First AWACS have huge RCS. second normal operating altitude of AWACS is less than 35000 feet. 3 sqm @400km is export Su-35. Expect MIG-31 at over 600Km for fighter size

So Star if I understand you right you think that, instead of detecting a Su-35 at 300km on its APY set actively, it will, actually, detect it at 400km passively. Also that an AWACS will get a passive detection against a MiG-31 at 600km?. Makes you wonder why the Su or MiG would turn its radar on doesnt it really!.:rolleyes:

MConrads,

This is the second time I’ve reproduced this image on the site. The first time I put them up I gave clear credit and made it expressly clear what the modifications I’d made from the original were to distance the original artist from any error I introduced.

Is it necessary to give credit every time an image is reproduced?.

Steve,

In regards to C2/3 would it be possible to enlarge the design *slightly* in order to leave the work deck on C2. Use the exact same design for both, but without VLS, Harpoon etc on the C3 variant.

I see where you are going but, personally, I’d be wanting a slightly different capability set out of the C2. I want it to be a vessel more optimised for MIOPS and small scale stabilisation ops than for MCMW etc. In that regard building over the working deck for extra aviation capacity and, perhaps, austere accomodation for an EMF would make more sense than the facilities the C3 would offer.

The key to the success of the C2/C3 patrol force you hit spot on – numbers. IF we were to offer BVT a production run of 28 hulls, 18 fitted as ‘batch 1’ C3’s and the rest as ‘batch 2’ C2’s, then offer BAE a contract to supply 28 additional ARTISAN radars, then RR a contract for 56 prime mover diesels etc they would run rings round themselves to get a good price out. That is how we need to be looking at this – not a chance to buy a dozen ‘bells and whistles’ FREMMs just so we can keep deploying ‘proper warships’ on taskings that dont need them.

Planeman

Jonesy mate, you’ve got to look for solutions not problems Britain wasn’t made great by people being conservative

I provided what I consider the optimal solution here weeks ago. I’ve still to see any solution presented by any official or amateur thats come close to offering the capability and efficiency of the operational concept I have been proposing. Quite a few people have balked at the concepts I have put forwards so to now be accused of conservatism, however light-heartedly, is a new one!. 🙂

Basically this is the design that VT put forward for C3. In C3 form the only difference is the FLynx sized hangar, the value of a hangar being someting we seem to be re-learning as a service, and the inclusion of a Mk8 replacing, as their artwork has it, an OTO SR.

The C2 removes the work deck in favour of a longer flight deck, adds 1-2×8 Sylver A43 or 6×4 Slyver A35 VLS fit for’d of the bridge, pushes the, lengthened, hangar farther aft to provide a weapons deck aft the mainmast and sites a refurb Phalanx-1A over the hangar covering the stern arc. Airgroup optimised for surveillance and MIOPS constituting the usual ships flight FLynx but adding at least two additional Firescout/A160 UAV’s.

The C3 as above being easily capable of extended patrol in any current UK low-threat tasking and offering vastly greater multirole capability than anything currently in the RN minor war vessels fleet. The only really high-price items being the radar and the combat data system (of which some type of open archtitecture system would be required anyway!).

C2 is equipped to deal with threat environments at least as adequately as a current T22B3. With a notional A160/Searchwater UAV embarked it could have vastly superior situational awareness over the extended oparea.

Anyway you cut it seperating C2 and C3 off as the ‘patrol’ force means we are covering low threat taskings like APT(N) with vessels far more capable of actually doing something meaningful against druggies in go fast boats or providing a bit more, immediate, disaster assistance to hurricane battered islands than some overblown OPV(H) will do. It also means that in higher threat environments such as the Persian Gulf we can undertake robust patrols without having to task a major fleet unit.

Not necessarily a contradiction. Agree fuel should be in central hull preferably below waterline. But that’s not such a big problem re engines placement as you make out. For starters the engines could be in central hull on the decks immediately above the waterline as per the sketch below (not to scale just a sketch):

Which is nothing really revolutionary as even in non-IEP designs with conventional power trains the fuel bunkers are simply sited forward of the engine spaces. The problem is that your hull is narrower even than a conventional monohull of that displacement. So you are left with the question as to what you try and migrate out of the hull to make space.

Mission creep. As I said I’m not a fan of the whole C1/2/3 concept; it’s a peacetime orientated idea. C3s will inevitably be deployed in harms way. As soon as there is a war or an operational need to be ‘war ready’ the C3s will be found very lacking. Using Falklands as an analogy, you can imagine C3s being left in much the same position as the Leanders were, and with an equivalently inadequate defensive fit.

