SOC
How old is a F-117 and how old is a Rafale and the sawtooth is only used on the F-117 canopy.
Baffels limit your max speed and you forget Frenzl’s Area Rule and Wolfgang Haack’s Supersonic Area Rule. You can’t insert baffels in a straight intake duct without produce excessive wavedrag.
Knowing what to “look for” wasn’t meant to be taken completely literally.
And when you not know for what you have to look for?
We see, you overlook the canopy treatment.
You can’t see RAM (Unless it is subsequently attached patchwork), you can’t see RAS and you can’t see (FSS) Frequency Selective Surfaces.
You have also not only an inbuild “eyemeter”, but even the X-ray view!

O-Ton Dassault
Longitudinal stability is moderately negative with a full fly-by-wire
digital control system. The system is quadruple redundant with three
digital channels and one separately designed analog channel.

TMOR so much to a MAC =- 45%!

Aturo
The vertical fin was made of electromagnetic (EM)-
transparent composites. The RAMs initially used caused the black color
of the Rafale C prototype,prototype, but special EM-transparent paints
were later developed so the aircraft could receive
any color scheme.

This should act as Jaumann absorber. Whow WWII stealht technology.
No wonder that used sawtooth, that is ~1958 technology ;

It is very difficult to assess the Rafale’s RCS due to the high
level of classification, but sources have unofficially said that Rafale
has a much lower RCS than the Typhoon, a fighter of roughly the same size.

He also know someone who knows someone.

TMOR
I twist not the fact.
With this sawtooth fixed Dassault RCS deficits!
Why has the Raptor, F-35, Typhoon and the F-117 (except onthe canopy) not this visible re-entrant triangles? Maybe the better RAM, RAS, FSS?
Or EADS and BAE has just more experience in this fild as Dassault?
Or BAE and EADS has the better RCS facilities?
http://www.eads.net/1024/en/businet/defence/mas/technologies/aircraft_systems/stealth.html

EADS Stealth Experience
Messerschmitt-Bölkow-Blohm Lampyridae

In 1987, a year before the Reagan administration revealed the existence
of the F-117A, a fact-finding group of US Air Force officers was taken
to a closed-off section of Messerschmitt-Bölkow-Blohm’s (MBB’s) plant at
Ottobrunn in Bavaria and shown a three-quarter-scale wind-tunnel model
of an aircraft that MBB had been developing under the tightest secrecy
since 1981.

According to high-level Luftwaffe sources, the Americans were startled
by what they saw: a stealth aircraft, dubbed the Medium Range Missile
Fighter or Lampyridae (Firefly), whose core design principle – deriving
an efficient aerodynamic shape out of an arrangement of radar-deflecting
flat panels or ‘facets’ – mirrored the technique employed on the then
top secret F-117A. The demonstrator was subsequently tested in a series
of tethered flights in a wind-tunnel complex owned jointly by the German
and Netherlands governments.

Shortly after the visit of the USAF delegation to Ottobrunn, under a
directive that has never been adequately explained, the German
government cancelled Lampyridae, even though all tests on the
wind-tunnel model, which was big enough to accommodate a pilot, showed
that the design was highly effective. So effective, in fact, that MBB
was convinced that it was poised to receive an order from Bonn to
develop the Lampyridae into the world’s first air-to-air stealth
interceptor. When the Lampyridae’s existence was finally acknowledged in
1995, a number of German engineers who had worked on the programme began
making the allegation that the cancellation order had been issued as a
direct result of US pressure on the German government to drop the
programme. The implication being that the USA was determined to keep the
breakthrough science of stealth in US hands.

Senior engineers at the Military Aircraft division of the EADS company
at Ottobrunn – the successor organisation to the fighter design side of
MBB – are able to be more philosophical than their forebears about the
Lampyridae saga. “Everyone makes a secret of it, but Maxwell’s equations
have been around for more than a hundred years,” says Dr Peter Brecher,
vice president for technology management at EADS Military Aircraft.

