Carrier Strike doesnt even amount to half of the value of the unclaimed benefits pool out of the Social Security budget last year. Throwing 10000 on to the dole in the manufacturing sector for what is, in relation to that budget, pretty small beer would be a difficult thing to survive.
I’m afraid its very, very fair to criticise the RAF for its part in the White paper you mention. The RAF’s involvement in that process did little more than underscore the conniving and naieve nature of the light blue brass at the time. They launched a very deliberate and disingenuous campaign of disinformation about the carriers and their own capabilities to ‘support the fleet wherever it deployed’….what they didnt add was ‘provided it was in the Solent’.
Do I need to re-tell the story of how their crabby air-marshallships moved the continent of Australia, in the maps submitted to adivse the carrier decision, when it proved to be in the wrong place to provide basing coverage over the Far East?.
That offering up another services core capabilities for the chop, instead of joining that service in opposing the cuts in the first place, encouraged the politicians to get axe-happy is hardly a difficult future to predict. That they were too stupid to see past their own agenda is lamentable.
If you are asking where the services would rebuild CATOBAR skills from the answer is simple. The US and French Navies. Deck handling or, in the jargon ‘plane mangling’ is a transferable skill and it would not be a complex issue to cycle RN deck crews through the USN programme. My guess is CATOBAR would mean F-35C and so it could be more or less guaranteed that the USN would be as supportive as possible of this kind of endeavor.
The flying skills are perishable, as I’ve alluded to elsewhere, so CATOBAR for CVF would effectively signal the end of JFH. The retention of a pool of deck-qualified pilots would be extremely difficult under the current structure.
JonesyYou sure about that? I rather doubt they came up with it on their own.
….and right you’d be Kev. The FAA were forced to absorb into 3 Group RAF as part of Joint Force Harrier with the promise that an RN Commodore would be given command of 3 Group.
That happened as promised, but, the Commodore’s tenure was a finite one and his replacement was not, and was never likely to be, another Navy man. Shortly after the RAF were back in command of 3 Group suprise, suprise 3 Group is amalgamated into 2 Group – burying it even more deeply under the crabby shell and ensuring that the orginal jointness deals and equal partnerships originally touted became suddenly a very much lighter shade of blue in outlook.
I’ve been to Cottesmore several times, drained quite a few pints and spent more than one night in one of the girls blocks enjoying the hospitality if not some of the sights. I can you tell that Cotts is not a joint base its an RAF base with some tolerated naval personnel lurking thereabouts.
To get back on point to Nic – you have to look at what you are saying in context of the costs and the rewards. You say F-35C is the best of the two Lightning types….no argument. It is. For us to employ it though we have to throw away Joint Force Harrier and reconsitute at least two frontline Fleet Air Arm squadrons plus a large second-line squadron OCU on an FAA base. Then we have to develop our own logistics and training infrastructure to operate that type. Then we get to the changes necessary to the ship for CATOBAR.
All for an extra 150nm on the top end of the range and the ability to internal carry a 2000lb weapon. Nowhere near worth it and very definitely a prime example of ‘best being the enemy of good’.
JonesyNo but they do need the correct context and that has yet to be provided, the grandiose language being used here to suggest cost increases of epic proportions is unfounded without such context.
What context is there that can justify the inclusion of a maintenance heavy extraneous steam generating plant and 90m C-13 catapults on a design wholly optimised for economy and lean-manning?. Its patently absurd. Check out the crew assigned, on a US CVN, for catapult ops and maintenance. Even divided by two for the smaller CVF fit (with a few dozen extra added on to support the high-pressure steam plant) you are still looking at 150-odd extra bodies. On a US CVN with 5000 souls no-one cares, but, for a lean manned CVF thats about a 10% manning uplift. Plus, apart from the limited numbers that lurk in the submarine community, the RN hasn’t used high pressure steam, from memory, since HMS Intrepid left the fleet in 99 and hasn’t a training pipeline for working with it.
On no level could you even begin to imagine that acquisition, hull modification and whole-life support costs would be anywhere below the £hundred million mark. Then we look at what that spend delivers -> F-35C and Hawkeye. For what?. In what context in the reasonably forseeable future would we absolutely HAVE to have the extra 150nm that 35C brings over 35B. What is the context that sees the absolute need for the kind of sea control mission that E-2 supports (as its naff all use for forward ISTAR!)?.
I’ll state on here right now Lawrence that steam cats will never be installed on CVF and I am so confident of that I will, genuinely, give you £50 if they are. I’d not advise you to make the same wager back!.
There you go, but the force potential level selected is optional and not determined by any threat to the nation state but by the ego inspired desire of British politicians to undertake liberal interventionism. How many times does the 1998 SDR use the phrase ‘force for good’?
Would you term being participatory to numerous security agreements ‘ego’. Would you term the meeting of those obligations as beyond our capability or contrary to our national interest?.
JonesyThe actual costs have still not been quantified and it is entiely possible to do.
The whole-life costs dont need to be researched to the last pound Lawrence – they are too much for what they deliver before you get started on the cost-benefit analysis!.
Is the UK going to be occupied and subjugated without CVF? The carriers were mandated by the 1998 SDR to undertake missions that the paper explicitly stated did not affect the national survival of the UK. These ships are for an optional foreign policy.
