Wanshan,

Your welcome to your Ferrari mate!. I’ll stick with the Aston Martin! 😀

Unfortunately Dionekes you seem to have already neatly covered most of the pro’s and cons of the debate. That being the fact that quite a few pro’s come with the corvettes and most of those nations buying larger FAC’s are, in many respects, being conned!.

An aviation capability, i.e a chopper pad plus some fueling capability plus air weapons stowage etc is a collosal capability jump for a littoral warship as it adds a true surveillance capability, if only within range of a choppers shore base or for short duration patrols. Look at the capabilities offered by the, very lovely, Omani Qahir Class boats – OTO SR, MM40, Crotale-NG, MW08 3D radar, BAe ATAS towed array capability and chopper capability up to Super Puma size on 1400 tons with 15knts sustainable at State 6 and 3000nm range at that speed. Anyway you cut it thats bang-for-buck at $265 mill for the pair!.

Its the capabilities distinction between a corvette, as described, and a FAC of whatever size that is even more stark than the surviveability characteristics for me. With chopper support, space for transient personnel, superior stores stowage, extra engineering/workshop spaces and extra medical facilities etc the corvette is as valuable in peacetime performing SAR, SLOC patrol, Assistance-at-Sea and defence diplomacy missions as it is in its warfighting role.

FAC’s, on the other hand, shoot missiles and little else!. They can and do, of course, make port visits etc, but defence diplomacy is usually one of those missions where size really does matter!.

Anyway another good analysis (supporting dienekes points entirely!) can be found below:

http://www.mindef.gov.sg/safti/pointer/back/journals/1999/Vol25_1/3.htm

Fair enough!. Thanks Harry

Interesting stuff Roel. It begs a significant question that I wonder if anyone can answer. Do the IN make use of permanent deck parks, like the USN, or do they subscribe to the RN theory that the airwing should be capable of being fully struck down in the hangar?.

Is there anyway to find out who locked the Gorshkov thread I wonder?. It seemed to me that all the belligerent parties had stepped back with some dignity. Seems a shame to waste the good debate that we had going when the flames were on the verge of blowing themselves out?.

They’d definitely have to stretch the hangar to fit 24 aircraft aboard in anything other than a ferrying capacity!. 16 will demand the use of a permanent deck park which can be kind of harsh on airframes. Going from the listed diagrams 20 fixed wings could mean the deletion of the ASW chopper component to get them aboard and operational. Not necessarily a wise option.

The issue of maintainance is a huge one in regard the MiG-29. True believers are confidently predicting a vast improvement for the 29K over its land-lubbing bretheren because of its newer motors. I hoestly hope theyre right otherwise the low sortie rate of the carrier won’t be much a problem as they’ll have, with a small airgroup, precious few sorties to generate!.

Power projection in carrier terms is dependant on three major factors:

1) Size of airgroup
2) Battlespace management/situational awareness capability
3) C3I ability

The reasons behind this are very basic.

1)The airgroup needs to be able to support at least one, preferably two, CAP pairs on patrol. Giving a MiG-29K an arbitrary 2hr endurance on the 75nm ring that means, for two pairs, 12 aircraft assigned solely to fleet defence over a 6hr window. For a 16 plane airgroup that leaves 4 airframes available for deck alert, strike and ASuW taskings. Even a fast turnaround on the first CAP pairs will do little to mitigate this.

I’ve just worked out a likely flying programme on the strength of a 16 plane airgroup. I’ve calculated an 8hr period on station split into 4x2hr timeslots. Only the first and third timeslots can generate 4 aircraft for strike missions and 2 would be more sensible in both cases to ease the load on the matelots in the second and fourth timeslots as both intervals could see 10 MiG-29’s in the hangar undergoing turnaround. In that ‘modest’ hangar, with rotary airframes thrown in for good measure, servicing 10 twin-engined supersonic fighters in two hours might be a bit of a stretch!. In timeslots two and four the carrier is at max stretch to cover 2 CAP stations and keep 2 aircraft on Deck Alert.

This is with a full airwing that hasnt suffered any attrition too!. Numbers really do count and 16 is too few.

2) I’ve banged on about E-2’s so often that even such an erudite and composed gentleman as Harry expressed a desire to kill me. I wont do this any more for the obvious reason therefore!. Suffice it to say that chopper AEW is insufficient for adequate fleet defence and woefully incapable of providing coverage for strike missions far overland. With a fragile airgroup intolerant of losses it will be a big gamble utilising the range advantage of a MiG-29K without friendly radar coverage!.

Situational awareness isnt limited to surface and aerial threats though. Carriers are the highest value targets and I can think of no service that wouldnt willingly sacrifice an SSK to get scope shots of an enemy carrier slipping beneath the waves. Choppers with decent dipping sets are the best way to keep such nastiness at arms length, unfortunately, with a limited airgroup Gorshkov is not going to be carrying many. Lots of escorts with towed arrays and choppers required.

