JonesyDistiller
Truth is that the UK ordered two supersize-me carrier and now doesn’t know what to do with them.
Thats too simplistic…the truth is the UK ordered two carriers scaled for purpose. That purpose being to generate 100 sorties per day, on surge, off a 30+ fastjet airgroup with the, somewhat conservative, surge-rate of 3 sorties per day per aircraft.
Further it chose an airgroup that enabled the ‘joint force’ deployment strategy that kept a significant degree of recurring cost, inherent with naval air, off the Navy and gave the RAF the operational control over a sizeable fraction of the JCA force. This whilst retaining a basic, permanent, deck establishment for contingency ops. Effectively it was a plan to let the Navy do their part best and the RAF do their part best with the ultimate goal that we could project fast-response airpower quickly afloat, ashore or both.
The problem was that too many saw big-deck carrier and concluded, wrongly, that it meant the return of the Royal Navy and Fleet Air Arm of old. Suddenly the, very sensible, plan to stay the STOVL course meant continued Harrier-Carrier 2nd tier status. This view seems to have crawled up the stack and, thinly screened by promises of inter-operability etc, we suddenly have the policy shift to put in fleet carrier capabilities, but, without the commitment to dedicated naval air ops. So we knew exactly what we were doing with the carriers before the half-thought out and under-committed switch to CATOBAR.
JonesyI´ll be damned if the western Airforces havent been launching long range strikes since the end of the cold war…
Iraq 1991
Operation Provide Confort, Northern Watch, Southern Watch, etc (a full decade of it)
Operation Deny Flight
Operation Deliberate Force (Bosnia) 1995
Operation Allied Force (Kosovo) 1999
Afghanistan 2001
Iraqi Freedom 2003From the entire RAF inventory the aircraft who was more widely used, launched more munitions, had more flights, etc, etc, etc, was the Tonka.
For all the love that the Harrier gathers around here, that particular aircraft had to tail a refueler over a great big chunk of Iraq and Jugoslavia because it has the range of an AMX or Hawk 200…
If there´s one aircraft in the RAF inventory that proved that its mission is vital, thats the Tornado, and the RAF entirely agrees.
I’m sure the RAF are very defensive of the GR4’s capabilities. The simple fact is though that the operations you list saw Mirages, Jaguars, F-18’s, F-16’s etc deployed that contributed fully despite not being possessed of GR4’s range. The Tornado was conceived for a purpose and has on occasion proven useful for its weapon carry and range, but, often enough to require a manned replacement?. Nope. Going forward pursuing manned deep strike is begging for obsolescence.
As you say above a shorter ranged light striker can have its range extended by AAR or, if STOL, by the simple expedient of basing closer to the operational theatre. You cant take such steps to mitigate the costs of a big twin and if the runway is too short to deploy heavy fastjets to then you are faced with extending it or finding somewhere else to fly from…however much time that plugs into your localise-to-hit operational cycle.
…and its the last point thats key. Afghan and Libya have proved that a ready-responder capability is essential to exploit theatre surveillance as it can be provided now. However impressive the range of your heavy twin interdictor there is always the issue that, bombed-up, you are subsonic and, if you need to use the long range, you are looking at an hour lag in weapon delivery. A long-legged jet can loiter, but, only in a permissive environment and at the cost of airframe flight hours, weapon carriage hours and increased maintenance to regenerate. Fleets are smaller now so there isnt the same ability to spread airframe wear fleet wide…likewise pgm stocks are smaller so burning through airframe carry lives uselessly tooling round on cab-rank waiting for a tasking call is less than efficient.
Again citing Libya French Rafale-M’s were 200nm offshore and delivering effects 20 minutes from the launch – the advantage there is obvious. The closer the ability to base the better – enabling that and the faster response time is now more useful than raw range performance.
JonesyWhat evidence is there that when calculated on the same basis (i.e. not comparing F-35B operational costs on a US basis & Typhoon costs on the basis used by the NAO, which includes fixed costs as ‘operational’), F-35B operational costs will be far lower?
I’ve never seen a comparison on a comparable basis. Do we have the information to make one? If so, I’d love to see it.
