Wolf

some dont have a choice in the matter. many SE asian nations have territorial disputes with china in the south china sea. this has been a traditional worry for china as its hard to get decent aircover for PLAN taskforces in that area, even today with things like MK2s and tankers.

What use are these FACs without air-support? Remember what happened to the small vessels of the Iraqi Navy when they tried to operate without top cover?. They were easy meat for chopper-launched light AShM’s. Most of, even the smaller, fleets in theatre have some form of organic chopper capability and light AShM’s of the Penguin, Sea Skua or AS15TT types are hardly prohibitively expensive systems for anyone.

even hear, the FACs wont be expect to hold off a determined assault, but merely to act as a deterance, as well as patrol against pirates and illegal fishing etc. far more cost effective and safer then to send out destroyers or frigets.

What do you need a battery of 200km range SSMs for coastie operations for?. Look at the Indian Navy and coastguard for a good force mix for EEZ enforcement – adapted light transport aircraft and economical, lightly armed, high endurance OPVs with chopper capability are the types of systems you want checking nets and for antipiracy operations. No antiship missiles are really required!.

and the PLAN is trying its utmost to fill in that gaping hole. although there is no solid evidence in one way or the other, i feel that it is technical bottlenecks that are current restraining the PLAN’s efforts in that feild and not financial. as such, it could take quite some time before a suitbale ASW suit can be perfected to be fitted onto new PLAN ‘heavys’ to filling address the issue.

Fair comment, but, investment into research is a critical method of bypassing technical ‘bottlenecks’. Hell, if they used the money spent on this 2208 vessel and its design to purchase a couple of modern Thales towed arrays they’d be better off!.

however, in the meantime, threats still exist, and these FACs can act as a stop gap should something happen before the PLAN proper is fully ready to take on a strong oppent.

That still infers that the major surface units of the PLAN would be locked in port, no more effective than the Argentine surface fleet in 82, in the face of a sub threat. That is surely an intolerable situation.

as for the AAW 170s and sovs, well everyone has to start somewhere, and i feel its far better to stretch out purchases over a long time, building what u can based on what level of tech u have and gradually building up to a fully spectrum force. as opposed to waiting until u have mastered all the tech needed and then suddenly laying down a hundred or so hulls at the same time.

Wolf I agree with every word you’ve written there. The strides the PLAN have made in AAW and AsuW are considerable and impressive. They still have a long way to go, but, they are clearly on the right track. This is why I dont comprehend the interest in this vessel as anything other than a trials boat to evaluate the hullform. Such a missile craft suggests a reversion to their brown-water doctrine and its brown-water, in this case, that is already well covered, against air/surface incursion, by existing assets.

well, it has the ability to sink a heavy warship even if it has to close to 20nm, still works. and remeber heavy warships arent the only targets in the sea, so for some heavy targets, 20nm is more then enough.

Do you think a heavy warship will be approaching a hostile Chinese coast without, at very least, radar reconaissance from its own chopper?. If a captain acted so galactically stupidly he deserves a missile boat closing him down. In reality what makes you think one of these FACs would get to 20nm without some form of air attention?. Remember too that the 20nm I suggested was just a hit on a 70ft masthead so it may take further time to develop the surface plot before they could start with target selection.

well, i was thinking more in terms of one carrier battle group or a surface task force with shore based fighter support, as there is no way the PLAN and PLAAF can take on half the USN never mind friends.

Who would try and challenge the PLAN, PLANAF and PLAAF in China’s 200 mile EEZ (the effective radius for a small FAC such as we’re discussing) with a single carrier group? Come on wolf your stacking the deck a bit in your own favour there. Like I said Desert Storm saw the employment of no less than six carriers! You think China would warrant less attention?

another important elemint of the attack plan is suprise (hence the emphysis on stealth FACs), so the enemy isnt given the chance to concentrate his forces and position them as he would like.

