Have you ever lived in an MQ.? You’ll soon change your mind if you did.

…and because everyones experiences of MQ’s aren’t guaranteed to be wonderful and the quality of some housing is poor that wipes out the core value of the shared support environment that so many are genuinely scared to lose does it?.

The consumate beancounters view that isnt it?. This is not a numbers issue this is a moral issue. This is an issue of the contempt MoD is showing to some of its most experienced servicemen. This is an issue of service families being genuinely scared about being divorced from the wider unit community. No great shock that a civil servant misses the point though is it?.

Mods this is going to get unpleasant if it continues. My point on the thread was solely to bring attention of this, and the petition, to those who may also be close to the issue. That purpose is now served please feel free to lock this at your earliest convenience.

Tornado,

Sadly its precisely that misconception which seems to be at the heart of this issue. MQ’s are far, far more than just housing and those making the decisions haven’t taken the time or effort to comprehend that….a fact that is disgusting in itself.

Having loved ones on deployment is not, and never has been, ‘like any other job’ as you put it. Even in peacetime service personnel go on deployment and never come home. Undervalued as the NHS nurse is we dont lose that many to training accidents. The case for MQ’s is reinforced every time you hear of a serviceman lost leaving a family behind.

Anyway my point in writing is to report that the petition, after just a few days, has crossed the 1000 signatory mark and is going well. I’d just like to pass on a genuine thanks to all those who have taken the time to contribute to that number here.

HK

1. Soryus aren’t cheap at 10 billion yen a pop ($1.25 b).

Agreed, but, they do represent a de-risked design. It is far more likely that a project based off the Soryu hull will deliver the boats on schedule, to requirement and with the least cost growth than any of the other non-nuclear options.

4. If any of the above turn out to be concerns, would an SSK-derivative of Barracuda be a viable, lower-risk alternative? Wondering whether this would be a straightforward mod… “simply” scale-up Scorpene’s propulsion modules and plug them into the same engine room dimensions…

Quite the question indeed!. As you note there would be nothing simple about pulling the reactor section and replacing it with AIP and conventional propulsion units. Fuel tankage and trimming requirements could easily be headache inducing. If it was going to be Barracuda I think the wiser course would be to buy as is…if France would sell reactor tech?. Could be quite lucrative setting up a support infrastructure in country and French industry, generally, have a good rep for supporting their kit….albeit at a price!.

In conventional terms I was, rather, considering the new Brazillian work under way to design hull only plus space left for their indigenous reactor though. Its not inconceivable that, at such an early phase, a second spinoff design track could be started with those engineering spaces filled in with MESMA etc and with the appropriate changes necessary to support the Aussie RFI?. Has anything of substance broken cover about the nature of the work being done with Brazil yet?.

The point is Fed that scaling up a design, that was built to someone elses requirement, leads to a first-of-class situation and all the same kinds of problems that have followed the Collins boats all through their lives.

You have to change so much in the process you actually pull-through so little from the original hull that its scant difference from starting with a clean piece of paper. Starting fresh also avoids the temptation to try and pull through bits from the earlier design that lead to knock on probems with the new unit. See the Collins hydrodynamics issues and flow interaction with the screw for illustration.

Against that you have a mature design which is, fundamentally, already fit for purpose. Making detail changes to fit with specifc RAN requirements becomes a very much simpler job as you’ll know what works from looking at the boats in operational service. You want to change the engines….fine….you compare weight, dimensions and power output. Provided all stay very close to what the Japanese boats have you know that your on a winner. Likewise sensors, likewise power generation…you know you dont have to worry about needing to find extra power for enhanced HVAC (over what a Scandinavian design would need etc) as the boat is optimised for warmer waters and higher HVAC loading….etc…etc.

I had tongue slightly in cheek when I suggested earlier that the RAN dump a pile of cash on the Japanese and see how many boats they get for the money. There would, naturally, be some greater or lesser ‘Australianisation’ of the design required but the license build of the Japanese design would be dramatically less risky than any other SSK solution that I can think of.

Get this into your mindsets:- the ADF will NOT buy Japanese. Japan wont ecport its military technology. We can buy/creatre better anyway.

When there is only one, current, builder of large bluewater patrol SSK’s, and they build for the same operational waters your forces will operate in, who’s yard is out there who you believe is better suited to design/build an SSK for the RAN?

Looks pretty damning if true!

Some points are expected but never could imagine that Typhoon’s fabled MMI and EW are actually its weak points.:eek:

That is quite the point though Ray…the MMI-related pilot workload evaluation, according to the stats in the survey, rated Typhoon higher than Rafale…along with aircraft performance. So the better performing, easier to fly, airframe came second going by this data. Curious!

I know what you are saying Mercurius….and I cant disagree that to some extent I’m pishing to windward, but, an occaisional prod to those who may not have considered how their words can contribute to a potential opponents intelligence generation capability can only be a good thing in my mind. Its a well known fact that open source material is hoovered from the general media by virtually every gathering outfit out there and that small pieces gathered hither and yon can often build into a more illuminating picture than would be desireable.

Your examples are case in point. People who were unwittingly providing realtime BDA for the other side….there have been numerous other similar instances. Naturally that door swings both ways though no more will be said about it of course.

This case is, naturally, less immediate and stark in its impact but, I’m certain purely innocently, the OP here has given an indication of when UK Govt developed enough information to issue orders on a, hitherto, unpublished event to +/- 72hrs(ish) of the action and, in his second post, indicated when we had developed enough information to know we could stand down troops!.

Now, if that information required intel sources to develop, someone could take the OP’s posts and determine that we have a capability in place against them and get a vague grip on our response time. At very least whoever the opposition was may be a bit more stringent in his own OpSec next time!. Nothing helpful you’d agree!.

The TAKR fit Gorshkovs concept of localised forward sea denial and, had a Red Banner fleet task group been able to get through the GIUK choke and break out into the Atlantic, it would have caused fits for CINCLANT. The eventual outcome couldnt be disputed…it would only be a matter of time until depletion of SAM and ASW weapons or cumulative damaged/broke-down systems rendered the task group defences inadequate to meet an attack, but, the allocation forces needed to wear down those defences would jave been considerable. Certainly a full strength USN CVBG plus a number of, more competent, NATO SSN’s. Forces that would definitely have more productive taskings waiting than bashing up against heavy SAM defences and active sonar barriers in the mid-Atlantic.

If you have the same strategic requirement and, as Distiller notes, lack the ability to engage in fleet on fleet carrier manoever warfare, through inadequate assets or insufficient experience etc. its still a viable doctrine. Establishing a defended ‘bubble’ of sea/airspace…one that an opponent would have to reduce or see his fleet train threatened is definitely one way to defend your coast preserving strategic depth. In that scenario a 45k ton hull with flag C3I, powerful radar/area missile combo and massive local-area and point air/ASW defences with a tailored air group mixing a Yak-141/F35B style fastjet, MALE UAV and medium ASW choppers could still be an asset.

The cost/complexity of the hull would likely be more than enough to build a specialised pure-aviation unit though. Something like the circa 45k medium CVA speculated about for Brazil…an altogether more flexible and future-proof asset.