Very opportune for the Abkhazians this whole Ossetia thing taken at face value. Might be interesting to find out which warships the Russians have deployed to lay off Poti and precisely when they sortied!.
Very opportune for the Abkhazians this whole Ossetia thing taken at face value. Might be interesting to find out which warships the Russians have deployed to lay off Poti and precisely when they sortied!.
Echo
Like I said, don’t use the Royal Navy or AF here, it’s hardly relevant.
An experieced service with first-rate kit has problems, but, thats not relevent to what the PLANAF can manage?. Arrogance or ignorance Echo?.
Right, so the Nimitz is just going to hide in a sea lane and sit there. 😀 And the escorts will follow behind like a line of ducks . . .
Do you have a clue what a sea lane actually is?. These arent defined channels marked out with buoys a couple of miles wide you know?. Sea lanes are the terms for general routes that tides, winds and coastal topography have caused sailors to follow over the years. A carrier group could be spread across a 30 x 30nm box and still be travelling down a sea lane – it could have no recognisable formation whatsoever and have merchantmen pass through it with no ill effect and no knowledge that they had just done it!. If the group is relying on E-2 and SURTASS for offboard sensor coverage and has its ships on commercial nav radar only, how are search assets going to tell the difference between the ducks and the drakes???.
The Soviets/Russians could find them, I’m sure the Chinese could manage, they are not the Iraqis.
When did the Soviets ‘find’ them when the USN we’re trying not to be found?. Please dont embarrass yourself further by bringing up the Kittyhawk/Sukhoi incident from a few years back…the USN used to publish its movements on the internet back then!. Finding that ship was hardly a triumph of Russian maritime reconaissance and the Kitty had the Sukhois tagged an hour before the overflight!.
Extreme stand off is a little bit of a stretch for 500KM off shore. FORCAP simply means they would be escorting strike groups or recon groups, which is what I’ve been saying repeatedly.
So you still believe that fighters with just a few hours endurance can put coverage on MPA’s patrolling hundreds of miles offshore on patrol routes of 12hrs or more?. OK…like I said last time how many relays of fighters, tanker support missions and AWACS flights are you going to use to screen the MPA’s?.
Don’t ask me, because NATO’s missile technology is pretty amateur as compared to that of the Russians in terms of OTH? More realistically, what do you think aerial guidance platforms have been developed for?
Aerial guidance platforms???. You mean Uspekh or Legenda? LOL. Maybe you mean Outlaw Hunter…the platform developed by the USN to support TASM?. I’d encourage you to look all of them up – they all have one thing in common!. I’ll let you guess what it is! :rolleyes:
‘Wolf,
The TLAM vs AD debate IS difficult to quantify.
I dont think I have overstated the problems that I feel a defending air force will have engaging cruise missiles – the iraqi’s for instance had a virtually fully active AD setup during the initial TLAM strikes of Desert Storm. 238 TLAM’s were fired in Op Allied Force and the Serbs had opportunities to effect intercepts and had the lessons of 91 to draw on. Also you’ll note I’ve granted PRC SAM defences a near 1.0 pk rate against TLAM which is likely a shade on the optimisitic side.
All that said I dont want to get into a debate with you as to the precise number of missiles it would take to breach PRC defences at specific points to have the effect of degrading PLAN/PLANAF maritime recon capability. Simply I dont think that level of precision is possible without entering a degree of scenario depth that would be, as you so accurately note, bad ‘for the sake of our social lives and keyboards’. 😀
I’ll leave it with stating my opinion that 100-120 weapons, possibly with ITALD support, would be sufficient to the task and note the fact that you strenuously disagree!.
Something I’m a bit confused about here is if this is about South Ossetia why are the Russians putting warships off Poti and hitting targets in Abkhazia (sp.).
Are these two, seemingly disparate, issues related or are the Russians taking one opportunity to deal with both issues at the same time?.
Something I’m a bit confused about here is if this is about South Ossetia why are the Russians putting warships off Poti and hitting targets in Abkhazia (sp.).
Are these two, seemingly disparate, issues related or are the Russians taking one opportunity to deal with both issues at the same time?.
The concept of placing the VLS install down one side of the hangar on C2 was mine so thanks to Frosty, again, for his spirited defence of another mans follies! 🙂
The Sylver A35 module if, CAMM does end up as an approximately 3m long round, should be big enough to take the new missile. Cutting in to the hangar on one side will obviously steal space inside from the aviation department and would be likely to limit a 4k ton hull like this to FLynx and UAV’s. For me this is no loss to be honest. I think the chances of seeing Merlin, given the modest numbers we actually have, assigned as C2 ships flights are extremely remote. C2’s mission is actually just as well served by FLynx/Firescout/A160 anyway.