Wasnt specifically talking about the F-35B there Swerve it was a more general observation, in response to Gabby’s question regarding the need for a second tactical fastjet in the RAF inventory, that a STOL (note STOL not specifically STOVL) light striker that doesnt cost £70k per flight hour is something that the RAF does appear to have a need for. The £70k per hour value I’ve seen several times and is apparently comparable with that the Germans list for their Typhoons.
The F-35B may end up costing a similar amount to Typhoon, as you say, there is little evidence either way to base a judgement on. The major savings with F-35B would be those associated with Carrier Strike though as previously discussed. Perhaps Sea Gripen could be another route, if it was cheap enough to field, to deliver the same capability. No depth of analysis there just an attempt to get the idea across.
JonesyUnfortunately, the report of the Department of Defence Testing authority reports it as an issue instead, along with tons of other problems
25yds danger zone (thankyou for the maths correction Bager!) is not a ‘problem’ Gabby its a scare story. The clutch plate heating is unresolved but is not uniform across the fleet, or even from flight to flight, and is easily corrected by flying at a higher altitude using ambient air temp for cooling…you arent going to lose a plane from it…operationally you would abort a mission for it I’d expect…just as you would for an engine failure in a non-STOVL type.
And what will maintenance do? Kiss it better, put glue on it, or weld it? Not something you can do.
That piece should have a life of 8000 hours as of design. When it cracks, the only solution is to tear the airframe apart and replace it.
The point is that, despite all the drama and hand-wringing, this issue is identified and quantified. The plane is not going to break apart in flight on its third sortie. 1000 hours for the unstiffened part is 3 years operational service….maintenance involves checklists for known issues and any cracking in that bulkhead will be identified under that routine maintenance. Its absence will likewise be noted during that same maintenance…and if there is no cracking there is no cause for alarm!. That is what properly scheduled and effected maintenance does. As Bager states though the issue has already been addressed and a weight penalty paid.
Not a single person yet who’s been able to give a realistic answer about the real need for a second land based jet fleet for strike missions. What does it add to the nation’s defence?
Are you talking about the need to replace Tornado?. If so I agree…the requirement to bomb Eastern Europe from the UK has diminished to a large extent. Replacing Jaguar and GR7/9 though I’d say is a different story. Typhoon looks to have rather a large price tag when it comes to operational costs. I’d say a STOL precision light striker with fair air-air performance with far lower operational costs and ‘easy’ deployability is something that the RAF does need…though, not being glitzy and flash, I’d imagine you’d be hard pushed to find an RAF officer to agree.
I’d so like to know how France does it without a OCU and without a large reserve of Rafale M airframes, then. Are they supermen?
As explained once before the Aeronavale splits its airwing between two types – Rafale and Etendard. It has not stood up three squadrons of Rafales yet. When it does, if it wants to be able to keep two squadrons of Rafales on the CVN to ensure 30+ are ready at short notice – as we have a requirement to deploy 30 JCA to CVF – then it will be a significant ramp up in naval ops for that type. They then will need to be able to spread the load on airframes across a wider fleet. They dont appear to have that requirement now so no need for blue underpants outside their trousers. Simple as that.
If you’ve been current 60 days to 6 months ago, you need to do some Field Landing Carrier Practice ashore with the LSO directing you, and then make 4 day landings, 2 to 3 of them being arrested, and 2 night landings within 36 or 48 hours to be again day/night current.
So, as I’ve been saying, your pilots, who’ve been on a Herrick-style shore det for 4 months followed by a well deserved spot of leave, have to spend a few days at the OCU doing touch-and-goes then join the ship and only then EACH PILOT has to perform the above, to the correct standard, to get their deck rating back. You’ll doubtless be able to pull some from the OCU and perhaps recall some from secondment with USN/MN who will be further along the curve, but, its not going to substantially alter the situation. Even IF every pilot performs perfectly you are looking at more than a week, at best, to get up to establishment – especially so if you are bringing in a full squadron or more of additional capability!. This is why I’m saying that, practically, the only way to get the full surge 100 sortie rate, with CATOBAR, is to keep a basic establishment on deck of 20+ aircraft (realistically two squadrons) and bring a ‘wartime surge’ in from, likely, the OCU to top off to 30+. That means more overheads, higher loading on aircraft and a larger aircraft pool required and THAT on top of needing the extra spend on the CATOBAR kit and the higher running costs of cats, arresting gear and the extra ships complement needed to run and fix it.
