JonesyWhat is funny is how you attempt to mock me, when you are the one ranting as if you and you alone are graced with the intellect to comment on this subject, your arrogance is remarkable.
I am stating facts….simple as. The requirement is for Carrier Strike. STOVL fits the Carrier Strike mission profile. You seem upset that the RN doesnt want more from its CVF’s….fine. You have that right – just understand that it bears no relationship to operational reality.
You only have to scan back through the pages of this thread and others on this forum to realise that you are very much in the minority. The tiresome and repetative nature of your posts rather suggests that it is you who is upset.
So because I am in the minority I am wrong?. I would point out that I was in the minority, and forced to repeat myself ad nauseum, on the Gorshkov threads. There I was also arrogant, self-important and all the rest. Get the point?.
Considering that the F-35 is unlikely to enter service until 2015 in the UK and will serve for at least 30 years it is just plain ridiculous for you to suggest that the CVF’s will only ever engage in Iraqi Freedom type ops.
The future is predominantly asymmetric warfare. You dont need to be a graduate of BRNC to appreciate that – one would hope.
As I’ve asked where is the threat?. China or India?. What we have in the CVF/SSN force, as envisaged, will cope with an opposing single CVA-group force in blue-water if needed. We are not going to try and invade either country with a couple of CVF’s, 3Cdo and the Para’s!. Once again you resort to nebulous fantasies to try and justify a spend that has significant impact on the size and shape of the future RN.
I never said that that V/STOL does not have advantages, the fact that you are trying to put words in my mouth says a lot about the weakness of your argument.
Your words I believe were ‘surge excuse’. The word ‘excuse’ suggesting you believe this to be trivial…you also failed to note the other advantages in your dismissal. I sought to point them out. I fail to see how that puts words in your mouth.
The range issue is of great importance, the Falklands showed how important it is to keep a carrier as far from the coast of one opponent as possible and that was in an environment of Exocet armed SuE’s we are already in a world of Flankers armed with Kh-31’s and will soon be in one of evolved Flankers with Klubs and Brahmos, within the F-35’s lifetime that will be certainly be Pakfas armed with such weapons.
It is not enough to say that threat systems may exist in future that will threaten the carriers Sealord. You have to look at force mixes. Some idiot halfwit in Venezuela might buy three dozen evolved Flankers plus wunder-missiles of every shape and size, but, if his MarPat is based on a couple of C235’s what threat is he?.
To deploy the saturation strike of BrahMos or Club missiles you indicate means having a large number of launch platforms, a large number of trained pilots, a large support infrastructure etc, etc. Is a regional-power level nation going to be able to generate that kind of force mix quickly or unnoticed if at all?.
Hopefully this will help you understand that just because nation-x may have a couple of operational PAK-FA squadrons by 2040 it means precisely nothing, in strategic terms, to a purchasing decision being taken in 2006. The best that any naval architect can hope to achieve is to build in adaptability to his design to allow it to meet future requirements. Fortunately the BMT lads were aware of this and the Thales CVF design derived from their work is going to be adaptable so that, should some regional-power develop a military capability that the existing Carrier Strike capability cannot handle by 2040, changes can be made at the time.
Maybe you would like to quantify the actual price difference between a CTOL and a VTOL carrier, then we can talk about what sort of a ‘sacrifice’ the fleet would have to make. That is unless you intend to continue talking in vague generalities.
The fact that PA2 is a standalone design means that direct comparison is difficult. As an indicator of the cost difference the extra crew requirement for a full ALRE suite will be on the order of 150 personnel (US CVN’s ALRE complement is circa 205 for four C13 cats). 150 people multiplied by an average salary of about £15k each is about £2 mill per year so for a 20 year cycle, until mid-life refit, thats £40 million in salaries for the extra crew alone.
Then count in aquisition costs, sparing, personnel training (ALRE), shore based facilities, air crew training and all that good stuff and you can look at the cost difference between a CATOBAR and STOVL carrier being in the hundreds of millions over a 20 year operational cycle.
JonesyThe numbers would hardly be worth assembling a UK-only CATOBAR training squadron.
Possibly it may be worth doing something joint with the French, but, the problem would mostly be that each nation will only actually have one deck in service at any given time, there may simply be no deck available for the UK/French Goshawks to practice with!.