The 120m design you’ve generated is obviously superior, but, its interesting to see what could be achieved on the planned 100m layout Vospers are putting forward for C3. The below renderings are based on a chap called Wakazashi’s quite superb drawing of the VT C3 proposal. I have taken his name off solely to distance him from my tinkerings.
The changes to C3 are obviously the extension of a hangar back between the funnels to the mainmast and, naturally, the replacement of the OTO Super for’d mount with a Mk8 mod 1. Neither change being something outrageously difficult to accomodate IMO. The C2 concept obviously moves the hanger farther astern to createa weapons deck aft of the mainmast and modifies the raised forward superstructure, shown in the original VT plans, to accomodate, notionally, 6 A35 modules for 24 cells.
Ken,
dispersal. But how to recover, replenish, relaunch? Can’t,
Perhaps a facile question, but, why not?. ‘HMS Sheathbill’ the San Carlos FOB a mere 17yrs later than your timeframe was quite capable of generating multiple sorties and its logistics state was parlous to say the least…plus half of the base construction material had gone to the bottom with the Atlantic Conveyor.
It begs the question of why the RAF were incapable of developing dispersal ‘hides’, complete with adequate logistics stocks, seeings they had the transport infrastructure of a developed european country to fall back on?.
Same for F-35B: when will it take off S, dash supersonically, and land V?
I’d imagine relatively frequently – in USMC and RN markings.
Echo
Why is this a problem – a first strike for the Chinese? Are the Americans suddenly going to sneak attack on China? Come on now.
Do you lads get taught this routine all in the same place before you are allowed onto the net Echo?. You exhaust the options you have for countering my argument technically so then you resort to vacantly blurting out that it would never happen anyway so its all irrelevent?. You all follow exactly the same tactics?.
And RAF failures don’t apply here. I also doubt sea lanes are going to be in question for hiding, as this would probably just make the search easier.
Anyone on this site will tell you my opinions of the RAF and that they are not all that high. They have though nearly 70 years of experience in maritime patrol and, more specifically, oceanic patrol missions. They still make glaring mistakes in long-range ship recognition despite first-rate technology and all that operational experience. How do you justify the PLANAF doing any better with poorer kit and a fraction of the experience?!.
The Nimitz would be slightly shorter, and perhaps larger in beam by a bit than a VLCC/Malaccamax type vessel.
Look up the words RESOLUTION and ASPECT. There is a picture of a Chinese radar display scope on this thread – its an old-style PPI. You are not getting the resolution on that scope to tell which contact is a ‘bit wider in the beam’. You need a SAR capable radar and about 10m resolution to tell detail at the level you are talking about. You’d also need to be about 100km from the target…which might be just a bit risky!. Also you need the target to be at the correct aspect to your radar platform to get the correct profile. From stern port quarter a Nimitz is going to have a near identical radar profile to a VLCC even at 10m SAR res.!!!. 2/10 Echo – must do better.
So at the same rate, you can overwhelm a CVGB’s defenses too.
Of course you can. The problem, which no-one has solved yet, is finding the carrier and fixing its position for long enough to coordinate a strike of sufficient weight to saturate its defences.
So there’s no such thing as HAVCAP or FORCAP? Come on now
What have Combat Air Patrols got to do with the kind of ocean reconnaissance that the PLANAF is capable of mounting at extreme standoff. The CAP is programmed to form a barrier between a set HVU and a pre-determined threat axis – hence the other acronym BARCAP. You are suggesting that the PRC has enough recon assets to BARCAP the whole South China Sea?.
Right, Jonesy vs the whole USSR military, good luck with that one.
LOL. What makes you think I’m the only one who knows the way this works in the real, non-internet fantasy, world!. A USN Lt Cdr painted the pic clearly enough above. I’ll let you into a little secret, lots of Warfare Officers, in Navies all over the world know what the limits of OTH targetting are!. Why do you think so few OTH missile shots have ever actually been attempted!:rolleyes:
plawolf,
First I have to acknowledge what you wrote above. Respect from ones adversary being the greatest accolade etc. Sincerest of appreciations, sir.
Even assuming a 150-200km detection range, thats still plenty of time to vector in the huge numbers of J7s and eariler J8IIs to intercept a sizeable proportion of those slow subsonic missiles out at sea while still leaving all of China’s newest and most capable fighters free to perform other missions.