Against this STOVL pilots could, in an emergency, deploy straight to the ship from an operational det and likely fly operational sorties the following day, perhaps the newbies fly the lighter loaded flights, inside VL bringback, for the first few sorties and leave heavy-loaded SRL-likely missions to the NSW…if the conditions are a bit bumpy.
JonesyGabby
The aircraft has flown very well during the sea trials, said Marine Lt. Col. Matt Kelly, lead F-35 test pilot at Naval Air Station (NAS) Patuxent River, Md. While he couldn’t compare the jet directly to the Harrier since he was an F/A-18 Hornet pilot, Kelly pointed out that the sea trials are his first experience operating from an amphibious assault ship, which is a testimony to the F-35B’s excellent handling characteristics.
“I have found this airplane to be just a really nice airplane to fly in the shipboard environment,” he said. “Prior to two weeks ago I had never landed or taken-off from this type of ship… It’s a pleasure to fly.”
Kelly added that the F-35B is easier to handle on the flight deck than he had imagined it would be. The challenge is not landing the aircraft but rather “putting the nose tire in a 1-foot-by-1-foot square box,” he said.
Cordell said that one piece of good news is that the “outflow” from the jet’s exhaust while hovering is less intense than expected. “It’s counterintuitive, but the jet has a less harsh environment hovering at 40 feet than it does at 100 feet,” he said. Engineering models had predicted the outcome, but skeptics – Cordell included – had doubted those conclusions.
We’ve already had confirmation, from the Lt Col doing the driving, that the deck trials had shown no major issues in terms of jetblast. You are talking about a 20yd safety zone around an air vehicle thats sitting on 40 thousand pounds of thrust during a landing??!.
I’ve been up close and personal to several flavours of Harrier setting down and, please believe me on this, I would, by choice, stand a good bit further back than 20 yards any time I had to repeat the experience!. Also the way your article is written it states a 20 yard limit from the STO line?. Is your clip actuallly saying dont stand within 20 yards of the reheat jetblast of a fighter taking off?. While thats clearly good advice I’m not sure that its a reg that would need all that frequent enforcement!. At most it does, perhaps, call into question the deletion of the JBD’s from the STOVL deck design…but I believe the comment was, with the deck length available, the simple expedient of spotting the following aircraft a bit farther back would achieve the same effect…at the cost of a small decrease in maximum sortie generation rate.
In terms of the structural issues the bulkhead cracking is clearly serious, but, is identified and quantified at the 1000hr mark….more than 3 years uninterrupted normal service in US projected flight hours!. The presumption would have to be that some level of maintenace will be performed through those years in service to keep a track on this and whatever the stiffener solution is introduced?.
I think it’s undeniable that a carrier pilot normally has no issue working from land, while a land pilot has troubles working at sea. In a tight financial environment, with the naval strike force able to do land ops, while land strike force can’t readily do naval work, my choice goes for the first, not for the ugly, risky compromise of land air doing brief visits at sea.
Gabby I dont really know where to start with this. You seem to have an idea of Carrier Strike that is completely unrelated to the reality of the situation. You seem to be contending that the Carrier Strike squadrons be kept permanently deck-rated and detach to shore duties only as the need arises. With one operational deck that means keeping at least two squadrons embarked at any one time with a third on stand-down. We’d need a pretty big OCU/reserve component as well to keep the airframe trap cycles well spread across the fleet. Its a costly solution and it still leaves us with two major issues a) why are the RAF going to pay a percentage for the shore basing/logistics/training of the FCA force when its primarily a sea-based capability and b) how do we keep pilots assigned to shore duties, especially a lengthy shore tasking like Herrick, deck-rated?. You can short-cycle pilots between the shore-task, OCU and the deck but that leads to poor operational efficiency and low morale. You could establish a 4th squadron for shore deployment in the rotation…but that means additional airframes and pilots which is more cost again.
The issue always comes back to the same thing. If you want CATOBAR you have to do it the same way everyone else who uses CATOBAR does things. With permanent naval squadrons. There is NO commitment to this from MoD and there never has been. Any attempt to move in this direction will be met with direct opposition from light blue and, most importantly, very little desire for it from an Admiralty who would have to foot the bill for such a capability out of their budget. I’ve, simply, not heard of any flag rank RN officer express a desire to reconstitute a 3 or 4 fastjet squadron Fleet Air Arm.