Mission creep yet your C3 concept is a dual role warfighter?!. C3 is only going to be needed on fleet ops where there is a significant mine threat. With the REMUS/Seafox combination she would introduce a greater element of standoff in mine neutralisation compared to anything in the fleet now. One of the reasons I believe the Mk8-1 would be a good fit on this craft is it will allow the ship to lay off a shore threat 25kms off and suppress shore positions attempting to disrupt MCMW activities. Do that with a 57mm! :).

There is huge value in it because unlike the Mk8 it is credible for air-defense. Mk8 is too short ranged for shore-bombardment so really I don’t see the need for a Mk8 in the modern navy at all!

Which of the existing minor war vessel fleet has comprehensive anti-air capabilities?. If you are facing an air threat over mines then you are not going to fill that slot with an unescorted C3 tasking are you?!.

Why assume the motors would be underrated? In my line of thought speed is one of the biggest problems with C3. It’s not really fast enough to operate as part of a CBG or as a shadow of Russian/Chinese/Indian CBGs. I am sure that C3 will find itself in these roles simply because the RN commanders will view it as another combatant.

You tailor the output rating of the motors to the generation capability of your prime movers. Given 20MW of onboard generation capability from the prime movers you may want your motors to be 18MW output. You wouldn’t go to the considerable additional expense of speccing in 30MW motors just on the off-chance you might plug in an extra turbine once in a blue moon. As to shadowing opposition CBG’s why on earth would we do that with a surface vessel when we have some of the best SSN’s in the world which have the sensors to build up a profile of the ‘target’ vessels?. The RN has long been able to tell the difference between a patrol asset and a fleet asset Planeman.

So the C2/3 with Artisan still needs FCR etc.

ARTISAN should be able to direct fire for the medium calibre gun in anti-surface mode. It will also be capable of cueing a short-range active SAM like MICA or CAMM. Also, to an extent, providing Target Indication to any medium antiship missile embarked. So, realistically, there is nothing else likely to be embarked from UK inventory that would absolutely require a separate FCR of any type.

In that case scrap the carriers. Britain can’t play with the big boys by only spending its lunch money. Britain is the world’s 5th largest economy.

You do understand that we haven’t had the kind of Navy you seem to be thinking of since the 30’s dont you Plane?!.

Look at the capability mix we have, then at the taskings we actually undertake. We have a predominant tasking requirement for high endurance patrolling at extended range from home waters. We have assets optimised for state of the art warfighting that cost an arm and a leg to deploy to just pootle about picking half-drowned round-the-world yachtsmen out of the oggin. We need to address that gap far more quickly than we need to build the capability to chase down mythical PLAN carrier groups in the Pacific!.

Can someone please put this thread out of its misery before the warshot handbags start flying?.

The source for me was R Beedall, but he is quoting Janes, quoting Commodore Steve Brunton

http://frn.beedall.com/s2c2.htm

The date of that article being significant though. Little more than ten months later Vospers 100m C3 proposal started appearing on the net. Vospers being arguably the UK’s leading small combattant authority indicates something of the feasibility of a 2000ton hull to meet the requirement:

VT Shipbuilding, part of vt group, has launched a new range of designs tailored to the Royal Navy’s Future Surface Combatant (FSC) requirement for flexible ships. The FSC programme will ultimately comprise a series of variants to replace the RN’s Type 22 and Type 23 frigates as well as the existing MCM vessels and survey ships. The first of these variants, a 100m vessel, is seen as an ideal solution to the C3 element of the FSC programme that identifies the need for an eight-ship class of general purpose vessels for worldwide deployment to fulfill tasks including minehunting, survey work and patrol duties.

VT has utilised the hull of the Ocean Patrol Vessel (OPV) it is building for the Royal Navy of Oman to develop the FSC solution, although the ship has a larger equipment fit that increases displacement to just over 3,000 tonnes. VT’s C3 design would have speeds in the region of 25 knots and would be diesel-powered, while there would be accommodation for up to 76. The ships would be built in steel but with provision for FRP composite in areas such as the masts. The ships would essentially be compartmentalised by having the assets of a patrol vessel forward, while aft the ship would be equipped for its MCM and/or survey role. In its patrol role, armament would include guns of 76mm or 30mm calibre and provision for surface-to-air missiles if required.

The FSC design would include the option for a flight deck to accommodate a helicopter up to Merlin size and weather protected working deck which would accommodate four 11 metre rigid inflatables or unmanned surface vessels. These could be deployed either by ship’s crane or via a stern ramp that would include an integral launch and recovery system. Space is also available for two 20 ft ISO containers to carry additional MCM or survey assets. Additional assets may be transported on the flight deck and deployed by the ship’s crane at the expense of the capacity to simultaneously carry out helicopter operations.

A very bizarre statement from Cdr Tebbet really. That piece describes C1 as the 22B3 replacement Stevo mentioned and the ASW vessel being C2 – as highlighted by the later required in-service date – there being no way that the 23’s are giving up SONAR2087 to a similar sized/capability hull much before 2025.

