In a conventional fight, there is no doubt in my mind that UK can get the islands back if the situation were to arise. Having said that, if Arg really wants to cause trouble, it can makes things very uncomfortable for the UK. Remember that Arg would have learnt from the mistakes of 82 and will not be repeating those.

A strategy based on forcing the brits to deploy repeatedly (several times a year over 3 or 4 years) will be far more effective then a conventional fight that the UK will seek. Arg is more likely to try and fight the war on its own terms and use the space factor to maximum advantage. The UK will resist this and try and go all out. The better General will win.

Kaduna,

The Argentines have undoubtedly learned from the mistakes of 1982. Nothing like a serious kicking to provide cathartic stimulation to develop. Problem is though that the have not had the wherewithall to be able to implement the lessons they learned.

Their forces have improved in quality, marginally, from where they were in 1982 but, as Swerve accurately notes, this has involved a significant loss of quantity. The ability to ‘tweak’ the UK into strategic over-reaction would not be the winning tactic you believe – in fact – it would literally be manna from heaven for us Brits who have watched with mounting horror as our armed forces are continually being told that they must do more with less. A real threat on the horizon, such as that posed by a militant and belligerant Argentina, coupled to an opportunity for another PM to wrap themselves in the flag, could see the resurgence of the fortunes of the British armed forces and the end to the continual salami-slicing that has done so much damage over the past twenty years.

There was a, highly tongue-in-cheek and NOT serious, joke doing the rounds a few years back in the RN that went ‘Do your bit for the service – wind up an Argie!’.

I am trying to look at this as objectively as possible and, while I can see many ways for the Argentines to gain possession of the Islands once again, I have not yet been able to determine a way that they could militarily hold on to them if the UK chose to deploy military force to re-take them – which they certainly would.

The correlation of forces is simply too great against them in this situation and is getting worse, for them, as time goes on. If they are to act militarily it HAS to be before the new RN Carrier Strike capability becomes operational with CVF otherwise they simply do not have a prayer. That means that they have perhaps 8 or 9 years to develop their forces to the point that they could repel a CVS taskforce supported by TLAM shooting SSN’s and they must do it covertly to prevent the UK simply upgrading the Falklands defences beyond that of an Argentine expeditionary forces capability.

An interesting exercise – not one I’d expect them to be able to undertake successfully though.

Ed

The problem with that radar is the range, 30km or so isn’t much, where a proper military spec radar should get at least three times that. One alternative option might, and I repeat, might be to fit the Sea King ASaC 7s with the ability to guide AMRAAMs, using their excellent Searchwater radar. In this case, the Harriers would be given a virtual radar, using the air picture from the ASaC 7, and launching AMRAAMs on command from it. This would not be ideal, but for BVR work, it might work. For short range, obviously the ASRAAM is the weapon of choice, it just has to be hoped that the Harriers are going to be fitted for it, and a helmet mounted sight

Question is why?. What capable BVR platform does the Argentine Air Force operate that absolutely demands AIM120 to defeat….especially when you consider that strikers would be loaded with attack ordnance?. The ‘virtual radar’ concept with Link16 from the ASaC7’s is the closest thing to a practical solution here. Unfortunately Link16 doesnt come along until the GR9 Capability E revision is implemented…something that, afaik, is as yet still to be funded.

The same can, unfortunately, be said of ASRAAM though here at least the technology has allowed for a certain degree of leeway. ASRAAM can, I am told, use the same rail and adaptor as the existing AIM-9 series weapons albeit with reduced functionality. The GR9’s should therefore be able to leverage the ‘near-BVR’ capability of ASRAAM on to targets at all altitudes under direction from the ASaC ‘baggies’ choppers.

Always seemed a smartly setup service, from a distance, the Mexican Navy.

They arent going to be facing down Kirov class battlecruisers, squadrons of strikefighters or dozens of advanced SSN’s so they havent equipped themselves to meet those threats.

