JonesyDJ,
Thanks for the correction there. It appeared the relative orphan status of F-35C in the USN was because they expected VLO UCAV to be the more viable penetrator platform. Is this a case that they are caught between two stools – by the time that it takes to get 35C in the airwings at full establishment they will be near an operational J-UCAS…which will be the generally more viable capability?. Hence apparent lack of interest/concern?.
I know what you are saying about the saturation-fires issue….it was something that had a serious focus in the RN back in the 90’s…hence UKPAAMS. Isnt SM-6/CEC the answer there though?. Last I read that was all testing out quite nicely…though there seemed to be an absence of testing in a hostile RF environment?.
Bager,
Fair comment thanks. Of course I’m quite happy to take your word about the way things work at the coalface…what I was more trying to say was that CNO couldn’t decree that USMC would ditch STOVL and USMC would just have to wear that. In the same way that CMC is not in the chain of command to order a redirection of a CSG.
JonesyIs this not where J-UCAS/X-47B etc kick in DJ?. The concept being that the UCAVs engage theatre entry denial systems and opposing force multipliers, backed with TLAM and blanket MALD-J. Only when entry denial is reduced and the threat assessment becomes more cheery does the carrier force move in and start to deploy manned non-LO?.
JonesyFedaykins’ quite correct. The civillian Dept of the Navy oversees both but…
“the two branches have their own separate and distinct Chain of Command – the Secretary of the Navy oversees the two, but the Navy is headed by the Chief of Naval Operations, while the Marines are commanded by the Commandant of the Marine Corps. Both officers are normally 4-star ranks.”
….they are sister services but the USMC is not subordinate to the Chief of Naval Operations in any operational sense.
JonesyYou do have a really insulting attitude there, its very clear now. In fact I DO know how the Marines operate and I DO NOT appreciate your snide attitude about me. The point YOU were making was that the US Navy was unable to deploy a CVN off Lybia and all they could contribute was an ARG. I see now that you must be mentally slow (see? I can play your game too.) so I will put it out ONE more time that the reason that the ARG (with as you put out only 400 Marines) was all the US contributed was a POLITICAL decision. The US Navy was more than able to deploy a CVN if directed to do so. As to your other point…..YES, I do KNOW that the Marines DO have so-called “organic” airpower. But that does not (as much as you might wish it) mean that they are not a part of the US Navy. You can hold your breath till your blue or stamp your little feet in tantrum but you are not going to change that. And in these times of tight budgets, that doesnt seem like its going to change.
When did I say they couldnt send a CVN?. I’ve said they didnt send a CVN…the bottom line is no organic airpower beyond STOVL…and that was the point I was stressing. The USMC has a separate and distinct role to the ‘fleet’ elements and different requirements and priorities you dont seem to appreciate that…or are happy to try and ignore the reality?.
http://www.sldinfo.com/shaping-the-strike-force-for-bold-alligator-2012-the-perspective-of-2nd-maw/
Look at what they did with Bold Alligator, look at the commitment to LHA, look at what Kearsage actually DID on ops….I’m not the one having the hissy fit pal. I’m saying that STOVL is a more significant capability, with commitment in service, than some here are trying to make out. If anything aren’t you the one saying that ‘its the USNs ball and they can take it home if the USMC dont play nice’?.
JonesyAhh you have a fundamental misunderstanding of what the Marines do and why it differs from the rest of the USN. OK its clear now, like Ben, you believe they should take what they are given and like it or else.
We’ll see how that one pans out….suffice it to say from what I can see, not least todays news about the new $2.5bn LHA, independent USMC tacair, ergo F-35B, looks quite assured.
Jonesy19K11
Which is the point many have been making about STOVL for the USMC for years. With reliance solely on USN CV’s for organic air support they are at the tender mercies of those who direct the carriers movements for the deployment of MARINE tacair. Libya had an ARG with 400 troops deployed yet they were not important enough to get their own squadrons there covering them?.
STOVL gave them a small measure of organic air which was used to good effect by all accounts. Without F35B they lose that when Harrier goes. I expect that will cause a fair bit more grievance than Ben suggests within the USMC brass.
JonesyWhat if there had been a CVN but no Marines?
