It certainly shouldn’t be forgotten that the -C version now has so many advantages, i.e. range, weapons capability (including extra AMRAAMs for the fighter role, as was recently revealed by Lockheed), and general performance.
Why is the range and additional weapons carriage capability really all that advantageous Ed?.
We will not be getting the kind of surveillance assets that will let us identify time-critical targets at 800nm standoff anyway so the use of having deep strike capacity, that can engage those kinds of short-duration targets, is marginal at best. If the targets are fixed then they can be serviced with TLAM, Storm Shadows extending the F-35B strike radius, or eventually with UCAV’s.
Seeings, as I understand it, the F-35B weapons bay is simply just shorter than that of the other models there would appear to be no real reason why it couldnt accept the same number of AIM-120’s as the others. At very least it seems feasible that 2 AIM-120’s could be carried per bay. 4 AIM-120’s internally in a maximum LO configuration would seem an adequate combat load to me.
Scoot,
In short the RN would prefer F-35C’s and Hawkeyes to F-35B’s and possibly AWAC/C-22’s…………….Yet, to find the money for the CVF’s and include the RAF they had to compromise! Nothing wrong with that just politics.
There is a strong movement within the RN to harken back to the CATOBAR days and to see an approximation of a USN supercarrier join the fleet that cannot be denied. There is also, however, a core of true believers in STOVL within the Navy too. Its seen as ‘our’ technology seeings as we made it successful in 1982 and, as I’ve alluded to in other posts, STOVL has also allowed us to pull some ‘unconventional’ strokes on opposition forces in various exercises. Retention, and development, of the technology wouldnt necessarily be viewed all that dimly in the service.
I would agree the F-35B offers many advantages compared to the much less capable Harriers. Yet, does the RN really require Super Carrier Sized (i.e. 70,000 tons +) Aircraft Carriers to operate strickly STOVL types?
Simple answer is yes it does. This is because the carrier size is not solely a function of the aircraft-type embarked upon it. Its more a function of the aircraft numbers embarked as they, by-and-large, tend to be of similar size. There are exceptions i.e the Hawkeye trap issue CdeG suffered, but, by and large the rule holds.
The calculus is actually very simple. The first issue to consider in determining the size of vessel required is what you want your vessel to accomplish. If its merely to throw up an air screen over a deployed fleet you design a flying programmme that can keep two CAP pairs up with an additional DLI pair on alert. You would probably plan to have a CAP up, at maximum, 2hrs to preserve the pilots sanity and so you dont have to keep the Alert5 lads sat in their cockpits for ridiculous time spans!. You will therefore require 6 aircraft in the cycle over three, preferably four, cycles so the initial aircraft have time to be regenerated and the pilots time to rest. Your airgroup therefore needs to be 18-24 aircraft and the carrier scaled to carry that airgroup and support it for x period of time.
You start tasking the carrier for power projection, in addition to Fleet Air Defence, you then need to add aircraft/squadrons extra and over the basic requirement so that airframes can be generated for seperate taskings, you need bigger hangar, more fuel stowage, more and larger air-ordnance stowage, larger maintainance facilities with more manpower (and all the overheads that come with larger crew) etc, etc. Size of the carrier goes up from the 30ish thousand tonnes mark to the 50ish thousand tonnes mark. You want a margin of safety to allow for future development so you add in a bit more space than is absolutely necessary and bingo theres another 10k on displacement, steel is cheep and air free as they say!, and then you’re at the CVF!.
So, are the F-35B’s just a smoke screen to get the CVF’s and a way to include the RAF?;)
Not a chance of F-35C’s or E-2’s unless F-35B flops OR the RAF try and shimmy a few in for their FOAS-eque role…in which case they’ll never see a carrier landing.
In reality this isn’t a big problem as the only thing it really precludes is the kind of deep strike that we havent the ISTAR assets (now or projected) to leverage anyway!. Against fixed psuedo-strategic targets we have TLAM already, the stovies will have Storm Shadow and UCAV’s will round out the deep penetration capability. Who wants to be sending manned aircraft out of friendly radar coverage anyway!?.
The sortie generation, operational envelope and training overheads advantages of the STOVL variant over the CATOBAR are manifest and trotted out every time this topic is broached. With smaller PGM’s being the order of the day in modern, CNN-monitored, conflicts for their minimisation of collaterol damage there is no immense handicap from suffering a payload handicap compared to the more onventional variants.
With the increasing capability of, potentially carrier-capable, high-endurance UAV’s to loft surveillance radars for far longer periods than manned types it may be that, in a decade or two, the E-2’s could start to look a bit dated regardless.
The more this is studied in terms of enabling, emerging, technologies the more and more sense the STOVL layout makes.
The Charles de Gaulle is every reason the French needed to go well clear of nuke propulsion for PA2. If you think of it they have invested heavily in providing facilities to handle nuclear powered surface units, so, to revert to conventional propulsion, and not get the maximum benefit of their earlier investment, is an extremely strong commentry on just how much of a screw-up CdeG has been.
