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Jonesy

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  • in reply to: Royal Navy FSC two tier thing or whatever it is called now #2039458
    Jonesy
    Participant

    Peter,

    UUV’s have a role to play in providing MCM capability certainly but there is no way that a REMUS100 is providing the same capability as a Sandown with 2093. The sidescan array on the Remus does not have the same resolution as 2093 and, while the UUV can close for a closer look, its still the fighter radar versus AWACS analogy. The SRM is providing a deeper strip coverage more reliably and therefore, for time critical clearance, the UUV is the poor relation.

    2) Fleet Ready Escort (UK waters) – 2) could be anything;

    FRE always had to be a towed-array ship as FRE was tasked to support the bombers when they deploy from Faslane. Delousing ops always required a tail. If this is still the case then FRE will have to be a C1 job as they look like the only units that will keep a tail.

    Lawrence

    C2 seems the same only even more complicated, first of we do not even have a purely defined role for it, is a true T23 replacement? or something less?, does it need a helo, if so what size? I know that Jonesey is pushing the DDH idea, I am not convinced that is what we are going to see, helo capability is not a massive problem for the RN at the moment and if C2 has a helo then one has to ask what the point is

    C1 is essentially going to be the T23 replacement not C2. C2 doesnt comfortably fit as a replacement, really, for anything save perhaps the T22B3’s – not a vessel to be replaced by an austere anything!. As I understand it the Admiralty are hoping for it to be a cheap-to-run escort that can be tasked where we currently send expensive-to-run T42’s and T23’s on patrol. To state that that poorly defines C2 is a gross understatement!.

    What makes you think that the RN dont have a chopper deployment problem?. CVF/CVS/LPH can all carry ASW choppers but….certainly for the latter two…only to the detriment of other airframes plus it may be that operationally it is wise to put your ASW assets further out than the carrier deck. LPD’s and the Bays have limited aviation capability only…you seen the ‘bouncy castle’ hangar intended for the Bays yet?!.

    As stated littoral ASW is best done at arms length from the surface platform by a high-endurance chopper. That is a no-brainer. The ability to generate chopper sorties over target, seamlessly, over an extended period is crucial to the successful prosecution of an SSK target otherwise the target goes quiet and waits you out – basically it clears off the datum when your chopper goes back for refuel!. Now you can say that choppers from more than one vessel could cooperate for the same effect of keeping on station, but, is it not wiser to have one vessel capable of the task so that a second vessel can be elsewhere prosecuting a second target?. Enter DDH. Besides – that other island nation steeped in ASW capability have underscored the need for DDH’s and their wisdom is good enough for me.

    in reply to: Royal Navy FSC two tier thing or whatever it is called now #2039482
    Jonesy
    Participant

    Swerve,

    as I see it, what you’re saying is we should abandon the C3 concept & build more C2 instead.

    Not quite mate…what I am saying is that a 2000 ton, 20knt OPV(H) is inadequate for any meaningful tasking outside Falkland Islands/Gibraltar patrol and would be a waste of resource however cheap they come. I am also saying that, seeings as we have a transformational window ahead that circumstances exist for us to exploit economies of scale that we haven’t had, probably, since the end of WW2. IMO we can hardly whinge about underfunding and salami slicing of fleet capability if we squander that opportunity to develop the fleet to its maximum potential. I think that if we do follow the established path and end up with a dozen RiverB2 Mod vessels that, in service, prove incapable of much beyond the rescue of half-drowned fishermen and wayward round-the-world yacht racers we deserve our loss of capability for our timidity and lack of insight.

    One implication of that is that we either give up MCM when the Hunt & Sandown classes come to the end of their lives (BTW, I don’t see why a vessel of at least 3 times the size of them would be less capable – plenty of room to fit the equipment which gives them their capabilities), or build more small, single-role vessels. Or do you see C2 doing MCM?