Given the additional funding to do so, which would be considerable, sure – lets stand up 4 14-plane Rafale-M squadrons plus a 40+ aircraft OCU/reserve establishment. I’m not entirely sure Yeovilton could take all that lot and Culdrose is up to its armpits in rotaries and museum tourists these days so I’m not entirely sure splitting the force between the bases would be a goer either?. Maybe we could stick the OCU at St Mawgan now thats meant to be a ‘joint’ facility?. Suffice it to say….more expense. That would provide the capability for Carrier Strike though and surely offer better payload/range for the odd time its required.
Alternately we go back to STOVL keep the NSW on the deck and have the RAF STOVL jets fly out and embark when they need to. That does Carrier Strike as well.
JonesyJacko
The Jaguars had no problems in Afghanistan. They didn’t go. And however asthmatic the Jag was, it managed ok in Iraq, Oman, India, etc. and the Jags on the Azores could have brought a lot of relevant effect to the table for Sierra Leone.
Not least recon as the GR7, as well as a very thin weapons list, also had no recce capability. So FA.2, having the time-served F95 fit, was able to bring everything necessary to the party in terms of selective fire and recce (and actually used its recce capability to good effect if memory serves) in one organically supported and defended package i.e the carrier.
Against that we would have required the Jags deployment…and its associated logistic chain…plus whatever political consideration would have been clawed back by the host nation and been at their whim for the continuation of our efforts. Seems like, to me, thats more of a justification for having left the RAF GR7’s at home for Op Palliser and left the FA.2’s to do the job than anything else?.
And every time we’ve used a carrier since 1982, land based air could have got their faster and cheaper, and would have been more cost- and operationally-effective once in place.
…and in 1982 the sum effort, without a carrier, was one Vulcan when it could be managed.
In ELDORADO CANYON we saw the French close their airspace to USAF F-111’s. In IRAQI FREEDOM we saw Turkey pull out and kick the opplan in the head. In both cases workarounds were found, but, significant compromises had to be made. We had friendly local states in range of the Falklands in 1982 but they, very understandably, chose their own interests over ours so no base-in. We weren’t as lucky with that one as no immediate alternative presented itself. To say that we cannot hinge our future expeditionary strategy on the basis that we’ll always have more luck than we did in 1982 isnt a difficult concept to grasp surely?.
“Ours” referring to the Navy’s budget, Jonesy? That speaks volumes for your neutrality on this issue.
I’m advocating the solution that gives us the greatest range of contingency operational effect for the least spend. That is undeniably a commitment to the ‘golf-bag’ CVF/Carrier Strike concept to enable strike effect from ashore or afloat with equal efficacy and a rapid-augment capability along either (or both) routes. After all lets not forget that coordinated diverse, simultaneous, strike vectors can be very useful in overcoming defensive forces. Sea and land basing, if we can get the numbers and have the right geographical scenario, are entirely complementary capabilities – it definitely need not be one or the other.
My aim here is to be objective….not neutral.
JonesyI’m not ex-forces, and lack any first hand knowledge of what happened but I strongly suspect that both Liger’s and your arguments are gross simplifications of what really happened,
Correct.
The assertions about the questionable value of carrier presence are a degree off as well.
Half of the problem in Sierra Leone was that the strikers….RAF GR7’s of 3sqdn, if memory serves, didnt have the hot weather performance to take off with more than a single 1000lb’er. FA.2’s could have launched with ADEN pods and achieved as much….but blowing things up ashore was apparently the light blues mission thankyou very much!.
If I remember right the RAF Jags found hot conditions something of a challenge in Afghanistan in the early days didnt they as well. So maybe not as cut and dried as made out and the continued reference to carriers utilisation after 1982 has always amused….akin as it is to questioning the value of the RAF’s air defence capabilities after 1944! :rolleyes:
Such issues always arise though and dilute the point of the thing here which is the agreement that Carrier Strike and CATOBAR are pretty much incompatible…as the RN have stated to Govt already. If they, the Whitehall mandarins, persist in wanting to go CATOBAR they need to give the RAF their Deep Strike budget back and increase ours to stand up a similar force to that the Aeronavale deploys…with whatever fastjet type happens along…or forget Cats and go back to JFH and the way things were.