Operational research in the mid-to-late 1970s showed that the Warsaw
Pact’s air defences were so dense along Germany’s borders that the
Luftwaffe would suffer unacceptably heavy attrition losses should NATO
have to fight a high-intensity war. To alleviate these attrition rates,
German technicians were forced to address the issue of detection ranges
by Soviet air defence radars and interceptors. That, in turn, led them
to look again at the equations of the 19th century physicist James Clerk
Maxwell, whose computations on the transmission, absorption and
reflection properties of electromagnetic waves are the underpinnings of
radar development – and of stealth.

It was this same analytical process that led to the development of the
F-117A in the USA, demonstrating that the parallel appearance of
Lampyridae in Germany was not as coincidental – or as sinister – as the
US fact-finding mission supposed. “The principles are well known through
Maxwell, it’s the fine-tuning of those principles that is sensitive,”
says Dr Brecher. “What makes me confident is that in Germany we have had
a quarter century of permanent research into stealth.” The point is,
stealth outside the USA is a reality – and has been for at least 25 years.

In Germany, stealth activity continued after the cancellation of the
Lampyridae. In the mid-1990s, DaimlerChrysler Aerospace (DASA), MBB’s
successor company, commenced work on a new stealth programme called the
Technology Demonstrator for Enhancement and Future Systems (TDEFS).

The TDEFS was proposed as a European stealth technology demonstrator
with both manned and unmanned variants. Like Lampyridae, TDEFS was ready
for development, but the program collapsed due to a lack of money and
interest from Europe’s other main combat aircraft companies, which were
engaged in their own stealth activities.

With major LO development facilities at Manching in Bavaria and Bremen,
DASA continued its development of stealth shaping techniques and radar
absorbent material (RAM). Today, the Signature Technology Department in
Bremen is charged with the development of stealth technologies for the
whole of EADS’ Military Aircraft. The unit is responsible for stealth
concepts, for the camouflaging of components and objects, for signature
measurement, calculation and verification, and the development of RAM.
There are two indoor RCS measuring facilities at Bremen, used for
analysing objects up to 5m in size and one tonne in weight. A third
facility is operated jointly with STN Atlas Elektronik. In addition, a
new outdoor RCS range has recently opened at Manching where the radar
returns of full-size aircraft up to 45 tonnes can be measured.

Nick Cook& Bill Sweetman, “Hidden Agenda.” Jane’s Defence Weekly. 15
June 2001.