    C2 will be doing MCM by default anyway…its raison d’etre is to steam up and down a dangerous littoral….there will be mines somewhere in the C2’s future!. On a shared hull design fitting the same RoV handling gear to the whole class of C2’s and C3’s is just another economy of scale and another flexible capability that the RN could utilise.

    This MCM capability does not replace what we have in the Sandowns though…not by a very long shot. The 2093 minehunting sonar is a truly remarkable tool that I have been priviliged to see in operation…the image it generates is extremely impressive. That is only one aspect of the design though – propulsion, ship positioning and navigation systems and even the hull itself are all specialised for a specialist task on the Sandowns and that does nothing to detail the most important resource the MCM fleet has – some astonishingly skilled, specialist, warfare systems operators.

    A limited crew on a multimission hull is going to have few berths for specialist OM’s and I shudder to think what would happen to the MCMW course if we were to go to just RoV’s slung over the side of OPV(H)’s. That is, to an extent, a different topic though.

    It’s what the RN is asking for, & at present, the RN says that up to 4 of the MCMVs are assigned to the Fishery Protection squadron at a time, despite the occasional ceremonial & thing & public show, which has always been something the Navy has done – but it used to do it with much bigger ships.

    I think thats actually close to the point I was trying to make. If we are to lose dedicated MCM to a vessel more capable of multirole deployment then we need a vessel that actually IS capable of multirole deployment and not the limited OPV(H).

    If you look at the costings, you’ll see that the Dutch OPVs come in at £65 mn without the expensive sensor mast, for over twice the displacement of HMS Clyde. The BAM, as far as I can discover, is cheaper – but also smaller, ca 2500 tons. BTW, please don’t pull the polemic trick of attributing opinions to me that I haven’t expressed. I have not said anywhere that we’d get a proper OPV(H) (i.e. something with a hangar) for £30mn.

    Last thing I’d do to you deliberately Swerve but you did seem to suggest that £30mn was a viable ballpark figure for OPV(H) C3. All I intended to do was to point out that the PFI obfuscates those costs quite thoroughly. £65mn for the Dutch OPV without sensors is obviously a good package over only three hulls. My contention is that, if we were to ask VT (for example) to build 17 analagous hulls, all with identical propulsion and machinery, with the first batch of 8 as basic-fit C3’s and the second batch of 9 as evolved C2 combattants we get a very real unit cost savings across BOTH C2 and C3 classes – not just cheap hulls for C3 as we would going down the OPV(H) route.

    You have to take into account the politics. Build C2 & C3 on the same hull, & the beancounters & certain politicians will count them all as C2, & leak it to the press as an attempt by the Admiralty to sneakily get more frigates under the guise of patrol ships, & the total numbers would be subject to the same ceiling as C2 would be without lumping in the C3 role.

    Dont see it to be honest Swerve…there are too many precedents for patrol vessels of frigate size…Thetis, WHEC/Deepwater, Dutch OPV, Absalon etc..etc. The Telegraph would have a field day with the MoD for trying to pull the wool and it could do so easily in colour pictures…so the general public could even get it!. Besides the C3 batch would, in all likelihood be programmed first to defer the spend of weapons/sensors for the C2’s closer to the decommissioning windows of the later T23’s. The danger being in the cancellation of C2 in favour of upgunning the C3’s…but the danger of the cancellation of C2 exists anyway and is less likely to happen if it is genuinely the cheapest way to deploy a robust littoral MIOPS capability.

    Turbinia,

    Your Option 3 is a revisit on FSC you do know that! 🙂

    IMO if we do go down the route of a small cheapo OPV for C3, and a revisit of the original Castles wouldnt be a bad idea there – excellent boats that just needed a 3D radar and a hangar!, then C2 has to be something very different than that being envisaged.

