JonesyThe economics of placing large orders in his own constituency shouldnt be overlooked here either. Being the Prime Minister who ushered back in the glory days of building the Royal Navy’s major capital ships on the Clyde etc, etc is not something to underestimate.
He cancels those carriers and he dumps a good few thousand labour voters on the scrapheap in his own backyard. Not a very real possibility of that in all honesty. I tend to agree that the carriers should be safe now and for a future term with Gordie still in no.10 post election. It would be a revolutionary Tory government that chopped the legs from under HM Forces by cancelling the carriers too – an I say that as someone who got ‘made redundant’ by the Tories ‘Options for Change’ pillaging of the armed forces back in the early 90’s.
It is fashionable amongst all RN/Crab/Pongo sites to run about wailing of how we’re all doomed…and in fact they echo the sentiments on many bases around the country…but we do have some positives to keep in mind. The escort requirement is being studied comprehensively and, now Fleet AAW looks to be well sorted, is a lower priority issue than the logistics/RFA issues….which MARS should address. So there are very few real capability gaps that still exist in the fleet that are not being actually addressed – MASC being about the only one that immediately springs to mind!.
There is also the factor that should be remembered that, apart from a UK-only context, the one thing that the NATO navies are not really that short of are escorts. In future we are as likely to see coalition ops centred on a UK CVF screened by Dutch 7Prov’s, German F123’s, Spanish F100’s, US Burkes etc in addition to RN Type 45’s/23’s as we are for a UK-only group. This does not mean that we do not need more escorts, or even the escorts defined as minimum necessary under SDR!, but it doesnt mean that the Royal Navy ceases to exist as a competent fighting force if we drop to circa 20 first rate escorts and bolster out with ‘second-rate’ vessels.
JonesyHi Steve,
I’ve just blown up the shot of ZD330. It looks like my mis-ident. It would appear that it is 800 NAS markings. Well spotted!
On a side note ZD409 was being flown by ‘Sharkey’ Wards son, Kris. ZD330 was being flown by Cottesmore’s Station Commander.
You know what Tom – this is one of those times where I’d have loved you to tell me I was wrong and that 801 stood back up x no. of months ago and it was just a case that no-one had told me!.
Boll0cks!. 😀
That was baby Sharkey at the controls?. Big splash in Navy News a few months back about him finishing SHOFT and taking his dad up for a spin in a T8!. Dont know which would be tougher…completing your flying training or a single flight with Mr SHAR in the back…ouch!. 🙂
JonesyJames,
Much as I understand the general alarmism of your post I think the ‘weakest navy in the world’ line might cause no small degree of bemusement from many posters around the world.
After all at worst case you are still looking at a fleet comprising sustainable and deployable LO tactical airpower in significant quantity, screened by a number of AAW escorts who’s technology would still be top-drawer, similar top-drawer ASW escorts and choppers, covered in turn by cutting-edge SSN’s. All leading the way for hugely capable Amphibious forces with some of the finest naval infantry in the world. In addition it would the service responsible for the maintenance of the UK national deterrent force – the ultimate ‘big stick’.
‘Weakest Navy in the world’ appears just a touch hysterical perhaps.
A force comprising both active CVF’s (if by some miracle we could crew both by that time), 4 of the T45’s, 6 SONAR2087/Type23’s and 4 A-class SSN’s supporting a full ARG with LPH, both LPD’s and the Bays could undertake a Falklands recovery in hours not weeks. Look at the capability set that lot bring and align it with the threat. Yes it uses most of the RN to do it, but, you couldnt say Op Corporate didnt hand on heart!. The only question over the viability of the group would be the logistics…the underfunding of the RFA is the real potential achilles heel on the horizon.
I’d go further to say that the RN task group above could operate in the littoral of any nation on the planet given skillful handling and undertake limited strike missions ashore. Note I am NOT saying that this group could anchor off Shanghai, destroy 58 squadrons of all kinds of every fighter in the inventory, kill 97 SSK’s and uber-wonderful 2nd gen SSN’s then raise the PRC to the ground!. I am saying that a group of the type I mentioned could handle and defeat theatre forces that even an advanced enemy would be able to muster, at one geographic location during a short attack window, before leaving smartly after the completion of a mission tasking.