Most likely that we’d send pilots to the US to join the French and Indian lads already involved with the USN training programme. They, the USN, would probably be quite accomodating on that score as well with a UK C variant buy going some way to safing that type and helping their unit costs!.
JonesyThe RN is making a sacrifice as has been pointed out inumerbale times by inumerable people, in many cases far more qualified than either you or I.
Ahh the old ‘how qualified are you dig’ when someone disagrees with deeply held views. What do you want Sealord? Service number?. PO’s inside leg measurement?, length of time taken to clean the stairs in Fisguard messdecks with a toothbrush?. Should we then compare that with your ability to judge operational requirements sufficient to call me arrogant and unqualified?. :rolleyes:
The reality is that the RN is getting an aircraft of reduced range and payload in order to save money. The only reason you have produced is the surge excuse, the fact is that the fuel lost by the B compared to the C makes this irrelevant, if you really want to create a large strike package the C will have more than enough fuel to wait around in the air for a few minutes whilst the other aircraft are launched, not to mention the fact that the increased payload of the C would reduce the need for larger numbers of aircraft to start with.
Surge capacity is an advantage of STOVL just like the training and operational envelope advantages you conveniently gloss over. These are not excuses but genuine, real world, advantages that come with the technology. The price they come with is reduced range and payload. Peters statistics suggest that this is in the order of 270km or 145nm….which is close enough to the range of a Storm Shadow as makes little difference. CASOM, as said from the kickoff in this thread, can offset the range disadvantage of the STOVL type against first day of war targets….the only ones where internal carriage is really critical anyway!.
The fact that you seem to think that the UK’s inventory of A2G weapons is going to remain static for the next 30 years is just absurd.
Again look at the operations being undertaken now – they are a blueprint for the kind of asymmetricwarfare we will most likely be engaged in for the next 30 years. Are we dropping a lot of 2000lb PGM’s against targets where maximum LO characteristics are important. In IRAQI FREEDOM, where we did need to engage hardened targets in a defended environment, did we use 2000lb LGB’s or CASOM?.
You are repeatedly stating that the UK’s choice of STOVL CVF/F35B is wrong because it is less capable than a CATOBAR CVF/F35C combination would be. Yet, apart from nebulous statements about possible future threats, you have offered no credible tangible threat scenario where the additional, expensive, capabilities would be vital?. Not one. So I ask you now Sealord why should the Royal Navy spend an extra few hundred million, whole-life, on building and operating an Anglicised PA2 and is it worth the negative impact on the rest of the RN fleet?.
I appreciate that you think you are better than the rest of us but you clearly are not and contrary to your opinion we do not need to be lectured by you.
Funny how you say ‘rest of us’ when you are the only one seemingly upset?
JonesyThe range issue is not valueless, indeed it is very important, as is the loiter capability.
Loiter is important…but not so much as to justify steam cats and all the associated expend for the carriers. What is the value in range, operationally, that the F-35C brings over F-35B…and please be specific here?.
The other factor that you ignore is the loss of internal weapons capability that the B suffers over the C.
Which affects one weapons system currently in the UK inventory. Again I say to you is the lack of internal carriage option for the 2000lb EPW worth the cost of building CATOBAR over STOVL.
A CATOBAR carrier is perfectly capable of surging attacks, this is not some uber capability specifically reserved for V/STOL carriers.
CATOBAR surge is nowhere close to that offered by STOVL – a factor proven time and again by the Royal Navy. Surge capacity that HAS actually proven valuable under operational conditions.
Finally, and I feel that I speak for a lot of people here I would prefer it if you did not patronise us with paragraphs like your last one in the above qouted post. We are all well aware of ‘operational requirement’ what is being pointed out is that that requirement is is in this case wrong and as such the RN is making a major sacrifice in terms of actual potential capability.
To be honest Sealord when it has been explained to board members repeatedly, and in such clear terms that people actually PM me tell me to give it up as I’m not penetrating closed minds, I’m not taking accusations of being patronising as fair comment. The requirement is that set by the Ministry of Defence to replace what we have in the CVS’s. It, no matter what anyone says, is a quantum leap over that capability and, most importantly, is what we can, just about, afford without shelling the rest of the fleet.
