JonesyI always was for a more honest and in-depth look into the case of 11 CVNs + 8 LHAs + 8 LHDs vs a fleet of 32 conventionally powered medium carriers (around 50.000ts with around 45 CTOL aircraft, but double-tasked as tacair and amphib assault/helicopter carriers). Never seen a total cost of ownership analysis.
Couldnt agree with that sentiment more wholeheartedly. 4 strikefighter sqdns, a Hawkeye det and some rotaries would make a very useful airgroup and are a perfectly feasible fit aboard a PA2-type carrier.
As for costs the crewing figures alone are stark – 11 x 5500 crew per CVN (rough) = 60,500 personnel compared with 32 x 1500 per (PA2) = 48,000 and we arent even figuring in the amphibs on the CVN side there. Obviously not all CVN’s would manned all the time as would be the case with the PA2’s so there would be variance, but, the manpower differences are remarkable!.
There is, counting against it, the issue of the PA2’s fossil fuel requirements compared with the CVN’s independence of that particular achilles heel. Also the fact that nuclear support facilities have been built to support the USN CVN fleet so those costs have already been invested in where the USN UNREP capability would probably have to be stepped up to service a “PA2-esque” carrier fleet. Even so I struggle with the view that a 5500 crew CVN is an efficient solution to the USN global presence mission.
JonesyStill very little time to make a more comprehensive post I’m afraid, but, briefly – there was a contingency plan should the war go into a protracted phase beyond the ability of the task force to stay on station at maximum strength.
That was the development of a lodgement on W.Falklands. The Argentine presence on West Falklands was minimal and it was considered feasible, just, to set up an austere base similar, but larger, to that established at San Carlos there.
The theory being that RAF GR3’s in strength plus FRS1’s transferred ashore from the departing carriers, with radar/SAM support offshore from the fleet, and Rapier, concentrated on open ground with clear arcs, could be enough to form a bridgehead that the Argentine forces would have a very hard time assaulting. The lodgement, over a period of time, being enhanced with hard-runway capability to allow the RAF to bring in Hercs, Phantom and Tornado.
Logistics would’ve been the hard part of the plan but the winter weather would have hampered everyone equally in the air and the SSN presence wouldve meant a very limited Argentine seaborne challenge to UK transport ships transitting to the islands.
JonesyThe normally articulate British, in my case only, is extremely busy at the moment unfortunately! 😀
As soon as I have sufficient time to respond to all of the different points made I will but at the moment the Argentinians have me outmanned at least 4 to 1!. Be fair Pegon! 🙂
JonesyJuan
ON this post, I will include another close up of the CORVUS where the “use ” of it is more evident……
A colleague pointed out before that he spent his chaff on false alerts before and was awaiting for resupply.. but now I think… how would you sent a full blown Class 42 on Radar picket duty without an extra reserve of chaff?
Would it be maybe the case that the exocet was effective at all? That in spite of all efforts, they got it?
The ship hadnt spent ‘all their chaff’ on false alerts. As I said earlier Sheffield had launched a pattern following a false alarm – this is why the launchers showed signs of rocket exhaust scorching. Chaff rockets were obviously very portable between ships but, on average, most escorts had as few as 3 full reloads for the launchers. The company that made ‘Chaff Delta’ for the RN, Chemring IIRC, went on 24hr production to get fresh stocks to the Fleet. They did so well that the MD of the company was honoured by the Queen after the war!.
I know you are enjoying attempting to analyse this, but, there really is nothing to analyse in this situation. Even the MoD Board of Inquiry report clearly states that Sheffield did NOT launch chaff during the Exocet attack and was still in Defence Watches when the missile hit.
JonesyThats the BAE UVX concept ship. Widely considered a bad idea – though if you delete the ridiculous ski ramps you could have the makings of an interesting DDH/CGH platform.
Previous thread on this design: http://forum.keypublishing.co.uk/showthread.php?p=1232391
Cheers,
Steve
JonesyNicolas,
I think its possible that you’ve got a couple of different stories muddled together there.
The RN didnt need any codes or other technical assistance from Aerospatiale with either recognising or defeating the Exocet seeker. This is simply because we already had the weapon, in MM38 form, in the fleet. We knew all about the weapons capabilities just as the Argentines knew all about Sea Dart because they used that weapon.