Thats worst case for the future composition of the RN too!. If we could get a latter day version of a Type61/Leander type vessel lightly armed but modular as C3 we can probably keep up with most of our routine obligations whilst we dispatch the above group into the bargain!.
JonesyWith the coming demise of the USN’s LCS program, and this latest report from the UK, the future of MCMW looks rather tenuous. If there is truly an operational requirement for MCM vessels in the near term, it will be in the Persian Gulf, where the situation will either get better, or far worse, long before the C3 becomes a reality. It would make more sense to permanently base a handfull Sandown class minehunters in the Persian Gulf for the next decade, while scrapping the rest, than to make a long term investment in the C3.
Quoted almost verbatim from the US concept of naval warfare!.
Fortunately the RN knows better than to believe that!. We’ve had too much experience with being on the receiving end of mine warfare to ever de-emphasize that facet of the maritime battlespace. Not just in the Persian Gulf either. Chris Craig would tell you all about using a Type 21 as a minesweeper, the hard way, in Falkland Sound in 82!. Its tantamount to saying that we would de-emphasize ASW or AAW…just plain crazy!.
The future, as 1SL has gone on record stating, is largely going to be coping with asymmetric warfare in the littoral battlespace. If you can show me a better weapon system in terms of persistence, effects and cost-to-deploy than mines in that specific environment then I’ll be very impressed. Put simply, to a state wishing to deny their maritime routes of approach to an opposing force mine warfare is a key factor, that fact has never been lost on the RN….unlike others.
Part of the raison d’etre behind C3 is to amalgamate the Minor War roles of patrol and MCMW together, amongst others, into a single modular hull. In the past that was impossible as minehunting demanded a reduced-signature hull for the obvious reasons. Today though, if we accept that a ROV will be doing most of the work at standoff, there is little to stop MCMW being folded in with more conventional patrol taskings. The C1, C2 and C3 concept of force capabilities is a bit too underdeveloped currently for many people, with any conviction, to state that one or other part of it is going to be ‘cut’.
JonesyThis article is speculative gash. There will be a statement released, if they bother, in the next couple of days that the release was a ‘proposal’ or ‘analyses’ piece only and not a policy document.
Hulls 7 and 8 for the T45 programme would be nice and, by all accounts, the programme is turning into a major success story with industry offering impressive savings on follow-on hulls and with DARING turning in an excellent performance on her sea trials. Can see Gordie wanting to get himself associated with that one as a triumph of Scottish expertise….yadda…yadda.
and the nuclear submarine program looks like it might receive and additional hull or two.
ASTUTE has been the diametric opposite of T45 to date. It may be a world-beating design that offers significant capability increases over what we have now, but, for HOW MUCH?!. BAE seriously humped the puppy with the project management on the Astute deal and it is hard to see how they are going to be able to turn in the 8 originally stated as desired by 1SL (to replace 12 S and T class boats) after the royal screw up of unit 1. The 11 boats listed in the article doubtless means 7 A-class and 4 successor-SSBN so its not a case of ‘additional hull or two’!
The ommission of the Minor War Vessels from this list is the thing that pegs this article as wildly innaccurate for my money. Probably just behind the Scandinavian navies the RN are masters of MCMW and its importance is manifestly understood – the concept that it would be dispensed with is inconcievable. There is talk of MCMW being roled in with the C3 component of the future escort structure which, given the increased reliance on ROV’s and, in future, autonomous UUV’s, for stand-off MCMW seems entirely feasible.
For my money this all comes down to the C3 decision. If the numbers touted are near accurate, at around 16 hulls, and IF we get the design right and get C3 as a modular 2-3000 ton barebones hull, with extensive aviation support facilities, that has a sufficient propulsion fit to keep up with Fleet operations and sufficient bunkerage for extended deployment then the above is nearly tolerable. Get C3 wrong and it would be disasterous.
JonesyTEEJ
the other GR.9 was ZD330 with 801 NAS markings
801 NAS hasnt stood back up yet has it?. Mate of mine at Cottesmore hasnt said anything about 801 going operational and they are meant to be being based there when the FAA can get enough pilots scrounged up to reform the squadron?.
JonesyCrikey i thought for a second you meant ‘launched’……as in giant ‘ker….splash!!!’.