The RN is making no ‘sacrifice’ to get capabilities it hasnt enjoyed in over 30 years. Its true that it is not getting capabilities that a vessel of 60k tonnes could bring BUT as stated ad nauseum what value is there in having them if they are never used. The value of having the most efficient carrier possible is manifest – we get to keep money back to invest in Escorts that we DO need rather than in catapults and Hawkeyes that we can do perfectly well without!. Until that fact is grasped knock off the hurt and offended tone when someone points out a few operational realities to you!.
JonesySuprising news. The Castle design looked well suited to Pakistani needs for a cheap and economical method of getting additional choppers deployed to sea for patrol/MIOPS type taskings?.
Fair play they aint Type23’s, but, most certainly have the margins to accept a Bofors57 forward, TRS-3D or something similar on the mainmast and, perhaps, even a retractable hangar fitted onto the rear of the flight deck.
For regeneration costs plus a modest little sum completing the above you could be looking at a very capable, high endurance OPV known for fine seakeeping qualities. Curious there’s not more interest.
JonesyShiplover,
I think this design is ok if one is to accept Foch as beeing ok
Again, with all due respect, if one accepts that the CVL needs to be Foch sized to be practical as a platform for operating Hornets why bother with the compromised axial deck VSS-III design?.
Surely it is the cheaper and more logical answer to license the Clemenceau design, increase the angle of the angled deck a couple of degrees and adapt it for your own machinery/sensors if you dont want the French kit?.
JonesyI choose the word ‘academic’ as you suggested that there was little value in the practise of surge sortie-ing. I illustrated one instance where it was actually used on a combat mission just to prove that the capability is not, for want of a better description, academic i.e it has real world application and value.
Sorry that it wasn’t clearer.
Any other critique?
JonesySL
The CTOL versus V/STOL argument is a perpetual one here, Jonesey has fallen for the V/STOL argument and that is fair enough, we are all entitled to are opinion and as long as we can Justify it and Jonesey certainly can, however I am not convinced.
The irony to this is that I am still a distinct fan of CATOBAR – just not for us with our very specific requirements. You look at the IN IAC and I’ll tell you that there is a carrier that NEEDS E-2’s and wants to be embarking Rafales or Super Hornets…because they are planning to use it squared-off to PLAN blue-water ambitions. If you want to control large volumes of sea-space you’d better have a method of surveilling it. We dont need that…or what we do need we can use an A-class sonar to achieve…..they do.
The targeting argument, to me at least, does not hold water to me. Storm Shadow carrying Tornadoes have been able to function in long range operations without the assets that Jonesy claims are required.
By saying that unfortunately you are missing the whole point of what having a manned deep strike capable asset in the airgroup brings. A fixed, strategic, target like those engaged by the GR4 Tonka force with Storm Shadow does not require a great ISTAR capability – i.e you can target buildings, airfield facilities, port facilities, comms towers etc, etc without needing ISTAR UAV’s or satellites!. RN TLAM’s and F-35B launched Storm Shadows can replicate that GR4 capability wherever the RAF are unable to stage Tonka’s out to – which is what I’ve said all along. What F-35C can bring is the ability to put a reactive strike asset deep over hostile territory able to engage fleeting or ‘pop-up’ targets…but you need to have a cueing asset able to support that deep capability or its largely valueless.
The sortie rate argument, in my opinion this is largely irrelevant, the need to surge large strike packages of JSF’s is likely to be rare at best and the loss of fuel that the V/STOL version suffers is unlikely to be offset by a CTOL having to wait in the air for a few minutes longer than if it was CTOL for its buddys.
The surge capability is one we used to good effect in the Falklands when striking Stanley airport and Goose Green strip simultaneously so its hardly an ‘academic’ capability. For intensive operations the rapid launch-land cycle of STOVL CVF could be extremely valuable in keeping aircraft on call.
Cost, fair enough, CTOL is more expensive but the figures are not absurdly vast and as always you get what you pay for.
Its the nature of the cost thats largely the problem though…its nearly all year on year stuff. More people, more training, more logistics – at a time when we are trying to find efficiencies in meeting our routine commitments putting in the additional expense, again for what is a marginal real-word capability increase, is unjustifiable realistically!.