They do need to keep positive control over their EEZ and counter narcotics infiltration in partnership with their big neighbour. So they buy the design to an economical, if basic, Spanish OPV and develop it into a series of, apparently, competent and efficient OPV classes. They in mounting the Bofors 57 with 3P ammunition are more adequately defended, against even quite sophisticated threats, than most other vessels of this type and, sensibly, have fair provision for aviation deployment.

Rumours suggest that they want to develop a circa 130m GP frigate with greater range and warfighting capability, presumably this is to allow them to dispense with the Knoxes and carry their patrol and surveillance mission farther out. Makes sense if they can afford it!

Two assumptions need correction here:

1, That we would re-fight the Falklands War the same way we did it last time.
2, We would need outside assistance to accomplish the task.

It has to be remembered that, in 1982, the Royal Navy was primarily a blue-water ASW force. Its weapons systems and training models were designed to cope with the Soviet Atlantic threat i.e a latter day replay of the WW2 Battle of the Atlantic. For that reason the Falklands War was not one that was well fought.

The threats in a new war are unchanged. Argentine air power based at Tierra del Fuego etc and forces stationed on the islands. Their surface fleet had no answer to the RN SSN force in 82 and hasnt measurably improved.

Today the first UK move would be the dispatch of at least 3 SSN’s with near full onloads of TLAM – one for the former RAF Mount Pleasant and others for the Argentine mainland bases supporting the Argentine operation and for Puerto Belgrano. Argentina has no IADS worth the name so a few dozen Tomahawks should be sufficient to significantly degrade Argentina’s ability to support its deployment.

With the islands seperated from mainland support, and the tacair threat degraded, placing a CVS group with ASAC7’s, a Daring or two and a GR9 squadron plus pingers west of the islands shields the striking arm which comes from the second CVS/Amphib group with the other two GR9 squadrons who are busy using Maverick and Brimstone to knock out every SAM, AAA, artillery piece, commo node and POL/Ammo depot on the island.

After the island defences have been significantly attrited by GR9/PGM’s an amphibious landing combined with chopper vertical envelopment from HMS Ocean and backed with AH-64’s and cab-rank CAS from the remaining GR9’s should see the islands back in UK hands within days.

Which is precisely the reason why Argentina would not consider a military solution to the Falklands/Malvina’s dispute!.

The bottom line to this though guys is that the MoD have a kitty of about $20 billion set aside for FJCA. Now, IF F-35B was to fall on its @rse, and if we could not for any reason take up the F-35C, that the USN would trip over themselves trying to get us to switch to, the Rafale, even at $100 million per aircraft, would be easily affordable out of the existing budget.

The existing budget would even allow for the ‘compensation’ of the RAF with additional Typhoon airframes to make up for the loss of their Harrier squadrons and the departure from ‘Joint’ operations that a switch to CATOBAR and Rafale would, naturally, engender. Lack of finance is not going to be a driver for this anyway round – for a change!.

The optimal solution would possibly be the F-35C following an F-35B cancellation as the RAF have already, according to rumour!, shown interest in it for the GR4 mission post-Tonka and for RAF 35C pilots to deck qualify along with the FAA squadrons to retain ‘jointness’. Seeings as the first production 35B starts trials in December I guess we’ll find out in short order whats likely to happen.

Ed,

Well as I see it, and it must be remembered I am a lot better with the big grey boats rather than the little grey planes, F-35B comes with 40,000lb thrust in reheat. Empty weight is 26,000lbs and full internal fuel is something like 13,000lbs. If someone could confirm those numbers it’d be appreciated but they seem a good average of whats out there. Less weapons then I make that a PWR close to unity.

Internal only weapons load wouldnt change that much either, but, obviously hanging a pair of Storm Shadows externally and carrying 4 AMRAAMs in the bays is going to push the figures down a bit. As stated though – not so much I wouldnt expect it to have a problem with a no-WoD takeoff.