JonesyThis is my first post here but just wanted to say to Jonesy, spot on.
It is really refreshing to read nothing but commonsense as opposed to the frothing, recycled third hand, sentimental hyperbole that so often characterises these discussions. It was a pleasure reading your posts.
Good first post that man!.:)
Seriously I am still scratching the surface of the 700+ post thread that Nocuts linked but it seems that good common sense is also present there. I particularly liked the references to the Kearsage in Libya and the USMC’s development of their next gen OTH ops. Also this:
Deck Handling and the CEPP; carrier strike has morphed into Carrier Enabled Power Projection (who thinks these up by the way, is there a training course one attends?) which is a blend of carrier borne fast jets, helicopters and in the future UAV’s, supported by other capabilities and force elements. The Royal Navy openly admit that the move to conventional aircraft handling will complicate matters in this regard, noting in evidence to a House of Commons Select Committee that no other maritime force will be doing this and that the challenges are significant. With STOVL aircraft the deck movement challenges are much fewer and we have a deep well of experience from which to draw.
Programme Title engineering…Abbey Wood runs it so I’m told…in the creche!. Otherwise what you have there is effectively everything I’ve been saying for the past half dozen entries on here!.
Respects duly returned and I’ll be interested in reading more from your site.
Cheers
JonesyAre you saying that CATOBAR airplanes wouldn’t be used in support of operations? That the RAF can’t be made to deliver CATOBAR current pilots? That the RAF does not give a flying ****?
I’m saying that the RAF would have to manage the feat of keeping its shore-tasked pilots CATOBAR deck qualified whilst they are on whatever detchment happens to be a requirement at the time….otherwise it will not be able to generate pilots and airframes to get out to the carrier if needed. Even if the light blue were absolutely wild with enthusiasm at the idea of carrier basing that would be difficult to achieve in a short space of time. Needless to say they will be less than enthusiastic about the prospect.
Because naval, CATOBAR airplanes have provided as much as80% of the sorties flown over Afghanistan in the 2001 ops and a large share of the total sorties in the decade…
…and how many of these were flown from a CATOBAR deck by pilots retasked from shore duties straight out to the ship at zero notice?. That is what Carrier Strike requires.
As to the training penalty, how comes that the french naval pilots keep CATOBAR current flying on average less training hours than RAF land based pilots?.
I would assume that as there is only one active Rafale-M squadron and it is permanently assigned to naval ops it would be little different than the way that the UK NSW would be permanently assigned to the CVF. Difference is that the Aeronavale augments its Rafale-M squadron with two further DEDICATED naval strike squadrons on Etendards.
Will you understand that we WILL NOT have three dedicated naval squadrons under Carrier Strike. The issue isnt keeping a dozen or so fastjets available on a carrier deck. Its where the augmentation comes from in case we need to put the extra striking squadrons on the deck that is the whole issue here. We cannot generate the hundred sorties per day required for surge ops with just the dozen aircraft of the NSW so we HAVE to have squadrons to add to the embarked airgroup. Those squadrons will need deck qualified pilots if they are to deploy to the carrier…keeping those pilots current and available….while keeping some form of training programme under way and meeting the RAF’s shore-based taskings is almost impossible without a ridiculous ratio of pilots to aircraft.
How can they get their pilots converted from T-45 Goshawk, flown in the US, to Rafale, with as few as 12 hours in the simulator?
Likely as they spent several weeks flying CATOBAR approaches etc in the US before hand. Type conversion can be done on a simulator as its principally a task of learning the controls, where all the buttons are and getting used to visibility out of the ‘cockpit’. You dont deck qualify in a sim.
How could they do so well with Rafale M in Libya when their second Rafale squadron has yet to stand up? How can they re-certify currency to their pilots with the very terrifying figure of 6 day-time traps and 4 night-time traps?
Likely as there were ‘only’ 8 aircraft from a dedicated naval squadron running Rafale-M operations. Something which could scarcely be more different to what were talking about with Carrier Strike. Terrifying figure of 6 day traps and 4 night traps PER PILOT!!!. If we suddenly need to requalify 10 RAF pilots to get them up to operational status thats 100 traps altogether then figure in another, say, 100 missed approaches, bolters etc. This has to be worked into the operational flying programme with jets who’s deck fatigue life is measured in launch/trap cycles.