Here your missing the true power that full-up attack carriers bring to a Navy. Mobility, mobility, mobility!. Right now there are three carriers within roughly 7 days steaming of the South China Sea – Kitty Hawk and Stennis on PACFLT deployment and the Kennedy attached to 5th Fleet in the Persian Gulf. Are you suggesting that the PLAN could assemble the naval assets you are talking about – 100+ FACs, major surface units, subs and hundreds of tactical aircraft for a major fleet action in the South China Sea without tipping off the US more than 7 days in advance?.

well, first off, u are assuming that the USN is going to know months in advance of the conflict and have a steady build up of forces. that just doesnt fit the operational realities in any probably conflict scenario involving the PLAN and USN!

See above – they dont need months of warning!.

given the timescale, the USN would likely get 2 carriers and support ships at most in threater in time to help. the plan of the PLA is to present an ability to fight and defeat those two battle groups, and so force them to wait for reinforcements to come in before engaging. however, by the time the USN has gathered enough forces to be able to have a good chance of victory, the war would be over and there will no longer be a reason for them to fight.

Again see above. The PLAN will not have months of free-rein before the USN could react.

as such, it would be pointless to try and address how the PLAN is going to fight half the USN, as 1) that is never likely to happen; 2) if such an event did occur, the USN would so easily domonate the PLA that there is little point in discussion; and 3) if faced with such a situation, the chinese will not be relying on the PLA but rather other means to try and get its way.

So if the PLAN has the ability to pick and choose its fights as your suggesting what does it need these FACs for? They are little use in a battle against the USN even in absurd numbers, they’re little use forward deployed to island bases as, according to what you say, the top-cover they depend on cannot be guaranteed too far out and for coastal defence really they just reinforce a capability that hardly needs it when you consider the other requirements the service has!.

i dont think it is just a demonstrator, there are too many operational additions. (the AK, the C803 etc). we certainly dont see any of that on the sea shadow, and the presence of such additions would screw up any test info to the extent that u wont get any useful data to apply to the design of bigger ships.

Very much not the case and I’ve already given you part of the reason why. This boat is trialling the SWATH hullform. One of the main factors that the PLAN will be studying is platform stability and the effects of that stability on weapons mounts are particularly pertinent.

the only thing for sure is that stealth is a major influence in its design, however i seriously doubt it was the only consideration, as i feel other factors such as cost and ease of mass production would have also been major factors.

I wouldnt disagree with that.

well, i was thinking of having the FACs form a line perpendicular to the incoming missile, maybe i should have meantioned that eariler, no relock issues there.

I would really disagree with that though!. 100 FAC’s in line abreast with a safe amount of sea room (presumably you want these things blatting along at 30knots) is a formation over 3km long!. I dont think many opponents will give your flotilla commanders enough time to assemble that kind of formation really because it certainly wont be difficult to miss and wont be accomplished quickly!.

well, i dont see much problem for the kilo to move in from either beam, u can try and predict the oppenent’s course and plot one that brings u into his path. if u factor in things like course changes, well that will also affect an SSk’s ability to close from dead ahead. the key is to put out a couple of SSKs in a pattern and hopefully one will get a chance to close.

Believe me there is no way a 10knt sub heading south is going to get an intercept in on a 30knt carrier group going east-west. Like I said SSK’s dont do much chasing!.

no, what i meant was that in order to maximise their potential (against something like a carrier battlegroup), its best to use them as i described. against lesser oppents, less support is needed.

Well a lesser opponent is hardly likely to try forcing an entry into Chinese waters to within the deployment range of these vessels is it!?. A lesser opponents fleet that would be equally as vulnerable to PLANAF air launched weapons it should be mentioned!. 🙂

also, one of the very reasons that these vessles are important to the PLAN is exactly because of the PLAN’s lack of comprehensive ASW capacity! subs might find these things, but it will be hard for the subs to effectively deal with them given that the sub’s torpedos are designed to sink lumbering (in comparison to FACs) heavy warships.

The answer to a submarine threat is ASW!. Its not spending money on assets that are too light to target with a HWT!. What is the point of the massive expenditure China has made on AAW destroyers, Moskit-armed Sovremenny’s and all the other major surface units if they have to sit in port, awaiting air/cruise strikes, in the face of a submarine threat?!.

no, firstly, i never said they can only be useful if off-board targeting info is given. they can attack using target info from their own radars, but they will need to get in closer.