What we didnt have was any experience going up against the Super-E/Agave/AM39 weapons system. This is what the French Aeronavale provided welcome assistance with.
The issue with ‘codes’ may be more to do with the technical assistance ‘provided’ to the Argentine Armada by Aerospatiale in order to get the AM39’s integrated onto their Super-E’s. The best description of this I’ve ever seen being on this very thread from Juan:
1- The French technicians that were helping the COAN to reach the “firing top” of the system were ordered to go back to France, at that time, the COAN did not “know” how to launch them properly prepared to home on target and explode. They left, but they “forgot” all the technical documentation, and the Argentine armament people of the SuE squadron were able to decode their way to be able of launching successfully from the first opportunity.
Which, its got to be said, is a very creative way of making sure you fulfil your obligations to a paying customer without unduly embarrassing and earning the displeasure of your Govt. A very ‘Gallic’ solution! 🙂
JonesyMajor Posadas,
Just to follow on from Swerves greeting its great to have individuals of your background and experience onboard to join and add to the quality of the debate here.
Of course, that said, the first thing I have to do is question some of the information you have shared above! 🙂
You say that you had no UK sourced freefall ordnance?. Was that just your squadron or Argentine air forces in general. Its just that I have a picture, somewhere, of the UXB that sat, for a short while, in ARGONAUT’s Sea Cat magazine and its definitely a UK Mark17 1000lb’er. The fuse hadn’t armed during the fall but had been damaged when the bombs impact detonated two Sea Cat missiles in the magazine and it was a distinctly hairy task getting the thing out!.
That brings us on to the second point about the impact fuses. The only warships in the Task Force, I am aware of, that used aluminium in their superstructure where the Type21’s and although ANTELOPE did end up with a UXB aboard ARDENT wasnt quite so lucky and, despite the aluminium, at least 3 x 500lb weapons detonated. The remainder of the ships, including all the 42’s, were of all-steel construction and the older County, Rothesay and Leander class designs bore more in common with WW2 escorts than anything we’d recognise as a ‘one-shot ship’ of today – they were tough old girls!. They should have been at least ‘as tough’ as an old freighter/merchie target hulk.
There are several occaisions where the bombs released skipped over their targets. There is an account from one of BROADSWORD’s Bofors gunners of him seeing a bomb bounce before his ship – beam on – go right over his head and splashdown somewhere the other side of the ship that makes fascinating reading. I would enjoy discussing the tactics that the Air Force pilots were trained to employ, but, that will probably fall outside the scope of this thread.
Regards
Steve
JonesyJuan,
Ahh sorry I think you misunderstand – its slang to say ‘in my book’ it means ‘in my opinion’. There is no actual book involved.
One other small point is that Sheffield was known by the nickname ‘Shiny Sheff’ as was the Type 22 that followed the T42 lost to the Armada. This was owing to many of the fittings on Sheffield being of stainless steel (instead of the more normal brass) – the stainless steel being donated by the city of Sheffield (a famous steelworking city) to the ship named after it.
Sens,
Rodionow and Nowitschkow seemingly had some gaps in their work. Pentreath was the Plymouth’s CO and he wasnt close enough to Sheffield to render assistance for some time after the Exocet hit. In fact HMS Arrow and Yarmouth were the vessels that got to the Sheffield in the first instance. Arrow actually placing her bows on Sheffield to allow the crew to abandon. Yarmouth took the damaged Sheffield under tow later in an attempt to recover her.
The last communication from the Neptune to the SuE’s was some 20 minutes before they launched and it was to report a group of ‘one large and two medium contacts’ according to Argentine sources. There is no way that the Neptune could have directed the individual Etendards on to Sheffield and Plymouth simultaneously.
JonesyHello everybody,
I would like to first introduce myself, I am Juan Mielke, Argentine living in Spain and a “pen pal” of Enrique Rey del Castillo, one of your new forum “jewels” as he was the operator of one of the LR radars on the islands at the time.]
Greetings in return Juan I personally, look forward to other contributions yourself an Enrique can make. I’d particular like to discuss the movements of Argentine radars and the Roland battery on the Islands during the conflict with him at some later time.