Was going to ask just how they planned to go from design freeze to hull in the water in a year!. THAT would be an achievement!.
As I understand whats written above though it seems to suggest first steel cut next year and a launch in time for sea trials in 2012 leading to a in-service date in 2014!. A programme that sounds far more civilised!
JonesyThats not the story as I heard it Sealord!.
It was a few years back now but the Commandant of Marines at the time, one General James L Jones, was quoted as saying:
“You know, before we had Harriers, we had fixed-wing aviation for many years – I mean, the A-4s and all kinds of F-4s – and we had airplanes that didn’t go vertical,” Jones said. “We were able to develop that technology, and it’s been … on balance, a good thing to do. It’s certainly enabled the fixed-wing aviation portion of the Marine Corps to employ small deck carriers and the like…but V/STOL JSF, for us to buy it, is going to have to be something pretty good,” Jones said. “I mean, we’re not going to get into another kind of – take a chance on something that isn’t going to be very, very useful and recognized within the family of tactical aviation as being an additive. I can only tell you that we’re going to wait and see. But we’re not going to buy something that’s technologically risky.”
Even today there is still a maintained opposition from the USN to integrating USMC STOVL ops in their CATOBAR flying programme and it is easy to understand why. The USMC jets are going to demonstrate the one, over-arching, advantage of STOVL – its ease of operation. The USN will be most embarrassed if they see a full USMC F-35B strike package launched before they have the head of the ship into wind and the first -35C’s connected to the catapult!.
JonesySealord,
I’d consider it extremely unlikely that any public source will be able to shed much light on the Active Sea Dart project. As stated I only heard about the concept from one disgruntled petty officer!. I would guess that an enquiry put to BAE may be the only route for trying to find out what, if any, serious progress was made on the weapon.
From what little I know it was a carryover from the work done on GWS27 ‘super-SeaWolf’. It was quite the fashion, at the time, to try and stick active seekers onto anything and trying to get a VLS setup knocked together was the logical next step.
As to timeline I heard about it in the middle of 1992 and it had obviously been knocking around, as a concept, some time before that. The BAE MESAR radar research, that later developed into the SAMPSON MFR, was under development from the mid 80’s and I always assumed that there was an intent to mate MESAR to Active Dart. Pure speculation on my part though. Anyway what is certain is that the Aster/PAAMS project was embarked upon in December ’92 and that put paid to any further development of the GWS30 system beyond that needed to maintain viability.
Range is, of course, dependent on the target being engaged. Kinematically the missile is good for a LONG way past the 40km’s originally advertised and the limitation was always with the 909 directors. The 909(I)’s now deployed, along with the upgrade rounds themselves, make the system hugely more capable than it was in either the Falklands or Desert Storm, somewhat obviously, and I wouldnt be so fast to write it off as totally obsolescent – apart, of course, from facing concentrated saturation fire which, to be fair, would also present problems for SM-1 or SA-N-7 equipped vessels!.
JonesyThe flight deck movements I cant comment on, different branch, though the concept of two Lynxes side-by-side in a 42’s hangar wouldn’t immediately leap to mind as something I’d be in a hurry to try having stood in Exeters.
The thing that gets me about this is why they didnt just land the choppers on the RFA that must have been alongside the 42 in order to provide all this AVCAT!.
I forget the precise bunkerage of AVCAT embarked on a 42 and surely wouldnt be able to print it here if I could, but, its not going to keep half a dozen Lynxes operational for more than a couple of days at the kind of Optempo being described!.
UNREP every other day or something Shipmate? 🙂
Jonesy“The pain of it is that now – with CVF and JSF committed and locked together – the Govt now announces that it can’t afford JSF and Typhoon, and the UK gets JSF, which is slower, shorter-legged and less versatile.”
LOL.
Did anyone whine about the Harriers low speed, shorter range and lacking versatileness compared to the Tornado for example? Some people like to forget that the F-35B is a Harrier replacement. If you dont want STOVL, dont get it and compare the F-35A or C to the EF. Its neither slower when loaded, shorter legged nor less versatile.
The substantial irony of the situation is that it was the RAF’s repeated lobbying that got the UK FJCA downselect in favour of the STOVL -35B variant. The RN’s choice was to push forward with the -35C as it was seen that commonality n operations with US and French naval airwings far outweighed the benefits that STOVL brings. The RAF, allegedly, wanted STOVL to allow for rapid deployment to forward austere shore-basing, reducing the perceived ‘vulnerability’ of operating off a carrier.