I knew someone would pick me up on that. For me its difficult to calculate the effect fighters would have on a TLAM strike. Many hundreds of TLAM’s and dozens of CALCM’s have been fired operationally and, whilst a number have been brought down by ground defences, I’m not aware of any that have been shot down air-air. TLAM is still a small radar-target thats flying very low against background clutter (how good is a J-8’s radar against multipath reflection?).
Then there is the issue of Alert status and how many aircraft the PLAAF could actually generate in the few minutes from detection to the TLAM’s entering the targets SAM engagement zone?. Obviously there would be a CAP up and alert-status fighters spotted at various airfields, but, only certain airfields alert fighters would be in position to be able to vector on the inbounds. Theoretically the number of interceptors able to engage the TLAMs may not be all that high!.
I am also highly dubious of the idea of a carrier battlegroup operating completely emission (electronic before some smartass starts) free, as that would leave the entire battlegroup extraordinarily vulnerable.
Information Warfare ‘wolf. If there is one thing that sets the USN apart from everyone else its their ability to exploit passive and offboard sensors to develop the plot whilst remaining silent. They realised this after Midway and they have spent decades refining fleet manoever to an operational art. I’m critical of the USN in some areas, I think they ridiculously over-man their ships and they have strange ideas on engineering officers being suitable for operational commands (and I say that with my engineering background!), but their fleet ops are light years ahead of EVERYONE else.
If a carrier battlegroup does run slient, then that is taking a gamble with incredible stakes when the odds are probably unclear even to the people making that choice. If the Admiral in command looses his nerve and goes to full battlestations, then its a totally different ball game.
Everyone can make mistakes. The USN isnt infallible and they have been caught napping under exercise conditions. My point would be though that you cant rely on the other side making a mistake for your nations defence!. Either the capability is there to find and track a carrier group before it could initiate land-attack operations or its not. For the PRC at the moment, going purely from open source, its not.
Just to butt in a little bit, but a while back I read from a pretty good source that China was preparing 5000 HQ-9 missiles at that time. Of course, it’s not fully deployed yet, but it definitely sounded like they were preparing for some serious pounding against the 4 major civilian areas and military regions. If you add the S-300, HQ-12, HQ-7, all the anti-aircraft artillery and mobile air defense units, you seriously need a lot of missiles.
Indeed you would. There is no way we were talking about facing down just a couple of Crotale fire units in the first place! 😉
The fact remains though that individual SAM batteries have a certain, finite, number of SAM’s in the ready-to-launch position. China has, for the whole country, about 40 batteries of S-300s each with 4 TEL’s and 16 ready-to-fre missiles. I’m happy to acknowledge that your probably going to see those missiles down 14, 15 or even 16 TLAM’s. There will possibly be a battery of SA-15’s close-in defending the site, with some AAA thrown in. Again I’d agree that you could see the same amount of TLAMs destroyed again. The SAM site has downed 30 inbound TLAMs.
So if one ship fires 40 TLAM at the one site, mixed in with the 300km ranged air launched ITALD, you have a pretty good chance of a dead SAM battery. Give the target MPA airfields two full batteries protection each and you are still looking at ‘only’ 100 missiles or thereabouts to saturate the defences. So thats the TLAM firepower of, what, a Tico and a couple of Burkes to knock down an airfield – by rough rule of thumb – from 500km off. Raytheon are contracted to deliver nearly 3500 missiles to the USN as well!. Plus we are still only talking of Navy weapons. The USAF has, apparently, in excess of 1100 CALCM’s and, if they ever get it fixed, JASSM to team in with.
The US has sufficient weapons and deployment platforms to saturate a modest number of fixed targets, from extreme standoff, with the effect of knocking back opposition forces aimed at counter-detecting the naval forces.
Enrique,
First please accept my thanks for the information you provided about the radar installations on the island. I was going to ask you about the effects of our gunfire as I’d been told that the radars had been observed to drop offline following several shellings. I was never sure if this was just the systems being resited or whether they were damaged and needed bringing back into service. Thanks for clearing that one up!.
Three torpedos fired , two hit belgrano – The third one ? aimed at an escort or missed -?
The third Mk8 was fired in salvo ahead of Belgrano’s position from a firing point about 1500yds off the vessels port beam. As I understand it the two escorts were positioned on the Belgrano’s starboard beam (ARA Piedro Buena) and line ahead on the bows (ARA Hipolito Bouchard) just off to starboard. The whole salvo was aimed at the Belgrano.
What seems likely is that the third Mk8 missed forward of the Belgrano and kept on its merry way towards the Bouchard. I’ve never heard anyhting definite about whether a third explosion was recorded on Conks’ sonar – the possibility is that the noise put in the water by the Belgrano’s break up could’ve masked the third detonation even if it happened.