    To my way of thinking C2 would have to be the T22B3 replacement and be somewhere near the ‘discredited’ Global Cruiser concept. C3 is not going to be any kind of warfighter so distant patrol stations are going to have to be a LOT more self-supporting and is going to end up looking like a post-conversion Tiger Class cruiser. Extensive self-defence, capability for 2 FLynx, at least 2 CB90-style interceptor boats on davits and extensive C3I fit. All in all a very expensive platform and we’ll need at least 4 to keep 2 on station at any one time.

    in reply to: Ability of RuAF and Russian Navy to destroy US CBG #2519259
    Jonesy
    Participant

    What’s your opinion on attacking surface groups (ESG, SAG, ARG) using terminal guided ballistic missiles like Iskander-E, along advanced real time ISTAR assets for cueing and surveillance?

    My opinion is that the advanced realtime theatre ISTAR assets required to make a unitary-warhead anti-ship ballistic weapon viable are a long way from deployment.

    I think that, given todays level of technology, using a ballistic delivery system requires some other factor to remove the inherent inaccuracies in the targetting solution. In the past that has seen high-yield nuclear MIRVs employed on a retargettable bus stage to scatter bursts over a broad area of ocean surface. I think that still, probably, has merit and is a viable solution…if a bit messy.

    The more surgical option…and the one I would be pursuing where I facing a need to rid myself of USN CVBG’s…would be to create a re-entry vehicle for my ballistic missiles that was capable of bussing out a number of smaller, autonomous, intelligent, hunting missiles. Weapons like a Tacit Rainbow/NSM or possibly even smaller like LOCAAS with multispectral seekers and target recognition capability. That way you need only a very broad target solution for the carrier group and you can, quickly, place a swarm of attack missiles in the vicinity and let them get on with the job. You could even have the larger weapons link back and provide refined data for a follow-on attack.

    The system isnt foolproof and still relies on getting an initial fix on target…which may be hard to come by and could see many of these bussing missiles wasted. It would force the US battlegroup into a higher, routine, optempo with the natural attrition effects that ensue and, perhaps, force them emissions active and, therefore, targetting cooperative sooner than they would wish though.

    It would also need a considerably larger weapon than Iskander to deploy – probably something more akin to the Chinese DF-15/21 or perhaps a new weapon entirely. I see from a quick scan Iskander is claimed to be capable against a moving target…no information about the terminal phase seeker is listed though…would this be some form of MMW guidance perhaps?.

    in reply to: Ability of RuAF and Russian Navy to destroy US CBG #2519289
    Jonesy
    Participant

    He provided video not a proof. Proof is when things are done in neutral environment over large scale of population.

    Oh what glorious claptrap. By your definition BrahMos, Moskit, Onyx…in fact virtually all advanced missile systems across the planet cannot be said to be proven!!!.

    Thanks for the conversation Star, but, I think I see where you are coming from now and I’ve no interest trying to penetrate yet another closed miind on Keymags!.

    in reply to: Royal Navy FSC two tier thing or whatever it is called now #2039526
    Jonesy
    Participant

    The question is, can we do without a small cheap ship? If we dispense with it, will we get enough frigates (even lightly armed ones) to perform its role? I think the answer is no: what we’d get is too few frigates, & we’d wear them out, & incur considerable operating & maintenance costs, using them for roles for which they’re either overkill, or unsuitable.

    To be honest with you Swerve I think we’re doing without ‘small cheap ships’ now. Clyde is doing sterling work in the South Atlantic, by the sounds of things, just as the Castles did before it, but, the River Class are wholly insufficient in number to offer any semblence of fisheries patrol. You can tell that fact from their websites….HMS Tyne’s, for example, includes the fascinating detail of a visit from the ‘Worshipful Company of Butchers’. Surely a primary tasking for an RN vessel?!!.

    My question is – do these vessels serve a useful function and are they worth keeping?. Clyde may have cost just £30mn, but, as I understand it that was a PFI arrangement and effectively just a lease payment as the Clyde is still owned by VT and is not a UK Govt vessel. They have already had to reschedule their PFI debt once to bring their costs on the project down as well. I wouldn’t count on the same deal being available in the future and, to be honest, I’m not entirely comfortable with the idea that RN warships are actually owned by anyone other than the RN!.