I have seen, actually I have a copy that I would like to post as soon as I find it, of the damage to the side of the Sheffield in which it is very clear that the “entrance hole” has like “flower petals” protruding outwards from the hull of the ship…….. that, from my point of view, is a clear indication that at least that Exocet DID explode…….. we can agree I think, that if there was no explossion, then the “hole” should have not “blown outwards”.
From the account of someone on the ship at the time, who’s duty station was in the Computer Room, where the missile impacted I can tell you that there was a loud bang and an overpressure blast from the sustainer motor when the missile hit. That is more consistent with the damage shown in the photograph…not a full warhead detonation. In truth though if someone says the warhead went off then I wouldnt argue it…all I can say is that the view amongst the crew is that there was no explosion.
More over, the story goes on that the Sheffield did not react in any way with any countermeasures……… but…… in the same pic I mentioned before. the “covers” of the CORVUS Chaff launchers are open…… and there is smoke stains that clearly indicate that the Sheffield DID launch chaff…… This may explain also why the other Exocet did not struck home….. maybe that one WAS decoyed from the ship……
This one I can answer accurately. Sheffield had launched chaff on an earlier occasion after a false alarm. This is why the chaff operator didnt deploy a pattern on the fleet Exocet warning signal from HMS Glasgow. Basically RN escorts had finite supplies of chaff rockets embarked and the fleet supply was still catching up. The operator was concerned with wasting another pattern of rockets on a possible false alarm (Sheffield wasnt holding any contact on ESM owing to the SCOT use) and was waiting for confirmation from the PWO. The PWO wasnt there so the ship got hit.
……… so I think we should give a “point” to the exocet and to the fantastic planning and execution of the operation by the Argentine naval pilots in a team work that led ultimatelly to the loss of one “top of the line” AAW destroyer.
On the performance of the men I absolutely concur – with very real credit to the Neptune team’s too. They are very much unsung heroes, in my book, when nearly all of the credit goes to the Skyhawk and Dagger pilots who did all the low altitude work. The missile system got lucky I’m afraid.
So this should credit the SuE/Exocet team a bit more, I consider exagerations to say that there was a 100% “luring ratio” of the exocet system.
Sorry Juan, Exocet was defeated by every warship that used countermeasures.
Sens
Is it a running gag and I missed it? Not adjusting bomb-fuses to an attack-profile is a technical problem neglected by someone in charge to take care of.
No – thats an operational issue. Its not a technical fault because there is nothing technically wrong with any of the hardware – it was all working fine. Its an operational fault because if dropped from the correct altitude the bombs would fuse successfully and detonate. If the attack profile calls for a release altitude below safe minimum for the fuses in the slick bombs then its an operational requirement to have the ordnance fitted with ballutes or change the attack profile.
Your claim about the Exocet is curious at best. How many Sue and how many Exocet were at hand? When I remember well, the delivers were held by France to support the UK. The RN was briefed about the capabilities of that and even some training sessions were conducted. All advantages were on the the British side.
So, because the French Aeronavale provided invaluable assistance to the RN amongst several other less well publicised examples of co-operation, I should not say anything bad about Exocet?. Why?. Who still uses the early block AM39?.
Had the HMS-ships siesta, when unable to protect that high value asset? Did the same woodward keep his assets in a distance and do limiting the amount of support by that?
The Glamorgan and Ambuscade were not assigned to consort the Atlantic Conveyor – they were part of the outer screen of the carrier group. Ambuscades chaff may have dragged a missile off Glamorgan and set it on its way to the Conveyor I doubt well ever know for sure. Also the Conveyor was over the visual horizon from Hermes so that figure of 6km doesnt look right.
Did the same woodward keep his assets in a distance and do limiting the amount of support by that?. Either such Exocets posed a real threat or the RN-commanders were idiots.
There still needed to be a warship to launch the chaff to defeat the missile and screen the carriers. Putting that screen several miles downrange from the actual targets is established naval practise.
In 45 km distance they popped up to 150 m or 450 feet and used the radar for 30 seconds targeting Sheffield and Plymouth.
