JonesyOK so, bottom line, you dont believe the article despite the fact you have no proof or indication that the submarines, hydrophones, surface/sky-wave radar and whatever else you believe ‘should’ have been tracking the carrier were actually present and doing so?. In fact you are quite indignant that it shouldnt be just ‘accepted’ that they were there and knew everything that was going on?.
This is also despite the fact that the discovery of the Midway from visual intercepts triggered a significant search effort for the carrier which was unsuccessful….clever of them to ‘miss’ the ship they were tracking for so long.
…and, lastly, this is despite the fact that the Midway NORPAC experience has been replicated both on operation and under controlled exercise conditions.
Putting words in your mouth? You have repeatedly made references to these claims about undetectability. Some of those claims have been proven to be false.
..and now you are quite simply being dishonest. The claim for undetectability of a carrier 20 miles off someones coast I’ve never made. Similarly I’ve never said that, when a service advertises its carriers transit through a chokepoint on the internet, it will be undetectable. The former was the case with the Iranian UAV and the latter with the Fencer overflight.
So to state that my ‘repeated claims of undetectability’ covers such situations is a clear attempt to twist my words to mean something clearly inaccurate so that you can protest their innaccuracy. Extremely poor behaviour and entirely in keeping with a poster who seems more concerned with semantics and obfuscation than providing any kind of evidence to support his own assertions.
The point of the thread though is not about evangelising about the virtues of US carrier operations in Soviet waters or the omnipotence of the Soviet submarine fleet. Would you care, Wilk, to offer an opinion on the topic of the thread or are you more of the stance that sea power is a fallacy and only land-based air is worth consideration?.
JonesyRii
I am wondering how much you could scale up a ScanEagle-type system with a vessel designed in accordance with the concept as a core capability.
There was a concept called RITS (Runway In The Sky) that was being developed for the USCG. Dont think it went far and the last heard seems to be that the developing outfit was busy sueing Boeing over ScanEagle, but, description of the system as below:
A Saint Louis, Missouri, company named Advanced Aerospace Technologies Incorporated (AATI) has come up with an alternative scheme for launching and recovering a Dragon Drone or other small UAV from small vessels. The scheme involves the use of a parasail and is referred to the “runway in the sky (RITS)”. In AATI demonstrations, a Dragon Drone is attached to a piggyback frame that harnesses the drone to the parasail. The parasail is reeled out into the wind until it reaches an altitude of about 250 meters (800 feet). The drone is then released, diving until it builds up enough speed for the operator to pull it out of the dive and sent it on its mission.
In recovery, the parasail is used to lift a tow line into the sky, with the tow line trailing a series of recovery lines hanging between the parasail and the ship. The drone is flown into the recovery lines, and a snaplock mechanism on the drone’s wing grabs onto a line. The drone is then reeled back down to the ship. The tow line has more “give” to it than a recovery net, reducing the likelihood of damage.
The current RITS scheme can handle UAVs weighing up to 180 kilograms (400 pounds), but AATI thinks it can be scaled up to handle larger aircraft. AATI claims the system is inexpensive and easy to use. They also point out that the parasail could also be used to loft an antenna to allow over-the-horizon communications with a UAV. Whether the Coast Guard intends to use this scheme or not is uncertain, but it certainly is an interesting concept.
That 180kg limit puts the system capable of launching vehicles up to RQ-7 and Hermes 90 size…so quite a bit of an advance on Scan Eagle. Cant imagine it would be an easy system to employ in adverse weather conditions though!
JonesyLeon
And what does the fact prove that the other carrier was detected??? There are many examples of Soviet planes or submarines, which were able to detect and track carriers, e.g. the high speed chase of USS Enterprise by a November class submarine etc. etc.
It does prove the response to a detected carrier, in that theatre at that time, at least. One that Midway, in that example, was not subject to until it joined up with Enterprise.
For me it is one more instance of were the difficulty (note I’m saying ‘difficulty’ not ‘impossibility’) of completing the kill-chain against an alert carrier in open water is well documented.
In context of the thread it speaks to the value of multiple decks, providing they remain large enough for practical operations, over single or fewer larger decks.