    I think it can be safely assumed that the straight-sale of an OPV(H) design for C3 would be considerably more than £30mn. Plus, as stated, VT have offered a 3000ton variant of their Omani OPV design for C3….that wont be £30mn a piece either!.

    Then we must look at what a Clyde-like vessel actually provides and where it could be tasked:

    Falklands Islands patrol ship is obvious…but those waters are going to become a LOT more important in the next couple of decades and a real warship may have to be tasked to maintain overview on our mineral claims down there.

    APT(N) and the old WIGS (West Indies GuardShip) duty. Possibly I suppose but with 20knts top end and a Pacific 22 RIB for a fast interceptor capability I dont know whether I’d consider that sufficient capability against the more commited druggie types if the weather was out of envelope for chopper operations?. A 2000ton vessel is also going to be very limited in what it can embark for disaster relief type ops too and a 40 man crew, whilst nice and economical, doesnt give you many strong backs to send ashore for stabilisation ops.

    Home Waters taskings?. Well no towed array means Falsane Patrol is out and that leaves fisheries protection – is it sensible replacing a cheap River class with a more expensive, chopper capable, River class when the original River class wre acheiving little in the first place?!.

    NATO MCM taskings. Will NATO accept an OPV with a couple of RoV’s as a contribution?. Especially if it replaces the excellent capability of the Sandown SRM’s and demonstrates a willful neglect of MCMW in the RN. I could quite easily see NATO pointing to other partners, specialist, MCM capabiliies and politely declining RN involvement.

    So what would these OPV’s actually do?. We cant send them to the Gulf as 1)thats a high threat environment and 2) presumably that’d be a C2 tasking!. We cant assign one to SNFM or whatever the standing NATO Med tasking is now because thats a warship deployment. I cant think of anything thats left?!.

    The Dutch OPV is by far a more sensible design apart from the incongruity of the sensors and propulsion fit. If you have warship sensors you must have warship performance – the WHECs found this in the Gulf as stated where, when they tried to keep up with Fleet Ops, they found their ‘economical’ CODAG propulsion fit was suddenly quite the reverse as, to maintain fleet speeds, they were running extensively on their turbines and hadnt the bunkerage to keep up – as they were never designed to run on turbines for any length of time. The size of the Dutch design does improve the situation in terms of aviation ops and deployability of course. For something on the order of £90mn, using your figures, thats a good deal.

    For C3 IEP may be expensive but, again, economies of scale could be be important and logistics savings, whole-life, easily could be signifiant. Incorporating it into a similar sized hull to the Dutch vessel could not raise the unit cost by more than 30% so, for a hull needing modest electronics only (C3), using the Dutch vessel and the Omani OPV’s as comparison C3’s could conceivably come in as low as £100mn per unit. C2 adding weapons/sensors on top of that. £800 million for the class with integrated fleet logistics/crewing/training savings and a Fleet capable hull. Thats were we need to be looking here, in my opinion, not simply just a continuation of the present fleet configuration for the sake of convention.

    in reply to: Royal Navy FSC two tier thing or whatever it is called now #2039534
    Jonesy
    Participant

    That the C3 come out of the original S2C2 work as a 2000 ton OPV hull is still something that I find difficult to accept to be honest though I know that is what happened. It can only be assumed, in the light of the Dutch decision to build their ‘C3 equivalent’ to 3750 tons displacement and the fact that VT are proposing a 3000ton 100m version of the Project Khareef OPV, that the C3 assessment would generate different results today?.

    As I see it, any up-scaling of C3 into a real combatant would mean a considerable reduction in numbers. The point of it is that it is a fraction of the cost, both to buy and operate, of a real warship, maybe as much as one Type 45 to build the entire fleet.