Dont know where you’re getting that from Sens. HMS Plymouth, according to David Pentreath, was several miles away to the east from Sheffield during that attack. She would have just been detectable on the SuE Agave if Sheffield was attacked at 20nm.
Anyway the point on this that needs making has been made already and that simply is that AM39’s performance in 1982 was poor and the ‘2 hits out of 5 shots’ originally mentioned does much to flatter the missile and does not tell the full story.
JonesySens
It was a technical problem, because the Argentine did not realize in time to adjust the fuses to their operational profile.
How can it be a technical problem when nothing was wrong with any of the hardware?. Believe me if you handed me the snag list and told me, as a weapons engineer, to fix the issue of the bombs not detonating I’d have laughed you off the deck then shown you what a retard kit is. I suspect my equal number in the Armada probably did the same to some air force pilot in 82 as well.
The fitting of retard kits to dumb ordnance to make low-level antiship attacks safer and more effective was well known before 1982 and hadnt escaped the Armada. The point being that, just as we knew how to defeat Exocet and did so at every time of trying, the Argentine strike forces knew how to attack ships with dumb ordnance – they just made a mistake not fitting more retard kits.
Just fools did prepare for the last conflict and do not look ahead. Just to iron-out some obvious shortcomings is never enough.
Ironically we werent even preparing to fight the last war – we were preparing to fight a single enemy and a specific range of threat-systems. I think foolish is probably a kind understatement there too!.
JonesyThis is the same kind of pride that has the Argies claiming they sunk carriers – still, after all these years.
You talke pride in your navy, and your service, but pride cannot change the facts.
You see Pegon this is very little to do with pride. If it were wouldnt I say that the AM39 was an absolute wonder weapon. That the Sheffield was hit by a superior weapon we had no ability to defeat?.
Instead of that I’m saying the opposite. I’m saying that it was the mistake of the RN that led to at least one, possibly two, warships being hit by the missile.
As you say pride cannot change facts and the facts in this case are very clear. AM39 was a very easy missile to defeat. Why would you concievably need a standoff weapons system that can only be used against a defenceless target?.
JonesySens,
With respect this is indicative of the problem – common myth has it that Argentine bomb fuses were poor:
The other way around the Argentinians had problems with their bomb-fuse, which they did not sort out in time.
The Argentine air force did not have a problem with its dumb ordnance fuses. Its aircraft were flying the wrong profile for the perfectly workable fuses that their bombs had. Do you see the difference?. One is a technical problem and the other an operational one.
Argentine bombs would have fused properly had they had sufficient time to arm from airframe seperation. Owing to the extremely low-altitude that the pilots flew in at that time wasnt available so the fuses never armed. They would either have to reduce the arming time for their bombs or, as the Armada did, add retard kits to make those fuses work. So in this case there was never anything wrong with the bombs they just were not employed correctly.
Back to the AM39 the myth, as reinforced by PhantomII, is that Exocet was responsible for the loss of RN ships. It wasnt – on its own merit.
JonesyYou really are full of nonsense Jonesey. Sheffield was sunk by Etendard/AM39. The fact that she may have been able to avoid this, does nothing to alter this premise.
Mistakes are made in any war, but in the end, Sheffield was sunk by a missile – not a mistake.
Sheffield chaffs and Sheffield survives. Thats very simple. Yes she was hit by a missile and yes she sank because that missile started a fire, but, she was only hit becuase she didnt attempt to defeat the missile. EVERY SINGLE TIME AM39 is fired at a ship that attempts to defeat the missile the ship wins. Draw your own conclusions.
You cannot call a missile that will only work against targets that are defenceless themselves a good system however much you want to generalise things.
My point exactly. You can say “if they did…” or “they should have…”, or “well, if this had been done…” all day long, but at the end of the day the reason the Sheffield and Atlantic Conveyor did not make it back to England is because of a French-build strike aircraft and anti-ship missile that did what they (it) were designed to do.
Quite true, but, if an A4 could have done the same job what value was there using an Exocet, one of a very small number in the inventory, for the task. I’m sorry but there is no way you can paint this to describe a missile with a 0% success rate, against a defending target, as a good weapon.