3)Command, Communication, Control and Intelligence could be bundled with the above under the ISTAR banner, but, its important to differentiate simple AEW from AWACS/ASAC capability. The former is vital for ownship defence, but, the latter is vital in strike coordination and standoff air operations. They mark a significant difference between a sea control ship and a real power projection platform.

In all of those criteria Gorshkov is an inadequate platform. The range of its fighters, their manoeverability, their sensor fit or combat persistence makes not one jot of difference. Neither does it make any difference whether Gorshkov is a more impressive platform than a STOVL Ocean type platform. The real long term future of IN aviation should be the ADS vessels NOT whatever is used to augment the Viraat in the coming years. After the IN withdraws its last SHAR a modern CVL could fill an ASW or LPH role and be a meaningful contributor to the IN fleet. Whats Gorshkov going to leave as a legacy in the fleet?.

If one goes by the thumb rule it should be 1 A/C per thousand tons , since Groshkov displaces 45000 tons , it should be able to accomodate 45 aircraft , since a fine balance ha to be maintained between A/C and ASW helo as well as AEW Hello , 22-25 Migs with 15-18 Helo should be the air component of Groshkov

That rule only applies to a purpose designed carrier not this vessel. An airgroup of 16 MiG-29’s, 4 Ka-31’s and 4 ASW choppers is, seemingly, representative of whats achievable.

Nitin,

I am sorry Steve, but you are seriously living in cloud cuckoo land if you believe that the IN of all three services would accept something foisted upon it by the political leadership.

Every other developed Navy in the world has to accept, and make the best of, the results of political determinations about its acquisitions. Ships, carriers most specifically, are big ticket items and, in general, the ordering of them generates employment, income and tax revenue. This means that political advantage can be gained by a government allocating contracts in such a way as to paint themselves in a very positive light. This is a universal constant and, demonstrably in the Bofors affair, the Indian MoD isnt above such politicking any more than anyone else. This is no criticism of the GoI per se just an observation that theyre little better than anyone else.

The IN has traditionally been a very conservative service in terms of fund expenditure, it abhors waste and has always used its funds best of all three services. They have an amazing relationship with local industry primarily because they realised the cost effectiveness of local involvement.

I believe you wholeheartedly Nitin. However its not the IN’s role in this I’d criticise. Where I looking at this from the IN’s standpoint I’d much rather have a local industry solution i.e an indigenous ADS as it gives me a predominantly local logistics base and eases any worries I may have about spares etc. The decision to go with Gorshkov puts a maintenance intensive vessel in my fleet that I have to look to the Russians for the bits to support. From what you say of the IN’s prudence how could this be anything other than external intervention?.

If they are buying the Gorshkov, the ship would have been thoroughly checked out to the last bolt and nut.

Yes and the IN team determined that circa 70% of the nuts and bolts needed replacement!. Its inescapable that this vessel is in a poor materiel state I’m afraid as anyone who knows anything about ships will tell you – you dont replace that much of a hull if you have any other options. In the commercial world you flog the hull off and buy new!.

As regards accepting what is given- do look upon the Shtil issues and the Talwars. The IN chose to withdraw its entire team from Russia rather than accept a ship with a malfunctioning system which the Russians assured they would fix.

Slight difference in perspective there Nitin!. They refused to accept a vessel who’s primary air defence system was inoperative due to an EM conflict that was the result of a design goof!. Not being funny but I dont think many services would accept that either so its probably not an issue to make much of. Comparing that to the induction of a 20 year old carrier with a poor health record is a bit of a perversion of scale isnt it?.

Errant nonsense I am afraid. Have you even talked to any IN staff before making such statements? They sound extremely pompous and are false to boot.

I’m sorry you found that pompous it was a straight line evaluation nothing more, nothing less. A carrier is a political weapon as much as its anything else. The acquisition of one, at a time when IN carrier aviation is looking shaky, is a political matter that is inescapable. Look at the political ramifications that spawned from the British MoD’s planned disposal of its carriers in 1981.

Gorshkov has never been a political project- the delay suffered is primarliy because of India’s civilian top heavy MOD structure as well as the need to dot all the i’s and cross all the t’s when it comes to a multibillion $ project.
Furthermore, the prime delay in the Gorshkov came becuase India simply did not have the money. Kindly look upon when India’s purse became full post 91 slump, and the competing demands on a limited exchequer. All the services were hit.

Of course Gorshkov is political. The vessel offers very, very little really new capability over Viraat. It can’t achieve power projection to any greater extent than Vikrant did with her Seahawks and its sea control and fleet air defence mission is limited by its battlespace surveillance capability exactly the same as a STOVL carrier would be. Operationally the vessel offers little the IN hasn’t had before. Being professional they, the IN, know this yet they still accepted it.