    An understandable point, but, it must be remembered what effect economies of scale have on warship unit costs. Admittedly we are going back a decade and more, but, HMS St Albans – the last of the Type23’s – was built, inclusive of all combat systems, for £125million and the preceeding two hulls in the same ballpark. By the end of the Duke class production run the economies of scale had brought the average vessel unit cost down to £133 million per ship. US$250mill for a vessel that is still, IMO, the best ASW frigate in the world. Bargain!.

    Building 8 evolved-River batch2 class designs for £1 billion might be good value for money but, realistically, offers little for the money. Certainly the capability set of HMS Clyde as she currently exists is modest at best.

    Building a circa 4k ton joint C2/C3 hull with full-spec IEP propulsion would cost more in initial outlay, but, what kind of deal would RR offer if the RN came to them with a long-duration order for 20 MT30 shipsets for C1 plus another 16 for C2/3. 36 turbine sets over, say, 10 years running from the end of the T45 programme guarantees a lot of jobs for RR and would certainly elicit a favourable unit cost for the turbines. When you consider VT are building 3 80m Omani OPV’s, fully fitted, for £400m – dangle 16, austere i.e realtively uncomplicated, 4k ton escort hulls at them and see what unit cost comes back!. I’d be extraordinarily suprised if it wasnt a very competetive figure!.

    I think this is a critical juncture for the RN, not to mention a one-off opportunity for UK shipbuilding, as we are looking to radically depart from the fleet structure we have maintained pretty much since the end of WW2. Being in a position to need to order a lot of hulls simultaneously gives us the ability to take advantage of the kinds of savings that US shipbuilding returns routinely on programmes like the Arleigh Burkes. Being timid and looking at the issues piecemeal I believe will squander a golden opportunity to maximise the potential of the future RN without pushing our luck with the Treasury.

    in reply to: Ability of RuAF and Russian Navy to destroy US CBG #2519809
    Jonesy
    Participant

    I didnot put newspaper article I posted news from ITAR-TASS. and ur video is just talking. It does not reveal the intelligence of target. merely stating supersonic.

    What does intelligence have to do with this?. Are you stating that a bit of extra coding is going to make a difference to an Onyx’s flight profile?. The Vandal simulated the profile of a 10g terminal manoevering skimming supersonic and its hard to see how Onyx/BrahMos is going to better that at M2 no matter how smart it is.

    I have question do things move on the curves at same speed as in straight line and when it is decided to go straight vs curve vice versa.

    No, terminal manoevers do scrub off velocity so a M2 vehicle may drop down to M1.6-1.8 region depending on the angular deflection being attempted.

    and u have provided anykind of proof except those life experiance with obsolete stuff.

    No I’ve been quite lucky – another poster kindly provided the proof of the NAVSEA testing I mentioned for me. The video?!!!.

    in reply to: Ability of RuAF and Russian Navy to destroy US CBG #2519848
    Jonesy
    Participant

    and anyway it is only showing cartoon not the actual maneovers.

    Are you serious?.

    You cite a 7 year old newspaper article to defend your position and are challenging the video footage from the NAVSEA tests because there isnt specific clear pictures of the actual intercept?. You are saying that and expect someone to communicate with you at a mature adult level?.

    so do u think Onyx/Yakhont do S shape maneovurs as some thing it has to do to reach the target it cannot go in straight line. there is no element of artifcial intelligence.

    So incomprehensible one wonders quite where to start?. Now you accept that ESSM can defeat manoevering targets you are suggesting that a straight line approach is also a possibility?. That despite the fact that there actually were pictures of the straight in Vandal intercept on the video.

    You should not be curious. u know everything with certainity.