The French do it without wires, on a rather standard runway, with a light guidance system like that of the carrier mounted on wheels.
No the French do the real work in the US and fly practice approaches on shore facilities. Just as SRL is suddenly a different proposition in adverse sea states and weather conditions so is CATOBAR. The same factors apply.
How can they meet so well their training needs with a Joint Air Force/Navy squadron, and with training in the US for the naval pilots
Which Aeronavale squadron is joint roled with the AdlA?. I’ve not heard of 12F or 17F spending months on shore detachment before joining back up with the ship?.
JonesyThere’s been periods in which the RAF had 1 or 2 pilots deck ready, and none of the two cleared for bad weather or night ops.
The point is though that with STOVL you dont have to be deck rated to deploy to the ship!. The RAF had no pilots deck rated, if memory serves, in the GR3 community in 1982 yet they were able to deploy straight to a light fleet carrier in the South Atlantic during bumpy season!. That was with absolutely none of the automation and general whiz-bangery that the 35B’s will come with. Provided we accept that the brass will attempt to make sure that an unqualified pilots first deck landing isnt going to be an SRL in SS7 with a couple of Storm Shadows under the wings the flight technique compensates for the lack of training.
If CATOBAR forces the “Joint Force” to spend more time at sea and gives the UK back a naval aviation, it is yet another reason in my book to go for it.
If we have to fear about the RAF only caring about its flights in and out of Marham, only putting some pilots on a ship now and then to get it done with the nuissance for a while, then there is something seriously wrong, and government should remember the RAF what their place is and that JCA is being procured for putting a wing on the aircraft carriers, not in Marham.
I’m sorry Liger but this is perfect illustration of the underlying problem with much of the pro-CATOBAR argument. So much is based on sentiment and the perception of Naval Aviation regaining its proper place in the service that developed the steam catapult, the angled deck, the mirror landing sight etc, etc
Its twaddle. Who cares if get extra points in some game of ‘Build a Fantasy Navy’ for having Fleet Carriers?. We spend the budget on capability we haven’t got a requirement for and we lose out on the things that we very definitely DO have a real NEED for….like ships and submarines….the foundation that the flashy capital ship/naval air capability rests on. We’re down to a scratch over a dozen frigates….half a dozen destroyers….going to be coming down to 7 fleet subs. Its all really good, first-class, kit but there is not enough of it to cover all the taskings.
For the very last time, I promise, STOVL shares the costs with the RAF and, at the same time, gives them the ability to deploy first rate strike to forward short-field basing. The planes are bought to do a job….these days mostly being a lifeline to the poor bloody infantry in some dusty hellhole in the back of beyond. I was as proud as hell of the lads in NSW when they were flying out of Kandahar doing the job they are meant to….bollox to it that they werent flying from the ship it doesnt matter….they were covering our lads on the ground and thats the job. Carrier Strike keeps a minimum complement on the ship for contingency ops and has the rest of the fighters were they can be best employed….thats just good inventory management…when we are so tight on resources its simple bloody common sense!.
You want the planes on the ship so we can strut around the worlds oceans, patting ourselves on the back for getting one over on the light blue and pretending we’re the USN thats your issue Liger?. It’ll be comforting for you to note that you arent alone. For me though thats not the way the Senior Service does things or ever should do.
JonesyLiger thats the point!. A former pilot should be aware of things like training and deck qualification and understand that ‘using the USN’ template means creating a permanent multi-squadron Carrier air group….like the USN does.
We are not going to be doing that. The stated aim is still for the RAF to participate in the same joint force structure as existed with Harrier. That works with STOVL…and has been proven many times, but, its not the case with CATOBAR. The USN does not have two thirds of its pilots flying with the USAF when they arent deployed to a carrier. You expect someone commenting, from an assumed position of authority, to know small details like that. It would appear that Peter Collins isnt aware of this joint-CATOBAR issue though.