Like Roel said the radar horizon from a mast-top radar on one of these FACs is limited. Optimistically I’d estimate a horizon range i.e first detect, against a 70ft masthead target, of no more than 20nm. Some use embarking a 100nm ranged missile is if you have to close to damn-near guns range to employ it!. Offboard targetting is the only way this ship works!.

secondly, its not a ‘this or that’ choice between one or the other, but rather both. one backs up the other just in case, cos overkill is always better then no kill.

Standard defence/offence team split covers this. Your suggesting a coordinated layered air-surface attack, well the defence plan is equally layered air and surface. Its not news. If there is an action that brings a huge commitment of PLAAF/PLANAF air assets plus hundred-plus PLAN surface and subsurface combattants then the attacking force is half the USN plus friends!. Just like the individually tasked command ships we discussed earlier USN doctrine calls for seperate E-2’s to be lofted to control offensive and defensive air and surface engagements.

if long range target info can be provided by something like the JH7, then chances are the enemy will know that he is being lit up and will send fighters off to try and shoot down the fighter. this means that the CAP will be carrying AAMs, so it will be harder for the fighters to attack these FACs with only guns. but even if the CAP also carry AShMs, the missiles will take up valuable pylons (and reduce manoverability if they encounter the figters first) which will reduce their efficiency against the fighter support of the attacking strikers.

Your assuming a very small opposing force here Wolf. Remember that the USN had no less than six carriers in the Red Sea and Persian Gulf for Desert Storm!. Opposing China in her backyard would require at least equal commitment!. Even with todays, leaner, USN carrier fleet your looking at four carriers and, more importantly, sixteen squadrons of tactical combat aircraft in theatre!. Seeings as the missile craft have no significant air defence capability an F-model ‘Navy’ Maverick would be sufficient to engage them. The Hornets could standoff 10nm and flip AGM-65s at these missile craft all day without chllenge!. Question is how many AGM-65F’s can a Hornet carry? Using an arbitrary 4 missiles per aircraft that means just two of those 16 squadrons are lofting 96 Mavericks!. Further using an equally arbitrary 50% hit rate thats 48 dead missile boats off one strike – theoretically – and, what, 8 or 9 ready squadrons for fleet air-defence at any one time!.

well thats a comparative thing, stealth has definately been incorporated into the design, there is no denying that. how good the stealth is is another matter, and i belive it is pre-mature to speculate on that given the little info we have ATM.

If the conclusion WanShan came to, that I concur with, that this vessel is just a demonstrator its irrelevent anyway as the final vessel could easily be more or less stealthy than what we see on our screens here. Using this vessel as our yardstick though (as its the only one we have) we can see enough for some preliminary impressions of its likely RCS characteristics. Those impressions lead me to the belief that this vessel is less stealthy than the mentioned Scandinavian designs.

i never said the FACs wont be totally immune from AShMs, just that current AShMs will not be as effective against them as larger warships.

Thats fair but, like I said, there are many ways to attack a craft who’s air defence envelope only extends 2000yds or so!.

as for missile evasion. well, off the top of my head, there are two ways they can go about this.

The first solution you propose needs a lot of sea room, which you may not have, and relies on luck that a missile decoyed once by chff may not simply re-lock on a second vessel. Happened with Atlantic Conveyor in the Falklands. The second trusts that a 300ton missile boat charging along at full speed will be a steady enough gun platform to engage the inbound missiles reliably. Either way its an imprecise equation and is the reason why I used that arbitrary 50% hit rate earlier!.

when did i say the kilo will be coming in the same direction as the FACs?

Remember that SSK’s dont chase anything!. That rules out an approach from astern or on either beam as they would not be able to get the intercept position. The only workable attack option for the Kilo is in front of the attacking force. Where are the dozens of missile craft coming in from? You try and marshall a flotilla of missile craft on oblique angles to the opposing fleet course track under E-2 surveillance and your asking for your boats to be sunk long before they’ve formed up for their mad charge!. Naval version of Lee Mallory’s ‘big wing’ that one!.

WanShan,

Ok, good point. Still, they seem very comparable with Delhi class, esp. when fitted with Mk41, ESSM. How do you think they compare, Jonesy?