    Oh for chrissakes?. You suggested that a T/R (more correctly Tx/Rx) module-based satellite existed. Now, I know fact and proof arent really your thing, but it is nice, every now and again, to actually provide some shred of proof to back up what you state just so you are not taken for an absolute fantasist!.

    in reply to: Ability of RuAF and Russian Navy to destroy US CBG #2519850
    Jonesy
    Participant

    I have asked question about that S shaped maneovers of Brahmos. Do u think it is a random act?.

    So BrahMos is a M2 air vehicle performing S-type manoevers at deck level in terminal phase to target. Look at the video clip that was posted and tell me why that isnt such a problem for an ESSM ship to sweat?!.

    Its good that u drop that Space lauching/Satellite. u cannot hide anything now from latest T/R module based Satellites.

    Well the rest of what you wrote is obviously unrelated gibberish, but, the above did get me curious. What, pray tell, is a ‘T/R module based satellite’?. I would guess you are talking about some form of RORSAT/surveillance satellite with an active array radar scanner?. If so who is making it, whats its power source and when will it be launched?.

    in reply to: Ability of RuAF and Russian Navy to destroy US CBG #2519940
    Jonesy
    Participant

    Suez yes, Panama no IIRC

    in reply to: Royal Navy FSC two tier thing or whatever it is called now #2039557
    Jonesy
    Participant

    On the 155 issue, it is about a lot more than just the mount. 155mm ammunition is notoriously heavy and space consuming especially as it is two piece rather than fixed ammunition. I would be surprised if significant amounts of additional structure were not required for the larger weapon. The other issue is what barrel is being talked about, if it is only the 39cal then range will be a very long way behind the 127mm

    Ahh yes I wasnt clear there was I?. Mount in this case refers to the below deck installation as well as the actual turret and ordnance. I have a feeling that it is the 39 calibre ordnance that is being looked at rather than the 52 initially – though I have seen it, from a credible source, that the 52 caliber ordnance WILL be compatible with the evolved Mk8. Anyway 40kms with base bleed is still nothing to be sniffed at and compares very favourably with the standard 127mm round and current 4.5″ base-bleed round. It should be noted that to get the fantastic ranges ascribed to some of these special 5″ rounds you either end up with an expensive RAP or a, less-destructive, sub-calibre round so tradeoff’s will be made about have many conventional and how many ‘special’ rounds would occupy a 5″ magazine racks.

    Artwork as mentioned below – snaffled from Richard Beedalls site.

    in reply to: Ability of RuAF and Russian Navy to destroy US CBG #2519986
    Jonesy
    Participant

    India is independent third party customer and has PHD Scientist/engineers involved in designing and building the missile in two factories. More over they are inducting the system in Air/Navy/Army. It takes supreme confidence on system to be inducted in Tri-service.

    Why u have more credibility than the manufacturer who are saying centimeters.? U works only beliefs like X- is expected to perform well against Y. why do u think Brahmos do S-Shaped manevouers?

    Or it means that India isn’t planning to fire Brahmos at anyone who has ESSM capability?. Why do I have more credibility…I am certain I dont, but I am equally certain that, for all the time I stuidied the operation, repair and maintenance of guided missiles, nothing would encourage me to believe that a circa M2 air vehicle would be able to transit over a mobile surface at an altitude of a ‘few dozen’ cm. I am also equally certain that the manufacturer would have no compunction about exaggerating the capabilties of his system.

    If you can Star watch the video kindly provided by DJCross and then assess the value of BrahMos’s ‘S-shaped manoevers’.

    DJCross, please accept my deepest appreciations sir.;)

    Garry,

    Easiest way to kill an american carrier is simply with a roll on roll off ship carrying a nuclear mine with the sound signature of all US carriers in its memory sitting in a choke point. My personal favourite would be somewhere where it is likely to sail, like the Suez or Panama canals or pick a foreign port where the carrier is due to visit. It could sit on the bottom for years waiting for the carrier…

    If memory serves the canals are swept periodically for just such a purpose. Others have the same nasty sneaky little mindest…it was my first solution too when asked how to sink a CVN! ;). Chokepoint is definitely the way forward. Straits of Malacca/Hormuz if you dont care about non-combattant casualties. Mandeb straits off Yemen might do it too.

    in reply to: Royal Navy FSC two tier thing or whatever it is called now #2039571
    Jonesy
    Participant

    This is, to large extent, the issue at hand. Where to define the capabilities?.

