Any body who trys to claim that T23 is more stealthy than a La Fayatte realy needs to sort themselves out.

Similarly anyone who claims naval stealth to be solely a function of RCS needs to expand their frame of reference!. Just because it looks ‘stealthy’ doesn’t make it so!.

I’ll try and explain this in terms that wont get me in trouble. The Lafayette designers painstakingly reduced radar reflectivity of their vessel and did an admirable job of it. Their mistake though was to leave the radar profile of the hull unaltered. To a radar seeker the Lafayette profile, despite issuing a weaker return, looks undeniably like a ship – low bit on the bows, high bit, lowish bit amidships, high bit over the hangar and low again over the pad. If you can disturb or adjust this pattern though you can confuse a seeker as to your true aspect and, within a few ship lengths, your position.

So on one hand we have a medium RCS design with additional tweaks and, possibly, the quietest ‘stealthiest’ propulsion fit of any current escort OR a slightly-compromised lo-RCS design that chugs along merrily on its diesels?. I know which vessel I think is overall the more ‘stealthy’ though I may need to ‘sort myself out’ because of it!. :rolleyes:

Wanshan,

Nonetheless, doesn’t the Talwar have more than 3 channels? I mean, there are 4 Front Dome directors associated with the Shtil missile system alone. Together with 2 Kashtans with integral radars, that make 6 radar fire control channels for SAMs IMHO. As compared to just 2 in type 23.

Yep your right mate. Sorry should have been clearer. To me the number of fire-channels is a function of the number that can be brought to bear on a given arc of fire.

The vessel has all those directors but effectively each beam and bow and stern aspects are covered by 2 Front Domes and a single CIWS. In the event of a converging attack by inbounds on both beams simultaneously the additional fire channels become useful but, really, that is the only scenario I can imagine the extra channels becoming useable. In that scenario the question would be how fast the single-arm Shtil launcher could train onto diametrically opposed threat bearings and spit missiles out!. Suffice it to say if you’re that badly cornered you are in deep trouble whichever of the ships you happen to be on!.

Jon,

thats typical detection range for lo flying fighter aircraft intercepting a naval fleet (like during falklands), no enemy fighter aircraft in the right mind will fly high right into IN fleet unless they have superior numbers because they have good chance of being detected by surface combatants and intercpted by land based sukhoi’s or by harriers.

Detection range perhaps but a search set getting an intermittent hit is a long way from a weapons track. If the attacker is sea skimming and is still, for some unfathomable reason, inbound on the ship he’s got another few kms to play with before he crosses the missile illuminator horizon!. Powerful as Shtil doubtless is its not shooting through the horizon!.

Nuke

I still haven’t well understood why and how the type 23 frigates have a sthealt capability as radar cross section. They seems alll but not Sthealt vessesls , or the French builders are incredibly stupid.

The conventional method, well taken up now, to reduce a ships RCS is to angle the vertical bulkheads off perpendicular. Everyone is well aware of this. The Lafayette takes that a degree further by screening internal angles etc, but, what they ignored was the proportions of the RCS that was left. I will not say too much on this but a vessels radar signature can be modified in more ways than just the raw energy returned to an emitter. The designers of the Duke class boats knew this, but, in their desire for minimal possible RCS the Lafayette team missed a trick. Plus they then, after working so hard to manage the signature, went and bolted a Crotale Navale on the roof and blew the whole thing!.

Thanks Wanshan thats about what I remembered. As I was saying though this shows that the Krivak-III has AAW capabilities against medium altitude aircraft up to about 30km that the T23 just doesnt, but, the question must be how often are you going to find hostile tactical aircraft closing inside 30km to attack ships these days?.

Everyone I can think of facing a developed naval threat, save perhaps the Philipines, has at least AM39/AGM-84 level standoff ship attack capability so a PDMS such as Shtil is going to be predominantly employed shooting the arrows not the archers just like Sea Wolf will. My contention is, in this antimissile regard, Shtil offers little practical advantage over GWS26.

Overall though the point I was making above was that despite the Krivak-III’s seeming capability advantages the Type 23’s RF/Acoustic stealthing, sensor fit and ease of operation would swing it where I to have a requirement for an economical GP escort.

I think its a fair pairing to be honest. Both are intended to be GP escorts capable of independent and fleet action in a general sense.

T23 started life as little more than a large OPV with a Towed Array and a chopper. Spiritual descendant to the Rothesay/Leander class if you like. The Falklands experience changed that and the design got heavily modified into a GP hull albeit still with a heavy ASW bias.

Krivak-III is a modification of the original Soviet -I ASW hull and as such is something of an odd mix of capabilities. Soviet style ASW was strong on teamwork, numbers and lots of brute force. As such Krivak never had to be that subtle nor that capable as an individual unit!.

The Indian -III design has taken the hull to its probable zenith in capability terms. Decent PDMS/CIWS, good ASuW and an ASW capability backed by a chopper makes for a good jack-of-all-trades hull. IMO though it suffers from the limitations of its heritage and the common problem encountered by vessels with such a mix on a small hull. It excels at none of the tasks its capable of accomplishing.

Stealth is very important these days, of course, and on the face of it the Krivak-III looks to have a superior design in this regard. I’m not convinced that that is actually the case. I recall a study comparing the relative RCS advantages of the French Lafayette over the T23 that had remarkably interesting results!. Also the T23’s layout incorporates some very clever trickery that would make it the choice ship to be on in an ARH missile attack even if it has to do without the Krivaks fearsome CIWS.