The other area in which I feel that increased range is required is in keeping these very powerful and expensive assets away from the littorals. With the increasing prevalence of SSK’s (of all sizes) and shore based anti-ship missiles it seems sensible to me to keep your most powerful assets as far from the coast as possible.
To repeat my illustration above though…this vessel is capable of striking London from a point well off the south-west coast of Ireland, in the Atlantic, using Storm Shadow!. This is not a Harrier/CVS level of capability being discussed here!.
Just my two cents but essentially this argument is a subjective one and down to individual opinion and as most people here can justify their positions on this issue it seems pointless to continue this debate in perpetuity.
Not so unfortunately. People here are stating the just because the F-35C can fly further and carry more ordnance than F-35B that makes CATOBAR the natural selection for the UK Carrier Strike mission. I am pointing out why that is not the case and how, comparitively, valueless extra range is when it cannot be leveraged into any extra capability and that greater weapons carriage is valueless when it only impacts one type of weapon, in the UK inventory, the targets for which can be engaged with alternate weapons systems. Essentially I am trying to detail the concept of ‘operational requirement’ over ‘brochure capabilities’ and I’m very convinced it’s not something I am making very clear!.
JonesyEd,
I agree entirely with Sealord, the capability/cost margin favours the more capable CTOL arrangement, given the relatively minor cost difference. I would just like to point out, however, that at no time have I contended that the carriers should be given C-13 steam cats. I have consistently supported the use of EMALS, even if it means giving that program a kick up the backside to speed it up. Given the likely delivery schedule of F-35s, it is unlikely that we would end up with much of a gap between F-35s reaching readiness and EMALS-equipped carriers entering service.
The problem is though mate that EMALS isnt even guaranteed to be successful aboard a carrier. Its still in the very earliest infancy of its concept demonstration phase…only just moving up to full scale testing.
We cannot afford to push back the CVF’s until EMALS finally becomes deployable as we have a finite lifespan left in the remaining CVS’s and a limited time for the viability of GR9 as a naval strike asset. ESPECIALLY not when you consider that the ONLY real advantage of 35C over 35B is the loiter time on station and even that advantage is offset by the F-35B’s unique characteristics. Its just not worth the delay to get the F-35C’s few advantages.
Jonesy@ Jonesy
I know I’m not going to change your mind, but I’m still hoping Edlaw and I can win this “Battle of the Atlantic”.
Yeah I’m afraid convincing me of the value of a circa 20k ton CATOBAR CVL for Atlantic Ops is going to be a real toughie!.
The way I see it if a service can afford to operate a CATOBAR ship at all, with the whole life maintainance costs associated with a pair of steam cats, an arrestor engine, and cables etc it can afford the, very marginal, cost increase associated with creating a serious, Clemenceau-sized, vessel capable of conventional operations.
This strange little axial deck 20k ton CVL would cost little less, whole-life, than a Clemenceau as all the same expensive bits are common to both, but, would offer drastically reduced capability for the money.
Well… dozens of S-2s are still operational in 2007. And firefighting operations aren’t exactly easy on airframes. The aircraft that went through the Turbo Tracker upgrades in the early 1990s were also stated as being good for 25years. So I think it might be no more of a nightmare than keeping the F-14 in service…
What makes you think that keeping the F-14 in service wasnt a nightmare from the support and logistics viewpoint?!. Also the issue is not whether there were airworthy Trackers by the mid 80’s rather that there may not have been many with the airframe fatigue life left to offer many more catapult shots/traps.
So how is 10 F-18s worse than 8 Sea Harriers on an Invincible? I understand it’s not enough for a 24h sustained BARCAP, but it’ll still provide you with more air defense capability than any carrier at the time bar the U.S. supercarriers.
Not really a fan of the CVS’s, I know precisely how many problems they had originally!, but they have proven their usefulness time and again for comparitively little money. It is this comparable value that is the problem with what you say above IMO.