    To my way of thinking a second-tier MIOPS combattant has more in common with an OPV, in terms of tasking, than a T45/C1. As demonstrated by the, otherwise excellent, USCG WHECs on Ops in the Persian Gulf, however, such an OPV can never be confused with a fleet-capable warfighter and we will need C3 to have some of that pedigree….especially if it constitutes our remaining MCM capability.

    C2 is a hell of a muddle too. Theorised as a limited warfighter, but, is a vessel that will perform the majority of its taskings in the most dangerous environment in naval warfare…a potentially hostile littoral. If nothing else C2, by definition of that OpArea, has to embark a very serious defensive systems suite…by that I mean competent PDMS, MFR, hull sonar, CMS, ECM/ESM, extensive expendable decoy fit – basically the whole 9 yards. Thats an expensive vessel already and we’ve not gotten away from ownship defence yet!.

    By comparison C1 as a primary-role ASW warfighter could be little more than a fleet capable platform for three Merlins, an active towed array and a VLS fit for a LACM and do its job admirably. Comparitively it could be quite an austere hull as its primary weapons system, its choppers, obviate the need for the vessel to close in to dangerous waters in the pursuit of its primary tasking.

    The bottom line is that we need to do the patrol job more efficiently without dulling the sharp edge of the warfighting fleet. I would, personally, prefer to see us do that by streamlining the logistics tail that supports the fleet rather than incorporating cheap-to-run vessels that cannot contribute in any meaningful way to warfighting operations.

    To my mind the optimum manner in which to cut the support costs is to increase commonality as much as is possible across the fleet and we will not be doing that with 4 seperate classes for T45, C1, C2 and C3. As stated BAE have already produced artwork of a stretched T45 with extensive aviation capability…starting the C1 run directly after T45 has to get us these hulls cheaply and we dont need anything more than a DDH because we dont actually have the Merlins to deploy more than a dozen or so out on ships flights in total. C1 done for 9 units replacing the 22B3’s and the 2087’d T23’s.

    Then we come to C2/C3 and I admit to a lack of comprehension of what tasks C3 will NOT perform that C2 will?. We currently use OPV’s for MIOPS, anti-drug, constabulary/anti-piracy work, disaster assistance etc. What is C2 going to be doing over that?. These are exactly the same kinds of duties that C2 will be performing – just in higher-threat environments?. Why not share the same hull/propulsion fit and simply increase weapons and sensors on the C2 variant if the taskings are so closely related?.

    IEP is inherently an economical propulsion fit and, if the whole fleet shares the same turbines and diesels, the potential support savings are dramatic. The operational benefits could be equally huge as any RN vessel could lend spares and technical assistance to another on deployment and crew from a C2 could seamlessly transfer to C3’s and vice versa. Most importantly C3 becomes an asset that can slide into the warfighting order of battle and bring MCMW, additional NGFS and aviation capability to a taskgroup without incurring any handicap on fleet operations.

    You would end up with the escort fleet being something on the order of 8 45’s, 9 C1’s, 9 C2’s and 8 C3’s for 34 fleet capable vessels of two classes. That as opposed to the same numbers providing for 26 fleet capable ships of at least three classes perhaps four. To me this is an easy one!.