Would have made evacuation ops a lot more difficult wouldnt it – unless you plan to dock the CVN or ferry evacuees one at a time in the back of an F-18?!!.
Regardless the point being that there wasnt!. The point being that there was an ARG in an active threat situation that, if it weren’t for the STOVL detachment, would have been entirely dependent on someone elses land based air. As I understand the USMC ethic thats not their idea of the right way to do things.
F-35B is the one with inherently most potential problems.
Lets see if the new hook-tip and hold-down ram work, without ripping the hook off or damaging the carrier deck, before we finalise our views on that. If the quick fix doesnt turn out to be the answer the remaining options are not quick fixes!.
JonesyYeah Ben’s kind of, deliberately, forgetting that JSF was initially configured to the USMC requirement for a STOVL F-18C!. The USMC have pandered to an anxious USN to leave some of their fixed wing squadrons on the CVN’s otherwise USN airgroups would start to look a bit lightweight. The impression is there that the USN dont give a toss what the USMC fly off their decks provided its not STOVL!. If they stay with Super Hornet alls fine and well with that!. The -35C does look by far the least issue to get shut of and it could well turn out to be the one with the most difficult problems to solve.
I’m not entirely sure the USMC will be as happy as Ben tries to make out that they would be losing the ability to operate independently of a US CVN. In Libya there was no CVN and yet there were 400 Marines in the Kearsage ARG just offshore. So much for the oft heralded view that there would naturally be a CVN around anywhere the Marines were tasked – sounding ever more like the RAF’s promise to cover the fleet whenever and wherever required that one isnt it?!. Anyway without the Harrier detachment on Kearsage the USMC would have been operational without any of their own fastjet tacair support. I suspect the issue would be brought up quite quickly if the F-35B were to actually be in real danger of cancellation.
JonesyHail PPP….bringer of light to those who are in darkness and cant see past the end of their nose.:D
JonesyAgreed. Tough question.
It would have to be attractive for the Italian Govt to try and stretch every last ounce of capability out of the Harrier fleet as saving that 2bn odd from the 22 35B’s would be a gift in their current climate.
Against that if they wanted to operate fastjet naval airpower again, and they just had a live demonstration of its usefulness just off their own coast, there would be no cheaper way of doing it, in the long run, than jumping into Gripen with the UK. Hell they could even tag an order for Cavours’ arresting gear onto ours and get best-price!.
Some really rough sketches on cost, based on SAAB’s ideas of cost-to-develop and the NG offer to the Dutch, put bottom line figure for 120 aircraft for the UK at about £50mn per copy inclusive of development. Plugging in another 30 for MMI reduces the unit cost about 20%. In $US whats that about 60mn a throw?.
Perhaps it may be feasible to get the deck hardware, adapt their CVS and establish a capability based on a 30-plane Sea Gripen buy for the same money it would take to buy those 22 F-35Bs?!. I can see how the MMI could try and make a case for it at least….should the wort happen to F-35B!.
JonesyJohn
When will you look beyond the end of your nose?. Deterrent until 2060+. Just because today the missiles are pointed elsewhere doesn’t mean they will be tomorrow. Or would you like to guarantee that one for us right now?.
You seem to accept that in the Cold War there was a need to provide deterrence to stop a potential aggressor attempting to coerce us with nuclear weapons or to give them serious pause for thought before they fired them on whatever grounds?. Is that a fair read on what you have said?.
Where do you think those missiles and nuclear warheads have gone?. Some of the overkill has been thinned out sure but a nuclear capability still exists that is an order away from being trained on us. At the moment its unlikely that it will, but, only a fool would assure you that we will never be in a confrontational stance against Russia again. Iskanders to engage BMD sites in E.Europe ring any bells?. The wider dismay in the Ukraine (at least the Russified bits) of the leanings towards NATO?. Individually they are issues of little consequence but the fact that there is an undercurrent of opinion over there that needs to oppose the US/NATO perceived hegemony is undeniable.