OK I can see I’m not getting through to closed minds. Let me swing this around for you. You need to attack a task force and you have 10 Super Etendards and 100 AM39 blk1 in the inventory. You send 10 ten-aircraft sorties out over a period of days and they all launch every one of the missiles in the inventory. They dont get a single hit on a warship because the opposition soft-kill defeats every missile that is launched against them. How do you rate your Super Etendard/AM39 antishipping capability after the completion of the action?.
JonesyAnd yet I’m pretty certain both of those ships would have likely made it back to England had the SuE’s and their Exocets not been used against them.
No way you could make that determination. HMS Coventry was an equivalent T42 class vessel screened even by a Type 22. It was sunk and the Argentines didnt need an exocet to do it!.
This is the point by and large, and I dont know how else to put it unfortunately, Exocet was NOT the deciding factor in the attacks on Sheffield or on the ‘Atlantic Conveyor’ group. The deciding factor was that both ships made no attempt at defeating the missile. In Sheffield’s case swap the Exocet for an Armada Skyhawk/snake strike pair and Sheffield still gets hit and probably far more seriously. In fact HAD Sheffield been switched on she would’ve had a much easier time against the AM39 attack than the A4 strike pair!.
Far from making excuses I am correcting you on the reasons that two ships were lost and its a fundamental point you seem to be missing. You said that because of Exocet 2 ships were lost. You are wrong. As stated repeatedly had Sheffield deployed countermeasures she wouldnt have been lost – so the factor wasnt that the Exocet was fired – it was that Sheffield didnt undertake the necessary procedures to defeat the missile.
I dont really see how I’m being all that defensive when I’ve said clearly that the RN was responsible for the loss of its people and civillians under its protection in the Exocet attacks mentioned. All I have done, in those terms, is seek to bring a little balance back to a situation where people have tried to make the RN out to be poor on the strength of two incidents 26 years back. You accept yourself that ‘people and procedures’ were at fault for the ship losses and have not disagreed with the technical limitations of the AM39 under operational conditions.
I find it hard to understand this – you understand that the missiles performance was not the reason for its success in the two launches that it found targets, yet, you still advocate the weapon?. On what grounds?.
JonesyFair play Arthur!
One ship stricken because of an incompetent officer, that may happen. A second one? That’s pretty poor if you ask me.
Sheffields PWO’s behaviour was, IMO, inexcusable. I cant rememeber why it was Glamorgan’s CO crossed into the MM38 engagement zone but there was a reason behind it so I’m not willing to condemn until I find out what it was. So its one bad officer out of the ships companies of nearly twenty warships in an operational environment…plus one CO that made a bad call. I dont think ‘pretty poor’ is really called for?.
There recently have been two US escorts that have badly failed INSURV inspections:
Most of the missiles couldn’t be fired, and neither could any of the big guns. The Aegis radars key to the ships’ fighting abilities didn’t work right.
The flight decks were inoperable.
Most of the lifesaving gear failed inspection.
Corrosion was rampant, and lube oil leaked all over.
The verdict: “unfit for sustained combat operations.”
Those results turned up by an inspection by the Navy’s Board of Inspection and Survey — commonly known as an InSurv — would be bad enough if they came from one warship.
But they came from two. In different fleets, in different oceans. Within a week of each other. And each ship represents the Navy’s most sophisticated front-line surface combatants.
“This is worse than I remember seeing,” a recently retired surface flag officer said after reading the reports of InSurv inspections conducted in March aboard the Norfolk, Va.-based destroyer Stout and the Pearl Harbor, Hawaii-based cruiser Chosin. “I don’t remember seeing two that stood out like these.”
…so does this make the US Navy ‘poor’ Arthur?. No, of course it doesnt it just means that there is a failure in the system somewhere that needs resolving. Maybe some people who need a kick up the stern end.
There were the issues of a couple of UK submarines and, most famously, HMS Nottingham banging into big lumps of hitherto unidentified rock. Do those examples mean that the Royal Navy is lacking in its navigation skills?. No, of course not, it just means that a couple of people have made mistakes.
There isnt a naval service on the planet that doesnt have equivalent stuff-ups every know and again. The RN is just the service that has its most widely reported for some reason.
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