The squadron of Hornets may be more capable, longer-ranged, better armed etc than a squadron of FRS1’s, but, enough to justify the huge difference in expenditure between the CVS and catobar CVL?. The superior CVL airwing, as oft stated, could easily find itself in METOC conditions that prevent flying operations. If the CVS can still fly off FRS1’s under the same conditions what is the value of the Hornets extra speed, firepower, or avionics?. See what I mean?.
Put simply I dont think the ‘reverse-angled CVL’ pictured above is doing enough to justify its expense over a similar-sized STOVL platform, and, if the pockets are deep enough to build catapult-carriers build ’em to a more sensible size!!!.
HMCS Bonaventure seems to have conducted North Atlantic operations just fine for more than a decade.
The Bonnie operated two squadrons of F2’s in fastjet terms plus cross-decked RN jets of the same vintage. Hardly comparable with F-18 ops off this notional CVL. It also spent as much of its time exercising around Bermuda and Puerto Rico with the USN as it did in the Atlantic and across the UK side of the pond!. hardly a straight line comparison!. 🙂
Jonesyesp,
On the surface a CVL with 10 S-2’s, however many of those left with shot/traps left on their airframe lives by the 80s!, and 10 Hornets may seem to be of value, BUT, in reality what could they achieve?.
BARCAP….with 10 aircraft?. 2 aircraft on a CAP slot plus 2 on DLI ‘Alert5’ and 1 set-up with an emergency buddy pack and there’s half your airgoup gone…for the provision of a single CAP pair!!!. Even if you cycle pilots through the Alert birds you have 2 cabs struck below under maintenance, 2 up on station, 2 on deck and the buddy tanker…that leaves a whole three aircraft…be still my wildly beating heart! 😉
As to the S-2’s I agree that it was an under-rated aircraft that could have been evolved into a modern versatile platform…in many ways the Julie/Jezebel setup that the S-2 embarked was a primitive predecessor to the LF Active sonar that we think is so clever today!!.
Would I choose 10 S-2’s over, say, 12 SeaKing HAS.5/6’s for my fleet ASW in blue water though?. Easy choice….give me the Sea Kings every time. Why?. Dipping sonar. Type195M or the 2069 set beats buoys every time for chasing down subs and with both carriers having limited airgroups neither is going to be sending hunters hundreds of miles away.
Anyway, I just though your argument highlights the need for a CTOL carrier!
Far from it. Given that a 20k ton CVL is going to seriously pitch and roll in a standard-issue Atlantic seaway, and catobar ops are going to be an interesting proposition, a 20k ton CVS with 10 SHAR FRS1, 12 HAS.Mk5 and a few AEW.Mk2’s is going to be, operationally, the far better proposition.
Jonesy(@ Jonesy: definitely impressed at how managed to “spin” my argument. Is that skill part of your line of work? )
(Apologies for all the emoticons, I overdid it somewhat)
No need for apologies…better to put in too many and convey the intention to keep things light hearted than risk someone reading antagonism and hostility where none exist in my experience!.
However, if you would prefer not to finish swimming in the cold Atlantic waters , then you probably will want a supersonic , BVR-capable fighter capable of providing 24h BARCAP coverage outside of enemy bombers’ launch envelope, with long-range AEW support. In the later case, the CTOL option is suddenly very attractive, even if you need to plan your launch & recovery cycles more carefully…
The problem with that is, unfortunately, precisely those cold Atlantic waters. The Atlantic is a very unforgiving body of water and the idea of trying to get catobar ops, with F-18s, off an itty-bitty 20-25,000 ton CVL in a normal Atlantic swell is going to be something to behold!.;)
Seriously though, if anyone wants to defend themselves against Soviet massed anti-shipping strikes with subsonic , short-legged , WVR-only capable STOVL fighters, then be my guest.
Your Soviet airstrikes, in that period in the Atlantic, bear little resemblance to Clancy’s Backfire Regts with their massed volleys of ‘Vampires’. Also, before any Kh-22’s or KSR-5’s appear, the Bears would have to have sniffed out the target. Now, you can deride subsonic, WVR, STOVL fighters all you like, but, for sitting on a CAP station 100nm upthreat for an hour and a half waiting to pot the first recce Tuploev that pops up SHAR FRS1 was perfectly adequate.