I’ve read a piece, allegedly from the Bouchards skipper – Capt Barcena, that suggested he believed his ship had suffered damage from an explosion close aboard, but, that his ship wasn’t directly struck by a torpedo. I find that a little hard to believe to be honest – the odds against a weapon that missed one ship ending up on a bearing to a second and detonating just close enough to the hull to avoid sinking it….but enough to put a few 5″ wide cracks in is just a little too much for me to easily believe I’m afraid. I think that the torpedo ‘damage’ on the hull was probably something a bit more mundane, like exposure to very heavy seas would do to an old hull anyway, and the third torpedo was a straight miss.
Escorts did they ever had the oportunity to detect the HMS Conqueror , or was it an imposible
Belgrano had no working sonar apparently and Wreford-Brown had been very careful to make his approach on a bearing that had him masked from Piedro Buena by the Belgrano itself and was in the Bouchards stern arc. It was a very professional approach – even if the two escorts had been equipped with decent sonar (which according to Barcena they weren’t) neither would have had much of a hope of tagging Conks even at 1400yds owing to how the escorts were situated.
After achiving the mission , HMS Conqueror remains in site or departs to other areas ?
I’ll have to check but I think that she went west after the Belgrano engagement and performed intel/raid warning duties off the Argentine coast.
Frosty,
Please consider my cap doffed to you sir….that is exactly what I want to see!. IMO its all deliverable, efficient, capable and affordable….almost guarantees the fact that your work will be as close as we get to it!!!.
Unless you have some sources to bring to light, I’m sticking with “opinion.”
Entirely up to you. The evidence supporting what I’m saying is manifest and the sources actually on this thread, but, if you lack the intellectual honesty to accept them it really is not my problem. As stated you are far from alone in your views.
Right, so that TLAMs are just going to vaporize everything China has right? Have you even considered their SAM defenses? Clearly for your own convenience, you have not. Who says the US gets the first strike? What if the Chinese to a sneak attack on the carrier with various assets instead? :rolleyes:
What assets and how though?. The whole problem for the Chinese is targetting the carrier group before the carrier group can fire. If the Chinese could actually get their shots off at 500km offshore then the CSG is going to have a difficult life. The point is though that, barring luck, the PRC forces cannot relaibly do that with the assets they have as they cannot put out a sufficient, surviveable, reconnaisance screen that deep to find and identify the carrier group. Remember there are lots of ships in the Sth China seas that dwarf even a Nimitz and evading a handful of MPA’s is not something that is all that difficult. The RAF never got a solid track on the Argentine carrier in the Falklands despite repeated false-target tracks and the Nimrod MR2’s they used then were no worse that the MPA’s in use by the PRC..
Hmmm I’m a former SAM technician and I never thought about whether SAMs could counter a TLAM strike eh?. The word ‘saturation’ means, in this context, to fire more weapons than the opponent can defeat. It is a dramatically successful tactic. The SAMs arrayed by the PRC are amongst the best in the world, they, like all SAMs though, have x number of ready-to-fire rounds on the launchers. If you fire x+5 TLAMs at that site then, barring freak incident, you destroy the site.
If you mix in a few Super Hornets worth of 300km ranged ITALDs with the x-5 TLAM strike you guarantee saturation. It would require a lot of TLAM’s, several hundred in fact to just open up SAM defences and knock out a few airfields, but the USN has no shortage of Mk41 cells and hitting MPA airfields, OTH sites, etc would be worth the expense.
Who even brought up armed vs unarmed?
Me!. Shooter = armed as opposed to Recon = unarmed. You do not use armed strike aircraft on long overwater patrol missions. You use a high endurance recon asset to cue in the shooters
Fact is, the various assets work together, not separately. Be it China or Russia, unless you think only countries of NATO are the smart ones and can stomp over any other Armed Forces, while the other countries have no sense of cooperation.
Dont recall making any grandiose statements like NATO only being the ones who are smart so knock the prejudice off right now. I’ve said that the kind of anticarrier tactics you are proposing are useless and based on the old Soviet model which experience shows was little better.
The problem is that those drawings are now out of scale by some margin. I’m not sure about the Merlin hangar on either the C2 or, to a lesser extent, C3. The Merlin size flight deck on C3 I think is do-able I’m just not sure that a hangar that big is a practical measure. Given its mission I think FLynx or a couple of Firescout/A160 UAV’s would be the target to aim for for hangar space and air ops on C2.