If the Govt relented and realised, at some later date, that jointness and CATOBAR deck-qualification were the conflicting requirements that they are then its still bad news for the Royal Navy. This is because, as i said originally, we lose RAF support and RAF budgetary contribution to Carrier Strike and it becomes an all-Dark Blue deal. We then have a LOT of work to train, support logistically and stand up what would be, at minimum, 2 14-plane frontline squadrons and an OCU/2nd line squadron probably close to 22-24 aircraft strong. That would be a significant recurring cost item on the Navies books and we are having a hard enough time as it is keeping all the ships out.
Copying the USN is a lovely concept….its just not one that has any basis in reality for the Royal Navy and its not what Carrier Strike is all about.
JonesyBottom left is a Besson class LSV….very likely the Phillipines version.
JonesyAnyhow I am going to step back from this argument for the moment as I don’t want to be seen to be arguing with a fellow poster and forum friend who I respect for his clear thinking (even if I don’t think it is clear on this;)). I suppose we all wait for the next government study to finish…
Fair play…in my view the very best people to argue with are those you consider friends…after all if they then go on to prove you are an idiot better that you, at least, have the comfort that you pick your friends well!.
Anyway my cap is tipped to you sir and it will be quite something to see what happens next!.
JonesySimples Jonesy, go to Newsagent pick up latest copy of AFM, buy then takes home and read Tim Coxs article. I am not saying it can’t VL with a load I am saying it is unsafe. AMRAAM has been deleted from the load out on a strike mission due to weight issues. F-35B as it stands doesn’t meet the JCA KPP, so that means STOVL has failed as far as I am concerned and we should go with CATOBAR.
Youtube clip of a 40knt F-35B approach:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VF8t5re3nKU
Doesnt appear unsafe or even particularly difficult to me and thats 10knts over SRL approach speed that Qinetiq mentioned!. Remember that SRL is not a similar approach to CATOBAR and the CVF deck is not a small one like a CVS Fed so the fact that this is a deck and not an airstrip is marginal in all except really poor sea conditions.
The AMRAAM deletion is contradictory to US DoD figures according to AvWeek. I’ve yet to pick up my copy of the magazine this month so I will give it a read, but, at present these claims dont seem exactly unchallenged!.
JonesyNow were getting there.
Distiller Carrier Strike is all about high sortie rate just-over-the-horizon (100-200nm back) strike effects in support of a UK/allied beachhead or assembly area. CVF is even designed with assault routes to the flight deck to allow it to balance tacair/amphib deployment so, for more limited threat scenarios, we send CVF with a fleshed out NSW to perhaps 18 cabs, plus an Apache det, plus half a dozen Chinny’s and a short battalion of airmobile light infantry. The term used was ‘golf-bag’ capability as it can take along air/land elements and do the job of a CVA plus LPH at the same time. If we need to attrite modest theatre denial assets ashore thats done with F-35B/Storm Shadow and Sub-TLAM from beyond entry-denial ranges.
UK force mix is then CVF, an Albion with her LCU’s and a Bay or two with Mexies plus escort. CVF is surging 60 sorties a day for the first 72hrs supported by TLAM then, once safer to move inshore closes to just-OTH to support up to brigade strength landing force and the establishment of a beach- and air-head as applicable. Some component of the fastjet force could detach to forward shore basing, if such facilities exist and can be A400M supportable, to allow for the carrier deck to be freed up.
The 60k ton size is all about adaptability. If there is a higher threat level, and theatre entry will require more work to achieve, the ship goes to full CVA mode and embarks 30+ fighters to get, with the JCA KPP’d 3 sortie surge rate, 100 sorties per day at minimum. If STOVL failed the ships remain sized properly to be adapted for CATOBAR and still generate somewhere near the same capability. The size then, far from being an extravagance, is a key enabler for operational flexibility and relevance.
Cause if I want cost effective land attack capability I build some light commercial hull UAV carrier to provide ISR for sub-launched (or cargo aircraft launched) cruise missiles.
As per the earlier element in the discussion regarding the Guardian/Mariner type UAV’s why build and crew seperate hulls for this?. Why not put a multimode air/surface search set on the UAV….even better with SAR spot imaging capability….as well as the usual optronics and use that off the big deck carrier as well. The deck and hangar space is there regardless and you offset the rotary-AEW limits on carrier battlespace awareness in the same solution?.
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