Tying into this stealth isnt just a function of RCS in the naval environment. Accoustic profile is every bit as significant and here, from the top of my head, the T23 is unsurpassed with its very discrete CODLAG fit. 15 knot, high discretion, transit on the electric motors is a very useful capability if hostile subs are about.

Weapons fit, on paper, seems to favour the Indian ship. In reality though I think the circumstances where the advantages would tell are quite limited. Shtil has little real cross range ability and is, effectively, ‘just’ a PDMS. Against inbound missiles its range, again from memory, is on the order of 10km or so. The difference between that and GWS26 Sea Wolf being a mere few kms and, essentially, irrelevent in any practical terms.

The Klub system can give the Krivak-III a land-attack capability which T23 doesnt have – albeit at the expense of some of its antiship capability. Klub ASW also gives a standoff ASW capability that the Dukes dont have. The sensor advantage of the T23 mitigates that deficiency to a large degree though and, again, Klub ASW rounds are included only at the expense of the vessels ASuW potential. Finally the Ashm variant with 200 or 300kms of range, where targetting allows, allows the Indian ship a much greater radius of action than the T23’s Harpoons provide. Again though that is entirely dependent on RoE’s and the availability of targetting support.

In terms of habitability, DC, maintainability, reliability and the hundred and one other neglected factors that are crucial to the successful operation of any warship I can only talk about the Duke Class about. According to an MEA of my acquaintance the Dukes score well in the operational areas being comfy in terms of fixtures as well as ride and are pretty easy to keep going (his last ship was HMS Cardiff though which was a bit shocking so its possible his perspective is tainted). I’d be interested to hear of anything thats come back about operational conditions on one of the Indian Krivaks.

Terran looks to me that thats journalistic confusion between angled-deck and deck-ramp more than some attempt to describe a non-cat waist launch. The ski jump is meant, roughly, to reduce a takeoff run by about 30%. Even given a full length launch run the numbers, IIRC, for an E-2 TO with the 30% ramp are still short of the requirement.

By 2010, the USN will have retired some 106 S3B Viking aircraft. If E2C can operate from Vikramaditya/Gorshkov, then maybe these could operate from it also. So you might get 3 E2C, 3 S3B, 1-2 ASW/UT heli’s 12-14 Mig29K

Wanshan the big problem with that one, mate, is what a detachment of 3 Hoovers is precisely going to offer you for its deck footprint and overheads. Airborne ASW is very much a numbers game and 3 S3’s may give you the ability to prosecute a single target OR man a single ASW picket station, but, not both simultaneously. To maintain a long duration presence, unlike the E-2, you need more than 3 in the airgroup.In this instance I’d imagine a few good medium choppers instead of the Vikings would be far more useful.

Concur absolutely with Wanshan and Wolverine here. 16 Fulcrums in two squadron groups, a detachment of E2’s (potentially three airframes given the 6 plane requirement identified by the IN) and a handful of rotary assets for plane guard and liaison would seem an optimum group for the vessel as she will complete.

This does rely, naturally, on the E-2 compatibility trials with Gorskovs STOBAR arrangment going successfully. As I understand that article Northrop Grumman are yet to be commissioned to undertake those trials. It will be very much in their commercial interest to do this though as the UK MoD will also be very interested in the outcome for their MASC requirement. While CVF is currently listed as STOVL in layout a design flexibility is incorporated that means arresting-gear could be introduced as late as 2009 without any negative impact on schedules whatsoever.

When Harry first mentioned the IN interest in E-2 I, admittedly, was a little sceptical about the viability of E-2 operating unassisted off such a small deck. You do have to admire the persistence of the IN in trying to craft a silk purse out of this sow’s ear though!.

You do recall correctly Vic. VLF can handle relatively fast A1A Morse for example but its by no means what we’d understand as a high datarate in any terms that would fit today!. It is a high datarate compared to ELF though – once read it took 29 minutes for a Sov sub to recieve a short letter group from their ELF rig up near Murmansk!!!.

I know what your talking about in terms of netcentricity and, yes, I agree that is where ultimately those with the assets and pockets for it will end up. Global reach netcentricity, as opposed to ‘local node’ netcentricity, is the step beyond that thats now started to whet the appetites of certain parties. Parties that, IMHO, need to remember the line about the eggs being in the one basket – thats another debate though!.

What I’m disputing, theoretically, is that submarines and SSK’s in particular will ever form a true component of the netcentric warfare model. The value of netcentricity is the information edge it gives to your planners and shooters – obvious!. If your information edge allows you to position your shooter optimally for its weapon system to defeat the opponent before his sensors provide him the same information on you victory is yours every time.

In naval warfare this is all about manoever and cutoffs. If you can detect, identify your targets and their range of motion before they know who or what you are – you win. The critical factor, of course, is if you can provide that operational intelligence to the shooting assets within the time frame that allows their weapons to bear or gives them useable positional data for the intercept. If you cant disseminate that inteligence quickly enough then you may as well not have it!.

This comes back to what I was saying earlier about surface assets and aircraft. A 25-30 knot fleet steaming in may get out of range of an SSK 100km or more off its course track before it could get the targetting downlink and make an attempt at the shot or the cutoff. It is unlikely that fast escorts or alert strike aircraft would be equally unable to react or reach the target though.