Aviation Week
EADS Eyes a Jump in Stealth Capability
10/02/2005
By Robert Wall
STEPPED-UP STEALTH
Unmanned aircraft projects are emerging as the main drivers for European
low-observable technology investment.
As part of this trend, EADS is completing work on a radar measurement
facility that should allow it to boost the stealth characteristics of
future systems. Research also is ongoing to improve aircraft visual
signatures.
The company’s focus is not just on UAVs, though. For example,
researchers have applied radar-absorbing material to a single Tornado
strike aircraft to reduce its radar cross section (RCS). The treatment
has been affixed selectively to areas that provide radar return spikes.
The goal was not to turn a Tornado into a stealth aircraft, but to
reduce the RCS enough to improve the effectiveness of its towed-decoy.
Developers here believe spending money on the selective use of the
technology will be a cheaper way to make Tornados more survivable than
fitting the aircraft with a higher power decoy.
A 10-dBsm. signature improvement can be generated with these techniques
at the cost of about 80 kg. (176 lb.) of additional weight, developers
suggest.
Other aircraft could similarly benefit from this approach, with the
Eurofighter Typhoon a likely candidate. EADS has a half-scale model of
the fighter to conduct detailed signature analysis and identify possible
radar energy scatter points that could be treated.
But the more far-reaching improvements in stealth technology are being
envisioned for unmanned aircraft. EADS’s German unit already is building
a classified stealth UAV for the German military, called Barrakuda
(AW&ST Mar. 21, p. 26). This is only one of a large number of classified
and unclassified unmanned aircraft programs the country has on the
agenda.
The next acknowledged step will likely be the Unmanned Reconnaissance
Air Vehicle (URAV), a demonstration program being discussed by EADS and
the German government. The effort would likely run from 2005-10, says
Peter Gutsmiedl, EADS military aircraft senior vice president for
programs. A full-fledged unmanned combat air vehicle (UCAV) project
isn’t expected to emerge until 2020-25, he adds.
The German program is being undertaken with an eye on meeting future air
force and navy tactical reconnaissance requirements, including
replacement of the Cl-289 fast drone and the Tornado’s tactical recce
system. The type of sensor with which the URAV would be equipped hasn’t
been determined, but it would likely use several as part of the
technology evaluation process. The URAV would be a modular system,
Gutsmiedl says, to allow changing out of various elements.
Work on future UCAVs would be supported by the new signature measurement
facility that EADS is building at Lemwerder, north of Bremen. The
building can accommodate vehicles sized up to 12 meters (39 ft.) and is
to be completed in November. Initially, it will support vehicles
weighing up to 2,250 kg. (4.950 lb.), although that should grow to 5,000
kg., says Jurgen Kruse, an EADS signature technology expert.
The 48 X 31 X 15-meter facility will include an adjustable height
antenna up to 13 meters to take different measurements, as well as walls
within walls to ensure that wind doesn’t cause wall warping, distorting
signature assessments. Measurements will range from 0.5-100 GHz.
The new site is deemed critical to achieving a step-change in aircraft
signatures, with a target of reaching a level on the order of 10-3 sq.
meter from the current 10-2 sq. meter. Developers hope to beat the
F/A-22’s performance by 10 dB on future systems.
Lower observability can be achieved on
unmanned aircraft, because they don’t have to accommodate a canopy;
keeping the radar reflectivity low where the fuselage and canopy
interface has proven difficult for designers.
The new RCS facility, while designed largely for work in Germany, will
be made available to others on a contractual basis. Kruse notes that to
keep personnel costs down and be competitive with similar facilities in
the U.K. and U.S., the site will rely heavily on automation.
Additionally, EADS is working on a government contract to devise
“tunable” optical signatures. Aircraft are often too dark and stand out;
by illuminating the surface, the aircraft brightness can be adapted to
the sky to blend in. The project essentially tries to adapt modern
flat-screen TV technology to aircraft skins. A demonstration of the
technology is to begin in the near future. Developers believe the power
requirements for such subsystems and their weight are now small enough
for airborne use.
EADS IS PURSUING both the near-term efforts on current aircraft and UCAV
thrust because “we have to think in terms of products that contribute to
our business while not forgetting about our future,” adds Gutsmiedl.
EADS foresees military users fielding a variety of unmanned aircraft
with different survivability levels–high-end, extremely stealthy
systems with visual, infrared and radar reductions and advanced sensors,
alongside more affordable, “less decked out” UCAVs.
Some of these efforts are also underway in other countries. Russia, for
example, is believed to have the know-how to selectively add stealth
material to its combat aircraft, and it may be exporting that
capability. One concern out of this development would be that when
allied aircraft encounter a treated fighter, its signature return would
no longer match threat databases, making target identification more
difficult.

Apologies if my commenting offends or irritates anyone, but:

As a general rule, no. But as a professional who knows what to look for, the Rafale has had more LO attention paid to it than the EF-2000. That’ll be it from me on this topic in this thread, I’ve nearly driven it right off topic completely as it is.

Then you are an amateur?