JonesyLeon
Still, it was not real. It was only an exercise and hardly something, which really tested the carriers. E.g. no weapons were launched, nothing was damaged etc. You are only arguing that it tested the ability of the Soviets to detect the carrier (and you have not shown that they really did not detect it – it was only guess). If the lack of the detection would be the main argument that would favour submarines – not carriers.
The hard part was real though. Firing weapons is the least significant part of the kill chain. It becomes almost a strictly mathematical exercise in the number of missile launches the attacker can generate against the number of defensive fire channels and soft-kill efficacy available to the defender.
The ability to detect the carrier, identify it correctly, establish a track and hold that track long enough to generate the strike is the key capability for those looking to engage a carrier force. That can be practiced without it ending in missile launches and has been done numerous times.
In the majority of the instances I am aware of, where the carrier hasnt been artificially tasked to allow itself to be detected, the opposing force has had a similar experience to that Cdr Pico describes so well in his piece.
JonesyLeon,
There were instances when things were quite real….some events have made it into the public domain….most haven’t and never will.
In terms of the NORPAC serial the opposition DID respond when they had a target for their response. It would seem counter-intuitive that they would show their response capabilities, on one hand, by staging mock attacks on one carrier while leaving the other completely undisturbed. Especially when the USN’s clue dropping (i.e a visual intercepting F-4 with ‘USS Midway’ stenciled on the back) provoked a vigorous response from Soviet maritime recon assets.
Could it all have been a fiendishly clever plot to deceive NATO as to the Soviet ability to localise, detect and track marine targets. Its impossible to 100% guarantee it wasnt. Experience other than just that with the Soviets, back in the day, does validate the premise though. If the Soviets couldn’t find the Midway as they couldnt find other naval forces in their coastal regions they were far from alone in that deficiency. The focus is only on the Cold War here as the Soviets was the most comprehensive surveillance capability that has been arrayed to target carriers in blue water yet.
JonesyIf I’m “missing a few key points” then you certainly haven’t pointed them out. Claiming undetectability whilst operating in the face of OTH radar, in peacetime, against a force that has no reason to divulge detection info, is stupid.
Apart from the point that they did divulge detection info….mock strikes against Enterprise?. Immediate reaction when Midways aircraft were observed?.
The surtass statement makes no sense. Why would the Soviets be using a US sonar, and where did I state that the hydrophones need be fixed?
My apologies I thought it plainly obvious I wasnt talking about the Soviets using American sonar. I was referring to a type of theatre passive sonar deployment. i.e if no fixed array was in place then a mobile one would be required. You didnt state the hydrophones needed to be fixed but, in absence of a SURTASS-type platform, it does beg the question of what deployment platform you are considering for the long-range passive sonar capability you describe.
So to make an analogy, your team decided to show up for an unannounced practice at the opposing team’s pitch. The other team wasn’t there, so you made up some rules, played against an imaginary opponent, scored a few empty netters, and left, declaring that you would do that well against him if it was the championship game. Meanwhile, the other team watched you play using the microphones and cameras that you pretended weren’t there.
Wilk, to follow your analogy, do you think the home side would’ve allowed the ‘unannounced practice’ on their pitch in the first place?. Demonstrably they didnt when the other ‘half’ of the team turned on the floodlights and ran their practice blatantly in full view. Your suggestion is that they were happy to reveal their gameplan on one hand and allow the other side to continue their practice unhampered on the other?. Remarkably generous.
See the above analogy. It is hilarious that you actually think the Soviets were the ones who paid the high price in intel.
I dont think it. They did tip their hand several times and it gave us, I’m told, valuable insights. I’m sure you’ll spin it to state that these were all intentional efforts of misdirection and counter-intel as you are well aware that disproving such a comment would be near impossible. All I will say then is that tangible, significant, intelligence benefits were derived by NATO operations that, where I in the Soviet position, I would not have allowed if I could have at all stopped it. That they didnt stop those actions from happening, had they known they were in progress, would be a display of fantastic stupidity. I dont believe they were that stupid.
Funny how the story changes. First, “we were never detected,” then, when the other side decides to present irrefutable evidence of detection, it changes to “it was localized before.”