    Sealord, the ‘new’ BAE 155 is meant to be an adaptation of the original Mk8 mount and is anticipated to increase its weight by approx 4 tonnes or so. Seeings as Mk8’s have been fitted on vessels down as far as 1500 tonnes a, modestly enlarged, Mk8 should be little issue for a circa 4000ton vessel. I like 155 for the C3 for the reasons stated above and for the MCM role. When on MCM duties one is often obliged to pootle about at relatively low speeds fairly close to unfriendly coastlines – having a bloody great gun on the front lobbing 6″ shells 40kms might be a good insurance policy against shore batteries and light AShM units seeking to disturb your minehunting!.

    in reply to: Ability of RuAF and Russian Navy to destroy US CBG #2520026
    Jonesy
    Participant

    so what they are doing in past 7 years? I am sure India would have tested export this thing against Barak.

    Newspaper is saying Artificial intelliegence, Group action mode, flight in dozen of centimeters not in meters, low rcs. and there is alot more than that they are not revealing for export. There was Putin visit to the plant.

    Newspaper clipping was given by manufacturer and manufacturer works for Government.

    Quite what India has to do with this I dont know seeings as we’re talking about US CVBG vulnerability to Russian missiles. If you are saying that test data exists of an Indian Navy test of Brahmos against a Barak defended ship I’d be interested in seeing the results. I’d expect Barak to perform quite well.

    Onyx is not flying centimetres over anything so please do not embarrass yourself on that score. ‘Low RCS’ is a meaningless statement – its low compared to what? a truck, the Golden Gate bridge, Mount Etna?. If its a low RCS compared to, say, a Harpoon then thats something, but, if its low compared to a P-700 then thats a different issue isnt it?.

    u will soon find out in coming decades

    You arent related to the Iranian chappie in that speedboat the other day are you….his slogan was ‘you will explode in a few minutes’ if I remember right – you sort of sound alike?.

    Ray,

    A:Anti missile systems tested against supersonic target missile hoping that the target performs exactly like a Russian supersonic Ashm(that too various types of missiles with various engagement profiles)

    Thats not really the case though is it?. We know, from observation on the older weapons and from their own advertising on the newer models, what profiles these weapons fly. We KNOW from the testing undertaken that our systems are capable of defeating weapons flying those specific profiles. It is that simple.

    You can say that, for example, a P-700 might have armour and ECM that could alter the dynamic, but, all it does is introduce a small random element in the equation. The fact is that missiles flying those profiles are defeated and would HAVE to have some additional capability to stand any chance of penetrating shipboard defences on an individual basis.

    Carrying that point to its logical conclusion then any missile that doesnt have advanced ECM or similar add-on capability will be a marginal threat unless it is fired in sufficient quantity to swamp the shipboard defence potential.

    It all goes back to the point that I always make on these threads. The determining factor in the success of a missile attack on a competent escort vessel is not whether the missile is supersonic/subsonic or big/small its whether it can engage the target without alerting its defences.

    If you catch a group of AEGIS ships steaming at low alert state and can launch your attack with stealthy, passive, missiles you are probably sending those ships home with bits missing. Otherwise the first sniff they get of your missiles active seeker they go to action stations and you have to try and saturate the defences which, for a group of three AEGIS ships is up to 12 simultaneous channels of fire, dozens of missiles simultaneously airborne under MCG and extensive soft-kill behind the missiles.

    in reply to: Ability of RuAF and Russian Navy to destroy US CBG #2520525
    Jonesy
    Participant

    Well, erm, Star that appears to be a newspaper clipping dated some 7 years ago that repeats the advertising material thats been around for a while. It actually, IIRC, predates the ESSM/Vandal testing.

    So….since that newspaper piece we find that supersonic skimming is really not the invulnerable attack profile it was advertised as being. We also find that, to get its 300km range, Onyx must fly an altitude cruise phase exposing it nice, early, detection by its target vessel. In otherwords, since your advertising piece from Itar-Tass was published, we find that Onyx is not as impressive as we were led to believe.

    If you can Star just be objective for a few minutes and tell me you can see the difference between the report of the official testing of a weapon system in a representative threat environment and a newspaper piece that, pretty much, regurgitates the manufacturers advertising?.

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