In a nutshell your propulsive force has to be sufficient to move your optimal hullform within a performance range suitable for the operations required of the vessel. The French nuclear solution for CdeG didnt come close to doing that and, so, they compromised their hullform and paid a penalty in stability and operations terms. That they had the courage to step away from CdeG to go for something closer their requirements is to their great credit IMO.
The issue is CVulnerableF. Jonesy has it as “secure”
The whole reason the RAF went gippy-fit over STOVL being the life-expectancy of most, tactically-relevent, hard-surface runways in the European theatre being about 36hrs. Carriers are distinctly more surviveable than the average airbase because they move and have to be localised and tracked long enough for a strike – a difficult prospect that few could achieve reliably. Given the proliferation of TBM technology its a brave, foolish or sickeningly naieve individual who banks on the availability of secure local basing.
Phelgan has modern defences as better than 1960s’. So is modern offense.
To which Phelgan is quite correct and you suprisingly wrong. Cutting edge defensive systems, in the naval arena, have outstripped offensive. Offense systems predominantly have improved little in the last 20 years. The only AShM that offers any revolutionary improvement over designs around since the mid-80’s is the Kongsberg NSM and that is still vulnerable to look-down detection from ASaC radar.
How did CVF win support from the Party of Nott, scrappers of the Reserve Fleet and RNVR? How did Admiralty convert the Party that briefly kept just 1 Illustrious active after 1945, sold off Majestics, cancelled CVA-01, did not repair the mess fire in Victorious, or try to put F-4K on Eagle? They chose the land, not sea, for their spend on an East of Suez role. Now we seem to be buying both. What has changed?
Enabling technology old boy….pray do some bloody reading!. The CVF’s are being designed to operate on the same budget as the three CVS’s. This is achieveable as the CVF’s will use Integrated Electric Propulsion amongst other automation features required to reduce the main recurring cost of any large warship – its crew!.
If Galtieri had waited some weeks, even days, ’till Hermes was off to IN and an Invincible to RAN, Falklands today would be Malvinas.
…and if the RAF hadn’t redrawn the map to place the Australian continent a little more to its wishes the RN would have had the CVA-01 follow on carriers and the Falklands War would never have happened.
We can’t put up £Bn.N for the explicit purpose of holding (was it) “a bunch of rock”.
We can though put up £Bn.N for the RAF to pretend that one day it might have to refight the Battle of Britain with Typhoon?. Are we that scared that the French are going to pull on the jackboots and surge the Leclercs through the Channel Tunnel?.:rolleyes:
UK’s 2005 SDR took Jonesy’s logic, of cohesion, to display CVF as cost-beneficial intervention solution. It did not brandish a name for a target – evidently littoral, as any regime ready to let our F-35s overfly onto a troublesome neighbour would let us transit their soil (See Uzbek and Talib-Afghan).
Alternately see Turkey – Operation Iraqi Freedom or France – Operation Eldorado Canyon. Sometimes even friends may not allow for overflight rights!.
We’re buying CVF…to do just what? It’s not, again, that we think that only a big stick puts us at the policy-making top table…is it?
We’re buying them, as stated, because the RAF is limited in what it can achieve in expeditionary warfare terms. Those capability gaps and lack of theatre persistence are most efficiently addressed with Carrier Strike.
Yep, just checked that one. The ADAWS 4 ships with the 992 did rely on the 909 for height information. Bit before my time – it was all 996 and ADIMP when I was going through Collingwood in 92.
As Peter states 909 can provide elevation data as necessary for the engagement cycle. I dont think that Rick was asking that question though.
TI is provided by the 996, a 3D set, that feeds range, bearing and altitude into ADAWS. GWS30 gets its initial steer from ADAWS and the operator lays the 909 to target track based on that data. The 996 is therefore the height finder in the system.
Now, with C-17A, C-130J, A400M, covered by UCAVs and/or accurate, non-nuke SLCMs to do our intervening, instead/as well, we choose very expensive CVF to brush off Astute-types while swatting stealthy, accurate incoming
Aaaah the fabled Crab-shooting-itself-in-the-foot routine. How often we see this!.
The ignorance of the fact that, in ‘expeditionary intervening’, the ability to deploy the UCAV’s or CASOM-shooters to a self-supporting, organically defended, forward base that, by its nature, is far more secure than an ad-hoc host land-base could ever be is a massive augment to the capabilities of the system.
The persistant ignorance of the fact that, for them to entertain the prospect of friendly forward basing, they will require a maritime logistics line and that the Navy would be critical in the establishment and maintainance of that sea-bridge. For forward land-basing therefore the resources of the RAF are entirely extra and over that of a solely naval carrier strike force who’s logistics chain is organic with the fleet – and paid for.
Then, of course we get to the established credibility of the RAF in supporting expeditionary warfare and in global reach – the war winning contribution of the Black Buck raids – one bomber or two today sir?.
This being compared to the danger of operating a carrier in the face of advanced submarine threats?. When the only ship ever sunk in anger by an SSN in the history of naval warfare was Chris Wreford-Browns prize and our ability in ASW is distinctly top-drawer I think that is quite a remarkable point to try and make!.