You do have a habit of trying to put words ‘in my mouth’ and telling me they are wrong!. I never said they ‘were never detected’ though. I have no idea why the USN released that statement if they officially ever did?. In the Iranian case the carrier passed through Hormuz. A light aircraft sporting nothing more than a chappie and a camcorder could have got some of the footage that made it into the public domain. I make no contention that carriers are invulnerable everywhere on the planet. Carriers need searoom to manoeuvre. If you are going to transit a chokepoint during hostilities you program that appropriately to push back opposing platforms before you go through. My point is that knowing where the target is before you launch your aircraft doesnt make your aircraft’s achievement overflying the target all that great.
Rather like your attempt to steer this discussion on a different course; the dispute is about your absurd claim of carriers being “definitely tested against the best the Soviets had.” Slightly disingenuous indeed. Minus the “slightly” part.
Again for that to be the case you have to turn a blind eye to the reaction of the forces involved during the operation. Or you have to ascribe the actions to some overarching and incredibly subtle strategic deception plan on the Soviets part. I’ll look forward to seeing you provide evidence that Pico was wrong in his, reasoned and experienced assessment, with your equally reasoned and experienced counter position.
JonesyWilk
In the rush to discredit you are missing a few key points though. Midway was operating in the face of OTH radar in that exercise serial. Fixed passive hydrophone lines are best deployed on favourable marine topography, if you dont have those convenient topographical features then its SURTASS…if you dont have SURTASS then what is your platform for the passive sonar?.
During which RN-Soviet exercises were these tests conducted? Were both sides completely transparent and revealed the full extent of what they did detect? And can you provide statements from the Soviets involved that confirm that they used “the best they had?” and that they agree that they could not do “anything about and the escapades of the Midway” had a shooting war started?
RN side it was on operations. The proof of the one-sidedness, certainly in one case I recall, was quite tangible, irrefutable and wont be expanded upon here. All you are saying though, effectively, is prove that the carrier group wasnt detected and that all this isnt false assumption. In the RN case the ships involved eventually were discovered but not in time to prevent the actions we needed to take to achieve our goals. In Pico’s illustration he provides the basis for his position that they werent detected during that 4 day window…..so you are arguing a moot point.
The article is full of this sort of nonsense
…what even the parts where he said Enterprise operated plainly and was subject to a number of Soviet mock attacks?. Maybe you liked the part where he acknowleged luck can play a part…you can always run over a submarine thats inconveniently located and gives the game away….by extrapolation you can say the same thing about an AGI if it somehow manages to go unnoticed long enough…thats happened too. That it is not guaranteed to work 100% of the time does nothing whatsoever to degrade the core principle, and proven efficacy, of deceptive manoevre outlined though.
Obviously if you wish to delude yourself into believing that, then that’s your prerogative. Luckily, as stated earlier in this thread, there has not been a real test (aka a shooting war) so it’s easy to make extravagant claims. And hopefully, the other guy won’t release a video of your carrier from his UAV, which you claimed wasn’t there
Its easy to make claims with conviction when you know some of the operational history. If the Soviets were deliberately letting NATO navies take the actions we did, in order to fool us into the mistaken belief that we could act with some license, (as you imply) then they paid a high price in gifted intel for their ‘victory’.
Falling back on Iranian UAV’s or Fencer overflights to try to disprove the carrier advantage, when in both cases the carrier position was localised before the fact, is more than slightly disingenous…its no different in fact to the mock attacks Pico mentions himself from 82.
No one disputes that aircraft can overfly ships when they know where to find them. The dispute is whether they can reliably find them quickly enough for it to make a difference. I’d expect you would have a problem proving that one.
JonesyThats an EXCELLENT article jonsey!!!! VERY informative! But……..although it makes perfect military sense the statement ” not getting into a war of attrition with an enemy who’s logistics base is close at hand while yours stretches back thousands of miles” is kind of exactly what the US Navy did to Japan in WW2. Just a thought.
I would have actually put that the other way round Kilo with Japan coming out to a war with the logistics shortfall. You could say the same about the Falklands with the UK ‘seemingly’ on the wrong side of the logistical gradient. Truth was that we werent though…even though they were far closer the Argentinians had more trouble with logistics than we did!.