I’ve seen the fiscal argument tabled before and its just so much tosh, as I said earlier, shipbuilding generates employment, industrial development and revenue. The GoI had already contracted and paid DCN to develop a design for the replacement of Vikrant in 91. Taking a finalised design off them and ordering three from Indian yards would have bolstered the Indian economy at least on a regional basis. It certainly would have been more beneficial than dumping a billion and a half into the Russian economy for Gorshkov!.

All this superpower status necessitates an aircraft carrier is left to the Tom Clancy types.

Or to the Brazillians or to the Russians or are you going to tell me that both those nations have a maritime requirement that demands the retention of an aircraft carrier in their respective fleets?. Nonsense, as I said, carriers are political weapons as much as anything else and India, having lost Vikrant and facing the imminent departure of Viraat, had to face up to the fact they’d prevaricated too long and could lose their capability.

Here you approach the basic rationale yet cloud it up with a tale of political expediency! The GOI has pushed for the Gorshkov because the Navy WANTS it. The GOI would gladly not sign the deal and the Fin Min would gladly allocate it elsewhere. However, the Navy has consistently stuck to its guns on the Gorshkov issue and has detailed reports backing its case. In such a scenario, the Navy’s needs have to be met.

You dont strike me as a niaive person yet you have a very narrow focus on the issue here?. I can introduce you to people in the RN who venemously dont want our CVF’s to be STOVL, rather they want them CATOBAR wih Hawkeye, yet they’ll expound the virtues of STOVL to anyone who’ll listen because they dont believe we’ll get anything else and they want to try and make sure we get what we can!. Does the RN love the idea of STOVL CVF – no, will the official commentry say that though – equally no it wont. Does that make the RN ‘unprofessional’ no chance!.

As I’ve said ad nauseum the basic facts on the Gorshkov are not in dispute.

– A small(ish) STOBAR layout is inefficient.
– Its airgroup is too small for continuous operations at a serious optempo.
– It lacks the comprehensive AEW you’d expect on a 40k ton CVA.
– The propulsion fit is inefficient (even after replacement).

In no way is the vessel, even IF the conversion goes perfectly to schedule and to budget, a sensible proposition for the requirements the IN have specified, given any alternative. If they perceived no other alternatives, though how they could arrive at that by the late 90’s I’ve no idea, elements in the IN are obviously going to be keen on the Gorshkov regardless.

Utter tosh. You are speaking of a nation here which has detailed stats on all its acquisition programs.
The Govt is bound by law to release all details of prime acquisition programs and is (over) enthusiastically vetted by the Comptroller and Auditor General of India who reviews defence expenditure and programs, plus a nonpartisan Parliamentary Accounts Committee.

Sounds very similar to the system we operate under which was as I expected. We have the NAO and the Defence Select Commitee to oversee our expenditure and do you want a list of the stuff ups that have still been foisted on us?. Just because systems are in place to monitor expenditure means precisely nothing!. Expediency is everything check out what our National Audit Office says about Eurofighter for example and we’ve just ordered Tranche 2 regardless!.

In fact, by taking a political tack to addressing the Gorshkov issue and resorting to the hackneyed arguements of “regional superpower”/”image” etc, you only indicate that your arguements are apparently failing on technical grounds and you have to resort to emotive mud slinging to substantiate your claims.

Not at all. I’ve made all the technical points ad nauseum. No one has ever been able to contradict what I’ve said on that score. Hell most still seem to think that the MiG-29K’s supersonic capability makes one whit of difference to the strategic potential of the carrier!. To be honest I’m fed up trying to get the point across that Gorshkov is going to be a very poor excuse for a strike carrier which is exactly what the IN is on record as saying it is going to be. Let me get this across to you the IN knows that they cant NOT know it as its so fundamental that a 30 year old former missile tech can see it!.

Given the standards you are aspiring to, I may well point out that the RN maintianed its Upholders for purely political reasons and the Canadians purchased an utter lemon – as demonstrated by its recent “excursion”, testifying to the RN’s impeccable maintenance. Hardly accurate, but hey, anything goes, eh?

This is my point in its entirety Nitin. The RN did not maintain the Upholders at all after their withdrawal from the fleet. They were never going to be reintroduced as we switched to a nuke only policy so very little was expended on those subs. The Canadians didnt buy a lemon – they bought 4 subs at a bargain basement price that needed a LOT of work. They couldnt have bought anything else for the kind of money they spent on the Upholders. The IN, on the other hand, have spent what, about $700 million, on the Gorshkov hull alone. They could’ve had a new build STOVL CVL for that from any number of yards and had a modern efficient CVS/LPH after the ADS programme completed, and the SHARs retired, to address the IN ASW/Amphib deficiency.

Anyway you look at it Gorshkov is a bad deal for the IN, based solely on facts and capabilities, and no amount of protestation on the ‘professionalism’ of the IN is going to change that.