Where the EF-2000 demonstrates a lack of low-RCS design, off the top of my head:
-trailing edge control surfaces hinged at 90 degrees to the centerline
Wrong! See picture
-single, large vertical tail
No greater as Rafale, greater swep angle and irrelevant because the counterpart is missing for reflection! It is by both practically invisible for the Radar. No Diherdral Reflector!!!!!
-apparently untreated canopy
Wrong,
http://www.sae.org/aeromag/techupdate_6-00/04.htm
It added that production canopies will have low-observable coatings applied, using proprietary manufacturing technology and processes developed by ACT, which screen electronic emissions generated in the cockpit.
http://www.manufacturingtalk.com/news/hca/hca103.html The company has developed a patented tungsten carbide surface engineering technology which combines abrasion, erosion, friction and chemical resistant properties in one coating.The coating is now approved for use in the production of the Typhoon canopy.
-vertical intake lips placed at 90 degrees to the centerline
and entirely RAM-coated, sweped and rounded!

It is by both practically invisible for the Radar. No Diherdral Reflector!!!!!
-corner reflector created in the intake at the lower left and lower right corner
No 90°! See picture.

The EF-2000 constantly uses pylon-mounted stores as well, particularly the AIM-9.

The Rafale + 5 pylon-mounted Micas on the center airframe

EF-2000 has canards that are angled as well, but that actually helps the RCS from some aspects. Not sure what you’re going for there. And I’d disagree with Richardson. That book is relatively old (I have a copy as well) as well and may be inaccurate as a result.

The Rafale canard has less has a lower efficiency (smaller lever arm), and must therefore more angled for the same effectiveness. Therfore greater RCS!

Nevertheless, Richardson has more know how as you we now know!

But only in direct line of sight and the earth is not flat!
The signal to be radiated is delivered through an electronic phase shifter giving a continuous phase shift now, the beam direction will be electronically adjustable. However, this cannot be extended unlimitedly and the effective surface of the antenna decreases with increasing phaseshift.;)The highest value, which can be achieved for the Field of View (FOV) of a phased array antenna is 120° (60° left and 60° right).

The gain of a phased-array antenna deteriorates into dependence of the angle of the irradiation (Θs)!

Our F-22 at 60000 feet 😉 has a detection range:
Against a 3.3 m2 fighter of 200 km (AFM page 44, March 2006)
Janes has 1 m2 at 200 km (different interpretation of ‘small fighter’?)
17 March 2000 AW&ST has:
190 km in LPI mode
260 km in ‘non-stealthy mode’

An Exocet/Harpoon class missile is rated as 0.1m2, taking the worst case scenario of 200 km vs 3.3 m2:
(0.1/3.3)^0.25 results in standardish cruise missile being detected at 83 km (even if its 1 m2 at 200 km this results in 112 km)

Against other ‘typical’ targets (RCS will vary) using 3.3m2 value as standard:

100 m2 B-52: 470 km
25 m2 F-4, A-10: 330 km
10 m2 B-1B: 260 km
5 m2 generic fighter: 220 km
3 m2 MiG-21: 180 km
1.2 m2 F-16C/18C: 155 km
0.25-0.75 m2 Eurofighter/Rafale/F-18E: 105-140 km
0.005 m2 F-35 (Golf Ball sized): 40 km
0.0001 m2 F-117, B-2, F-22 (marble sized): 15 km

When you fly a cobra without this, then have you a ~50:50 chance for a collision. Whitout this he would ram maybe his wingman. He rolls alwas away from his wingman. A pure safety precaution.

The Saab J-35 Draken can do it… Think that was a bit before either the Flanker or the Fulcrum. :diablo:

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Hax3rhqGJcQ

Courtesy of Signatory

This video was recorded in the 70is and already back then the J35 could do the cobra.

While I remember that in damage scenarios, especially for fighters with closely mounted engines, the second engine normally goes with the first. More annoying would be loss of aircraft due to bird strike or other engine failures, I mean even with GOP-administration the average US Navy fighter will not constantly be at war and under fire, but will do training mission after training mission.

Looks here somewhat differently.