I’m not saying a new Cold War is just round the corner I’m saying that issues WILL crop up more and more…not least over resources as they become scarcer….and there is no guarantee that the current status we all enjoy were everyone is best friends with everyone else in the world will continue. If the anti-deterrent crowd get their way we’ll be stood there all deer-in-the-headlights as we realise that we have adversary states with nuclear warheads pointed at us and we gave ours up to save a few quid in the hopes that the govt might give us our Top Gun fantasy….or another dozen poorly performing hospitals….or prserved another few criminally mismanaged banks!
Once again John….the defence budget, over 30 years, CAN withstand the costs of successor SSBN, and UK manufacturin will certainly benefit from the investment (you know that bit you keep ignoring!). We have the spending hump from CVF and JCA (JCA shared with the RAF budget allocation as STOVL allows for flexibility remember?) then, after that, we have T26. After that point we will be running on still-current AAW destroyers, brand new frigates, carriers still with 20-30yrs left in ’em and still pretty new SSNs in the shape of the A-class boats. Scheduled properly we can slot the finalised SSBN build in after the T26 funding crunch subsides a bit and a little bit after Astute-7, HMS Ajax, is finished towards the latter part of the 2020’s.
Follow on SSBN isnt to blame for you not getting the catapults/traps you wanted to see on CVF John. Cancelling it isnt going to get the spend on conventional arms you hope for. Give it up.
JonesyA good few years old that one MrM. That was the original concept artwork for the Astute successor wasnt it?.
Remember thinking that if that ever materialised into a genuine design I was selling up, buying a tug and offering my services to the RN. God knows that thing wouldnt be going anywhere near alongside without a few to help it!.
JonesyNew spend Cherry is £15bn on the Govts back of envelope figures. We are paying ops costs now for AWE and the V boats so its disingenuous to try and spin the issue in that fashion.
Both the capital spend and ops cost, it needs to be reiterated, is money supporting vital sovereign industry. No SSBN and Barrow either goes and we lose nuclear submarine design and build capability or we, further, pay BAE to not build nuclear submarines. Which one is the winner there do you think…or is it acceptable to lose the capability to build nuke boats ourselves?.
Now, unless there are those out there with prescience enough to predict great political upheavals like the Arab Spring, there has to be a dawning realisation that nuclear arsenals that can threaten the UK are out there and new ones, with new delivery platforms, are being developed and deployed. The only reason that they are not currently threatening us is the lack of political need in those possessing states. If we remove our nuclear deterrent…and by this I mean actual deterrent not half-assed excuse for it…we become vulnerable to the political stability of several nuclear weapons states. With the deterrent we have a measure of insurance against any eventuality because, bottom line, nuclear weapons are the great equaliser.
The absolute key point, and its the first point I made on this, is that political change can happen a damnsight faster that we can regenerate a nuclear submarine design and build capability and put new SSBN’s in the water. For us the issue of unaffordability is moot. We spend £37bn odd on Defence per year and, my favourite touch stone, we have a YEARLY surplus in the unclaimed state welfare benefits pool of near £10bn which rises again if you add in unclaimed tax credits.
We can afford these things if we so choose. We can afford £15bn for new SSBNs especially when the bulk of that is propping up the UK PlC Advanced Technology Manufacturing Dept!. We CAN afford CATOBAR CVF’s we just dont need that extra capability, cant justify the additional spend and have found a far more efficient way to operate!. That happy circumstance doesnt present itself for the national deterrent as there are presently no cheaper ways to assure a warhead reaches its target than the way we do it today.
Jonesy19K11,
AGM-129 range 2000 miles
AGM-86B range 1500 miles+
Storm Shadow 150 miles+
SCALP 150 miles+
Different classes of weapon.
JonesyJohn
Once again.
1. The only guaranteed way to get a warhead on target is with a ballistic RV
2. There is no geographical location in the UK suitable for siting ballistic launchers
3. To retain a deterrent we have to maintain the skills to develop and deploy it.
4. £15bn costs over 30 years not upfront.
5. SSBN sustains the submarine design/fabrication until Astute follow-on
These are all simple inalienable facts. Your questioning who were deterring?. The answer is simple. Anyone with the nuclear inventory and political will to apply coercive force against us at any time between now and roughly 2060ish.
Making procurement decisions for a strategic weapons platform that will extend three decades or more based on purely the strategic situation today redefines the concept of stupidity.
Sign In