Closing the Chinese mainland, as an example, is a slightly different case.
JonesyFor sure that is not an argument in favour or against the size of the current carriers – the current carriers were never tested, therefore it is not really known, if they are a relic of past or will remain useful. Very obvious is only that they are very expensive, which explains their shrinking numbers.
What gives you that idea?. NATO carriers were definitely tested and tested against the best the Soviet Union had….and in their own back yard. I know of some things that the RN got away with that the Soviets just would not have allowed had they been able to do anything about and the escapades of the Midway (note – medium carrier) off the Kamchatka back in the day are legendary.
The quite affable Andy Pico, at the time a Hawkeye operator, described the process and history more than adequately here for anyone who’s not familiar: http://www.navweaps.com/index_tech/tech-031.htm
Mobility and passive plot generation are, were, and always will be key. Splitting the defensive force multiplies your chances of giving them a targeting problem they cant solve thereby accentuating your mobility and plot generation abilities. You do not give that advantage away and you, very definitely, do not get into a war of attrition with an enemy who’s logistics chain is immediately to hand while yours extends thousands of miles back overwater.
JonesyThe erudite Cdr Canaday’s piece withstands the test of time quite well doesnt it. Then again the bottom line of the piece is that a small carrier cannot be as efficient in all roles as a large one. To my mind this is akin to a statement declaring the sea to be wet. Accurate, but, a surprise to relatively few.
The point under contention is that whether the extra capability, that you absolutely get, from the large deck is worth the risk of presenting an adversary with fewer targets and allowing him to focus his counter measures more easily.
The second piece is more relevant naturally and this line stands out:
The CVX analysis concluded that a 75-aircraft-capacity ship (100,000 tons) costs 8 percent more than a 55-aircraft ship (65,000 tons) and generates 100 percent more strike sorties
I’d like to see what was actually compared to what to allow that statement to result. Clearly whole-life costs were not taken into account. Nor the likely impact of a lengthy production run of the 65k ton ship!. The sortie rate, again, can not be disputed but PA-DSX figures state sustained rates of 75 a day which, multiplied by two or three decks, puts a slightly different slant on things. Add in tailored air groups on the ‘adjunct deck/s’ and the inherent resilience in two or more separate decks over one and the calculus changes again.
JonesyCome on, Jonsey… you know very well that, barring a complete reversal of current trends (likely involving a full-on “USA vs USSR”-style cold war between the US & China), that the ONLY thing building 65kt full-on carriers would get the USN is a 1-for-1 replacement of Nimitz-class CVNs with the new “more economically-reasonable” “nuclear-powered Midways”.
Your force structure would actually be 2-3 100kt Fords and 9-8 65kt “CVMNs”.
To be honest Bager that wasnt the first problem I’d have anticipated. I think the USN is too wedded to the ‘big deck’ concept to let go easily. You would have to recognise that the trust element would be a factor in that, of course, as the build of the ‘New Midways’ would naturally span a good few administrations.
Clearly this is just musings on the question of how to evolve the aircraft carrier to keep it the optimal platform in the evolving threat and budgetary environment. Given that highly theoretical start point though there are factors that crop up to support the fact that, financially and politically, there may be merit in the more numerous smaller deck concept.
First would be manpower…currently the plan seems to be 3 Fords and 8 Nimitz (assuming Nimitz and Ike are replaced by the 2nd and 3rd Fords). In simplified manpower terms then you have about 13000 for the Fords and 44000 or so for the older boats for about 57k total. Move to the Fords with 15 of the CVN-M’s and its 13k plus 30k….43k all told. An immediate 20% decrease in manpower with, arguably, a gain in deployable combat power.
Then you look at the industrial dimension. Two factors present themselves – a) CVN77 has about 40yrs to run given the rough lifespan of a Nimitz CVN and b) the new Enterprise isnt set for launch until 2023. So there will be a span of about 30 years from the yards falling idle from the CVN80 build to the need to replace that last Nimitz. Thats a nice drumbeat of one CVN-M every two years to keep the US carrier building industry going for three decades. With the side effect that long build runs see very significant cost savings!.