The greater irony is in the rumours now circulating that the RAF are trying to press for a re-evaluation of the FJCA decision to allow a split buy of F-35C for them in a land-based BAI/Strike capacity in conjunction with the F-35B variant for the token replacement of ‘Joint Force Harrier’.
So, in effect, rather than work with the Senior Service supporting the CATOBAR JSF, in the process gaining a self-defending and self-supporting forward operating base for their long-range airstrike potential, they have dithered around and now face the prospect of exactly that long-range potential being the sole preserve of CASOMs until the strategic-strike UCAV matures to operational readiness.
Least they haven’t let the Navy get away with anything more useful though! Trenchard would be proud!
JonesyWhat a remarkable idea this is!. The IN is having to ramp up its infrastructure just to support Gorshkov operations, that someone could seriously think they were considering a vessel of the scale of CV63 is unfathomable
Two questions that would immediately spring to mind would be…is there an 1100ft drydock anywhere in India to actually support this thing?. Secondly could the IN actually crew a vessel that needs 2800 hands for ship operations only?.
Then we have the issue of how you fit a CATOBAR 80k ton CVA into the deployment cycle with the STOBAR Gorshkov and a pair, if that, of 35k ton STOBAR CVL’s?.
Nah, if the level of capability that future IN ops will demand required the adoption of a vessel like Miss Kitty then there is no way that Gorshkov or the current IAC designs could ever have gotten as far as they have. They simply will never provide more than a fraction of the Kitty Hawks capability set.
If CV63 level capability is required they better shut down Gorshkov and the IAC immediately and start talking to us and the French about licensing the PA2 design and trying to get a good deal for two hull builds following on from the UK/France production run.:rolleyes:
JonesySo just a really big FAE device by the looks of the detonation then?
JonesyWell, yes you are. Aus is likely, and needs, to be involved in any major regional conflict long before mainland Aus is threatened.
Will Australia be involved, alone, in a major regional conflict in AsiaPac?. Not very likely. If there is such a conflict it will be a coalition game and it would be unlikely that RAAF Super Hornets or JSF’s would be tasked for air superiority in that context!.
Plus LACMs from SSK’s and surface vessels will present a direct threat to the Australian mainland right from the kickoff of any hostility involving Aussie forces – utterly irrespective of the location of a regional conflict!. So more attention called for there than in aquiring aircraft that can face down the Flanker hordes that will never approach the Australian mainland anyway!!!.
By the time any threat is directly threatening Australian cities and towns, the game is already over….No modern nation can function without its network of trading partners and allies.
This is the point though….there is no direct threat to the Aussie mainland from any tactical aircraft in the SE Asian theatre. Perhaps, when the PLAN fields its first carrier, there may be a couple of dozen Su-33’s for them to sweat and, likewise, there could, potentially, be a handful of Indian MiG-29K’s to handle – if those scenarios where ever to actually be credulous!. Neither Russian design would be supported by sufficient battlespace management systems to be able to successfully enter the Australian air defence environment and survive for very long though.
5500km is not that far: from East to West Australia is about 3,000km.
5500km IS ‘that far’ in terms of the deployment, of strike-ordnance laden, tactical fighter aircraft. The question is one of assets against effects – its doubtless possible to stage Su-30’s 5500km on a strike through use of AAR. The metric of how many tankers would be required to support one Su-30 there and back is critical here though. Once you have that you can extrapolate the maximum size of force you can deploy governed by the number of AAR assets you have available.
The PLAAF, with only a handful of Il-86’s and a dozen or so converted Badger tankers in total, will be supporting a single-digit deployment of Flankers and little more. The issue is then can, for example, 8 PLAAF Flankers contribute enough firepower to make the deployment worthwhile when two PLAN Kilos loaded up with LACM Klubs could do significant hurt to targets ashore far more simply?.
If I understand Kaduna correctly this is more a case of being a ‘net p1ssing contest than anything actually serious anyway so I’ll leave it at that!.
JonesyTell you what Arthur that was a damn good Aussie accent….thought I was talking to Ja Worsley for a bit……mate! 😀
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