Thats a complete reversal of the previous statements of what S2C2 is about.

C3 as a separate entity is ominous sounding for that program – though it would seem to fit with the very conventional concept of minor war vessel that was originally put forward – before Vospers more sensible offering appeared.

In my view this is still very early days and the Janes article sheds light on a program that has little of substance for that light to fall on as yet!. Certainly if we go the route that is appearing to be outlined we’ll be no better off in deployment terms than we are now.

I have a terrible fear that the persistent RN disease of rigid conventional thought is about to reassert itself with a vengeance at a time when we need to be a LOT more creative!.

Difficult to seperate C1, C2 and C3 unless your proposal is for distinct and seperate designs for each though Swerve!. IMO 3 seperate designs, though perhaps optimal, would be unnecessary and wasteful – at this time and at today’s threat level.

It is very important to stress that last point as the goalposts on this one could well be shifting such that in the next 5 years the threat board could look dramatically different.

My concept of C1 I’ve outlined in Planemans thread. Circa 9k tons deep load. 20m stretch on T45 for enhanced aviation fit. Drop VSR and SAMPSON. Keep CESM/ESM fit and add ARTISAN. VLS for significant LACM component with rotary UAV for organic ISTAR. ASW Merlin airgroup for primary warfighting. Tailored airgroup including Merlin HM1/HC3, FLynx, Firescout, A-160ISTAR/AEW for ‘peacetime’ MIOPS and ‘Global Cruiser’ taskings. Build 8 starting in 2016-ish, taking up post CVF slack at Scotstoun and Vospers, at 18 month drumbeat. First 4 or so to be completed with space left for 2087 – taking over decom T22B3 role until T23’s decom and transfer SONAR2087 at C1 major refit interval.

C1 works, to me, no matter what threat level has evolved by 2017-18. Any vessel with rotary-wing airgroup space and support infrastructure, 2087 towed array, 32 LACM’s and a decent ELINT fit is going to be useful.

C2 is the catcher. Right now we need C2 to be something we can deploy cheaper than a T23. No point C2 being a FREMM-style all-signing all dancing GP FFG if we cant afford to deploy it any more than we can do the Dukes. IF we avoid a new Cold War C2 has to be an OPV hull with FFG-style armament otherwise there is no point building it. IF the Russians continue on the course being charted currently then the budget has to pick up and C2 has to be a GP warfighter. That is a vessel that would be interesting to define and specify – though perhaps slightly difficult as build would not really need to be started until about 2025 ish. Still needs to be cheap(ish) and fit with the rest of the fleet so no 5″ guns or SM-3’s, but, perhaps something a bit more punchy than a T23 would be called for.

C3 regardless of any other consideration needs to be bigger than 2000 tons. Simply put for oceanic patrol taskings and to deploy MCMW with the fleet an overbred OPV(H) with a popgun on the front is going to be woefully inadequate. There are about 24 hulls that the C3 would have to replace ultimately and if you want one hull to do the same job as all of them you’re looking at 18 or so 3000ton vessels. Vospers already have this one nailed IMO – their 100m design looks very promising….if they get a hangar for an Flynx sized chopper sorted out!.

Nick,

Is taking the p*** , as it is called, very common in Brit culture, or is it just one of those side things which occasionally happen?

How long have you been on these boards and you have to ask that question?!. :).

Taking the weewee is enshrined in British culture. More so in service life, there are very often running contests within divisions/messdecks/sections etc to see how close to the wire its possible to get before insubordination, charges and a brief stop in jail result!.

Also, whats “fluffy”, does it mean anything apart from the normal meaning of the word?

Nope just that. Fluffy as in bunny rabbits, pillows etc. Apparently there is no word in the German language thats equivalent?!.

Target fixation. A thing common to many many pilots over the world, including many senior, highly experienced types.

According to what he says not exactly. He was fully aware that going around three or more times was a hugely stupid thing to do!.

His comment was that he had a friendly FAC screaming at him to get something done about the Serb armour and he ‘couldnt leave him to his fate’. There was a technical fault with, IIRC, the radar altimeter that was preventing the system giving him his bombing data and he was unwilling to release, with friendlies nearby, without the system data.

I think one of the biggest things combat experience does is it tells you exactly how much you can push yourself & what risks to take. But its learnt the hard way, like many things in life. :rolleyes::(

Could not agree more with that sentiment. Richardson should have gotten to a higher altitude after the second pass and vectored another asset in on the armour when he realised that his system was in the toilet. That said though its easy to second guess when you’ve not got friendly troops screaming at you to get them out of deep trouble and you have a chance at being able to do it. Again, IIRC, I think he did get reprimanded for poor decision making, but, it was deemed understandable in the context of the situation so he avoided the CM.