I’ve only got personal knowledge of a Kidd-class unfortunately – having been aboard the USS Scott many years ago. My overriding impression of that close cousin of the Spru’s was BIG SHIP!. These things are very large indeed and very impressive from maindeck level!.

Like I said earlier they are powerful Fleet ASW units, but, that power does come at a cost. The US Congressional Budget Office lists, in its 2003 figures, an annual operational cost for a Sprucan at some US$34 million!. Thats a full 30% more than the equivalent figure for an Arleigh Burke.

Comparing these vessels to the Delhi’s requires a little bit of fudging as the Delhi is a very different beastie – also the costings for them are a little less visible (would welcome any input on unit acquisition and annual costings of the vessels!). Essentially the Spruance design team was given the brief to produce a large ASW escort tasked with keeping up with, and screening, full CVBG’s against an advanced blue-water sub threat. They succeeded every bit in achieving that.

The Delhi design team, presumably, were tasked with creating a General Purpose destroyer capable of independent deployment and, lacking the resources (and challenges) of the USN to create specialist vessels, to act as a combined surface, air and sub-surface screen for a HVU. I’ve seen nothing to suggest that they were not every bit as successful with their design as their American counterparts. The difference between the two is therefore a fundamental one – specialist vessel versus general purpose. The Indian ship gives much ground on ASW terms to the US vessel but makes it up on AAW and ASuW capability.

The reason, IMO, that the retiring Spruances have solicited so little interest is mainly following on from the above reason. They were perfectly tailored to a specific mission and threat and those factors just dont exist anywhere (except possibly in the PLAN! :rolleyes: ) for someone to find interest in the vessels. The RN managed to sell-on some of its specialist Type22’s but these were half the size of the US ships, much cheaper to run and went for bargain-basement prices!.

Interestingly, where I sitting in IN procurement, I would be following one design from the US closely. Not the Spruances, but, very definitely the General Dynamics LCS proposal. Perfect hull for the IN’s ASW requirement IMO.

heeroyui,

Your Inglese is just fine. Very much better than my Spanish!

The sources used by the website you linked to are a little old. Norman Polmar and Jurrien S. Noot, Submarines of the Russian and Soviet Navies, 1718-1990 (Naval Institute Press, Annapolis 1991). and John Jordan, Soviet Warships 1945 to the Present (Arms and Armour Press, London 1992). are both excellent books, but, are over a decade old now.

They may be right (maybe Roel could check with his Russian source?) but I’ve never heard of a conventional DC warhead and Janes lists only the nuke tip and UGMT-1 torpedo!.

Interesting little mystery…..over to you Roel?

I’m no expert with hull structures and materials really I’m afraid – that was the preserve of the Mech.Eng lads at HMS Sultan when I was in. I’ve heard though that the GRP hull does absorb shock better than steel or ali. IIRC there would be stiffness issues with large GRP hulls that would surface at higher speeds or in heavy seas – I’ll try and check up on that.

The primary reason for the GRP in minehunters is, as has been said, the minimisation of the magnetic signature of the vessel. Also, obviously, the lighter the hull the lower the propulsive force required to maintain creep speed on a sweep. The lower the force required the lesser, proportionally, the accoustic signature of the vessel!.

Hyper,

Look who is back after along absance! 113 seems to have completed her refit (pic 1).

Any news on what the refit has entailed to require such an abnormal refit interval?

I admit, Jonsie, the difference between a Gulfstream Learjet
and a Grumman’s F-14 Tomcat, is like day and night. I mean you just can’t
add oranges to apples and say they are equal in every respect.

Sorry Haley I thought you were the one that brought up 007 in respect to a missile boat!. The point I made was that, even by your new justification for the boat, theres better out there than 2208!.

For whatever this’s worth:

For people that doesn’t or that can’t accept the realities
of the world outside of their own little cooped-up self-obsobing fantasies,
the joke will IMHO, ultimately be on themselves.

Denials are fine, but it doesn’t change reality for what it is…

You know sometimes I really wish I could understand more of what you write!. I honestly dont have a clue what your trying to say there?