Is the UK going to occupied and subjugated if it has half a dozen Sentry’s, a few Typhoon sqdns, a dozen SSK’s plus a smattering of frigates and destroyers and about half the current regular force strength of the standing British Army?. Answer – no. Is the UK’s military stance defined by these carriers – equally no!. The carriers are enablers for the rest of our force potential not the force potential in and of itself.
JonesyI don’t say that EMALS have no advantages, only that the CdG operates a catapult at the same time as being smaller than the CVF, so was wondering why the CVF would NEED EMALS to operate the F35C. Sure it would be more efficient. No debate about that.
Rafale on the CVF would generate higher sortie rates than Rafale on CdG. Why are you comparing what isn’t comparable? And while F35B would probably be on par or superior to most naval types. F35C would still be superior, which is all that matters.
Nic
Nic,
You are still talking about CVF’s size as a driver to whether its CATOBAR or whatever. You have to stop that thinking….it isnt that simple. Look at the drivers involved. Joint RAF/RN airgroup, pilots that may have just rotated off a land-based tour and not seen the ship for 4 months. With CATOBAR they are unavailable for carrier ops until they deck certify again. With STOVL they get in the aircraft and go off on ops. That IS extremely important in the Joint Force model we are employing now.
F-35C is the superior aircraft in technical terms – no argument – it can fly farther and carry more, but, if its sat at an RAF base in Scotland because its pilot has just been shipped to the US for refresher deck quals its worse than bloody useless.
EMALS really IS a necessity for CVF CATOBAR where we to go down that route eventually though. CdeG can use conventional steam catapults because it has very effective onboard steam generators powering the ship – the reactors. CVF has no such steam producing capacity. So adding C13-type cats would mean adding auxilliary boilers and hundreds of miles of steam pipery onto a ship designed to be highly automated and lean-manned. It is NOT a credible option.
If they are not critical to national security, then why buy them at all?
I’d dispute the ‘critical to national security’ element in my book they are exactly that as it impossible to meet certain security requirements, with assuredness, without Carrier Strike of some description. Also support your foreign policy goals, as earlier described, otherwise you accept the position of having no options when the jaw-jaw fails. To the UK this is unacceptable.
JonesyI disagree. In most low intensity conflicts, airports are available. If not, a helicopter will be able to take over the job. The STOVL was useful when countries couldn’t afford large enough carriers. Now with the size of the CVF, it would make MUCH more sense to CATOBAR it and go for F35C. The tradeoffs for going STOVL are definately not worth the ability to land where there isn’t an airfield just once in a while.
Nic
Nic,
Airports can be rendered unavailable for all sorts of reasons. Look at the earlier post by Stacey 24b. The runway condition in the Afghan oparea was a factor in the decision to deploy GR7 to theatre and not the, then available, Jag or Tornado GR forces. Yet that is a ‘low-intensity’ conflict that you confidently predict wouldnt need STOVL capability.
CATOBAR isnt an option for CVF until EMALS is available as there is nothing to generate steam for steam cats. So its STOVL or wait for EMALS. The F-35C range advantage over F-35B is less than dramatic. The overheads that come with the need to have a pool of carrier qualified pilots are significant, especially within a joint land/sea based squadron structure as we are using, and the attrition rate in crashed jets and unlucky pilots equally significant.
Not choosing STOVL simply on the basis that the carrier is big enough to take a CATOBAR arrangement is schoolboy fantasist thinking I’m afraid.
JonesySeahawk,
2x such amphibs which could carry up to 30 F-35B each in CVF use would make more sense then the larger pure CVFs.
Disagree. The cost of an LHD that could operate a CVF-max airgroup at a practical optempo and still be configured to be a worthwhile amphibious unit would be at least equal to what we are paying for CVF. If we didnt have the Albions perhaps it might make sense, but, we do have them.
The other issue is that whilst the CVF, as its is intended to be rolled out now, isnt a Fleet Carrier it very swiftly could be adapted to that role. Its my fervent belief, after a great many years as a devout follower of the creed of CATOBAR and Hawkeye, that new technology is ageing manned naval AEW&C very, very badly. UAV systems exist today that I think are far more suitable for adaptation to the AEW/ISTAR mission than E-2 is and they would be deployable off a, big, STOVL deck too!.
The point being that its easier to build a dedicated aircraft carrier, and just not exploit its full capability in routine peacetime ops, than it is to build an amphib and try to force it into being a full-up aircraft carrier during full wartime conditions.
JonesyI saw a documentary which said Harriers are ideal targets for Portable AA like Stingers
As with most things there are advantages and disadvantages here.
The disadvantage is that the hot nozzles are farther forwards than is usual for a fastjet and that can give the aircraft a broader IR signature, than a conventional tailpiped design, from the frontal lower aspect. Also the placement of the nozzles means that a missile hit is almost guaranteed to hit something the pilot needs wheras a tailpipe is something that can often survive a degree of perforation.
The advantages though, borne out in RN SHAR trials, is that the hot gasses are split by the vector nozzles and halved in intensity. This resulting in a more diffused and lower overall IR signature compared to a conventional design. Also with the nozzles obscured by the wings the aircraft has a very much lower IR signature to anyone looking down (or trying for an IR lock) from above.
Sign In