So to sum up you have:
a) Increased operational flexibility and efficiency – WIN
b) Reduced manpower costs – WIN
c) Greater interoperability with allies – WIN
d) Reduced build costs from long run – WIN
e) Guaranteed work for US manufacturing – WIN
Doesnt look that it should be such a hard sell to the US administration at cursory glance!
JonesyOne question answered…..cap doffed Wan!
JonesyWhat conventional weapons are out there that a single hit makes a mission kill for a super-carrier?
I’m sure DJ will be itching to say ‘a Zuni rocket’ in response to that comment…following on from the tragedy aboard Forrestal back in ’67.
JonesyInteresting. The escort issue was one I had considered and the article that was posted on the news thread, regarding the German 124 being attached to Eisenhower CSG, was something that dropped into focus.
There are a number of ‘allied’ states who’s naval services have gone to much trouble and expense to be able integrate, pretty seamlessly, into a USN force structure and who have numbers of escorts, but, little by way of carrier decks of their own!. South Korea, Japan, Australia, a number of European/Scandinavian navies all fit the pattern. I cant see that escort numbers need necessarily be a big limitation if better use is made of those resources in joint ops.
Just to clarify by ‘smaller deck’ I’m thinking of something very similar to PA-DSX size – 290m or so, 65k tons, 2000 crew hard limit, nuke plant out of the Fords for 2 manned FJ sqdns, an E-2 det, Growler det and a dozen or more UCLASS. Built as 5 replace 3 Nimitz….ultimate carrier force then 2-3 Fords and 15 65k tonner ‘medium carriers’.
Concept would be a more granular force structure. Low/regional threat 1 smaller deck, 1 or 2 Burkes and an SSN….screen augmented with allied units dependent on circumstances. Example current issue with N.Korea…one of these medium decks plus a pair of Burkes, a pair of RoK DDG/H’s and a pair of FF/G’s and you have land attack, fleet air defence and ASW sufficient for task.
Or Gulf tasking…same basic medium deck ‘unit’ plus a Euro carrier and its screen and/or maybe an LHA with augmented F-35B det. Certainly a task force of a two med decks with 4 total strikefighter squadrons, another of strike UCAVs all covered with organic AEW and EW support and screened by a pair of Burkes, a T45, a T23 and, say, a FREMM or two would be noteworthy enough!. STOVL/CTOL would be little issue….you’d have a natural split in responsibilities and could possibly even tailor the airgroup on the US carrier to counterbalance the STOVL strike emphasis.
What you have there is 2 principle taskings covered for an all-up USN deployment of 2 carriers, 4 Burkes and a pair of SSNs (more if LHA deploys of course). Total manpower deployed…bout the same as a single Nimitz!.
That granularity also allows for force to be oriented more efficiently where needed and even more focussed on specific task as the tailored airgroups can adjust the force mix in the CSG. If you are going for anti-denial ops against China maybe you deploy a ready Ford class as group flag and three of the smaller decks. Pair off the decks and you weight one deck in each for Fleet AD, EW and AEW support and the other deck is mainly a UCAV carrier…maybe in place of your manned squadrons you embark a dozen F-18E’s for local defence and 36 UCLASS. Two groups two co-ordinated strike axes = multiplies the counter detection problem. Now its not enough for the opfor to just ‘find’ the carrier…they have to hold the carrier group long enough to determine whether all the decks are there…with certainty…before they start building the H-6 strike package!.
Burrito,
how about using a Soviet type of carrier where the offensive power is more in its missiles than airplane?
I think, if you look at the concepts around the Virginia Payload Modules, the US are looking more at submarine platforms for volume long-range missile capability. Some variation on the old arsenal ship concept adding in an expanded aviation dept for a ‘squadron’ of TERN/VARIOUS-type VTOL UAVs could be fascinating to consider though. I’d expect that to be better deployed as an adjunct capability in an ESG as opposed to something that replaces big through decks.
JonesyI’ll side with Sintra. Someone mentioned the merits of damage resilience as a big selling point of the Sukhoi…widely spaced engines etc…well if an iceberg can beat an Olympic class liner thats where I’ll be putting my money….fire all the R-37’s you like!!!
Sign In