Sealord

What is the actual use of high sortie rates? Virtually nil, all that the increase can be used for is a surge and the occasions when that is required are almost non existent, Even if the one occasion on which such a surge may be required during the CVF’s career the increased fuel load of the C will easily enable it to ‘wait’ to allow other aircraft to be launched.

The increased fuel load of the C would allow it to loiter?. So you have a strike package in which the first few airframes shot off with less fuel than the later ones or you arrange for a buddy-tank off a Super Hornet that would have to be launched first….!. Then you are having to turn the carrier into the wind to get your WoD and only then start your launch evolution.

By this point the STOVL CVF has a full squadron airborne and en route to target…whilst swinging at anchor if so required.

What use is this in the real world…lots of use to be honest. Any instance where a time constraint exists, that would impinge on the flying programme such as a closing weather window, a threat detection that requires a course change taking the ships head out of wind, etc., then the ability to get the aircraft up and complete the launch evolution ahead of the programmed window could be critical. For a CATOBAR ship that would probably mean drafting in the waist cat(s) and losing the ability to trap…with all the negative safety aspects that brings.

Ed,

Yeah I got your point, but, it seemed you were underestimating the effects that including EMALS from now, seeings we’re already past design freeze, would have on the progress of building the ships. Currently, as far as is known, a full sized EMALS catapult has yet to be fired. The loadings on a ships power distribution grid, EMP effects etc are all total unknowns therefore. Its very hard to make concrete design changes without firm data to work off and, if we were to see EMALS on CVF-1 in 2014/2015 that design work would be needed to be complete, at an educated guess, within the next 18 months or so. Doesnt seem realistic to me I’m afraid.

As for the lack of ISTAR though, it should be noted that in CTOL configuration, they should be able to embark UAVs, e.g. the Mariner. This would help a lot, and if Searchwater is used instead of Hawkeye, then you already get a pretty decent synthetic aperture radar, as was shown in Iraq, where the ASaC-7s were used in overland surveillance.

I’m a big fan of Mariner its got to be said. Seeings as the RAF are getting two MQ-9’s which are basically the same airframe as Mariner I think they are a platform that could be immensely valuable to a CVF. I’m not sure that Mariner could loft, and power, a Thales Searchwater set…but a Seaspray 7500 mulitmode AESA looks to be well within its capabilities and, from 30,000ft on station for 24hrs, could provide a very useful outer radar picket around a rotary-AEW ‘inner-zone’.

Where I differ with your position is that I dont believe that a catapult would be necessary to launch one and I have mailed General Atomics for clarification on this. Its difficult to find information on takeoff distances for these vehicles but the CVF would seem to offer a 900ft long deck with a skijump at the end…which I would assume would be easier on the airframe than a cat shot.

Indeed, it is a risk. It’s a real shame that it’s not mature now – if it was then there wouldn’t be this problem.

Exactly and, in response to Sealord, the French choice is mitigated to a large extent by the fact that they already operate, and maintain, US C13-type steam catapults.

For the RN to opt for C13’s on the CVF’s would mean the inclusion of fairly high-capacity auxilliary steam plant and lots of additional high-pressure plumbing. These factors bring life cycle costs that are in the wince-generating territory. If the expenditure were to be made only for the C13’s to be ripped out at the first major refit, to mount EMALS, its likely some little beancounting gnome in the treasury would let out an almighty squeal and it’d get the 1SL dragged off and shot!.

I’ve long been an exponent of CATOBAR and the support airframes that cat/trap allows you to design in to your capability set. Having been exposed to an environment heavy in STOVL advocates however I am no longer sure that this is so cut and dried.

F-35B whilst having some negative operational limits balances them out by having some pretty unique positive attributes – especially in terms of sortie generation. With today’s MALE UAV technology offering some interesting abilities in terms of lofting multimode AESA radars it could be that the whole area of naval airborne ISTAR could be ready to enter a major transformational phase…especially now no-one envisages the threat of regimental Backfire/KH-22’s attacks as being realistic.