I dont think there was anything wrong with the first concept drawings you had that held the stronger commonality between C2 and C3 designs. I think that there might have been a moderate scaling problem with the actual drawing because, if you compare to an Iranian Vosper Mk5 corvette, the gun is too big in proportion to a 3500-4000 ton escort. If you could fit the CAMM into a hangar-side A35 mounts as the Greek FREMM layout has and re-site the Harpoons Mk141 tubes dead aft or recessed between the forward superstructure and the funnel-group perhaps then you keep much of the original design concept of commonality. The C2 as you had redesigned it was starting to look a lot more like a FREMM than an austere patrol combattant!.
The C3 was fine as it was IMO. I’d swap the SeaRAM for Phalanx just as we already have it and I’d resite it from the bridge to the hangar roof. Best to turn the stern onto the inbound bearing and risk a hit in the hangar than turn bows in to the threat and risk the hit on the bridge/CIC spaces. Personal opinion only but I’d have Phalanx sited to cover my stern arcs!.
Frosty
I have a few questions Aster would require a expensive multi function radar sensor fit?
In a word yes. Aster uses an active seeker, but, its relatively short-ranged and, obviously, battery powered. To get the most out of the seeker then the missile is steered to a position that puts the inbound nearby, with deflection, and inside the Aster seeker cone. To do this with a high speed inbound, like an antiship missile, means that the guiding radar must be capable of painting the target, deriving its position and predicted course, then updating the Aster with the intercept vector. At the moment that means a passive or active phased array set capable of beamshifting to ‘ping’ targets for the update.
CAMM wil have a range of around 7-10km?
I’ve seen it associated with the FLAADS (Future Local Area Air Defence) requirement which is meant to provide a weapon capable out to 20km ish with an active radar seeker – similar in parameters to VL MICA but less French as far as I can make out!!!.
CAMM will be able to take out other missiles? CAMM will be able to be mounted in a VLS and a phalanx/SeaRAM style?
As I understand it MBDA have already undertaken trials deploying an ASRAAM derivative test round 3m long x 166mm diam. from a VLS launcher and had successful tipovers etc. One would presume then that existing Sylver launchers like the A35 and A50 would be compatible with CAAM and, if the diameter at least, stays the same quad-packing would have to look a distinct possibility.
what would naval scalp require to be fired apart from the Sylver A70 launcher?
A 21″ torpedo tube is the only other alternative I’m aware of!.
To operate 2 Merlin Helicopters would you need deck space for 2 or just hanger space?
At bare minimum just the hangar space and a bit of wiggle room on the pad. You would want a lot more though. Ideally an aft pad with a minimum of a Merlin spot and a concurrent UAV spot or something similar.
Jonesy i guess like me you think a helicopter is one of the most valuable assets on a ship?
As a general rule yes!. Within sensible limits of course – there’s no way that an AAW design should be incorporating an aviation dept able to support more than a Lynx or a couple of rotary UAV’s wheras an ASW ship would have to count the chopper as a primary weapons system and make appropriate accomodations.
Regarding SeaRAM, I’m not sure about the conclusions drawn – though there don’t seem to be any plans to purchase, I suspect this has more to do with the budget than anything else!
Not quite so sure on that Ed. Over 7 years we could have found enough down the back of the sofa to buy in a few missile packs even if it meant pushing back the US$57mn -1B upgrades to some of our existing Phalanx mounts. That we haven’t and, after going to the bother of trialling the system on a 42, that so little has been heard of the system does not bode well for it in my experience. Could be wrong, of course, but usually their lordships like cheap little tweaks such as this that could be shown as major qualitative advances in RN capability. Seven years with nary a word does not fit the pattern for a weapons system we’ve gotten all excited about!.
It would certainly be a boost for ships not equipped with other anti-missile systems, i.e. pretty much anything without Seawolf! It would appear to offer much of the same capability as the Seawolf, yet with a fraction of the footprint. It certainly would seem to be a logical step, drawing on the existing hardware. It’s plug and play nature might even allow ships to share from a pool of gun-equipped 1B mounts, and SeaRAM mounts; as a money-saving measure.
Cant disagree with the logic, but, it does all hinge on the premise that SeaRAM was able to offer the ‘same capability’ as SeaWolf and that it was a measurable advance over normal Vulcan/Phalanx plus softkill in effects terms. I suspect, though have no proof, that SeaRAM may have failed at that last criteria….its roughly an improvement….but not enough to justify any expense when Aster is round the corner, Phalanx is up to the job with low-end threats and Phalanx -1B gives a useful multirole capability.