The issue is that if the WE177s didn’t have PALs, then it stands to reason none of the UK’s other nukes have them either. That is the issue.
Make no mistake, good security has played the overwhelming part in keeping Britian’s nukes safe, but it is also very likely that those seeking nukes assume the UK to have a similar level of security for its warheads as the Americans and Russians, thus they did not even try to breach the security of British facilities. But now that is changed, and ‘bad’ people are going to start taking long hard looks at the current UK security regime and I think you simply can’t be too careful when nukes are concerned.
Wolf,
Why do you persist in doing this?. You’ve been ‘advised’ twice now by two seperate posters that you are commenting on something that, not only, do you not know anything about, but, you arent willing to do the most fundamental research on?.
The UK has NO OTHER nuclear weapon type of which the type of PAL discussed here could be applied. The system used for Trident missiles is completely different and the warheads for those will only function as a component of the Trident system anyway. There are no UK nuclear shells, torpedoes, freefall bombs, TLAM warheads or any kind of nuclear ordnance.
As for challenging of British nuclear weapons security, well, the location of the warhead depot and loading facilities for the Vanguard force is a poorly kept secret, especially in the face of SNP ‘righteous fury’, I’d not advise anyone to try and capitalise on that knowledge though. It would be a one of life’s more unpleasant experiences for anyone attempting the feat without, probably, an armoured brigade behind them!.
I know you are simply attempting to save face with the ‘I think you simply can’t be too careful when nukes are concerned’ empty rhetoric, but, you really have little to be concerned about!
Naval radars, especially the larger 3D air search sets, are mounted on stabilised platforms to eliminate the ‘VERY bad things’ mobryan so accurately noted.
Wolf
every terrorist nutjob and underworld arms dealer is going to be actively seeking out cracks in the system to try and get their hands on these ‘unsafe’ weapons
If you are going to get all hysterical and ranty about these things do yourself a favour….check whether or not the weapons are still in service before raising an outcry?. The weapon discussed here is the WE177 freefall nuclear bomb/depth charge – google it.
Lastly, please do not insult the intellegence of people here by suggesting that the true reason for the MoD’s decision not to employ PALs as anything other then petty penny pinching from politicians who have a damning record of underinvestment in the military.
The decision of not adding PAL’s was, in rare instance, absolutely nothing to do with resources. No more than about 200 WE177 weapons were built in total and the numbers deployed to service units was a fraction of that total. All in all the RN had the massive total of 43 of the NDC variant of the weapon and they werent all deployable at one time. The need for hideously complex PAL’s just simply was not there when correct procedures and some fairly simple and effective technical steps could accomplish the same task.
Pesho
no 105mm ammunition is able to penetrate the turret and front lobe of improved T-72 and T-80….Spend more time to update your knowledge.Then you should known that even T-64BV is way superior to T-72M….
If I understand correctly the debate is to the viability of the early mark M1 with the L7 gun?. Surely then this needs to be compared to the tanks it would’ve faced in the early to mid 80’s?. The upgrade T-72B did not start production, as I understand it, til 1985 exactly the same as the M1A1 with the 120mm Rheinmetal gun. There is therefore no ‘improved’ T72 facing the M1’s L7.
In the M1 timeframe, lets say 1985, the most advanced Soviet opposition, from what I can see, is some quantity of T-64BV’s, though these have only been around since 1984, some early block T-80’s comparable in performance perhaps with the T-64BV’s and T-72A’s. None of which are a qualitative match for the M1 or Chieftain Mk11/Challenger 1 tanks they were facing.
At which point airborne AESAs might well be able to return the favour to incoming SAMs, though
True!. I think I’d bet on the ground-based system – plugged in to the power generation capacity of the local grid – getting there first over the aircraft mounted set though!!! 😀
Ivan
Even better if it drives 50m into a prepared bunker… Then it can just crawl out again when things are safe and start emitting.
Which is a damn good description of a mission kill!. The radars not much use if, for the duration of an attack ingress/egress, its having to bury itself in a bunker to dodge ARMs!. 😎
The best solution here, IMO, is a multitude of ‘fake’ emitters to tie down ARM shooters and deplete ARM stocks against a proliferation of ‘cheap’ decoys. That is until we start getting AESA’s through that are powerful enough to generate HPM attacks – at which point you can kiss goodbye to the ARM as a viable weapons system!!.
Keyboard excavations can be quite instructive I’ve found – in a previous job as accolyte to a very large IBM mainframe I, during a fit of unaccustomed boredom, started cleaning the crud out of the keyboard controlling the diagnostics terminal in the main equipment suite. By the time I’d finished I’d produced a ball of carpet tile fibres 2 inches across – no word of a lie!.
Amidst my disbelief that the keyboard could still function in such a state a dawning realisation struck that, if the keyboard could be so affected, so could a lot of other things!. Hard drive units, tape units, fan trays etc, etc – sure enough all showed signs, when we stripped ’em down, of fibre ingestion and several were close to fail point with drive motors heating through shaft resistance. Smiles all round that we’d dodged the bullet.
Moral of the story. Keep an eye on your keyboard!