Essentially then, recreating the axial deck CATOBAR CVL is a solution to a problem no-one would invent and, as you say, an inefficient one at that. Whilst its well and good stating that flying programmes would have to be planned more carefully you cannot reliably figure in emergency deck reconfigurations for an event like an engine blow-out on takeoff and its effect on a launching CAP team.
For example – you’ve found good enough conditions to land-on your previous two CAP pairs and are launching the replacements. You launch two but the third FODs out an engine on launch. Do you send the pair up to one CAP station and gap the other accepting the risk, or put one aircraft on each station accepting the risk, or launch the last remaining aircraft, after you’ve reconfigured the deck for the landing and restarted the takeoff evolution…then launch a buddy-stored bird and generate another aircraft to cover the broken one?. Operational nightmare.
If you wanted to deploy tacair in the 70’s/80’s Atlantic theatre without the spend on a supercarrier you are plain out of luck. More than Hornets you want something deploying Hoovers – the predominant Soviet Atlantic threat in that timeframe was always the Northern Fleet SSN/SSGN force. Seeings as even the Midways were too small for S-3’s the usefulness of something like this axial deck could hardly be seen as worth the cost of building it!.
JonesyThe overlap between the angled deck and the catapults is a non-issue. First, it would probably be inevitable even with a normal angled deck, assuming you want 50m+ length catapults (Clemenceau didn’t have an overlap with 50m long catapults, but was also significantly – about 40m – longer). Second, a small carrier only has about 20 aircraft, so efficient air operations are much less of an issue than on a supercarrier
I know this flies in the face of the whole point of the thread but the above quote illustrates the issue beautifully – essentially if you want to operate F-18s or similar build your ship 40m longer. If you dont, wont or cant do that go STOVL! :diablo:
JonesyGot to admit I had the same question when I first saw this. If you look at it its actually an axial flight deck just skewed, seemingly, to create a deck park aft of the island.
Both catapults are on the landing run so the flying program stops during landing events…for the whole duration of the landing evolution…any pilot who goofs with a couple of bolters is going to get keel-hauled on this boat as, if a launch evolution is under way, the airborne aircraft are going to burn a lot of fuel waiting for the deck to be reconfigured fom landing to launch evolution!.
Seems a far better solution to put in an overhang to port and orient the flight deck away from the starboard Cat in the conventional manner. You’d lose the deck park after the island, but, may be able to recreate that on the port beam aft .
JonesyThe recurring theme here is that one can achieve miracles when ones tender bits are in a sling!. This is, of course, true…. but only to an extent.
We managed to get the SHARs rated for a whole raft of dumb ordnance on the transit to the South Atlantic theatre that would otherwise have taken years to get cleared. This was a minor miracle in anyones book, but, it was all relatively simple trial and error work. The RAF had a few more significant issues trying to get Paveway cleared on the GR3’s to the extent that the impact of the weapon fell far short of what it should’ve been.
It is that difference between the simple ‘mechanical’ modification and integration of a smart weapon with its attendent volumes of new operational software that makes all the difference here.
ASRAAM as case in point. ASRAAM is launched from precisely the same rail as the existing AIM-9’s. It can use the same electrical interface as Sidewinder too and, to an extent, can be used as a more powerful, longer ranged Sidewinder, allegedly, using no more than the AIM-9 fit. To get the benefits of the IIR seeker though, including use of the missile as a bodge-up IRST, a far more complex interface and software integration is necessary. The coding for the latter not being something that can be knocked-together in a few days in an auxilliary machine space on transit to the OpArea.
……….likewise podded radars, likewise AIM-120!.
Phelgan,
Isn’t it remarkable, they retire the vaguely a2a capable version without remidial action on the GR7/9.
The word remarkable scarcely does it justice. You must remember that the RAF were insanely jealous of the FA2 as they had no equivalent aircraft that was declared to NATO as a full-up swingrole type!.
You must also check the timeline and take note of how long the FA2 survived once the RAF got operational control of Joint Force Harrier!. Makes for interesting reading.
That sounds like Ministry [wishful] thinking to me – are you sure you’re not a civil servant, or worse, a minister
Unfortunately the capability I described IS all thats left!. We’ll be ok with GR9 if the air threat is kept down to day fighters or older all-weather types, preferably subsonic, operating outside of friendly radar coverage!.
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